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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction  
2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
―…the time has come to make changes which will tip the balance firmly in favour of 
collective insolvency proceedings—proceedings in which all creditors participate, under 
which a duty is owed to all creditors and in which all creditors may look to an office 
holder for an account of his dealings with the company’s assets.‖ 1 
 
Recent years have witnessed a phenomenal increase in the frequency of corporate 
bankruptcies. The vulnerabilities which were lying dormant within contemporary 
bankruptcy regimes suddenly became apparent
2
, causing concerns within the international 
corporate community. Ever since, industrial economies have demonstrated a rising interest 
in bankruptcy research fueled with the objectives of reforming their legal framework for 
the proliferation of an adequate and efficient bankruptcy regime to mitigate the existing 
flaws within the system. Consequently, corporate bankruptcy has emerged as a captivating 
subject of interest for academics as well as the corporate world and governmental policy 
makers.  
 
The need for efficient procedures becomes imperative as bankruptcy does not only affect 
the debtor‘s company but causes severe damage to a lot of people directly (creditors, 
employees, shareholders) or indirectly (society, town, country) associated with it.
3
 Soon 
after the East Asian crisis of 1997, international community and World Bank got 
concerned about the inefficiencies of bankruptcy laws in many countries
4
. Consequently, it 
set out a series of principles to provide benchmarks for examining the effectiveness and 
adequacy of bankruptcy laws under a wide range of jurisdictions further categorized into 
                                                 
1
 Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency—A Second Chance Cm 5234 (London: HMSO, 2001), para.2.5. 
2
 In 2001, Enron appealed for protection under bankruptcy laws of US which also turned out to be the biggest bankruptcy filing and 
corporate fraud of that era. This brought out the vulnerabilites of the coprporate practices prevalent at that time and also inspired the 
creation of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 which lays down specific mandates and requirements for financial reporting. This bill was 
enacted as a reaction to a number of major corporate (Tyco International, Adelphia, Peregrine Systems and WorldCom) and accounting 
malpractices 
3
 The bankruptcies of chained small sized enterprises can result in a ―domino effect‖ where the trade suppliers can fall into the realms 
of insolvency due to the failure of closely associated enterprise. 
4 See., B Eichengreen, Toward a New International Financial Architecture: A Practical Post Asia Agenda, (Institute for International 
Economics Washington, D.C. 1999), p28-30. 
3 
 
different legal orientations. In terms of formal rescue proceedings, the principles designed 
by the World Bank stipulate that: 
 
―The system should promote quick and easy access to the proceedings, assure timely and 
efficient administration of the proceedings, afford sufficient protection for all those 
involved in the proceedings, provide a structure that encourages fair negotiation of a 
commercial plan, and provides for approval of the plan by an appropriate majority of 
creditors.‖5 
 
These principles are in coherence with the legislative guidelines on insolvency law set by 
UNICTRAL.
6
 However, these principles merely provide a framework and 
recommendations. However, it should be kept in mind that the ‗one size fits all‘ approach 
cannot be considered appropriate for countries belonging to different jurisdictions.
7
  
 
Since the World War II, almost ninety countries have reformed their bankruptcy laws and 
half of them have done it in the last decade. The success of these reforms depends on the 
design of its bankruptcy code and how successfully it has been implemented in a given 
country.
8
 Most of the reforms were constituted with the aim of maximizing the value of 
the firm. Economic growth requires that old and obsolete activities should be phased out 
and room for new ones should be made, so that the economic resources are reallocated 
from activities that are no longer profitable to the more productive ones
9
 and thereby 
resulting in overall growth of the economy.
 
Joseph Schumpeter was one of the first 
economists, who considered failure as the key component of economic analysis. 
According to him, ―economic growth results from a creative destruction process  where 
obsolescent companies go bankrupt replaced by companies whose founders have designed 
new products corresponding to consumers tastes,‖ (Schumpeter, 1912). Here bankruptcy 
                                                 
5 The World Bank, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, 
2004, p217-230. 
6 
For more details, see UNCITRAL, above n.3, p209. 
7
 K Gromek Broc and R Parry (eds), Corporate Rescue: An Overview of Recent Developments from Selected Countries (2nd edition, 
Kluwer Law International, 2006), p7. 
8
 Claessens, S., et al., 2001; Franks and Loranth, 2005; Hart, 2000 and World Bank, 2004, 2005, 2006 
9 
By allowing efficient firms to continue and eliminating inefficient firms (White, 1989) 
4 
 
is seen as a creative process, which helps an economy in getting rid of obsolete activities 
and in the process fosters economic growth.  
 
In recent times, almost every country of the world seems to have incorporated at least two 
basic formal processes for dealing with corporate debt recovery: Liquidation and 
Reorganization. Liquidation is primarily aimed at termination of inefficient firms while 
reorganization is concerned with ameliorating the financial distress situation of efficient 
firms and supporting their revival. Besides formal procedures of resolving distress, there 
are private workouts also which have registered very high success rates in some 
economies (Hoshi, Kashyap and Schwarstein, 1990). In the midst of all these prevalent 
procedures, it is inherent to comprehend that under legislation, the notion of efficacy may 
differ. Some countries focus on the rights of creditors (hard laws) enabling quick 
liquidations while others give freedom to the debtors (soft laws) to continue management 
of business even after default and stress on the need for continuation in order to keep 
employment intact and preservation of social objectives. Whatever be the orientation of 
law (creditor friendly or debtor friendly), a good insolvency regime should be able to 
delicately balance between the rights of creditors and the debtors. By providing automatic 
stay on the assets, it provides breathing space to the debtors to rethink their strategy and 
formulate a rescue plan and at the same time it should provide voting rights to the creditors 
for approving the plan.  
 
Governance of firms also varies with the orientation of law. In a debtor friendly country, 
management retains control of business while in a creditor-friendly country management 
is replaced by an insolvency practitioner. Whereas, in some countries management is 
retained but it is closely supervised by court appointed officials. Lastly, the rights of 
unsecured creditors (trade suppliers of raw materials, goods and services) are poorly 
protected in almost all the countries. They hardly receive anything out of bankruptcy even 
though their contribution is necessary for the efficient functioning of the firm. Thus, we 
can see how the orientation of law can affect the lives of the stakeholders.  
 
5 
 
The growing literature in law and finance
10
 has investigated the differences between legal 
origins especially the difference between common law and civil law and their impact on 
economic performance. Their studies established the supremacy of common law countries 
over civil law countries by analyzing the set of creditor rights in bankruptcy proceedings 
across a cross country comparison
11
. According to these studies, it was established that 
creditors‘ rights are best protected in countries representing common law and are worst 
protected in countries representing civil law especially French civil law system. Indeed, 
common law countries were seen to provide best and the most efficient bankruptcy laws. 
But, these studies have often restricted themselves to a weak description of bankruptcy 
laws: either through a basic opposition between ―creditor friendly‖ and ―debtor friendly‖ 
approaches or with a non comprehensive computation of very few indexes (four in LLSV 
and Doing Business Report, World Bank), which is clearly insufficient given the 
complexity of individual legislations and also the number of rival procedures existent in 
each given country. However, these approaches did not consider the dynamics of 
bankruptcy laws in each country and were rather restricted to a biased and incomplete 
view.  
 
This thesis is formulated upon a thorough exploration of bankruptcy laws of two major 
European countries, UK and France, which are representatives of the two main legal 
systems prevailing in Europe: Common Law and Civil Law. The key objective is to 
identify the factors (legal) that facilitate in increasing efficiency of bankruptcy procedures 
in both countries. As rightly marked by Finch (2002), ―the main objective of a rescue 
regime is not only to satisfy the interests of the stakeholders but also maximize the 
economic life of the community and provide social stability‖. 
 
1.2. Research Objectives and the Reason Why We Chose UK and France? 
 
Europe is often identified by bankruptcy laws which favour creditors more than the 
debtors. It was especially true for the countries like UK, Netherlands and Germany (Wood, 
                                                 
10
 The law and finance theory can be traced back to two seminal and widely cited paper by LaPorta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998, 1999, henceforth LLSV). 
11
 See., LLSV, Davydenko and Franks, 2007, Classens and Klapper, 2005; Djankov et al, 2008 
6 
 
1995). It was only recently that many countries (UK, Germany, France, Spain, 
Netherlands...) in Europe reformed their bankruptcy laws making them slightly more 
inclined towards debtors. The main aim behind such reforms was to promote a culture of 
corporate rescue and enable the firms to survive bankruptcies. In this dissertation, we 
focus our attention on France and the United-Kingdom, two countries which represent the 
two major legal systems prevailing in Europe: Common Law and Civil Law. These 
systems are believed to be in total contrast with one another with respect to their 
approaches towards distress resolution 
 
We investigate the theoretical, practical and legal perspectives of insolvency regimes 
prevalent in these two countries. The main objective of the dissertation is to study the two 
countries in detail and present the factors that can determine the choice of favouring a 
particular bankruptcy procedure within a given country and the legal determinants for 
increasing efficiency (recovery rate) in both the countries. We also aim to identify 
similarities and differences between the French and English legislations (bankruptcy) and 
to explore and highlight the underlying factors specific to each regime while at the same 
time examining the shortcomings and flaws so that in future it could be structured 
adequately and can become a pioneer for other developing countries looking for reforming 
their bankruptcy laws. 
 
The widespread acceptance of their (UK and France) legal system in other jurisdictions 
makes them undoubtedly an optimum object for research. France is characterized by a 
highly debtor oriented system where debtor rights are given precedence over creditor 
rights and social objectives ranked higher than financial goals. The primary objective of 
such a regime is to promote continuation
12
 and preserve employment. 
   
France is identified as the only country which exhibits significant similarities to Chapter 
11 of US bankruptcy code. France provides strong protection to its businesses and 
                                                 
12
 Yet, this trend does not mean the number of continuations is getting higher, compared to liquidations. On the contrary, in UK, 
Germany, and France, bankruptcy procedures end up with liquidation in more than 90% of cases. However, the quite recent change in 
the objectives of national laws means the institutional environment of default is evolving, which may finally affect the strategies, taking 
place in or out bankruptcy. 
7 
 
explicitly states it in its objectives. It aims for continuation of operations and preserving 
employment. It provides an automatic stay on all creditor actions and also provides 
superpriority status to post petition financing. French bankruptcy system provides strong 
protection to distressed businesses through its formal reorganization procedure, 
―redressement judiciaire‖. For over twenty years, since the act of 1985, the focus of 
reforms has increasingly been on the avoidance of corporate failures and promotion of 
continuations. Additionally, in France, the decision making power is mainly in the hands 
of the judiciary: there is no voting procedure or veto power for stakeholders. The 
commercial court has genuine enforcement power during the collective process and is 
responsible for the adoption of reorganization plan which is in total contrast to many other 
European countries (see the Finish case studied by Bergtröm, Eisenberg, and Sundgren 
(2004)). In addition, French legislation offers the stakeholders a specific procedure 
dedicated to sales as a going concern and as an alternative way of continuing activity.
13
 
Lastly, the French bankruptcy law has inspired numerous countries in Europe (Belgium, 
Luxembourg) and in developing countries (Africa) so it will interesting to study the 
features of a country, whose legislation has been a source of inspiration for  other 
legislations.  
 
UK provides a good opportunity for studying bankruptcy laws. It is often referred to as the 
country best for creditors as it protects the interests of its creditors. In addition, UK was 
among the first countries to incorporate rescue mechanisms (administrations and CVA) in 
its insolvency system. While most of the countries offer a single formal rescue 
mechanism
14
, UK provides a menu of rescue procedures. For instance, small sized 
companies facing imminent financial problems can seek protection under CVA.
15
 Schemes 
of arrangement under Part 26 of the Companies Act have proved beneficial for the 
rehabilitation of large public companies.
16
 In addition, all financially distressed firms can 
                                                 
13
 Since 2006, the sale as a going concern is viewed as a liquidation procedure. However, in our view, sales protect more employment 
than pure liquidations, as a part of the job positions is preserved through sales. 
14 
Such as the US Chapter 11, the Australian Part 5.3 A of the Corporations Law and the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act 1992 
15 NR Pandit, GA Cook, D Milman and FC Chittenden, ―Corporate rescue: Empirical evidence on company voluntary arrangements 
and small firms‖ (2000) 7 Journal of Small Business and Enterprise Development 241; especially after the Insolvency Act 2000 that 
provides small firms temporary moratorium. 
16 J Townsend, ―Schemes of Arrangement and the Asbestos Litigation: In Re Cape Plc‖ (2007) 70 MLR 837. 
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file petition for the initiation of the administration procedure irrespective of their size. This 
provides them with a chance for restructuring and revival
17
.  
 
Over the past few years, UK legislation has been exhibiting a rising inclination towards 
the creditors. With the Enterprise Act of 2002, receivership (a mechanism where secured 
creditors benefitted the most out of their exclusive rights and positioning) was abolished. 
Reforms were made to increase the likelihood of continuation and to provide level playing 
field to all the creditors including the unsecured ones.  
 
Presence of hybrid features (creditor friendly and rescue mechanisms) makes UK a very 
interesting country for research. It is often seen as the pioneer in the field of efficiency of 
bankruptcy laws and thus can serve as a benchmark for those countries adopting or 
reforming their bankruptcy laws
18
. 
 
In the preceding text, we disseminated the legal specificities of both the countries (UK and 
France). Now, we elucidate on the primary reasons as to why these two countries have 
gained such international exposure within the framework of bankruptcy research. These 
countries are regularly assessed internationally by the World Bank and other esteemed 
institutions. Besides, they interest the academics from all over the World who are 
interested in cross country comparisons on the basis of different legal orientations. La 
Porta et al. (1998) studied the creditor rights across various countries; they obtain a score 
of 0 for France, 3 for Germany and 4 the best for UK. The Doing Business Report (2010) 
places UK in the 9th percentile in its closing of business report. This is a very high ranking 
if compared to countries like Germany and France which are placed in 35
th
 and 42
nd
 
quartile respectively.  
 
Now the questions that the academics should address are: how can we explain the 
differences between the rankings of the two countries (UK and France)? Are these 
                                                 
17 For more details about administration regime, see R Mokal, Corporate Insolvency Law: Theory and Application (OUP, Oxford, 
2005), p225. 
18
 South Africa, Italy, Australia, Hong Kong (China), New Zealand and so on. For more details, see the P Lewis, ―Corporate Rescue 
Law in the United States‖, in K Gromek Broc and R Parry (eds), Corporate Rescue: An Overview of Recent Developments from 
Selected countries (2nd edition, Kluwer Law International, 2006) 
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differences relevant and realistic or do we need to explore and conduct more detailed 
empirical studies to answer following questions: 1) to find the reasons for such major 
differences in rankings and 2) Are the rankings misleading? 
 
1.3. Our Research Methodology and How Are the Aims Being Achieved?  
 
The thesis has been conducted upon two unique and primary databases manually collected 
through courts and various reliable sources (governmental and non-governmental offices). 
This is the major strength of this thesis. With such databases, we built individual statistics 
on the corporate bankruptcy process for two major European countries (France and United 
Kingdom). To the best of our knowledge, the UK database has no equivalence and we are 
the pioneers of including real world data on liquidations
19
 in our research database. For 
both countries, the collected data deals with the causes of financial default, the recovery 
rates of creditors, the process of decision making at the time of default, the efficiency of 
such decisions, etc. Such research project helps in distinguishing the origins of corporate 
financial default and in distinguishing whether they are independent of the national 
bankruptcy code or not. 
 
Additionally, we were actively involved in constructing new legal indexes for corporate 
bankruptcy law in France and UK. And it is notable that we succeeded in computing
20
 the 
most comprehensive legal indexes till date. These legal indexes consist of more than 300 
questions that explain the particular function of bankruptcy. In order to empirically test the 
effect of legal environment on economic behaviors and financial outcomes, we consider 
these indexes as explanatory variables of the variables
21
 that were hand collected in France 
and UK. This makes this thesis unique as it is composed of original sources of 
information. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Liquidations constitute more than 85% of bankruptcies in UK, see Insolvency service website, UK. 
20
 This data survey was financed by FNR (Luxembourg), and was supervised by R. Blazy and A. Boughami. 
21
 The most important variable being the ‗recovery rate‘. 
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1.4. Brief Outline of Chapters 
 
The thesis is composed of several essays (chapters) on corporate bankruptcy. The general 
organization of these chapters tries to capture the default process, viewed as a sequential 
process beginning from the arbitration between private and formal solutions and 
progressing onto the formal design of the legal solution and finally concluding by 
explaining the financial effects of legal indexes on various creditors. 
 
Before entering the empirical analysis of such process, we first propose a survey of the 
previous studies conducted in these fields. 
 
Chapter 2 presents the survey of literature on bankruptcy. It starts by explaining the basic 
concept associated with bankruptcy, need of bankruptcy laws, the main objective of 
bankruptcy, the main processes associated with bankruptcy, classification of bankruptcy 
regimes and the law and finance approach to understand as to how the legal environment 
affects the outcome of bankruptcy. Chapter 2 can be summarized as a blend of the 
exploration of previous studies conducted on this topic, presentation of various point of 
views for the justification of our research objectives and the addition of our research work 
with the intent of augmenting current bankruptcy literature. 
 
Chapter 3 empirically investigates the path to the resolution of financial distress for a 
sample of small and medium French firms in default, in particular on the decision between 
bankruptcy and informal (out-of-court) negotiations. The procedure is depicted as a 
sequential game in which stakeholders first decide whether or not to engage in an informal 
negotiation. Then, conditional on opting for negotiations, the debtor and its creditors can 
succeed or fail in reaching a workout agreement in order to restructure the firm‘s capital 
structure. We test different hypotheses which captures i) the coordination vs. bargaining 
power issues, ii) informational problems, iii) firms‘ characteristics, and iv) loan 
characteristics. Using a sequential LOGIT approach, we first find that the probability of 
selecting for an informal negotiation decreases when the bank is the debtor‘s main creditor 
and increases with the size of the loan and the proportion of long term debt. In addition, 
11 
 
the likelihood of successfully reaching an informal agreement decreases when the 
management of a badly rated firm is considered as faulty and when the bank is the debtor‘s 
main creditor. Finally, we find no evidence for the impact of collateral on the resolution to 
financial distress. 
 
Chapter 4 presents a macro view of the bankruptcy laws prevalent in UK and France and 
examines their functioning and triggering criteria along with underlying specificities of 
each process. Here, the reader is encouraged to pay special attention to the working 
mechanisms of each procedure because they form the basis of future chapters where we 
relate the result of our summary statistics and econometrics to specificities of these 
procedures and methodically derive useful conclusions and insights.  
 
Chapter 5, presents the detailed summary statistics for two databases and also provides 
results of our multivariate analysis. We explore the two unique hand coded databases, 
collected through different reliable sources. Our database consists of 264 small and 
medium sized enterprises representing France and 564 small and medium sized enterprises 
representing UK. Based on our datasets, we provide summary statistics on both the 
countries. Our descriptive statistics explain the average profile of our sample companies 
and provide us with the reasons which effectuate bankruptcies. They also provide us with 
the detailed asset and liability structures of firms and their detailed claim structure and 
recovery structure. In addition they also provide us with the duration of the procedure and 
the costs involved in the process. We also perform multivariate analysis to test the choice 
between continuation and liquidation for France and to test the factors which increase or 
decrease the chances of receivership
22
 and administration
23
 in UK.  
 
Chapter 6 aims to find the legal characteristics that impact the recovery rates. Previous 
studies (LLSV, Doing Business Report, World Bank) have usefully used a set of legal 
indexes to rank the bankruptcy law prevalent within the country. But they fail to identify 
the characteristics of bankruptcy procedures that create more recoveries. We give here 
                                                 
22
 Procedure made for the benefits of banks. 
23
 Regarded as reorganization procedure of UK. 
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elements of answer by taking into consideration two countries that are good 
representatives of the two main legal systems prevailing in Europe: France (Civil Law) 
and United Kingdom (Common Law). To enable this, we built original legal indexes 
comprising of 158 binary questions that highlight ten major dimensions of corporate 
bankruptcy procedures: (1) accessibility, (2) exclusivity, (3) bankruptcy costs, 
(4) production of information, (5) protection of the debtor‘s assets, (6) protection of 
claims, (7) coordination of creditors, (8) decision power, (9) sanction of faulty 
management, and (10) inclination towards liquidation / reorganization. We then propose a 
mapping of procedures that shows a clear specialization between them. The French 
procedures (―redressement judiciaire‖ and ―liquidation judiciaire‖) are more protective of 
the debtor‘s assets and favor more the coordination of secured claims, public claims, and 
unsecured claims. In UK, we find strong opposition between the procedures oriented to 
liquidation and the other procedures. 
 
We then use an original database of 833 French and UK bankruptcy files to measure the 
recovery rates that are generated by each procedure. We find strong differences between 
them. We then turn to OLS regressions and use our legal indexes to isolate the 
characteristics of bankruptcy law that significantly impact on the total recovery rate. By 
controlling for the value of assets, the structure of claims, the origins of default, and the 
firm characteristics, we test for several hypotheses. We first isolate the legal features of 
bankruptcy procedures that are associated to higher total recovery rates: namely, 
accessibility of the procedure, protection of the debtor‘s assets, protection and 
coordination of claims, orientation towards reorganization, and bankruptcy costs. From 
that perspective, these costs are not sunk cost only, but can be viewed as the counterpart of 
a service provided by the practitioners that eventually serve the creditors‘ recoveries. On 
the contrary, we find that the production of information under bankruptcy has a negative 
impact on total recoveries, probably due to the breach in confidentiality. Last, some 
dimensions of corporate bankruptcy law are not significantly related to total recovery rates 
(inclination towards liquidation, severity towards faulty management). 
 
 
13 
 
References: 
 
Aghion, P., Hart, O. and Moore, J. [1992]. ―The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform‖, The 
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, July, 523-546. 
 
Baird, D. G. [1986]. ―The uneasy case for corporate reorganizations‖, Journal of Legal 
Studies 15, 125-147. 
 
Baird, Douglas G. [1995]. ―The Hidden Virtues of Chapter 11: An Overview of the Law 
and Economics of Financially Distressed Firms‖, mimeo, University of Chicago Law 
School. 
 
Bergtröm, C., Eisenberg, T., and Sundgren, S. [2004]. ―On the Design of Efficient Priority 
Rules for Secured Creditors: Empirical Evidence from a Change of Law‖, European 
Journal of Law and Economics, 18(3), 273-297.  
 
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Mody, A., and Stiglitz, J. [2001]. Resolution of Financial 
Distress: An international Perspective on the Design of Bankruptcy Laws, An overview 
and Chapter 1. 
 
Claessens, Stijn and Leora F. Klapper [2005]. ―Bankruptcy around the World: 
Explanations of Its Relative Use,‖ American Law and Economics Review, 7, 253–283. 
 
Davydenko, Sergei A. and Julian R. Franks [2007]. ―Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A 
Study of Defaults in France, Germany, and the UK,‖ Journal of Finance, 63 (2), 565-608. 
 
Djankov S., O. Hart. C. Mc Liesh, A. Shleifer [2008] ―Debt Enforcement around the 
World,‖ Journal of Political Economy, 116, 6, 1105-1149. 
 
Finch, V. [2002] ―Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles‖, CUP, 
Cambridge. 
 
Franks J.R. and G. Loranth [2005]. ―A Study of Inefficient Going Concerns in 
Bankruptcy.‖ CEPR Discussion Paper 5035, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
London.  
 
Hart, O. [2000]. ―Different Approaches to Bankruptcy‖, NBER working paper 7921. 
 
Hoshi, Takeo, Anil K. Kashyap and David Scharfstein [1990]. ―Bank monitoring and 
investment: evidence from the changing structure of Japanese corporate banking 
relationships‖, in: R. Glenn Hubbard, Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and 
Investment, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago). 
 
Jackson, Thomas H. [1986]. ―The logic and limits of bankruptcy law‖, Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA. 
 
14 
 
Schumpeter, J. A. [1912]. ―Théorie de l'évolution économique‖, Dalloz, Paris, 1935. 
 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. [1992]. ―Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market 
Equilibrium Approach‖, The Journal of Finance, vol. 47, n°4, 1343-1366.  
 
White, M.J. [1994]. ―Corporate bankruptcy as a filtering device: Chapter 11 
reorganizations and out-of-court debt restructurings‖, Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 10, 268-295. 
 
World Bank [2006]. ―Closing a business‖, Doing business in 2006: Creating Jobs, 67-76.  
 
______, [1989]. ―The corporate bankruptcy decision‖, Journal of Economic Perspectives 
3, 129-151. 
 
______, [2004]. ―Closing a business‖, Doing business in 2004: Understanding 
Regulations, 71-103, 112-114. 
 
______, [2005]. ―Closing a business‖, Doing business in 2005: Removing Obstacles to 
Growth, 67-78. 
 
15 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
Corporate Default: a 
Theoretical Survey 
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2. THE CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY PROCESS: FROM DEFAULT TO LEGAL SOLUTION 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In a well functioning market economy, one of the main drivers for economic growth is 
private investment and a corporation is a vehicle that injects majority of private investment 
into the economy. It finances its business operations by raising a combination of equity 
and debt capital. The providers of equity capital are compensated in the form of dividends 
and residual rights in case of liquidation, which is contingent upon creditor claims. 
Besides, they enjoy the right to vote on important matters concerning the management of 
the firm. On the other hand, the providers of debt capital increase the value of the firm by 
providing deductibility of interest expenses but at the same time it increases the 
probability of default and heightens the chances of bankruptcy
24
. 
 
The corporation must supply fixed payments to its creditors based on the contractual 
agreement between the concerned parties. However, certain circumstances may arise, 
which impact the supply of fixed payment to the creditors. This can be attributed to many 
catalysts
25
 ranging from internal factors (bad management, lack of managerial experience), 
extended internal factors related to production (production of obsolete products, lack of 
product demand), financing (lack of financing), to external factors (industry downturn, 
macro economic conditions, increase in competition, fluctuation of currency, period of 
credit crunch) and to the unforeseen factors (accidents, floods, death, disaster, terrorist 
attack). Under such a situation, a company has few options left. It can either opt for a 
private solution (out of court restructurings) or has to file under judicial procedure 
(liquidation or reorganization).  
 
Bankruptcy is not a simple straightforward process and involves lot of complexities and 
dynamics. Thus, it becomes imperative to study the whole bankruptcy process in detail to 
understand its intricacies. 
                                                 
24
 The terms ‗bankruptcy, ‗insolvency‘ will be used interchangeably throughout the thesis. However, in UK corporate default is referred 
as Insolvency and not as Bankruptcy.  
25
 See for e.g., Regis Blazy, Joel Petey and Laurent Weill, ―Can bankruptcy codes create value‖? Evidence from creditors‘ recoveries in 
France, Germany, and the UK. Here a list of detailed causes of default is mentioned.  
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In this section of the thesis, we provide a detailed theoretical survey of the corporate 
default process. We analyze the previous literature and also present our opinions and 
contrasting views. We wonder as to what constitutes an ―efficient‖ bankruptcy regime as 
the notion of efficiency may differ from one country to the other. For instance, in France 
preservation of employment is one of the major goals of bankruptcy whereas in UK saving 
the company as a going concern is the primary motive of reorganization process. Further, a 
sound bankruptcy regime is vital for restoring equilibrium to a nation‘s economy and more 
so in lieu of the current global financial crisis. Hence, these dynamics make bankruptcy a 
challenging topic of research.  This chapter is divided in two major sections: Section 2.2-
2.5 describes the whole process of bankruptcy and its major impediments, need for 
bankruptcy laws and their consequences on the economy, the rationale for the selection of 
informal workouts and features of an efficient bankruptcy regime. Section 2.6-2.7 presents 
our analysis of the existing law and finance literature and their major shortcomings (for 
instance current studies are based on very few legal indexes 4). We also study the effects 
of legal environment on bankruptcy and mitigate the flaws of previous literature by 
suggesting new and more comprehensive methodology based on our 300 legal indexes 
(presented in the last chapter of the thesis) that takes into consideration the dynamics and 
complexity of the bankruptcy process
26
.  
 
2.2. Defining the Object of Research: What is Bankruptcy? 
 
Let us try to understand the term Bankruptcy and the factors that trigger it through this 
scenario: ―When a firm has debts in excess of their assets and is not able to pay them as 
they become due, it is said to be in distress. Further, the creditors have served enough 
repayment notices to the firm but the firm has failed to respond beneficially to the 
notifications. So, based on these factors a petition can be filed in the court to initiate 
bankruptcy procedure against the company. However, sometimes an insolvent firm, to seek 
relief from pursuant creditors, can file for protection under bankruptcy. So, as is evident, 
bankruptcy is a process designed, keeping the interests of both creditors and debtors in 
                                                 
26
 Example: for the same country, different bankruptcy procedures can have different answers for legal indexes 
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perspective and aims at providing a mutually beneficial resolution to the distress 
situation.‖ 
 
In classical terms, the definition of bankruptcy has taken various forms over the period of 
time and it has been our effort to dissect them and present them to the reader so as to 
enhance his appreciation that bankruptcy in its basic essence has evolved from an 
abominable procedure to a much more humane process involving a mutually beneficial 
resolution to the parties concerned (debtors and creditors). To highlight this point, we 
present 3 notable definitions of bankruptcy: 
 
According to Douglas G Baird (1987), ―Bankruptcy arises when a firm cannot meet its 
obligations and the creditors cannot resolve their competing claims without a collective 
proceeding‖.  
 
In this definition, bankruptcy is primarily defined as a process that takes into consideration 
the interests of all the creditors and aims at resolving arising conflicts by enforcing the 
absolute priority order for reimbursing the claimants. 
 
According to Philip R. Wood (1995), ―Bankruptcy is a collective procedure for the 
recovery of debts by creditors. It also protects individuals who have become overburdened 
by their debts.‖ 
 
As you would have noticed, in this definition, a slight perspective shift towards providing 
some level of relief to the distressed firm can be observed. Hence, during this period, 
bankruptcy as a process started showing signs of inclination towards helping out distressed 
debtors, at some level or the other, while maintaining its objective of arriving at a 
resolution, to pacify the solicitation of the creditors. 
 
According to Insolvency service UK (2001), ―Bankruptcy is one way of dealing with the 
debts you cannot pay. The bankruptcy proceedings free you from overwhelming debts so 
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you can make a fresh start, subject to some restrictions; and makes sure your assets are 
shared out fairly among your creditors‖.  
 
This definition reflects an interesting and radical shift in favor of the debtors. This was the 
time when various governments started acknowledging the plight of debtors burdened by 
an almost pro creditor bankruptcy system and incorporated norms to redress, in a humane 
fashion, the condition of the debtors as well. Thus, now it resonated with a rescue 
orientation rather than with intones of a sole creditor repayment mechanism.   
 
Under the changing definitions/objectives of bankruptcy, it becomes even more difficult 
for the legal practitioners or the judges to decide whether the firm needs to be liquidated or 
reorganized. It is up to the court to decide whether the debtor can be given another chance 
and provided with adequate protection from the pursuant creditors or to terminate 
business. To comprehend the decision making mechanics of this process, one must 
embrace the fact that default does not signify bankruptcy.  
 
2.2.1. Is Default different from Bankruptcy?  
 
Default implies that a company fails to meet its financial commitments and as such is in 
distress. According to the Basel 2 criterion, if a creditor is unable to meet its credit 
obligation towards the banking group and exceeds the repayment by 90 days or more, it is 
said to be in default. Default does not mean that a firm is bankrupt because although it can 
be insolvent for one creditor but can remain solvent for other classes of creditors.  
 
A company can face short term illiquidity during the normal course of business. This does 
not signify that it is bankrupt. Bankruptcy is a legal process and a company can be 
declared bankrupt only by the court if it meets certain legal requirements.  
 
Thus a firm which has defaulted on its financial commitments is said to be in distress. The 
severity of the distress can be explained by two underlining concepts: Economic Distress 
and Financial Distress.  
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A. Financial Distress 
 
A business is said to be in financial distress when it becomes cash-flow insolvent, which 
means it is unable to pay its debts as they become due
27
. Cash flow insolvency cannot be 
regarded as irreversible failure of the company. This short term insolvency of assets and 
debt payment may occur routinely in the normal life of business and results in temporary 
inability to pay debts. Such businesses have a going concern value greater than the market 
value of its assets. Dismantling such businesses is not favorable for the claimants of the 
company as well as for the assets of the company. Thus in such a case, to preserve the 
value of the company and to put the assets into highest use, the business should be allowed 
to continue and not liquidated.  
 
Comprehending financial distress is not an easy task because how it is perceived depends 
on who is putting forth a declaration for it. For instance, a firm can declare financial 
distress if it faces an imminent threat of insolvency whereas for a bank or any other 
creditor a firm may be in financial distress if it fails to meet its credit obligations on time. 
As one would have noticed, both perceptions point towards an important situation which 
needs deployment of a rectification procedure (reorganization or rescue mechanisms). 
Now, how efficiently is this procedure implemented, still remains a matter of concern for 
many economies.  
 
B. Economic Distress 
 
A business is said to be economically distressed if ―the net present worth of the troubled 
company’s business as a going concern is less than the value of the assets broken up and 
sold separately‖.28 This means that business is not viable anymore and must be liquidated 
to protect further shrinking in the value of the business and also resources should be 
redeployed to more efficient use.   
 
                                                 
27
 Insolvency Act 1986, s 123(1) 
28 See E Ehlers, ―Statutory Corporate Rescue Proceedings in Germany: The Insolvenzplan Procedure‖ in K Gromek Broc and R Parry 
(edition), Corporate Rescue: An Overview of Recent. 
21 
 
It is noteworthy that several studies have employed different proxies to acknowledge the 
difference between these two types of distress. For instance, Hotchkiss (1995) advocates 
negative operating performance as an evidence of economic distress whereas Denis and 
Rodgers (2007) affiliate higher leverage with more financial distress than with economic 
distress. 
 
Table 2.1 below highlights the types of distress and their rectification procedures 
Table 2.1: Types of Distress and efficient action at the time of distress 
DEFINITION ACTION
ECONOMIC DISTRESS The net present value of the assets is 
negative under any management 
team. 
Piecemeal liquidation of assets.
The net present value of the assets is 
positive under a different management 
team. 
Sale of assets as “going concern” to 
enable the change of management. 
FINANCIAL DISTRESS The net present value of cash flow is 
positive but it is lower than the value 
of claims by non-shareholders. 
Debt reduction in combination with 
restructuring and/or ownership 
change, if value of assets thereby can 
be enhanced. 
Liquidity problem Debt-rescheduling, Liquidity 
enhancement. 
 
 
Let us reiterate that bankruptcy needs additional criteria to be triggered. In other terms, a 
distressed company may become a bankrupt company if (1) the legal criteria to justify the 
triggering of a procedure are met, and (2) the stakeholders fail to achieve a private 
agreement.  
 
Now, let us consider a company that enters bankruptcy: 
 
When an application for bankruptcy is filed, the first step is to determine the value of the 
firm‘s assets and verify the creditor claims. Accordingly, a plan is formulated for sharing 
these assets among various categories of creditors. In general, the creditors have divergent 
claims and may rush to grasp the assets of the firm. A collective procedure is thus 
designed to effectively confront and resolve these complex issues and it is here that the 
absolute priority order plays a significant role.  
Source: Blazy and Chopard (2004) 
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The first step is to determine the priority rights of the creditors. Some creditors are secured 
and can exercise property rights to enforce their collateral or sell it while some are 
unsecured and have no legal way of enforcing upon their claims. Collective procedures 
decide the best way for sharing the firm‘s assets on the basis of the given law. They ensure 
that the assets value is preserved
29
 and put to best use and the distribution be made keeping 
economic objectives in mind. 
 
For initiating collective proceedings, certain legal requirements need to be fulfilled. In the 
next section we describe bankruptcy as a sequential process comprising of three 
consecutive steps. 
 
2.2.2. Bankruptcy is a sequential process 
 
Collective treatment of distressed firms can be viewed as a series of consecutive steps:  
1) initiation or the triggering of default, 2) management of the distressed firm and 3) final 
outcome of all these steps.  
 
Interestingly, within each country the requirement, triggering and implementation of these 
steps might differ from one collective procedure to the other. For instance criteria for 
initiating liquidation proceedings may be different from the criteria for the initiation of 
reorganization proceedings. And triggering criteria for liquidation in UK can be different 
from the triggering criteria for liquidation in France. Now let us focus our attention on a 
general outline of the process of bankruptcy which comprises of 3 stages: 
 
                                                 
29 
Entrepreneurs need funds to start a business; generally they raise capital by a mix of equity and debt. Sometimes entrepreneurs invest 
in risky projects in the greed for higher returns for themselves and consequently if the project fails then not only the shareholders of the 
company but also the debt providers are negatively affected. Thus, to keep a check on entrepreneurs‘ risk taking abilities and keep the 
creditors in confidence, a bankruptcy law provides absolute priority order. Bankruptcy laws should be able to sanction the faulty 
management who destroy the value of the company by undertaking risky projects and putting the creditor‘s money at stake. Efficient 
bankruptcy regime should preserve the bonding role of the debt by penalizing the managers and the absolute priority rule is an 
enforcement measure in which shareholders fall into the category of residual claimant. Thus, collective procedures keep a check on the 
Entrepreneurs‘ risk taking abilities by putting them last in the list of priority. This is a very important feature of any insolvency process. 
Absolute priority inbuilt in the collective procedures keeps a check on entrepreneurs risk taking abilities and hence preserves the assets.   
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During the first stage of bankruptcy, a petition can be filed in the court against the 
company, by any of the stakeholders. Such petitions are governed by bankruptcy laws 
which outline their initiation criteria (present/future/expected financial difficulties) and 
bestow certain types of stakeholders with the power of initiation (creditors, state, court, 
and the debtor). This initiation stage is very crucial. 
 
The advantage of an early initiation can be redeemed only if it is easily accessible by the 
stakeholders and is less restrictive of its demands. This means that the firms which have 
substantial assets still have a fair chance of resurrection, provided that the procedure is 
initiated at the right time.  However, this easy accessibility can be fatal as it can generate 
opportunistic behavior on the part of the companies which can strategically decide to 
default
30
, as part of their business strategy thus exploiting this vulnerability of the 
bankruptcy system
31
.  
 
Second stage is where vital decisions are taken about who takes control of the 
management of the distressed firm. It is during this stage that either a court appointed 
official is delegated with the management control or the incumbent management is 
allowed to continue. Also, these management rules vary from one procedure to the other 
and from one country to the other. The law decides who manages the company. Besides, it 
also decides whether there is an automatic stay on creditors‘ claims or some secured 
creditors can stay out of proceedings. 
 
Retaining the managers can be favourable for the firm provided the managers are 
                                                 
30 
The case of Texaco Bankruptcy Filing is a brilliant illustration of an unorthodox adoption of Chapter 11 by an organization as a 
survival mechanism. Interestingly it also became the biggest corporate failures of that time. On the date of its bankruptcy filing, the 
managers at Texaco wrote a letter to its customers and suppliers. Here's an excerpt from the letter:  
"Texaco Inc. is solvent - 8 - and financially strong. The Chapter 11 petition will enable Texaco Inc. to conduct its business in the 
ordinary course as it continues to appeal this judgment. Again, we wish to emphasize that our Company is not affected and is honouring 
all its obligations in full. We are financially sound and our business will continue as normal."  
As is evident from the letter, this was not a conventional bankruptcy filing. Texaco had strategically deployed Chapter 11 as a shield of 
protection against a court imposed award of 10.5 billion dollars to its competitor organization: Pennzoil (Delaney, 1998:145). Similar 
tactful maneuvers have been employed by several organisations, over the years, for breaching labour contracts (e.g., Continental 
Airlines), resolving individual claims (e.g., Manville and A.H. Robins), avoiding pension funds financial responsibilities (e.g., LTV), 
bypassing payments on unprofitable leases (e.g., HRT Industries) and as countermeasures against issues pertaining to tax authorities 
(e.g., Whiting Pools). A similar example is that of Federal-Mogul Corp, which filed for legal protection against asbestos related claims 
in October 2001. 
31
 See for e.g., Sheppard, 1995; Delaney, 1998; Rose-Green and Dawkins, 2002.   
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competent and honest.
32
 The incumbent management can use their knowledge and 
experience to advantageously benefit and contribute towards a good rehabilitation plan for 
the company. On the other hand, if the managers are incompetent and fraud, allowing 
them to continue business can have disastrous effects. They can take advantage of their 
position and use the assets for their personal benefits and as such further destroy the value 
of the firm to a point where chances of survival are impossible. At this point altering the 
management is seen as the best possible solution for the firm. Considering this 
perspective, in some countries managers are replaced by a court appointed administrator. 
This strategy has multiple benefits. First, it can preserve the value of the assets 
(repossession rights, cancellation of previous sales…), second it can facilitate in 
coordination mechanisms (stay of claims, nomination of a creditors‘ representative and 
voting rights) and third it can protect the company from fraudulent managers who were, in 
the first place, responsible for bringing the company to such distressed situation (removal 
of managers and appointment of administrators).  
 
The third step is the final stage where it is decided whether the firm will be declared 
bankrupt and liquidated or if it will be allowed to continue business. The choice between 
liquidation and reorganization is aimed at maximizing the value of the firm which is 
further influenced by the capital structure of the firm. As stated by Bergström et al. (2002) 
and Morrison (2007), the higher the numbers of secured creditors, the lesser are the 
probabilities for continuation under bankruptcy. This is true. Secured creditors are less 
likely to support debtor oriented reorganization procedure because the expected loan 
repayment under reorganization is lower than the loan repayment under immediate 
liquidation (Bulow & Shoven, 1978; White, 1989; Kordana et. al, 1999). Also, their 
incentive is more when a firm is liquidated rather than continued. Consequently, if the 
creditors are given voting rights to approve the reorganization plan for the firm then in 
such systems chances of type II error (viable firms get liquidated) might increase (White, 
1994). The suggested remedy to such situations is to transfer the decision making power in 
the hands of the court. The courts do not have any direct incentives from the firm and can 
behave in an unbiased manner to arrive at an optimal solution. This transfer of power also 
                                                 
32
 As in such cases they cannot be blamed for misfortune of the company but rather to their bad luck 
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restricts creditors‘ decision making power.33 However, type I and type II errors may still 
arise if the judge strongly abides by the primary objectives stated in law. For instance 
debtor‘s firm can be sold for a lower bid if it promises to keep employment contracts 
intact. In France, preservation of employment is one of the major goals of bankruptcy and 
is embedded within the law.  
 
So far, we have presented the crux of the bankruptcy process and the dynamics involved 
within. Let us now shift our focus to the tradeoffs between opting for formal bankruptcy or 
a private solution and its associated major benefits and impediments. It is noteworthy that 
this choice can have a profound effect on the efficiency of the procedure and its outcome. 
Also, in the later part of this section we will analyse both types of efficiencies linked with 
a bankruptcy procedure. 
 
2.3. The Ex-Ante Tradeoff: Should Financial Distress be resolved privately or not? 
 
The inadequacies of contemporary bankruptcy processes came into limelight with the East 
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. The phenomenal rise in the number of bankruptcies led to 
heavy losses to the government and to the market economy. This is when countries 
seriously started exploring for solutions to resolve financial distress and identified two 
ways of achieving it: either through a formal process (carried under the supervision of 
court) or an informal process (negotiations between the creditor‘s and the debtor‘s). They 
also started acknowledging the importance of informal procedures
34
 which provided 
solutions outside the framework of court proceedings and thus saved a lot of time and 
money. Some of such market based solutions have been advocated by some of the 
academics
35
.  
                                                 
33
 Under such legal systems final outcome is not dependant on creditors‘ choice and in a sense works well to reduce any conflicts 
among various creditor groups. 
34
 In mid 1970‘s, Bank of England created and promoted and informal way of corporate rescue called ―London Approach‖. It became 
quite a success. See for e.g., John Armour and S Deakin (2001), ‗Norms in Private Insolvency: the ‗London Approach‘ to the resolution 
of financial distress‘. Based on which many other economies (Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia) adopted the same approach. 
For more details see M Pomerlano and W Shaw (edition), ‗Corporate restructuring: Lessons from experience (the World Bank, 2005)‘, 
p104-107. 
35
 Roe (1983) suggests a scheme where existing debt is erased and replaced with equity in the reorganized firm. This gives a chance to 
creditors to make decisions on the future of the firm. The distribution is made in such a manner where senior creditors are fully 
reimbursed before any disbursements made to junior creditors. The value of firm‘s shares is decided by selling 10% of the equity in 
market. Baird (1986) promotes a scheme of auction for the bankrupt firm. He believes that auctions not only protects the rights of 
creditors outside bankruptcy but also avoids unnecessary costs and time spent on negotiations. Thus, it leads to efficient outcome. Also 
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Informal procedures generally involve the bank
36
 as the main creditor and can be initiated 
under their influence and support. Though these procedures have been in existence for 
long but because of an aura of confidentiality which surrounds them, their data is not 
readily available for research analysis
37
. However, we set out to deduce and list out the 
pros and cons associated with such procedures.  
 
2.3.1. The Rationale for Selecting the Informal Process 
One may question as to why an informal process should be selected for mitigating a 
distress situation. This can be best understood by taking into the account the following 
advantages: 
 
a) Avoidance of Bankruptcy Costs 
 
Bankruptcy is a legal mechanism involving both direct and indirect costs.
38
 Formal 
procedures of bankruptcy involve direct costs (accruing out of the legal process for 
instance fees to lawyers, accountants, auditors and other professional fees) and indirect 
costs (arising out of foregone investment opportunities, lost sales, loss of competitiveness, 
all the costs arising out of suboptimal use of resources, asymmetric information, conflicts 
of interests and loss of management time) which eventually have to be borne by the 
already distressed company and thus can shrink the overall incentives of claimants. Given 
a choice, the creditors will always choose a method which increases their returns (Gilson, 
1997; Gilson et al., 1990; Wruck 1990). Jensen (1989, 1991) argues that if private 
workouts are more cost efficient than formal processes, it always pays to choose them. 
Measuring the direct costs of informal workouts is difficult as this process is carried out 
                                                                                                                                                   
see Thorburn (2000) and Baird and Ramussen (2003) for further discussion on the mechanics of auctions. Bebchuk (1988) and Aghion, 
Hart and Moore (1992) propose a scheme wherein senior creditors are allocated with equity in the firm and subordinate creditors receive 
options to purchase equity. Thus, it solves a lot of problems related to allocation of control rights and also satisfies APR.  
36
 Gilson, John and Lang (1990) show that private workouts are more likely to prevail if firms owe more debt to the bank and hence 
complications arising out of hold out problems are mitigated. The same results were obtained and confirmed by Fisher and Martel 
(2008). 
37
 Pre packs and London approach.  
38 
For more detailed evidence of bankruptcy costs see for e.g., James S. Ang, Jess H. Chua and John J. McConnell, ‗The Administrative 
Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A Note‘, 37 Journal of Finance (1982) p 219-226; Edward I. Altman, ‗A Further Investigation of the 
Bankruptcy Cost Question‘, 39 Journal of Finance (1984) p 1067-1089; David T. Stanley and Marjorie Girth, ‗Bankruptcy: Problem, 
Process, Reform, Washington D.C., The brookings Institution (1971) pp 270.  
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with confidentiality. However some researchers have been able to document these costs 
for the restructuring of public debt via a formal exchange offer. Gilson, John and Lang 
(1990) examine the exchange cost for 18 offers at 0.6% of the book value of assets. Betkar 
(1997) shows that for 29 exchange offers, a cost with a mean of 2.5% of pre-exchanged 
assets is registered (while median is 2%). It has been found that out of court restructurings 
are faster than a judicial process while court procedures are evidently time consuming as a 
proper legal process encompasses a complex myriad of multilevel interactions, creditor 
approvals and information exchanges. Here we would like to emphasize that out of court 
restructurings are faster because they do not involve such time consuming activities. 
Franks and Torous (1989) and Thornburn (2000) exhibit that the amount of time spent in 
bankruptcy proceedings is a proxy for indirect costs. Thus, opting for informal process 
seems like a feasible and an optimal solution to resolving default.  
 
Haugen and Senbet (1978) further studied various efficient ways of restructuring debt in a 
market solution so as to avoid transaction costs accruing from formal processes. They 
advocate the use of informal procedures and state that if the capital structure problems can 
be resolved by restructuring of the liabilities and debts, the firm will be able to 
successfully avoid bankruptcy costs and resolve financial distress through informal 
workouts. Often bankruptcy costs
39
 have been an important factor in selecting the 
approach for resolving distress: formal or informal. Several other works have adopted the 
Coasian approach for analysing the tradeoff between formal and informal ways of 
resolving default. However, in the absence of any possibility of private solution, the only 
measure available for resurrection is the legal solution.   
 
b) Goodwill Effects 
 
The practice of workouts remains quite a secret and hence the extent of its usage is 
difficult to fathom. They are carried out in a manner in which the company and its 
business goodwill do not suffer. It preserves the confidentiality of the financial distress 
surrounding the company and keeps the creditor‘s confidence alive in the company and 
                                                 
39
 Bulow and Shoven (1978) and White (1989) 
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also prevents a bad reputation in the market and in the public. Chatterjee, Dhillon, and 
Ramirez (1995) show that return on announcement of workout are less negative and 
abnormal as compared to those of Chapter 11 filings. Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) 
further add that stocks returns are more negative for firms that subsequently file for 
Chapter 11.  
 
c) Protection of Internal Management  
 
Informal workouts are also preferred over formal ones because of the arising conflicts 
between legal representatives and the company agents (managers/directors), wherein 
company agents lose control in the hands of the legal administrator (Franks and Nyborg, 
1996). Fearing this fact, management is often reluctant to go to courts. Thus, the approach 
suggested by Haugen and Senbet (1978) which systematically favours the market solution 
and suggests unconventional approaches to resolving distress, questions the very existence 
of collective procedures of bankruptcy.  
 
Despite market solutions offering better alternatives than formal ones for resolving 
distress, they are not free from impediments. This is why we observe that formal ways of 
resolving distress are more extensively used than the private solutions.  
 
2.3.2. Limitations of Informal Process 
 
a) Incomplete Contracts: Firstly, when a debtor and creditor sign a private contract, 
anticipating the event of default, they specify the terms of debt contracts and describe 
the manner in which proceeds will be realized and distributed (Baird 1987, Hart 1995). 
However in practice, such contracts are incomplete in nature as they lack detailed and 
critical information and hence are difficult to enforce and of little value towards a 
harmonious resolution. For instance the contracts contingent on cash flows
40
 are 
difficult to enforce as their values keep on changing and are difficult to assess for 
                                                 
40 
Hart and Moore (1998) suggest that in order to make borrowing feasible, creditors should be given certain liquidation rights if they 
are unable to contract on cash flows. Otherwise, managers will always default strategically and divert the funds to their advantage.  
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outsiders and court. The managers can take advantage of their position in diverting 
these cash flows with the objective of gratifying personal gains even to the extent of 
putting creditor‘s money at risk without his knowledge. Moreover, problems like 
common pool and conflicts of interest initiate a run for debtor‘s assets and thus in the 
real world, enforcing these debt contracts is not such a straightforward process.   
 
b) Information Asymmetry: Secondly, it is possible to negotiate debt informally if the 
market is perfect and the information available to parties is assumed to be symmetrical. 
Webb (1987) confirms the supremacy of informal process in the presence of 
symmetric information. Brown (1989) pointed out that a private workout is always 
successful in the presence of single creditor as information is considered symmetric. 
But in reality, it seems that the insiders are better informed than the outsiders and have 
better knowledge about the assets and liabilities of the company, the ongoing firm 
value and the liquidation value. They can greatly harness this information to their 
advantage. Giammarino (1989) and Mooradian (1994) proclaim that creditors might 
opt for costly bankruptcy procedures if they observe asymmetries of information and 
develop distrust towards the insiders. Carepeto (2005) asserts that presence of 
information asymmetry can lead to extended bargaining, requiring several plans before 
any agreement can be materialized. The existence of uncertainty of credible 
information on the part of the debtors might urge the creditors to embrace a costly 
bankruptcy procedure. Lack of information can be two sided. At times it is difficult for 
the creditors to possess all the information for assessing their own profitability. This 
has been noticed
41
 and found true especially for small firms. Thus, the vicious loop of 
asymmetric information spoils any chances of private agreement between debtors and 
creditors.  
c) Free Riding: Thirdly, a firm does not have a single creditor; it has several creditors 
and multiple categories of these creditors. All these creditors have divergent interests 
in the firm. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) spotlight on the conflicts that arise in the 
presence of multiple categories of creditors. In addition, Bulow and Shoven (1978), 
Roe (1987) and Franks and Torous (1989) also discuss the conflicts arising because of 
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 Blazy, 2000, Allen, 1993, Rivaud-Danset, 1995 
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the presence of varied creditors. Some creditors have low priority, as compared to 
others, for the negotiation of debt terms (interest rates, extension of maturity period, 
principal amount). As private agreement requires the approval of all the parties 
concerned, some parties might decide to block the negotiation process in the 
anticipation of getting better recovery through a formal procedure. Grossman and Hart 
(1981) state that creditors with low priority, may realize that their decision to holdout, 
hardly affects their incentives and hence they prefer to stay out of it. While, other 
creditors fear the high costs involved in bankruptcy process and prefer to renegotiate 
informally. Moreover, each creditor has the incentive to be the first to enforce a 
liquidation process in order to guarantee full recovery. From this point of view, the 
collective procedures are chosen as they resolve in part the "common pool problem" 
(Baird, 1986). By freezing payments and suspending the creditor‘s rights, they provide 
some time for fixing the liability and maintenance of the assets of the debtor and the 
search for potential buyers. 
 
2.3.3. Empirical Findings on Private Solutions 
 
Few empirical works have examined the determinants of the firms‘ choice between private 
workouts and formal processes. But most of these studies were conducted on US firms.   
Subsequently as the reader will come across chapter 3 of the thesis he will notice that we 
have a conducted a thorough study to address this issue for French Civil System and we 
feel that this can be a valuable contribution to the existing literature because we have used 
an original database manually collected from the recovery units of 5 commercial banks of 
France. For now we present the main contributions of the previous literature.  
 
a) Balance Sheet Structure: Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) find that the firms having 
greater proportion of intangible assets in their asset structure would prefer to opt for 
private workouts. This is because chances of their value reduction are maximized 
during the bankruptcy process (for instance asset fire sales or loss of customers). 
Franks and Torous (1994) find that the firms opting for private workouts are more 
solvent and liquid and possess less negative stock returns just prior to the negotiation 
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process. Chatterjee, Dhillon, and Ramirez (1995) demonstrate that the choice of 
restructuring out of court depends on the firm‘s level of debt and its short term 
liquidity. Thus, to some extent, balance sheet structure affects the way a default is 
resolved. However this may vary from one country to the other. In chapter 3 of this 
thesis, you will be able to understand whether the assets or debt structure of the firms 
in France affect the private resolution process or not. 
 
b) Types of Creditors: Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) additionally suggest that the 
presence of fewer categories of debts
42
 could help in privately resolving the problems 
which arise due to conflicts of interests. Further, recent studies on bankruptcy design 
have exhibited that in countries where informal reorganization procedures are 
prevalent (for instance in continental Europe which is characterized by bank based 
system), a court controlled reorganization procedure may not be so efficient or 
beneficial (Berkovich & Isreal, 1999; Hege, 2003). Therefore, in these countries firms 
have greater incentive in restructuring their liabilities via out of court proceedings 
because banks in comparison to common debts (trade debts or public debts) are better 
informed and can play a pivotal role in restructuring and internalizing some of the 
restructuring costs. A point to be highlighted here is that with lesser number of distinct 
debts,
43
 private workouts become more manageable.  
 
However, recent empirical studies have found a decline in the number of firms 
restructuring out of court. The reason could be that a large proportion of firms fail to 
successfully renegotiate out of court. Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) experimentally 
verified this by examining 169 financially distressed firms and discovered that 53 percent 
(89 firms) failed to restructure privately. Additionally, Franks and Torous (1994) also 
found that similar proportions of firms failed to restructure privately. The reason for the 
decline of private workouts in comparison to formal procedures was explained by Jensen 
(1991). He draws attention towards legal ruling that discourages workouts. The LTV Corp 
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 Out of which a higher proportion belonging to long term debts mainly accruing from banks 
43
 James (1995) and Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) also claim that presence of public debts may hinder the process of private 
renegotiation. Chatterjee, Dhillon, and Ramirez (1995) also suggest that the choice of restructuring out of court does get affected in 
presence of various categories of creditors. 
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Bankruptcy case is an apt example, where the court held that the debtholders, who 
participated initially in out of court restructurings, could only claim the new reduced 
principal amount whereas holdout claimants received the original amount of money. This 
decision had a severe impact on the creditors who became apprehensive of the informal 
approach for settling their financial dues for fear of not being able to recover the originally 
lent amount.  
 
2.3.4. The Rationale For Adopting a Formal Bankruptcy Procedure 
 
A company facing insolvency strongly feels the need for bankruptcy laws because in the 
absence of such laws, creditors might confiscate assets critical to the functioning of the 
company‘s operation and may also harass the debtors towards payment of dues. 
Bankruptcy laws are designed to mitigate these arising problems and to find the best 
possible solution for the debtors company.  Some of the major issues dealt by bankruptcy 
laws are:  
 
a) Coordination – This problem arises when a company‘s debts and liabilities exceed its 
common pool of assets. In such a situation, there is a risk for some creditors of not being 
paid in full or not being paid at all. To tackle this situation, creditors rush to grasp the 
debtor‘s assets critical to the functioning of debtor‘s corporation in order to satisfy their 
own claims. Bankruptcy Laws provide relief from this problem by temporary halting of all 
such creditor actions which might diminish the value of an otherwise economically viable 
firm. This common pool problem has been widely discussed in literature.
44
 The immediate 
solution to solve this common pool problem is to provide an automatic stay over debtor‘s 
assets. This means that creditors cannot pursue the debtor and cannot seize its assets. It 
provides a breathing space for the debtor and an opportunity to formulate a plan for 
meeting its obligations. In addition to solving the coordination problems, the bankruptcy 
law appoints creditor representatives, who represent creditor interests in the court. 
Moreover, it is the court which decides as to how the value of the firm will be shared 
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 Bulow and Shoven (1978), Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), and Longhofer and Peters (2004) 
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among various categories of creditors in which some can be dissenting creditors as well. In 
such circumstances bankruptcy law can force
45
 the creditors to accept the terms of 
reorganization proposal and thus resolve the arising hold out problems. The order of 
disbursing stakeholder payments is also decided by the court. According to this rule, 
shareholders cannot be paid unless all creditor claims are fully satisfied.  
 
b) Information – Presence of asymmetric information is often cited as the most critical 
impediment to the resolution of financial distress. In a firm, it is often believed that 
insiders are better informed and can often use this information to their advantage in the 
event of bankruptcy. The existence of uncertainty of credible information on the part 
of creditors propels them to opt for costly bankruptcy procedures which reveal the true 
picture of a company and its business. This saves the creditors from being tricked by 
the insiders. This is substantiated by the studies of Giammarino (1989) and Mooradian 
(1994) wherein they proclaim that creditors might choose costly bankruptcy procedure 
if they observe asymmetries of information and develop distrust towards the insiders. 
Here, a bankruptcy code tackles this situation
46
 effectively by dissemination of 
credible information amongst various stakeholders of the firm and thereby facilitating 
viable decisions on their part. Further, to achieve this end, sophisticated audit 
procedures are conducted under the supervision of court appointed trustee.  
 
c) Protection – The need for bankruptcy laws is strengthened so as to allow for the 
protection of debtors‘ assets which are critical to the functioning of the company. The 
assets and contracts that are likely to maximize the value of the firm can be reinstated 
within the firm. New resources can be hired and some can be fired if it is in the interest 
of the debtor. In the same manner, a bankruptcy law provides adequate protection 
against creditor claims by verification of each and every claim wherein creditors are 
given substantial time to report their claims to the bankruptcy judge. They receive 
notifications for creditors‘ meetings and have the right to formulate creditors‘ 
                                                 
45
 ‗Cram down‘ provision of Chapter 11 of US bankruptcy code 1978 is an example of one of such measures taken by the bankruptcy 
court.  
46 
Brown and al. (1993) test how the presence of asymmetric information can be resolved by offering choice of securities in a debt 
restructuring process. The negative share reaction can be seen if public debt holders are offered equity in debt restructuring process. 
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committee for representing their interests in the court. Thus, as the reader can discern, 
the need for bankruptcy laws is essential for the protection of both creditors and 
debtors.  
 
d) Final Decision: If a conflicting situation arises wherein the debtor of the firm wants 
the firm to be continued while secured creditors want the firm to be immediately 
liquidated then the debtors can seek protection from the court by presenting a 
reorganization plan. The secured creditors deriving no benefits
47
 from the 
reorganization can appeal for immediate liquidation in order to prevent any dilution of 
their collaterals. In such a situation, it is the court that presides and effectuates the final 
decision. In some legal systems, it is mandatory for the creditors to vote on the 
reorganization plan and if they approve the plan then only the court can accept it 
(creditor friendly regime). On the contrary, in some legal systems, the court has the 
discretionary power to accept or reject a plan (debtor friendly regime). Whatever be 
the legal orientation, the primary intention is to resolve the decision making dilemma 
and materialize an option that is in the best interest of all the stakeholders.  
 
e) Faulty Management – Bankruptcy laws also facilitate towards the distinction between 
faulty managers and competent managers. Primarily, competent managers whose 
failure is attributed to unavoidable circumstances (misfortunes, natural calamities, 
external environment) should not be sanctioned by law. On the other hand, faulty 
managers who destroy the value of the company by recklessly undertaking risky 
projects and putting the creditor‘s money at stake should be liable for sanctions. These 
sanctions can be pecuniary
48
 or non-pecuniary
49
 depending on the country in which the 
sanctions take place. This tricky situation is proficiently absolved by the bankruptcy 
law by transferring the control from the management to the creditors (Harris and 
Ravid, 1991).  
 
                                                 
47 Secured creditors repayment of loan is lower in reorganization than in immediate liquidation. See for example given Bulow & 
Shoven, 1978; White, 1989; Kordana et. al, 1999. 
48 
Pecuniary sanctions are the sanctions which can make the managers liable to pay for the loss out of their own patrimony and personal 
estates.  
49 
Non-pecuniary sanctions are those in which managers are asked to pay fines or can be put behind the bars.  
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In the above sections we have explained the rationale behind the legal and private 
solutions and have discussed the pros and cons associated which each of these processes. 
We have also presented bankruptcy as a sequential process consisting of a series of steps 
of which the most important step is to choose between a firm‘s liquidation and 
continuation. In order to screen out distressed businesses it is a prerequisite to determine 
the value of distressed company. An efficient bankruptcy regime thus should function as a 
filtering device which allows efficient firms to continue and inefficient firms to liquidate 
(White, 1994a, 1994b; Fisher and Martel, 1995). It should be free from type I error 
(allowing inefficient firms to continue) and type II errors (in which efficient firms are 
liquidated).
50
 
 
The objective of the next section is to analyze these procedures from an economic, 
financial, social and legal point of view and disseminate their consequences.  
 
2.4. The Ex-Post Tradeoff: Should Bankrupt Companies be Liquidated or Reorganized? 
 
In recent times, almost every country of the world seems to have incorporated at least two 
basic formal processes for dealing with corporate debt recovery. These two important 
processes are Liquidation and Reorganization. Liquidation is synonymous with winding 
up, dissolution and bankruptcy while Reorganization is also known as rescue, 
reconstruction, renegotiation and rehabilitation. Many other processes which can stem 
from within the objective (survival) of Reorganization are as follows: Composition, 
Suspension of Payments and Corporate Voluntary Arrangement. Here we would like to 
focus on the two basic and most extensively used processes of corporate insolvency 
regime: Liquidation and Reorganization.  
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Fisher and Martel (2004) postulated a more comprehensive way of measuring filtering failure. In their empirical study of 303 firms 
for the period between 1997-1988, they observed that Type I errors (welcoming a plan of reorganization from a nonviable firm) are 
likely to take place 4 times more than the Type II errors (refusing a plan of reorganization from a viable firm). Thus, for the efficiency 
of bankruptcy code, filtering between viable and nonviable firm is imperative. Based on this viability, the company is put under 
liquidation or reorganization.  
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2.4.1. What are Liquidation and its Consequences? 
 
Liquidation is the oldest and most traditional way of dealing with the debts of a company. 
This process primarily involves selling off an organization‘s assets or business thereby 
resulting in the termination of organization‘s business tenure. It can be triggered 
voluntarily by the debtors or involuntarily by the creditors or the court. Although the basic 
features of all liquidation processes are similar for most of the countries, their 
implementation can vary based on institutional factors, legal origins or debtor or creditor 
orientations of the law. 
 
Liquidation is observed as the most extensively practiced insolvency process worldwide. 
Indeed, in France, it is observed that 90 percent of the bankruptcies end up in liquidations 
(Blazy, Delannay, Petey, and Weill 2008) and similarly in UK this percentage ranges 
between 80-85 percent
51
.  
 
1) What is Liquidation from an Economic Point of View? 
 
In any market economy, efficient firms should be allowed to continue and inefficient firms 
should be terminated as quickly as possible in order to facilitate deployment of resources 
to other better purposes
52
. Liquidation is a process that facilitates this motive and 
terminates inefficient firm and brings efficiency into the system. The assets are reallocated 
to more efficient and profitable entrepreneurs. Hence, economic theory justifies the 
process of liquidation as it avoids wastage of resources and results in the transfer of wealth 
in a faster and in an inexpensive manner.  
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 For statistics see Insolvency service website: 
     http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/otherinformation/statistics/historicdata/HDmenu.htm 
52
 According to the Darwinian approach, ―a capitalist economy will acknowledge that a certain level of corporate demise is both 
inevitable and necessary to the efficient functioning of the market‖, see J Argenti, Corporate Collapse: The Causes and Symptoms 
(McGraw Hill, London, 1976), p170; 
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2) What is Liquidation from a Financial Point of View?  
 
Good reputation and a bond of trust are built on the foundations of honoring financial 
commitments and contracts. Dishonoring such commitments leads to loss of reputation 
and destroy such accumulated value. Thus, from a financial point of view, the process of 
liquidation signifies that the firm‘s financial links are dismantled. It also signifies that its 
creditors would now be apprehensive in doing business with it in future.  
 
3) What is Liquidation from a Social Point of View?  
 
From a social point of view liquidation can be seen as a process that terminates the labour 
contracts. An interesting question arises here as to whether this can be an issue or not. Let 
us present our arguments for the same. If the labour market is not at equilibrium 
(unemployment hysteresis
53
) then in that case liquidation has a social cost. On the 
contrary, if the labour market does not suffer from inefficiencies then switching to a more 
stable and reliable employer can be considered a feasible measure. However, this view is 
less credible in the current times of crisis. The prevalence of insurance schemes attaching 
privilege to unpaid wages, redundancy payments and so on can be viewed as a measure on 
the part of the Government for the protection of employees.  
 
The Cork Report observed: ―We believe that a concern for the livelihood and wellbeing of 
those dependent upon an enterprise which may well be the lifeblood of a whole town or 
even a region is a legitimate factor to which a modern law of insolvency must have regard. 
The chain reaction consequences upon any given failure can potentially be so disastrous 
to creditors, employees and the community that it must not be overlooked.‖ 
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In economics, ―hysteresis‖ is generally defined as a particular type of response of a non-linear system when one modifies the value of 
the input: the system is said to exhibit the remanence property when there is a permanent effect on output after the value of the input has 
been modified and brought back to initial position. When the evidence of hysteresis is detected, there exists the availability to decrease 
the unemployment rate without changing the organization of the labour market. How rapidly the unemployment rate can be decreased 
depends on the mechanism of hysteresis.  
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4) What is Liquidation from a Legal Point of View?  
 
From a legal point of view, liquidation implies the death of an ‗artificial person‘ which has 
a separate legal entity. Legal theory supports this termination process as it is the genesis of 
a collective process that takes into consideration all the creditors (ranked according to their 
claims) and distribution is made in a fair and equitable manner so that no disputes arise 
and the firm is liquidated peacefully.  
 
2.4.2. What are Reorganization and its Consequences? 
 
Reorganization process is designed for the debtors who perceive that their companies have 
a fair chance of survival despite all financial problems. This procedure serves a dual 
purpose: It relieves the debtor from pursuant creditors and facilitates the continuation of its 
business. It also provides additional time to the debtor to formulate a suitable 
reorganisation plan for its ailing firm. One of the most noteworthy rescue regimes was 
initiated by Chapter 11 of US bankruptcy code 1978. Its main objective was to promote 
corporate rescue by providing a firm with an opportunity to restructure its debts and 
emerge out of its financial difficulties. Inspired by the goals of US reorganization process, 
a lot of the European countries (France, United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, and Spain 
and etc...) reformed their bankruptcy laws thereby making them more debtors friendly. 
This reorganization can be carried out under different names and different procedures but 
the main underlying principle is: Survival.  
 
The most commonly practiced methods of reorganization in Europe are ‗Composition‘ or 
‗Arrangement‘. Under these, the creditors and debtors mutually agree on certain terms and 
conditions for the reduction of a firm‘s debt and can restructure its liabilities in the 
following ways: extension of maturity period, deferral of interest payment, reduction in the 
rate of interest, conversion of debt into equity, closure of some non profitable business 
units and so on and so forth.  
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However, in practice and implementation, the process of reorganization process can 
widely vary from one country to the other and is not as universal in approach as 
liquidation.  
 
1) What is Reorganization from an Economic Point of View?  
 
Reorganisation is economically justified if the firm has positive value in the long run 
despite short term liquidity constraints. A market economy stresses the optimal use of its 
resources and competitive mechanisms which results in the maximization of economic 
value. Thus, dismantling such businesses is not considered an appropriate measure as it 
can reduce in the result of depletion of economic resources.  
 
2) What is Reorganization from a Financial Point of View?  
 
From the financial point of view, reorganization means temporary breach of financial 
contracts. One may note that this however does not signify permanent breakage of 
financial bonds. It might imply some changes in the debt contracts
54
 and payment terms 
and can result in extension of maturity terms, reduction of interest rates, and reduction of 
debts and so on.  
 
Thus, from financial point of view, reorganization restores the integrity of the debtor, who 
can still carry on with his financial relations and can avail new financing from the same 
creditors which is a necessary prerequisite for the implementation of any reorganization 
plan. 
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 In 1983, Roe proposed a strategy wherein existing debt was to be absolved and converted to its equivalent equity within the 
reorganized firm. He was of the opinion that this would empower the creditors with decision making powers about the future of the 
firm. Bebchuk (1988) and Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992) suggested a scheme wherein secured creditors will be allocated with equity 
in the firm and junior claimants receive options to purchase equity. This facilitates lot of coordination issues among the creditors and 
also solves the problem related to control rights. 
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3) What is Reorganization from a Social Point of View? 
 
Reorganization from a social point of view allows the continuation of the same corporate 
entity and at the same time preserves employment. One of the observed advantages of this 
mechanism, for employees, is that they can continue working on their familiar production 
lines or business unit. This can be instrumental towards awakening of a spirit of 
camaraderie between employees and firm owners and can be a big step forward towards a 
combined effort for stabilizing the business of the firm. The directors/managers are the 
forerunners of an organization and hence it is noteworthy that they are the ones who can 
sense a financial threat at its nascent onset. Since this mechanism preserves the company's 
control with them,
55
 they are naturally inclined to take timely preventive action in the 
wake of an early incoming financial threat. However, it is general point of view that 
managers do not think much about the creditor‘s losses and at times intentionally delay the 
onset
56
 for fear of losing their jobs and authority if the bankruptcy system replaces the 
current incumbent management by a court appointed official. Thus, reorganization process 
should control this opportunistic and risky behavior of the shareholders thereby preventing 
reckless risk taking activities. 
 
4) What is Reorganization from a Legal Point of View? 
 
From the legal point of view reorganization does not have any significant impact and 
ensures the continuation of the same business entity.  
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 However, there are some exceptions too as this process varies from country to county (eg: In UK, directors are removed by a court 
appointed official) 
56
 It has been observed that: ―[Under Chapter 11] [s]hareholders, who know they will get peanuts if the firm is wound up, want the firm 
to keep trading in the hope that it will come good. Creditors, on the other hand, can be damaged every day that the firm trades without a 
rescue package…Managers have two good motives to avoid a deal with creditors for as long as they can: they keep their jobs longer, 
and they work for shareholders, who do not want a deal either‖.  For more details refer to the ―The kindness of Chapter 11‖, The 
Economist, 26 May 1991, at 97. 
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2.4.2.1. What should Sale of Company be considered as: Liquidation or 
Reorganization? 
 
Within bankruptcy procedures sometimes sales are considered to be a part of liquidation 
process and sometimes a part of the reorganization procedure. In this section, let us 
analyse sales from different perspectives:  
 
1) Economic View–Sales result in selling of business as a whole or in parts to different 
business entities. It results in saving of the business but not the entity in itself. There is 
a big debate whether the business should be saved or the company. For running a 
company, human and physical assets are required and a combination of these results in 
a productive activity that generates revenues and adds economic value. Company is a 
legal entity and comprises of all these activities. In absence of these activities, it is just 
a name, nothing more. By selling the business to a different legal entity, we redeploy 
the profitable assets of the company so that they can be optimally used elsewhere, 
whereas unprofitable assets can be broken down and sold piecemeal. Thus, saving 
business adds economic value whereas saving legal entity does not create any 
economic value. Thereby, from economic point of view sales is synonymous with 
liquidation as assets are transferred to profitable businesses.  
 
2) Financial View – Interestingly from the financial point of view, sales cannot be 
considered as liquidation because financial contracts can be extended or continued 
under the name of a different legal entity. The payment received from the sale of assets 
or the business forms the basis of making disbursements to the creditors. Thus from 
financial point of view, sales commensurate the reorganization procedure.  
 
3) Social View – From a social point of view, sales is closer to reorganization than 
liquidation. Under sales, certain employment contracts can be continued while some 
contracts can be annulled. Thus from a social perspective, sales can exhibit hybrid 
characteristics (liquidation and reorganization). 
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4) Legal Point – From the legal point of view, sales is liquidation. The personal legal 
entity is cancelled and transferred to a different legal entity.  
 
Under the French Legislation, sales as going concern were considered to be the part of 
reorganization proceedings whereas after the 2005 bankruptcy reforms it has become a 
part of liquidation procedure. This is not neutral as it reflects the shift from financial and 
social point of view towards the economic and legal point of view. However, under new 
reformed administration procedure of UK (effective since 15th September, 2003), saving 
the company as going concern is considered as the primary objective in the hierarchy of 
statutory purposes
57
. This means that saving the company gets priority over saving its 
business. Sealy and Milman (2006) and Goldring and Phillips (2002) argued that the 
primary purposes of new administration regime were formulated especially keeping the 
incentives of directors in mind. This encourages the directors to enter into administration 
as they know their legal entity could be rescued in this process. On the contrary, if the 
directors know that it is the business that will be saved then they will have no willingness 
to seek protection under such a reorganization procedure.  
 
2.4.3. Pros and Cons of Liquidation and Reorganization 
 
Having discussed the mechanisms of two main processes of bankruptcy (Liquidation and 
Reorganization), it will be intriguing to delve into a comparative analysis of liquidation 
based and reorganization based systems. For this purpose, we will refer to some previous 
studies conducted primarily in US.  
 
Many researchers have attempted to study the pros and cons of Liquidation based (chapter 
7) and Reorganization based (chapter 11) Bankruptcy System (Pulvino 1999, Schleifer and 
Vishny 1992, Weiss and Wruck 1998). Denis & Rodger (2007) argue that Chapter 11 of 
US bankruptcy code induces substantial costs by protecting inefficient firms from the 
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Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule B1 
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creditors and market forces. To add to this fact Morrison stated (2007) stated that, courts 
are underfunded and often lack economic expertise and often result in keeping unviable 
firms alive that should have been liquidated. Weiss (1990) demonstrates that a success rate 
of up to 86% was recorded for all the quoted companies filing for Chapter 11 during the 
period of 1980‘s. Baird and Rasmussen (2002, 2003) find evidence of a decline58 of this 
success rate by 24% in 2002, while the usage of Chapter 11, being reduced to half as 
compared to the 1980‘s.  
 
Despite of many criticisms against chapter 11, recent empirical work finds evidence that 
reorganization under chapter 11 of US bankruptcy code is not as expensive as often 
assumed. In certain cases it has been found to be effective thereby allowing viable firms to 
emerge out successfully in a faster and adequate manner (Bris, Welch, & Zhu 2006; Denis 
& Rodgers, 2007; Morrison, 2007). Mooradian (1994) also stated that Chapter 11 can 
often act as a successful filtering device between the viable and unviable firms.   
 
Couwenberg (2001) finds evidence that reorganization success rates in European countries 
are considerably low as compared to Chapter 11 of US bankruptcy code. Moreover, he 
found that international comparisons between several countries were hindered by the lack 
of significant statistical coherent data. Brouwer (2006) in comparative studies between 
European and US bankruptcy procedures, exhibits poor functioning of European 
reorganization procedures as compared to Chapter 11. She further states that the 
Continental European countries are characterized by a creditor oriented bankruptcy system 
which is often biased towards liquidations. This is in contrast with common law countries 
where bankruptcy laws are more debtor oriented and thus provide more chances for 
survival to a distressed firm. However, here the author fails to recognize the case of UK, 
which alike US also belongs to common law system but instead of being debtor friendly it 
is more biased towards creditors. Thus, there is a need for additional work before arriving 
at any conclusions.  
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 White (1996) showed a very low success rate for small businesses filing under chapter 11. 
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Without knowing the exact reasons clearly for the success rate of Chapter 11, several 
countries of Europe amended their bankruptcy codes. They failed to notice the fact that the 
US and European practices vary drastically. The most significant difference being: who 
retains the power to manage the firm? In US, the incumbent management remains in 
control of about half of the reorganization cases filed (Franks, Nyborg, and Torous, 1996). 
However, this is not the case in European countries where most of the time a court 
appointed administrator or trustee takes control of the firm. He is the one who formulates a 
plan for reorganization of the distressed firm. This could explain why management is 
reluctant to file for reorganization. Moreover, most of the bankruptcies in Europe are 
initiated involuntarily by the creditors which are in contrast to what happens in 90 percent 
of bankruptcies in US which are initiated by debtors (Baird, 1991). Managers in general do 
not think much about creditor‘s losses and concentrate more on their incentives which 
results in late filing of bankruptcy and further distresses the firm. Such a bankruptcy 
system might delay the redeployment of resources to its best use instead of helping the 
economy in the elimination of nonviable firms (White 1990). Moreover, we see that in 
countries like France, 90 percent
59
 of the bankruptcy filings end up in liquidation and this 
percentage for UK was 85 percent
60
. Thus, we see that the optimum design of bankruptcy 
code and what are its key attributes is still an active and debated topic of research and 
interests researchers worldwide. 
 
So far, we have explained the pros and cons (and consequences) of each outcome, but 
without having provided a decision rule (which rule should be applied when choosing 
between liquidation and continuation). Now, we have to adopt a wider view and define 
what criteria a bankruptcy law should follow to attain efficiency and what should be the 
objectives of an ideal bankruptcy code. 
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 Blazy R., Delannay F. Anne, Joel Petey and Laurent Weill [2008] ―Une analyse comparative des procEdures de faillite: France, 
Allemagne, Royaume-Uni", Regards sur les PME, n°16, OSEO.  
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See for e.g., Insolvency service statistics UK:  
http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/otherinformation/statistics/historicdata/HDmenu.htm 
45 
 
2.5. Talking about “Efficiency”: What Should be the Objectives of Bankruptcy Law? 
 
Economic theory suggests that an efficient bankruptcy regime should be able to 
distinguish between viable and non viable firms and the latter ones should be eliminated to 
stop further deterioration of the financial situation of the firm and former ones should be 
allowed to continue in the best interest of the firm and the stakeholders. This filtering is 
facilitated by the court and some authors have tried to study the devices
61
 available to the 
courts for enhancing their decision making (Blazy, 2002, Besancenot & Vranceanu, 2005). 
An efficient bankruptcy regime thus should function as a filtering device allowing efficient 
firms to continue and inefficient firms to liquidate (White, 1994a, 1994b; Fisher and 
Martel, 1995). Also, it should be free from type I error (allowing inefficient firms to 
continue) and type II errors (efficient firms are liquidated).  
 
2.5.1. The Major Objectives: Ex-Post and Ex-Ante Efficiencies 
 
2.5.1.1. Ex-Post Efficiency 
 
The effectiveness of bankruptcy regime as investigated by the researchers is often 
measured by two of its complementary aspects: Ex Post
62
 and Ex Ante Efficiency (Hart, 
1995). A procedure is said to be ex-post efficient if it maximizes the value of the 
distressed firm, involves low bankruptcy costs and transfers the control to the creditors
63
. 
This signifies that law must choose the procedure that makes the best possible use of the 
firm‘s assets keeping in mind the rights of all stakeholders while deciding the priority 
order for distribution. The ex-post efficiency is determined by two important features of 
bankruptcy law. First, credible information about the debtor and its company is made 
available and is duly disseminated to other concerned parties so that they are able to make 
correct assessments. Second, it aids in decision making process by coordinating the actions 
of the creditors. Both these factors play an important role in maximizing the value of the 
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 Regis Blazy studied the sanction of faulty managers for abusive continuation of activity. The French legal system can lead to 
omission of manager or make him liable to pay partially or totally the insufficiency of assets.  
62
 Hart (2000) establishes two goals of bankruptcy law: ex post efficiency and ex ante efficiency.  
63
 Studies conducted by Baird (1986), Jackson (1986) and Aghion and Bolton (1992) stated that creditors should have the right to 
choose the future of the distressed firm as bankruptcy results in an implicit sale of firms assets to existing creditors.  
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firm and also in determining ex-post efficiency. Additionally an ex post efficient 
procedure impoverishes the over-investment and under-investment problems arising 
during the bankruptcy process. Over-investment takes place if the company invests in a 
project that decreases its value, and under-investment occurs if the company is not able to 
invest in the project that enhances its value. Upon the trigger of default an ex post efficient 
bankruptcy process, quickly decides between viable and nonviable firms and deploys the 
assets to their best possible use and thus maximizes their value.  
 
i) How can we measure Ex Post Efficiency in practice? 
 
A lot of empirical work has been done to measure the ex post efficiency of the procedure 
and often researchers have attempted to use it as a measure to judge the efficiency of the 
bankruptcy code
64
. However, in reality it is a herculean task because for doing so one 
needs to determine the liquidation value and reorganization value of each and every firm. 
While the liquidation value can be easily estimated, problems arise while computing the 
reorganization value. In US and Canada, under court supervised reorganization 
procedures, it is imperative for the courts to take ‗best interest tests‘ into consideration. 
Best interest test compares the value of both the processes from creditor‘s perspective and 
chooses the one which provides a creditor a better pay off.  However, researchers point out 
the weakness of this system emphasizing the fact that discount rates used are not 
appropriate (Klee, 1995). Fisher and Martel (2007) analysed the sensitivity of best interest 
tests by exploring a sample of 180 firms that filed for Canadian reorganization procedure. 
They tested the impact of discount rates, the estimated probability of success, time taken to 
liquidate assets and the market to book value of the assets. They suggested that bankruptcy 
courts can compare the sum of payments under reorganization to the net market value of 
the liquidated assets to arrive at the best choice. They do not need to take discount rates 
into consideration. Consequently, most of the researchers use proxy such as recovery rate 
(which should be highest for ex post efficient procedure) or the bankruptcy cost (should be 
lowest for ex post efficient procedure). In addition, to estimate the indirect cost of the 
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 Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code has received substantial criticism and a primary contributing factor to it is Ex Post Efficiency. 
For more details, the reader is urged to refer to the works of Baird (1986), Bebchuk (1998), Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992), Hart 
(1995), Weiss and Wruck (1998) 
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proceedings, the length of the procedure is calculated which is often regarded as a proxy 
for indirect costs. These indirect costs are difficult to measure so we use length of the 
process as a measure of indirect costs arising out of bankruptcy. Inefficiency of 
bankruptcy code is often judged on these factors. Towering costs, lengthy processes, 
higher failure rates and low creditor recovery rates all contribute to the ex post inefficiency 
of the code.  
 
2.5.1.2. Ex-Ante Efficiency 
 
Ex-ante efficiency analyses the effects of legal mechanism on the incentives of involved 
parties before the firm enters into default, even before any signs of financial distress are 
evident at the time of making contracts and taking financing decisions. This is the reason 
why bankruptcy law has been considered a significant factor in determining capital 
structure of the firm and major financing decisions
65
. The bankruptcy procedures have an 
impact on the access of credit long before any signs of default are visible. If the creditors
66
 
believe that they are less protected in the event of bankruptcy, they would increase the cost 
of credit or refuse it all together. In order to allow easy credit flow, collective procedures 
must protect the rights of the creditors and allow them to monitor the activities of the 
borrowers. Thus, bankruptcy procedures are ex ante efficient if they allow the company to 
undertake profitable projects and turn down projects that involve too much of a risk and at 
the same time keep a check on reckless risk taking by debtors. 
 
Two main effects on the incentives that are of significance can be observed. Firstly, a 
bankruptcy procedure keeps a check
67
 on excessive risk taking abilities of the managers 
and provides them with right incentives to manage the firm. Also it is in the best interest of 
stakeholders that the procedure is triggered as quickly as possible. For instance, criminal 
penalties on the directors and the managers, who sought to delay the opening of 
proceedings should encourage them ex-ante to initiate the process early. Secondly, a legal 
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 Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) points out the role of bankruptcy law in determining the capital structure of the firm.  
66
 Davydenko and Franks (2008) show how the lenders overcome the lack of creditor protection by demanding more collateral at loan 
origin.  
67 
Loss of job, no share in residual value 
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procedure reduces the overall cost of borrowing, for the firm, by protecting the rights of its 
creditors at the time of financial distress.  
 
Thus, legislation is deemed to be effective if it encourages, ex ante, the creditor and debtor 
to trigger the onset of default in a timely manner. Moreover, the law can explicitly confer 
the power on to the debtors for the timely triggering of the procedure. By penalizing the 
managers if they deliberately delay the onset of the procedure, the law might prevent them 
from undertaking risky projects and keep their activities in check. Thus, from an economic 
point of view, both ex post and ex ante efficiency are crucial for determining the efficiency 
of the bankruptcy code. However, in practice ex post efficiency (due to its quantitative 
nature) is often measured by academics but measuring ex ante efficiency is a complex 
process and can be laced with plenty of obstacles (due to the qualitative nature). 
 
i) How to Measure Ex Ante Efficiency in Practice? 
 
In practice it is not easy to measure the ex ante efficiency of bankruptcy laws as the 
behavior of creditor and managers can vary widely from one situation to the other. The 
effects of bankruptcy law on the design of debt contracts
68
 and on the claimant‘s behavior 
in terms of monitoring and granting of loans
69
 have been discussed widely in the literature. 
Similarly, the effects on the behavior of managers are varied. A good bankruptcy regime 
can prevent the managers from undertaking risky projects
70
 and thus reduce the moral 
hazard problem (Grossman and Hart, 1986). It also addresses under-investment problem in 
firms due to lack of availability of finances
71
 and promotes investments in firm-specific 
human capital.
72
 Besides, it aids in communication of information to the creditors and 
decides the timing of default (Baird, 1991; Berkovitch and Israel, 1998, 1999). Thus, the 
measures of ex ante efficiency are complex to implement in practice as the predicted 
sources can be varied.  
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 Gorton and Kahn, 2000; Jappeli, Pagano and Bianco; 2005 
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 Cornelli and Fella, 1997 
70
 Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991 
71
 White, 1989; Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991; Berkovitch and Israel, 1998 
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 Bebchuk and Picker, 1993; Berkovich, Israel, and Zender, 1997, 1998 
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The table 2.2 provides you with the literature on ex-ante and ex-post problems as studied 
by various researchers:  
Table: 2.2 The literature on Ex-ante and Ex-Post problems of Bankruptcy law 
Reference Ex-Ante Problem Ex-Post Problem 
White (1980) 
 
Debt overhang Debt overhang 
Eberhart / Senbet (1993) 
 
Incentives to take high risks  
Giammarino / Nosal (1996) 
 
Strategic default Perk consumption (effort) 
Kalay / Zender (1997, s. II) 
 
Underinvestment Managerial effort 
Kalay / Zender (1997, s. III) 
 
Excess continuation Managerial effort 
Cornelli / Felli (1997) 
 
Incentives for monitoring  
Berkovitch / Israel / Zender 
(1997, 1998) 
 
Investment in firm-specific 
human capital 
 
 
Berkovitch / Israel (1999) Underinvestment Allocation of bargaining 
power 
 
Bebchuk (2002) Overinvestment in risky 
projects 
 
 
 
 
2.5.2. Common Goals of Bankruptcy Laws 
 
It is difficult to design an optimal bankruptcy law but it should aim at achieving at least 
the following goals: 
 
a) Filtering and Maximization of the Value of the Firm: Whenever default is 
triggered, managers and the bankruptcy officials are left with determining the market 
value of the firm. This is a crucial decision based upon which future course of action 
(liquidation or reorganization) for the defaulted firm is decided. Thus, filtering of 
Source: Wohlschlegel (2002) 
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viable and nonviable firms is inherent for any bankruptcy law
73
. This filtering should 
be accurate otherwise efficient firms will be liquidated and inefficient firms allowed to 
continue which would result in further economic losses.  
 
A bankruptcy process should maximize the total value of the firm‘s assets to be 
divided among various stakeholders.  Consequently, firms may be reorganized, sold as 
going concern, liquidated piecemeal or shut down. Whatever procedure is chosen, 
underlying principle should remain the same: maximization of the total value of the 
firm available to stakeholders.  
 
b) Provide Good Incentives Before Default: A good bankruptcy regime should be able 
to maximize the value of the firm long before any signs of default are evident. This 
means providing right incentives to the debtors and the managers long before 
bankruptcy. Often the investment and financial decisions of a firm are taken much 
before any sign of default surfaces at the horizon. By monitoring the activities of 
debtors and keeping their risk taking activities under control, bankruptcy laws can ex 
ante protect the creditor claims. It must be able to sanction the faulty management 
which destroys the value of the company by undertaking too risky projects and putting 
the creditor‘s money at stake.  
 
c) Preservation of the Bonding Role of the Debt: Absolute priority means that senior 
creditors must be paid in full before any proceeds are distributed among junior 
creditors and stockholders. It should preserve the bonding role of the debt and keep a 
check on the entrepreneur‘s risk taking abilities. This motivates the lenders to finance 
the companies as they feel confident that contractual agreements entered with the 
company will be honored even when company defaults. Every bankruptcy law 
provides for absolute priority order but how far it is followed still remains a question.  
Moreover, there is still a big debate among the academics about efficiency effects of 
this feature
74
. In practice we observe quite a lot of deviations from APR.  
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Fisher and Martel (2004), study a sample of 303 Canadian firms in reorganization during 1977-1988. They find the type I errors 
(allowing a nonviable firm to continue) are likely to have four times more than the type II errors (shutting down a viable firm).  
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For some academics deviations from APR is supposed to be beneficial [Bebchuk and Picker (1993), Berkovitch, Israel, and Zender 
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d) Protecting the Interests of the Residual Claimants: One of the reasons companies 
fall into distress is often attributed to the managerial behavior and excessive risk 
taking. Bankruptcy law must ensure transfer of control to the creditors who are directly 
affected by the outcome of bankruptcy and not to people who have been responsible 
for the onset of default (managers). The future of the firm should be decided by the 
residual claimants because their lives are directly impacted by bankruptcy. This 
process ensures that the outcomes are favorably inclined towards the stakeholders as 
well as in the best interest of the firm. 
 
e) Saving Procedural Costs: Bankruptcy process should be easy, flexible and should 
provide quick and efficient solutions to the firm. As time is considered to be directly 
proportional to the cost of the procedure, adhering to a strict deadline, defined by laws, 
ensures a cost effective outcome. This is necessary so that stakeholders receive the 
maximum value out of the firm‘s assets and that the value of estate is not lost in 
lengthy and cumbersome bankruptcy proceedings. In US, these costs are found to 
consume substantial part of bankruptcy estate (Altman, 1984; Altman and Vanderhoof, 
1994).  
 
f) Finding the Optimal Tradeoff between Transparency and Confidentiality: 
Asymmetry of information between the creditors and debtors is one of the biggest 
obstacles in the way of resolving distress. An efficient bankruptcy regime should 
transfer credible information to all the stakeholders of the company. This information 
should be trustworthy and credible
75
 so that stakeholders can make decisions. 
However, in bankruptcy, information is often made public and can trigger panic 
situations whereas confidentiality prevents panics. Chatterjee, Dhillon, and Ramirez 
(1995) show less negative abnormal returns for announcement of workout than 
Chapter 11 filings. Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) further add that stocks returns are 
more negative for firms that subsequently file for Chapter 11. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
(1997, 1998), Baird (1991), Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), White (1989)]. While others believe adherence to APR increases efficiency 
[Jackson (1986), Hart(1995), Bebchuk (2002)] 
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DTI/Insolvency Service, Productivity and Enterprise: Insolvency—A Second Chance, (Cm 5234, 2001) ; S Davies QC (ed), 
Insolvency and the Enterprise Act 2002 (Jordans, Bristol, 2003), p38-39 
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2.5.3. Changing Objectives of Bankruptcy Law 
 
The treatment of debtors at the time of bankruptcy has evolved over the centuries and so 
have the objectives of bankruptcy. In the past centuries, the world of bankruptcy was 
highly stigmatized. The punishment for declaring bankruptcy in ancient Rome was slavery 
or being cut to pieces while in northern Italy insolvent debtors hit their naked backs 
against a rock three times before a jeering crowd and cried out, ―I declare bankruptcy‖. In 
England bankrupt debtors were often put behind the bars and occasionally had an ear cut 
off. Gradually, the severity of punishment kept on decreasing because with the increase in 
number of bankruptcies, rising unemployment and the worsening economic crisis, 
governments felt the need for more humane bankruptcy procedures.  
 
Thus, Chapter 11 of US bankruptcy code was introduced keeping this objective in mind. 
Its primary objective was to promote corporate rescue by providing a firm with an 
opportunity of restructuring its debts and for emerging out of its financial difficulties. A 
lot of theoretical and empirical studies have been conducted on Chapter 11 of American 
bankruptcy code since then. Inspired by Chapter 11 of American bankruptcy code, 
European commission in its communication
76
 stated that, ―Europe must re-examine its 
attitude to risk, reward and failure. Thus, enterprise policy must encourage policy 
initiatives that reward those who take risks. Europe is often reluctant in giving another 
chance to entrepreneurs who fail. Enterprise policy will examine the conditions under 
which failure could acquire a less negative connotation and it could be acceptable to try 
again. It will encourage Member States to review bankruptcy legislation to encourage risk-
taking‖.  The objective is to promote the survival of viable businesses, to enable smooth 
exit for non viable businesses and to offer opportunities for fresh start and at the same time 
fostering entrepreneurship and innovation
77
.  As a consequence, a number of European 
governments (France, United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, and Spain) reformed their 
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 Commission of the European Communities (2000) Challenges for enterprise policy in the knowledge-driven economy. Proposal for a 
Council decision on a Multiannual Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship (2001-2005) 
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Philippe & Partners, Deloitte & Touche Corporate Finance, Bankruptcy and a Fresh Start: Stigma on Failure and Legal Consequences 
of Bankruptcy, (Brussels, July 2002); European Commission, Enterprise Directorate General, Best Project on Restructuring, Bankruptcy 
and a Fresh Start, Final Report of the Expert Group (September 2003). 
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respective bankruptcy law procedures
78
 to promote a culture of rescue and provide 
incentives to creditors who support the rehabilitation process
79
 of the debtor corporation.  
 
Governments have demonstrated a rising interest in bankruptcy research with the 
objectives of enhancing legal framework which would then foster an efficient 
reorganization process. Most of the countries are becoming debtor friendly which signifies 
that bankruptcy is comprehended as an economic tool for the protection of businesses and 
for helping economic growth. Legislations are prioritizing continuations over liquidations 
(shift from creditor friendly regime to debtor friendly regime), but in practice liquidation 
remains the dominant outcome of bankruptcy.
80
 
 
2.6. The Orientation of Bankruptcy Laws  
 
Having studied the objectives and main features of an optimum bankruptcy regime, it is 
inherent to comprehend that under legislation, the notion of efficacy may differ. Some 
laws focus on the rights of creditors 
81
(hard laws) while others give freedom to the debtors 
(soft laws) to continue management of business even after default while others strictly 
stress on the need for continuation in order to keep employment intact and focus more on 
social objectives. Consequently ―for similar firms filing for bankruptcy in different 
countries, we could expect different outcomes for creditors depending on the level of 
creditor protection provided by bankruptcy code‖.82 In their seminal work, LaPorta & al. 
(1997, 1998) have highlighted the difference in bankruptcy procedures across countries. 
Interestingly enough, such differences are likely to impact the default process and its 
outcome.  
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For a detailed discussion of the US Chapter 11, see P Lewis, ―Corporate Rescue Law in the United States‖, in K Gromek Broc and R 
Parry (eds), Corporate Rescue: An Overview of Recent Developments from Selected Countries (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International, 
2006), p333. 
79 S Frisby (2004), ‗In Search of a Rescue Regime: The Enterprise Act 2002‘, 67 MLR 247, 249-251. 
80 
France it is observed that 90 percent of the bankruptcies end in liquidations (Blazy, Delannay, Petey, and Weill 2008) and similarly in 
UK almost 80-85 percent80 of bankruptcies end in liquidations. 
81 For the detailed guidelines for creditor rights see, The World Bank, Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems 
(Revised Draft, 2005).  
82
 Davydenko and Franks (2006) 
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In this section by analyzing the previous literature, we address the following question: 
does the orientation of bankruptcy codes (which differs from one country to the other) 
depends on the origins of the legal system or is independent from it?  
 
2.6.1. Classification of Bankruptcy Regimes as Creditor Oriented or Debtor Oriented 
 
We have often seen that corporate bankruptcy regimes have been classified into debtor 
oriented regimes
83
 or creditor oriented regimes
84
 or debtor friendly or creditor friendly. 
Creditor friendly laws are traditionally considered contrary to debtor friendly laws
85
.  
Debtor oriented regimes are often called as ―soft laws‖ and creditor oriented regimes 
called as ―hard laws‖. This can be attributed to how the law treats the creditors and debtors 
rights under bankruptcy (Chopard, 2005). If creditors enjoy more protection in the event of 
default, then it is termed as creditor oriented regime and if the debtors enjoy more 
protection upon default, then it is termed as debtor oriented regime.  
 
2.6.1.1. Debtor Oriented 
 
Upon default, under the supervision of the court, if the reorganization plan permits the 
manager to continue the control of business and additionally provides for complete stay on 
the enforcement proceedings of the creditors, it is termed as debtor oriented regime. This 
means that this regime is soft on the management (soft law). Burdened by the poor 
financial condition of business and the relentless pressures of pursuant creditors, the 
debtor can choose to seek protection under this regime. It provides them with immediate 
relief from all creditors‘ action and also gives them ample time to come up with a 
reorganization plan. Expecting some kind of return under this form of bankruptcy regime, 
debtors are tempted to trigger the process at the very first signs of distress. Thus, it makes 
the process ex ante efficient. But on the other hand, by allowing these rights to debtors it 
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 Chapter 11 of US bankruptcy code 1978 is the best example of debtor-oriented regime, France is also considered to have debtor-
oriented bankruptcy regime. 
84
 Receivership procedure of UK‘s Insolvency code 1986 was considered to be highly creditor-oriented procedure. Sweden‘s auction 
based bankruptcy system is also considered highly creditor oriented.  
85 
For details see, Gilles Recasens (2003), ―Faut-il adopter un systeme pro-creanciers de defaillances? Une revue de la littérature‖, 
Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, vol 6, p119-153.    
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can give them an opportunity to indulge in ex ante risk taking activities or undertaking 
risky projects that can later put the company creditors into difficult position and can also 
encourage moral hazard behavior on the part of managers. Thus, on one hand, we see that 
debtor oriented regime encourages debtors to trigger the procedure as soon as they suspect 
first signs of financial distress while on the other hand, it encourages ex ante reckless 
behavior by the managers and excessive risk taking activities.  
 
2.6.1.2. Creditor Oriented 
 
Upon default and under the supervision of the court, if the reorganization plan replaces the 
management by a court appointed official (hard on management) and does not provide 
complete stay of creditors‘ enforcement rights, it is termed as creditor oriented regime. It 
allows the secured creditors to enforce upon their collaterals by allowing them to stay out 
of proceedings. Under this kind of regime, an official administrator takes charge of the 
complete proceedings and has fiduciary duties towards all creditors. Reorganization plan is 
formulated by the court appointed official and is voted upon by the creditors while the 
management has no say in the process. Under such a regime, management can 
intentionally delay the onset of the procedure as they do not see any incentives for 
themselves if the company is put under bankruptcy. By delaying the procedure they can 
keep their jobs intact and also continue to manage the firm and take decisions. Such delays 
encourage the managers to indulge in over-investment
86
 and under-investment
87
 activities 
if they believe that chance of returning to solvency is very low. Consequently, it further 
deteriorates the position of the firm leaving no chance of survival. Thus, we observe that 
this type of regime can be ex ante inefficient as it delays the onset of the procedure but can 
be ex post efficient too by transferring the rights of deciding on important matters to the 
creditors. It can be ex ante efficient in the sense that it gives secured creditors the right to 
                                                 
86 
J.E. Stiglitz, ‗Some Aspects of the Pure Theory of Corporate Finance: Bankruptcies and Takeovers‘, 3 Bell Journal of Economics & 
Management Science (1972) p. 458 at p. 462; S. Titman, ‗The Effect of Capital Structure on a Firm‘s Liquidation Decision‘, 13 Journal 
of Financial Economics (1984) p. 137 at p. 145; D.E. Ingbermann, ‗Triggers and Priority: An Integrated Model of the Effects of 
Bankruptcy Law on Overinvestment and Underinvestment‘, 72 Washington University Law Quarterly (1994) p. 1341 at p. 1351; A. 
Schwartz, ‗The Absolute Priority Rule and the Firm‘s Investment Policy‘, 72 Washington University Law Quarterly (1994) p. 1213 at p. 
1216; R.K. Rasmussen, ‗The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on Investment Incentives‘, 72 Washington University Law 
Quarterly (1994) p. 1159 at p. 1172; M.J. White, ‗The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision‘, in J.S. Bhandari and L.A. Weiss (eds.), 
Corporate Bankruptcy: Economic and Legal Perspectives, (Cambridge University Press, 1996) at pp. 211-15. 
87 
See, e.g., G. Triantis, ‗A Theory of Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing‘, 46 Vanderbilt Law Review (1994) p. 901 at p. 
920. 
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enforce upon their collaterals in the event of bankruptcy. This makes them feel protected 
under the regime and they tend to provide easy access of credit to the firms and thus 
reduce the cost of capital for the firm.  
 
Thus, to sum up we see that both types of regime have some ex ante and ex post 
efficiencies and inefficiencies. A good bankruptcy regime should be able to mitigate the 
inefficiencies of both kinds of regimes by coming up with an optimum design for 
bankruptcy code and balancing these two aspects of law.  
 
2.6.1.3. Categorising Countries On the Basis of Orientation of Law 
 
We present a table 2.3 below, which is based on a study conducted by Wood in 1995. It 
ranks the insolvency laws of countries based on their legal orientation (creditor/debtor). 
According to Wood (1995), a creditor friendly regime recognizes the claims of the 
creditors to the greatest extent under insolvency while a debtor friendly regime provides 
adequate protection to the debtors. The latter allows the transfer of control to the debtors in 
the event of default even if there is no equity left in the firm. From the given table we can 
ascertain that British law strongly protects the creditor rights whereas France is considered 
to be worst in creditor protection and hence ranks last in the table and is considered to be a 
highly debtor oriented country. Whereas as countries like US and Canada fall in the 
middle in terms of orientation, while Germany and Japan are more inclined towards 
creditor orientation.  
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Table 2.3: Creditor/Debtor Orientation of Corporate Insolvency Law 
 
1. Former British colonies except S. Africa and Zimbabwe  
2. England, Australia, Ireland  
3. Germany, Netherlands, Indonesia, Sweden, Switzerland, Poland  
4. Scotland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway  
5. United States, Canada except Quebec  
6. Austria, Denmark, Czech and Slovak Republics: S. Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe (all 
three Dutch-based);  
7. Italy  
8. Greece, Portugal, Spain, most Latin American countries**  
9. Former French colonies, Egypt, Belgium and Zaire  
10. France  
 
 
Scale: 1 = Most pro-creditor  
         10 = Most pro-debtor  
 
No insolvency law: Liberia (many Arab countries)                          
Not classified: Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. 
*Orientation by explicit law disregarding implementation through the court system. 
**Except Paraguay that protects security interests strongly. 
 
In the table 2.4 below, we notice the main determinants of the degree of creditor-
orientation of insolvency laws provided by Wood (1995). Protecting the security rights of 
the creditors in the event of default allows the secured creditors to enforce upon their 
collateral and thus encourages more financing against collateral. However, strong 
protection of secured creditors weakens the position of other stakeholders (employees, 
state and the unsecured creditors) in the event of default. From the perspective of the bank, 
insolvency procedures must guarantee recovery of their debt. This results in enforcement 
of loan contracts by taking over the assets that had been pledged against the loan. 
However, other stakeholders may also have some kind of stake in the firm, but are not well 
protected by law. Hence the manner in which the legal system protects the creditors or the 
debtors is often regarded as the basis for judging the efficiency of bankruptcy code.  
 
 
 
 
Source: Wood (1995) 
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Table 2.4: Determinants of high degree of creditor orientation 
 
1. Wide scope and efficiency on bankruptcy of security and title financing (retention of 
title, factoring, leasing)  
2. Weak corporate rehabilitation statutes  
3. Insolvency set-off enables reciprocal unsecured creditor to be paid ahead of other 
unsecured creditors  
4. *Ownership of assets in the possession of debtor is recognized (e.g. trusts)  
5. *veil of incorporation and protection of directors against personal liability  
 
 
 
*These determinants are ambiguous from creditors‘ point of view, but creditor- orientation by 
these determinants can be seen as the recognition of explicit and implicit contracts between the 
firm and various stakeholders. 
 
2.6.1.4. Does the Distinction Make Sense? 
 
Is it effective to judge the bankruptcy regimes of the various countries on the basis or their 
orientation of law (―pro-debtor‖ or ―pro-creditor‖)? We rather believe the distinction to be 
artificial and even more misleading. For instance, Chapter 11 of US bankruptcy code is 
supposed to be the most debtor friendly system as it allows the distressed firm‘s managers 
to stay in operation. But, on the other hand, if the managers are competent, it may prove to 
be a creditor friendly feature as it may increase the value of firm available to all 
stakeholders including the creditors. The availability of new financing during the default 
process is considered to be a debtor friendly feature as it allows the continuation of the 
reorganization plan by supplying necessary credit to the firm. However, the super priority 
status provided to this category of creditors ensures the protection of the rights of post 
default creditors especially the unsecured ones. In this sense, it can be also be seen as a 
creditor friendly feature.  
 
Having observed that this distinction does not hold good and suffers from certain flaws, as 
mentioned above, it cannot be considered as a measure of efficiency of bankruptcy regime. 
As much we feel that there is further scope for conducting empirical studies for arriving at 
a definitive conclusion with respect to the ranking of countries based on their legal 
orientation. 
 
Source: Wood (1995) 
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2.6.2. The Legal Origins of Corporate Bankruptcy Codes 
 
The growing literature in law and finance has investigated the differences between legal 
origins, especially the difference between common law and civil law and their impact on 
economic performance. Even though the laws of two countries are not supposed to be 
exactly similar, still the presence of some features can help them to be classified into 
major legal traditions of the world. ―Among the criteria often used for this purpose are the 
following: 
a) historical background and development of legal system 
b) theories and hierarchies of sources of law 
c) the working methodology of jurists within the legal system 
d) the characteristics of legal concepts employed by the system 
e) the legal institutions of the system 
f) the divisions of law employed within the system‖ (Glendon et al. 1992, pp. 4-5)  
 
Based on this approach, researchers have identified two broad legal traditions: Common 
Law and Civil Law. Civil law has further resulted in the origination of three distinct laws: 
French Civil Law, German Civil Law and Scandinavian Civil Law. Let us now delve into 
a discussion of the characteristics of these legal regimes:  
 
2.6.2.1. Common Law 
 
Common law originated in England and spread through colonization. It provides great 
flexibility to its judges as long as their judgments are fair and in conformity with the law 
of precedent. The judges can administer the case according to their discretion and the 
outcomes can vary from case to case. The common law is concerned with facts and 
deciding concrete cases, rather than adhering to logical principles of codified law (Beck 
and Levine 2003, p 9 f). Common law planted the legal system above the Crown (State) 
and as such restricted monarch‘s potentiality to alter property rights and grant monopoly 
rights (Beck and Levine, 2004, 12). Australia, India, Nigeria, United States and Canada 
are some notable examples representing common law legal tradition 
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2.6.2.2. French Civil Law 
 
Contrastingly, civil code originated from French Code Napoleon of 1804. The main 
intention was to bring about a system of uniform law and replace the fragmented system 
that prevailed in many countries. This law was pioneered in France and disseminated in 
the countries under their establishment. Civil law tradition depends on statutes and written 
codes. Judges have to follow the written code and cannot act with full liberty to exercise 
their discretionary power. Their powers are restricted by the statues. As such this code is 
regarded more rigid. The civil law established the supremacy of State over the judges and 
relegated their powers to minor bureaucratic role (Dawson, 1968). Spain, Argentina, Italy, 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal and Mexico are few of the notable countries representing 
French civil code. 
 
2.6.2.3. German Civil Law 
 
Many countries derived their laws from Roman law statutes and codes and came to be 
classified as civil law family. The German civil law, though sprouted from the French civil 
code, is considered to constitute a different class because of its differences from the civil 
code. German commercial code came into existence in the year 1897, after Bismarck‘s 
unification of Germany. It impacted and influenced the legislations of various countries: 
Austria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Japan and 
Korea. Chinese law is also heavily influenced by German civil law.  
 
2.6.2.4. Scandinavian Civil Law 
 
Scandinavian law is also considered to be originated from civil law tradition. However, it 
is considered less derivative of Roman law than the French and German civil law 
(Zweigert and Kotz, 1987). Thus, Scandinavian countries adopted their own civil law 
which was different from both French civil law and English common law legal tradition 
and formed a separate family of legal tradition. Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark 
represent Scandinavian legal tradition (La Porta el al,. 1998).  
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Thus, most of the countries were divided into the four dominant legal origins- Common 
Law countries, French Civil Law countries, German Civil Law countries and Scandinavian 
Civil Law countries.  
 
2.7. Understanding Bankruptcy: Through Law and Finance Approach  
 
Failure of firms is an inherent element of any economy. Economic growth requires that old 
and obsolete activities must be abandoned so that the economic resources are deployed for 
better and profitable projects. Bankruptcy is a legal process which allows the termination 
of such inefficient firms. However, in recent times the objectives of bankruptcy laws of 
many countries have been reformed to incline them towards rescue culture. Some of the 
legal origins provide for quick and strict liquidation of firms whereas some allow chances 
for restructuring activities. Countries offering liquidation are often referred to as creditor 
oriented regimes as their main aim is to satisfy the claims of their creditors. Whereas 
countries offering rehabilitation are considered to be debtor oriented as they believe that 
the firm has potential and can be revived out of financial difficulties. Based on these 
differences, some authors have attempted to study how the legal orientation affects the 
legal rights of creditors and shareholders under bankruptcy proceedings.  
 
The law and finance theory can be traced back to two seminal and widely cited papers by 
LaPorta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LaPorta et al., 1997, 1998, henceforth 
LLSV). Their findings demonstrate that Common Law countries (Anglo-Saxon) generally 
provide the best investor protection whereas Civil Law origin (French, German and 
Scandinavian) countries provide the least investor protection while French Civil Law 
countries often fall into worst category. These studies established the supremacy of 
Common Law over Civil Law tradition especially the French Civil Law. This supremacy 
of Common Law over others was further established by various distinguished researchers 
(for example see: Davydenko and Franks, 2007, Classens and Klapper, 2005; Djankov et 
al, 2008).  
 
However these studies have often restricted themselves to a weak description of 
bankruptcy laws: either through a basic opposition between ―creditor friendly‖ and ―debtor 
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friendly‖ approaches or with a non comprehensive computation of very few indexes (four 
in LLSV and Doing Business Report, World Bank), which is clearly insufficient given the 
complexity of individual legislations and also the number of rival procedures existent in 
each given country. These approaches did not consider the dynamics of bankruptcy laws in 
each country and were rather restricted to a biased view. 
 
2.7.1. Impact of Legal Origins on Creditors’ Rights 
 
Recent literature in law and finance has established the significance of creditor rights and 
the role played by them in determining the development of financial systems and in 
affecting the firm‘s corporate governance and financing patterns. Recent financial crisis 
further highlighted the importance of bankruptcy laws with respect to rights of creditors 
and their efficiency in confronting and preventing corporate distress. These creditor rights 
not only significantly impact the ex post resolution of financial distress but also affect ex-
ante risk taking incentives and an economy‘s degree of entrepreneurship more generally.  
 
We also observe how these specific creditor rights affect creditor behaviors during the 
resolution of financial distress. If the insolvency law provides for automatic stay
88
 during 
the bankruptcy process then creditors try to renegotiate their claims and prefer to opt for 
out of court solutions. On the contrary, if the insolvency law does not provide automatic 
stay on assets during the bankruptcy process, creditors run to grasp the assets and trigger a 
creditor‘s race89 which consequently deepens the chances of bankruptcy and also reduces 
the value of the firm.  
 
Similarly, presence of absolute priority rule
90
 in the insolvency law helps in determining 
the payout order for the creditors (senior creditor being paid first followed by unsecured 
creditors and residual going to shareholders). Absence of this law would have resulted in 
conflicts of interests and coordination issues among the creditors and could have induced 
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 United Nations Commission on International Trade law (UNCITRAL), Legislative guide on Insolvency law, 2004, p217-230. 
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Bulow and Shoven (1978), Gertner and Scharfstein (1990), and Longhofer and Peters (2004) 
90
 White (1989) and Hart (2000)  
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hold-out problems
91
. Presence of this law ex ante reduces risky behaviour of the debtor 
and hence reduces chances of bankruptcy. However, if the shareholders believe that they 
are not going to receive anything out of bankruptcy, they may attempt to delay its onset 
and also initiate high risk projects with the intent of increasing their incentives and 
protecting their jobs
92
. This in turn depends on the fact that whether the managers are 
automatically removed during the bankruptcy process or they continue to manage the 
business thereafter. Thus, behavior varies according to the variance in the law.  
 
In some countries, behavior of the creditor varies with the judicial efficiency of the system 
and its enforcement. Creditors are keen on pursuing a formal bankruptcy procedure if they 
believe that the law is efficient. Thus, a country having an efficient legal enforcement 
regime will witness larger number of bankruptcies
93
. On the other hand, a weak 
enforcement regime would see debtors and creditors negotiating privately to avoid high 
costs of bankruptcy. Ayotte and Yun (2009) find a link between the optimal bankruptcy 
code and the legal environment. They show that the creditors should be granted more 
rights under bankruptcy for countries with inefficient judicial system and a low quality of 
judiciary.  
 
Several countries have reformed their bankruptcy regimes making it debtor friendly 
thereby simplifying the process of corporate rescue. However, the efficacy of these 
reforms has been hampered by the lack of empirical evidence across countries on the 
effects of bankruptcy use and efficiency. The cross country empirical evidence has been 
limited to the general effects of creditor rights and fails to explain the interaction of 
specific creditor right features on the judicial system and other inherent country 
characteristics. From this perspective, we highlight the work of three main papers that 
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significant problem is holdout, which emanates if public debt is diffusely held. To remedy such situations, bankruptcy law can force 
upon the creditors terms of reorganization proposal. Cram down provisions of chapter 11 of US bankruptcy code is an example of how 
can court use its powers.  
92
 For detailed analysis of ex post and ex ante efficiencies see Cornelli and Felli (1996). 
93
 As evidenced through studies conducted by Classens and Klapper (2003), the incidence of bankruptcies is significantly less in 
countries governed by the French Civil Law as compared to countries with English orientation. This leads them to believe that 
bankruptcy is more dominant in countries having efficient system of judiciary The creditors are more willing to resolve financial 
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courts 
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came close to providing cross country comparisons and contributed to the existing 
literature by using different methodologies and complementary answers.  
 
2.7.1.1. Building Legal Indexes Based on Comparative Law 
 
LLSV in their comparative studies
94
 empirically measure the legal protection of minority 
investors, based on a set of rights
95
 of shareholders and creditors: securities exchange, the 
law of bankruptcy and corporate competition law and commercial code.  
 
LLSV (1998) studies a set of legal rules protecting shareholders and creditors under 
bankruptcy. They measure the prevalence of these rules in a sample of forty-nine 
developed and developing countries. In the given sample they have 21 countries 
representing French Civil Origin, 18 countries representing Common Law, 6 countries 
representing German Civil Origin and 4 representing Scandinavian tradition. The authors 
then compare the legal rules and quality of their application throughout the world. In this 
context, LLSV classify countries according to the legal culture into four groups: the 
Common Law, Civil Law countries: French, German and Scandinavian. To empirically 
measure the legal protection of minority investors LLSV developed two indicators. The 
first indicator relates to the protection of the rights of minority shareholders called ―anti-
director rights‖ which is further composed of eight rights (six of them are binary and two 
continuous). These are as follows: 
 
1. One share one vote (one if company law or commercial code of the country requires 
that ordinary shares carry one vote per share; zero otherwise).  
2. The opportunity to vote by proxy (one if shareholders are allowed to mail by proxy 
vote; zero otherwise).  
3. The absence of an obligation of shareholders to transfer their securities to a trustee 
approved by the General Assemblies (one if firms are not allowed to require their 
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 Taking place in 1997, 1998, 1999 and 2000 
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 Investors are also protected by regulations of stock markets and certain accounting standards.  
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shareholders to deposit their shares prior to a General Shareholder Meeting thus 
preventing them from selling those shares for a number of days; zero otherwise).  
4. Cumulative voting or proportional representation of minority shareholders on the board 
(one if shareholders are allowed to cast all their votes to one candidate in the election of 
board of directors or if there exists a system of proportional representation in the board by 
which minority interests may name a proportional number of directors; zero otherwise). 
5. The existence of a protection for minority shareholders in case of oppression (one if 
minority shareholders are granted either a judicial venue to challenge the decisions of the 
management or if the assembly or the right to step out of the company by requiring the 
company to purchase their shares when they object to certain fundamental changes, such 
as mergers, assets dispositions and changes in the articles of incorporation; zero otherwise. 
Minority shareholders are those who own 10% or less share capital).  
6. The right of pre-emption (one if shareholders are granted the first opportunity to buy 
new issues of stock and this right can only be waived off by a shareholder vote; zero 
otherwise).  
7. Extraordinary meeting (minimum percentage of ownership of capital required to call for 
an extraordinary shareholders‘ meeting. It ranges from 1% to 33%). 
8. Mandatory dividend (equals the percentage of net income that firms are required to 
distribute as dividends among ordinary shareholders; zero for countries without such a 
restriction).  
The value of the indicator "anti-director rights" is obtained by the sum of all the marks 
awarded to the six selected rights, knowing that each right is represented by a binary 
variable. At the end of their econometric study, LLSV find that Common Law countries 
are characterized by regimes of protection for shareholders significantly better than those 
of Civil Law.  (Table 2.5 given below).  
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Table: 2.5 Anti-directors and Creditor Rights Index 
 
 
 
Common 
Law (18) 
French Civil 
Law (21) 
German Civil 
Law (6) 
Scandinavian Civil 
Law(4) 
International 
Mean (49) 
Index : Anti-
Director Rights  
 
4 
 
2,33 
 
2,33 
 
3 
 
3 
Index : Creditor 
Right  
 
3,11 
 
 
1,58 
 
 
2,33 
 
 
2 
 
 
2,30 
 
 
 
The second indicator relates to the rights of creditors which in turn are composed of binary 
variables, representing five rights for the legal protection of creditors and out of these, 4 
are binary variables and one continuous. Ranking of this indicator can vary from 0 and 4. 
These creditor rights are:  
 
1. Reorganization Rules (one for the imposition of certain restrictions to obtain creditors 
consent to file for reorganization; zero for countries without such restrictions).  
2. Automatic Stay (one if the reorganization proceedings do not impose an automatic stay 
on the assets of the firm during reorganization proceedings; zero otherwise).  
3. The Priority given to secured creditors (one if the secured creditors are ranked first in 
the distribution of the proceeds of a bankrupt firm; zero if non-secured creditors such as 
state, employees etc are given priority).  
4. Stay of Management (one if the official appointed by the court or the creditor takes 
charge of the business operation; zero if the debtor retains the control of the business).  
5. Legal Reserve (minimum percentage of total share capital mandated to avoid 
dissolution of an existing firm).  
 
From creditor right indexes, LLSV argue that the countries of Anglo-Saxon legal tradition 
offer more protection to creditors as compared to Civil Law countries, including French 
Civil Law. (table 2.5 above) 
 
From these two indicators, the authors confirm the existence of two families: Common 
Law and Civil Law. They find that Common Law countries are characterized by regimes 
Source: LLSV (1998) 
 
67 
 
of protection, for shareholders and creditors, significantly better than those of Civil Law 
countries, including French Civil Law. The values of indicators representing the rights of 
shareholders were recorded as follows: For common law countries (4 which is maximum), 
for countries following Scandinavian Civil Law (3) while for countries following French 
and German Civil Law (2.33). The indicator of creditors' rights is highest in common law 
countries (3.11) and lowest in French Civil Law countries (1.58) whereas Germanic and 
Scandinavian Civil Law countries provide medium protection to creditors (2.33 and 2 
respectively). 
 
Besides investigating the prevalence of creditors‘ rights under bankruptcy proceedings 
during a cross-country comparison they also employed these results to show the 
importance of the legal protection of investors in explaining the differences in the 
structures of ownership and control in one hand, and modes of corporate governance on 
the other.  
 
The strong point in their approach of research was that it offered an innovative (legal 
indexes) way for comparing several countries. However, the weakness of their approach is 
that they employed only 4 indexes to describe creditors‘ rights during bankruptcy. 
Moreover, these 4 indexes signify different implications and which raises an important 
question: Should it be considered wise to aggregate them and arrive at ratings? 
Analogically, can we add apples with mangoes, certainly not! These indexes imply 
different meanings and adding them together is not a wise decision. For instance these 
indexes take the value of 0 or 1 based on creditors‘ rights within a particular country. 
However, with a varied menu of bankruptcy procedures, this approach becomes highly 
vague and misleading. For instance in France, ―does the manager stay in reorganization 
proceedings?‖ The answer is yes for ―sauvegarde‖ and ―concilliation‖ but under 
―redressement judiciare‖ sometimes no, as the insolvency practitioner might replace the 
incompetent managers. This highlights the fact that even within one country answers can 
be different. Therefore, here the relevant level of analysis should not be country specific 
but specific to procedures prevalent within a country. Thus, as evident now, their approach 
did not consider the dynamics of bankruptcy process and was based on a general country 
68 
 
specific analysis rather than taking account of the specific procedures prevalent in each 
country. In the chapter 6 of the thesis we resort to procedure level analysis rather than the 
country level analysis.  In this chapter, we try to augment, previous studies which were 
conducted in the fields of Law and Economics that built very few legal indexes (four) to 
rank economies, we drastically increase this number (158 legal indexes) in our studies. 
  
While the work of La Porta et al. provided detailed insights on the features of creditor 
rights, still there can be many other unexplored aspects of bankruptcy wherein creditor 
rights differ across countries. Thus, given the complexity of individual legislations and 
also the number of rival procedures existent in each given country, rating the economies 
on the basis of investor protection and legal tradition with a non comprehensive 
computation of very few indexes (four in LLSV) is clearly insufficient. Their approaches 
did not consider the dynamics of bankruptcy laws in each country and were rather 
restricted to a biased view. In spite of receiving high accolades, these studies are not free 
from criticism (Singh et al., 2001; Fohlin, 2000; Berkowitz et al., 2003; Stulz and 
Williamson, 2003; Licht et al., 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Ranjan and Zingales, 
2003). The results of the legal argument may be questioned if one opts for the "stakeholder 
value". In this model, the objective is to maximize the total value of the company and the 
interests of all stakeholders are taken into account. Further, shareholders are set to the 
same status as other stakeholders (employees, customers, suppliers ...). An empirical study 
conducted by the OECD (1999) in fact shows the existence of two groups of countries. On 
one hand, countries of continental Europe and Japan that are characterized by high 
protection of employees and low investor protection and on the other hand, the United 
States and Great Britain where the reverse situation is observed (Pagano and Volpin, 
2001). Hence from a "stakeholder value" Civil Law countries are more effective than those 
of Common Law.  
 
These criticisms essentially reveal the lack of empirical depth in the work of LLSV; 
however, it does not in any way affect the reputation acquired by these authors on the 
international level. The methodology used by these authors in turn, is replicated by 
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numerous studies despite the fact that it raises questions about the reliability of the results 
announced. 
Ultimately, it is essential to evaluate the results of Law and Finance theory in the context 
of a Civil Law country such as France and Common Law country like UK. However both 
countries flag contrasting objectives with respect to creditor protection under bankruptcy. 
 
2.7.1.2. Building Legal Indexes Based on a Hypothetical Case Study 
 
Djankov et al. (2008) studied efficiency of debt enforcement in 88 different countries 
belonging to different legal origins and representing different economic characteristics. To 
facilitate this, the authors build up a hypothetical firm, which is a hotel and is insolvent. 
The same case study is presented to the practitioners of 88 countries and their responses 
are recorded. The firm has employees, has a capital and ownership structure and has 
higher going concern value and lower piecemeal liquidation value. The hypothetical case 
is presented to the practitioners and they are asked to describe the way in which debt 
contract
96
 is most likely to be enforced (foreclosures, liquidation or reorganization) in their 
respective countries. On the basis of this, authors collected the time and costs involved in 
computing a measure of efficiency of the debt enforcement procedure for each country. In 
addition, the authors also collected information on legal origins and economic 
characteristics, to study the effect of institutional features on efficiency of debt 
enforcement.  
 
The authors emphasize the significance of legal origins in determining the efficiency of a 
debt enforcement procedure. According to the results obtained by the authors, Common 
Law performs better than the French and German Civil Law, taking into consideration all 
the procedures (foreclosures, liquidations and reorganizations). German Civil Law 
performs better than the French Civil Law when it comes to foreclosures and liquidations 
but lag slightly behind when it comes to reorganizations. The reason for poor performance 
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 A corporation generally finances its business through a combination of equity and debt. Debt facilitates the company with its 
financing based on the certain contractual agreements between the company and the debt provider. These debt contracts require timely 
payment of interest to the debt provider. However, a situation might arise that leads the non-payment of these debts by the company. In 
that case, the creditors have the right to obtain their assets and go after the assets of the debtor. However, this procedure gets 
complicated in the presence of multiple of creditors where everyone is entered in a race to grab most of the assets to meet their lending 
amount.  
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by French Civil Law countries is due to the fact that no matter what kind of procedure they 
apply, they only succeed in keeping Mirage (hypothetical name of the hotel) as a going 
concern in 16 percent of the cases whereas in Common Law countries it is 75 percent. 
French Civil Law countries take 3.4 years to resolve debt whereas Common Law countries 
take 1.56 years on an average. They also documented the deviations in absolute priority 
rule
97
 in relation to senior creditor‘s debts. These deviations were more prevalent in poorer 
countries and those belonging to French legal origin. In these countries, many a times, law 
gives priority to employees, preferential creditors or even the shareholders over secured 
claims which is believed to hamper the development of debt markets.  
 
The Doing Business Report (2010) uses the same approach in order to rank 183 countries 
by studying 10 indicators of small and medium sized enterprises that measure the 
regulations applying to them through their life cycle (from starting of business to closing 
of business). The bankruptcy issues are contained in ‗closing a business‘ topic, and exhibit 
the recovery rate in these economies. For this indicator, UK is classed in the 9
th
 percentile 
where as Germany and France fall into 35
th
 and 42
nd
 percentile. The results are obviously 
similar to Djankov et al. (2008); UK appears to benefit most from the efficient bankruptcy 
regime than Germany and France. Yet, this study is based on a hypothetical case and what 
happens in reality can be completely different and dynamic.  
 
The potency of their approach is that it is able to remove the heterogeneity between the 
countries by presenting a similar hypothetical case to all practitioners that facilitates cross 
country comparisons. But it is not free for criticism as well. First, its main weakness lies in 
the fact that it is hypothetical in nature and far away from reality. It fails to adapt to the 
local conditions and the environment. Second, this hotel had 201 employees, 50 suppliers 
and one major secured bank. Can this be considered as a representative of a typical 
company within the sample countries? In UK probably yes, but not in France, where the 
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 La Porta (1997, 1998) uses violation of absolute priority order by law as a measure of creditor rights index. The authors obtained 
quite intriguing results for violations of absolute priority rule. According to their results, only 45 percent of the countries in their sample 
are able to abide by the rule and 55 percent of them deviate from it. 33 percent of high income group countries deviate from absolute 
priority rule. 50 percent of upper middle income group countries deviate from absolute priority rule, and 74 percent of lower income 
group countries deviate from rule. With respect to legal origins, no violations occur in Nordic law countries. The authors find that 25 
percent of common law countries deviate from this rule, 52 percent of German civil law countries deviate from this rule and 74 percent 
of French civil law countries violate the rule. 
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bulk of the hotels have less than 5-10 employees. Third, the estimated variables related to 
bankruptcy costs and recovery rates are only vague estimates because they are not based 
on real case studies and do not rely on statistics and credible data samples. Fourth, they 
choose a rather simple capital structure having only one secured lender, whereas in reality 
it is common to have more than one secured lender. Thus, to rank the countries on the 
basis of this study can be misleading and jeopardizing. A more comprehensive and serious 
measurement methodologies should be used based on real cases rather than hypothetical 
case backed by professional wisdom as well as guided by practical rules.  
 
2.7.1.3. Building Legal Indexes Based On Empirical Data  
 
Davydenko and Franks (2007) using the data from ten banks of France, UK and Germany, 
study a large sample of 2280 defaulted small to medium sized firms. The question they 
addressed in their paper is ―whether the bankruptcy codes affect distressed 
reorganizations, and can lenders overcome the lack of creditor protection by adjusting 
their lending practices at loan origination‖?  
 
They found evidences that the legal rights of banks across the countries (UK, France and 
Germany) tend to correlate and vary with the significant differences in banking strategies 
and outcome. In particular, French banks resort to the creditor-unfriendly code by 
demanding more collateral from lenders than in UK and Germany. They also reckon on 
special collateral forms in order to minimize the risk of dilution during court administered 
bankruptcy procedures. Even after such alterations, the bank recovery rates remain the 
lowest in France.  
 
Thus, outcome of bankruptcy may vary distinctly with the levels of creditor protection. In 
a debtor friendly country, where debtor has increasingly higher control over bankruptcy 
proceedings, the creditor recovery may be low and in countries where creditor‘s rights are 
well protected during the proceedings, creditor recovery may be high. In France the main 
objective, as defined explicitly by laws of 1985, is to maintain the firm and preserve 
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employment
98
. To attain these objectives court can even sell the firm to a lower bid if it 
promises to keep employment contracts intact. The creditors have no rights to vote in a 
reorganization plan and their approval is not required by the court to initiate reorganization 
proceedings. Contrastingly in UK before Enterprise Act of 2002, under the Receivership
99
 
process, secured creditors had the right to appoint a receiver out of court, who had 
fiduciary duties only towards the appointee. Indeed, assets were realized in a manner to 
attain highest recovery for secured and floating charge creditors and other parties had no 
right to veto his appointment. Germany is a country adopting a middle approach. Here, the 
reorganization procedures require the approval of creditors and they retain considerable 
right during this process.  
 
Davydenko and Franks (2007) find evidence that banks do tend to alter their lending and 
reorganization practices depending on the bankruptcy code. They found that in a pro-
debtor country, banks demand for more collateral at the point of loan origination to 
mitigate the risk. France is the best example as French banks demand for higher levels of 
collateral per dollar of debt. Moreover, types of collateral also vary distinctly in these 
countries. Real estate is the best form of collateral practiced in UK and Germany as it 
promises good bank recovery. Contrastingly in France, due to the current bankruptcy 
codes, courts often tend to sell the assets intentionally below market price, if it promises to 
preserve employment. Also in addition, preferential claims such as wages and legal fees 
during bankruptcy tend to dilute bank‘s claims. As a result of which French banks prefer 
collateral forms like accounts receivable and personal guarantees as they can be accessed 
directly by them with no risk of dilution by the preferential creditors. Thus, types of 
collateral at loan origination vary with the type of bankruptcy code in place. Secondly, 
they found that even though the bank alters its lending practices depending on the 
bankruptcy codes, it hardly affects the outcome of default. They exhibit undiscounted 
median recovery rate for banks- 92% in UK, 67% in Germany and 56% in France. 
However, they find that the recovery rates in workouts are very similar across these three 
countries. Thirdly, they find that contrary to the expectations of many academics, a 
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 See, Kaiser (1996) for more detailed analysis of French bankruptcy law.  
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 For detailed criticism of receivership process see, Benveniste (1986), Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992)Milman and Mond (1999), 
Finch (1999) and Mokal (2004) 
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creditor friendly country like UK, which is more biased towards liquidations and where 
secured creditors enjoy more freedom to sell their collateral
100
, seems to have a growing 
proportion of going concern reorganizations. Whereas in France, where the objectives 
clearly state survival of business and preservation of employment as their primary motives 
of insolvency, they observed a low proportion of going sales reorganizations as compared 
to UK. Fourthly they argue in support of the effect of institutional features in 
understanding bankruptcy legislation. UK is represented as a market oriented economy 
whereas France and Germany are considered to be bank oriented. This affects the way the 
lending practices are carried out. UK banks can demand higher interest rates even when 
expected losses are low, because it has higher industry concentration and lower 
competition among banks.  
 
Their regression results confirmed that recovery rates tend to vary with the kind of creditor 
protection that the country offers. Their results confirmed the supremacy of a Common 
Law country over a French Civil Law country. The author suggests that the levels of 
collateral affect the number of bankruptcies because banks often use formal procedures for 
the selling of collateral. Thus the number of bankruptcies is higher in countries where 
collaterals are used. One of their interesting findings exhibited the strong relationship 
between reorganization and age of the firm. They showed that the firms which have long 
credit relations with the banks are less likely to be liquidated. This is because in such cases 
banks often have complete information about the firm and are likely to save them by 
offering some negotiations. Their results are coherent with the studies conducted by 
Giammarino (1989) and Chen (2003) who show that the higher the level of information 
shared, the more are the chances of survival.  
 
To summarize: we notice that works of Davydenko and Franks (2007) depicted large 
disparities in the legal rights of banks across three countries (UK, France and Germany) 
correlate with significant changes in banking strategies and outcomes. In particular, 
French banks have a Coasian approach to their national pro-debtor bankruptcy code. They 
require more collateral than lenders in the UK or Germany. They also rely on special 
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collateral forms which minimize their risk of dilution during the court administered 
procedure. Still, they report that bank recovery rates remain inferior in France due to the 
lack of creditor protection. 
 
We acknowledge the strength of their approach to include both formal bankruptcies and 
informal renegotiations. Yet their results are restricted to bankers‘ claims only. It is 
noteworthy that, since the objectives of insolvency laws do not restrict to the bankers‘ 
interests only, but must embody all classes of claimants (employees, state, trade suppliers 
and so on), this is a critical issue.  
With our empirical research we aim to contribute the existing literature. We not only aim 
to provide a detailed and comprehensive view of determinants of recovery rates in UK and 
France but also provide global recovery rates, taking into consideration all classes of 
creditors for each country (senior creditors such as banks, preferential creditors such as 
employees and state dues, junior and unsecured creditors like trade suppliers, new money 
which encompasses claims arising after bankruptcy petition) and also the practitioners fees 
that is a measure of the bankruptcy costs.   
In contrast to the previous studies conducted by LLSV, Djankov et al. (2008), Doing 
Business Report and the World Bank which used only 4 legal indexes to rank the 
economies, we built legal indexes, based on 300 questions, for both the countries that 
provide answers to what we call as 10 functions of bankruptcy laws. This template and its 
functions will be analyzed in detail in the last chapter of the thesis. This will exhibit that 
creditor right index is not the sole criteria for judging the efficiency of any bankruptcy 
code nor the legal tradition approach appropriate to judge the efficiencies of debt 
contracts. We link these indexes to our empirical work to provide a more appropriate 
relation between these two countries and to find impact of these legal indexes on the 
recovery rates. In addition we built indexes for all the main bankruptcy procedures 
prevalent in both these countries (for instance for UK we have indexes for 4 main 
procedures and for France for 2 main procedures). It is crucial to separately analyse each 
procedure as the objectives of each procedure under bankruptcy can vary drastically, even 
within the same country. In this manner, we aim to provide credible solutions to the most 
critical weakness of the previously conducted studies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The choice between Informal and 
Formal Restructuring 
 
(Co-written with Prof. Regis Blazy and Prof. Jocelyn Martel) 
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2.  The Choice Between Informal and Formal Restructuring: The Case of French Banks 
Facing Distressed SMEs 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In their seminal work, LaPorta & al. (1997, 1998) have highlighted the difference in bankruptcy 
procedures across countries. Although there have been harmonization attempts, there still exists 
important differences in their functioning.
101
 Interestingly enough, such differences are likely to 
impact on the default process prior to bankruptcy. From a conceptual point of view, default can 
be viewed as a two-step mechanism. First, a firm fails to repay its debt obligations or chooses to 
postpone the payments in which case it can open up negotiations with its creditors in order to 
reach an informal (out-of-court) restructuring agreement or it can file for bankruptcy. Second, 
the negotiation process may succeed or fail, in which case the firm will seek protection from the 
bankruptcy court.  
 
According to Haugen and Senbet (1978, 1988), given that private restructuring is less costly than 
the formal bankruptcy process, firms in default and their creditors have incentives to negotiate 
out-of-court.  By doing so, they can internalize these costs savings. However, the increasing 
number of bankruptcy procedures show that, although less costly, out-of-court restructuring is 
not always feasible. The tradeoff between the out-of-court and the  court solutions is not 
straightforward and depends on a number of factors such as the classic common pool problem, 
the nature of the banking relationship, the national specificities of the bankruptcy law, the 
presence of asymmetric information and the design of debt contracts. Recent studies in Europe 
have examined the variables that influence the creditors‘ and the debtor‘s strategies taking place 
just after default. Franks & Sussman (2005) examined the UK system while Jostarndt & Sautner 
(2010) focused on Germany. These studies cover two of the most important European legal 
systems; the Common Law and the German Civil Law. However, both systems have significant 
differences, especially with regards to the design of their bankruptcy codes. Surprisingly, no 
study has yet been performed on the French Civil Law. Yet, this legal system has inspired other 
important legislations in continental Europe such as Belgium or Luxembourg.
102
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 Luxembourg in known to attract most of the European investment funds due to its attractive legal environment, including its bankruptcy law. 
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This research contributes to the bankruptcy literature by examining the decision between an 
informal (out-of-court) negotiation and a formal bankruptcy procedure for a sample of French 
firms in default. Unlike previous studies considering the default resolution as a static process 
(simple Logit or Probit approach), we model it as a two-step dynamic process.  First, the debtor 
and its creditors decide between opening up negotiations to arrive at an informal restructuring or 
filing for a formal bankruptcy procedure. Second, conditional on opting for the workout solution, 
this process may either lead to an informal agreement between the parties (success) or a formal 
bankruptcy procedure (failure). Indeed, one can expect that the decision to undertake private 
negotiations is conditional on the expected outcome of the informal restructuring procedure. 
Given that structure, we propose to use a sequential LOGIT model that explicitly considers the 
two transitional steps. 
 
We test a number of hypotheses. The first hypothesis (H1) deals with the coordination and 
bargaining problems faced by firms in default. The coordination argument suggests that the 
likelihood of entering into an informal negotiation process decreases with the number of creditors 
while the bargaining power argument suggests the opposite. Hence, there may be a tradeoff 
between these two effects and this may depend on the legal environment in which the 
negotiations are taking place. We believe that, in the context of the French court-administered 
system, the bargaining power argument may dominate the coordination argument. The second 
hypothesis (H2) reflects the informational problems prevailing when a firm is in financial 
distress. These problems can be mitigated through the length of the banking relationship between 
the bank and the firm and the use of collateral acting as a signaling device on the firm‘s quality 
level. We predict that the likelihood of an informal restructuring increases with the length of the 
banking relationship and the level of collateral. The third hypothesis (H3) captures the impact of 
the firm‘s characteristics. We predict that the likelihood of an informal workout increases with 
the firm‘s profitability and the manager‘s competence level. Finally, the fourth hypothesis (H4) 
examines the role of the loan characteristics on the type of procedure used to resolve financial 
distress. This effect is captured by two variables; the size of the loan and the level of collateral. 
We predict that the probability of an informal workout increases with the size of the loan while 
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the collateral effect is undetermined and depends on the strength of the liquidation bias of banks 
and the severity in the application of the absolute priority rule. 
 
 The analysis is based on an original data set collected from five major French commercial 
banks.
103
 Under the supervision of Standard & Poor’s Risk Solution, the data was manually 
collected from the banks‘ recovery units. The sample includes 735 credit lines allocated to 386 
distressed companies.  Following the Basel II criteria, a firm is considered in ―default‖ when the 
repayment delay exceeds 90 days. Our variables cover the firms‘ individual characteristics such 
as the company‘s profile, the cause of the default, and the loan characteristics. 
 
Our main findings are that the likelihood of negotiation i) decreases if the firm has a bank as its 
main creditor which suggests that the bargaining power argument dominates the coordination 
argument and ii) is positively related to the size of the loan and the proportion of loan term debt. 
In addition, we find that the firm‘s profitability and the managers‘ reliability and competency do 
not impact on the initial decision to opt for negotiations over bankruptcy but they are essential 
elements in successfully reaching an informal agreement. Finally, we find that collateral has no 
significant impact on the choice between bankruptcy and negotiation and on the outcome of 
negotiation. 
 
The article is organized as follows. Section 3.2 offers a review of the literature on the resolution 
of financial distress. Section 3.3 presents the different hypotheses which could explain the 
decision between informal restructuring and formal bankruptcy. In Section 3.4, we discuss the 
data and present some descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 presents the econometric implementation 
of the sequential LOGIT estimation and the results. Section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2. Resolution of Financial Distress 
 
Strictly speaking, a firm is considered in financial distress when it cannot meet its current 
obligations as they become due. The Basel II criteria define a firm as being in ―default‖ when its 
scheduled payments are delayed for more than 90 days. In such circumstances, the debtor and its 
creditors must find a solution. There are basically two mechanisms for the resolution of financial 
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distress. First, stakeholders can open up negotiations with the objective to arrive at an informal 
(out-of-court) restructuring of the firm‘s capital structure. Typically, this involves the reduction 
of current obligations or their postponement to a later date. Second, they can opt for a formal 
bankruptcy procedure in which the firm can either file for liquidation or reorganization under the 
supervision of the bankruptcy court. According to Haugen & Senbet (1978), Roe (1983) and 
Jensen (1989, 1991), given that the costs of an informal restructuring (workout agreement) is 
lower than a formal restructuring under the protection of the bankruptcy law, firms in financial 
distress should opt for the later in order to internalize the cost difference which could then be 
shared by the debtor and the creditors. There exists some empirical evidence to document this 
prediction. Gilson, John and Lang (1990) examined 18 exchange offers of publicly traded firm 
and estimated that offer (workout) costs represented 0.65% (median of 0.32%) of the book value 
of assets. Based on a sample of 29 exchange offers, Betker (1997) reports a mean direct cost of 
2.5% (median 2%) of pre-restructurings total assets. These are typically lower than direct 
bankruptcy costs associated with a court-supervised procedure such as the U.S. Chapter 11. 
Finally, informal workouts are also known to be faster than a court-supervised procedure, 
involving lower indirect costs.
104
 
 
There is still a lot to be learned on the structure of informal workouts and the extent to which it is 
used by firms in financial distress. Unlike a formal bankruptcy procedure, negotiations leading to 
workouts are often confidential in order to preserve the company‘s ongoing activity and its 
goodwill. It ensures confidentiality on the financial difficulties encountered by the firm and the 
associated negotiations with creditors, preserve creditors‘ confidence and the firm‘s image for 
investors and the public. For instance, Chatterjee, Dhillon, and Ramirez (1995) show less 
negative abnormal returns for announcements of workouts than for Chapter 11 filings. Gilson, 
John, and Lang (1990) find that stock returns are more negative for firms that subsequently file 
for Chapter 11. This represents evidence that the market is able to identify firms that will 
successfully renegotiate its debt. In addition, Franks and Torous (1994) report that firms that 
successfully reach a workout agreement with their creditors are more solvent and more liquid 
than firms emerging from court-supervised restructuring. In addition, they find that senior 
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creditors in private workouts are ready to forego some of their priorities to junior creditors, which 
illustrates the importance of bargaining in the context of a workout agreement.  
 
Yet, a large number of firms end up in a formal bankruptcy procedure. There are a number of 
reasons which explains this outcome and they are linked to the impediments to reaching an 
informal agreement. Indeed, there are well known conditions under which a private workout is 
the efficient solution to financial distress: i) single creditor, ii) complete contracts, and iii) 
symmetric information. However, in practice, these conditions may not be satisfied which makes 
an informal agreement more unlikely.  
 
A first impediment to informal workout is the presence of many creditors. Studies by Bulow & 
Shoven (1978), Gertner & Scharsfstein (1991), Franks & Torous (1991), Roe (1987) and White 
(1989) have illustrated the problems arising in a multi-creditors context. First, this gives rise to 
holdout problems whereby each individual creditor has an incentive to holdout, hoping that the 
rest of the creditors accept the agreement. This is particularly important in the case of public debt 
restructuring in which a new agreement on the interest rate, extension of maturity and the 
principal requires unanimity. By holding out, a creditor hopes to increase the relative value of its 
claims in the event that the agreement is signed by all other parties. As pointed out by Grossman 
& Hart (1981), this effect may be stronger for lower rank creditors, especially those with small 
claims (individual bondholders and trade creditors), who may feel that their decision to hold out 
has little impact on the outcome of the restructuring process. Thus, given that each creditor has 
the same incentives, negotiations may fail. According to Blazy & Chopard (2004), such free-
riding incentives could be reduced if the bankruptcy law was to allow some deviation from 
absolute priority rule. These deviations could then be internalized through the private negotiation 
process [Friedman & Viswanath (1994)].
105
  
 
Second, the presence of many creditors may lead to the formation of coalition and conflict of 
interests. For instance, managers, representing equity holders, may have an incentive to form a 
coalition with the bank in order to extract a rent from bondholders. In addition, different classes 
of creditors may have different preferences on the outcome of the negotiation and this may lead 
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to a common pool problem and a race for the firm‘s assets by individual creditors. In such a case, 
reaching an agreement that suits all parties may become impossible.  
 
A second impediment to informal workout is the incompleteness of contracts. As argued by Hart 
(1995), complete contracts are difficult and costly to enforce because assets and cash flows may 
vary over time, in which case contracts would need to be continuously adjusted. Given these 
difficulties, it may be impossible to design a contract that would specify the most appropriate 
procedure to follow in every state of nature. Hence, contracts are by definition incomplete.  
 
Finally, a third impediment to informal workout is the presence of asymmetric information. The 
main issue at stake in a restructuring is the firm‘s value. It is generally accepted that managers are 
better informed about the value of the firm‘s assets and future cash flows than outside creditors 
and investors. This informational advantage may then be used by managers to extract a rent from 
creditors. In this context, Giammarino (1989) and Mooradian (1994) have showed that poorly 
informed creditors may prefer a formal court-supervised restructuring, and more costly process to 
an informal workout. According to Carapeto (2005), the presence of information asymmetry can 
lead to extended bargaining, requiring several rounds of negotiations before any agreement can 
be reached. Hence, from a creditors‘ point of view, the existence of uncertainty on the firm‘s 
value can propel them to go for a costly bankruptcy procedure in which they would get better and 
more accurate information on the true value of the firm. An alternative point of view has been 
suggested by Hotchkiss and Mooradian (2003) who show that in the context of bankruptcy 
auctions, a combined bid for the firm by a coalition of the management and creditors may convey 
positive information about the firm‘s true value to outside investors.  
 
There exists some empirical evidence on the difficulties of reaching an agreement in an informal 
setting. Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) who examined a sample of 169 financially distressed firms 
report that 53 percent fail to restructure privately. Franks and Torous (1994) find similar results. 
According to Jensen (1991), the legal environment in which informal workouts are conducted 
may partly explain the decline in the relative use of private workouts. He cites the example of 
LTV Corp. bankruptcy case, where the court held that the debtholders who initially participated 
in the out-of-court restructuring were only compensated for the reduced claim they have agreed 
91 
 
upon in the agreement whereas debtholders who holdout, received the full amount of their 
original claim. This decision is expected to have a negative impact on the creditors‘ behavior and 
may reinforce their incentives to holdout during informal workouts. 
 
Although there are real impediments to informal workouts, there are means by which they can be 
mitigated. Gilson, John & Lang (1990), show that negotiations in informal workouts are more 
likely to succeed when firms have closer relationships with their bank and deal with a smaller 
pool of banks. Similar results were found by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) in their 
study on Japanese industrial firms that had privileged relationship with their banks. Gilson & al. 
(1990) also find that the firms with a larger proportion of intangible assets in their asset structure 
prefer informal workouts to a formal restructuring procedure in which they have a higher chance 
of losing firm value through fire sales or loss of customers. In addition, they suggest that the 
likelihood of reaching an informal workout agreement increases when the firm has fewer 
categories of debt, especially if there is a high proportion of long term bank debt. Indeed, a 
smaller number of debt categories and more debt owed to banks, which are assumed to be better 
informed, have a positive impact on the outcome of the negotiations. James (1995) and Asquith, 
Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994) also claim that presence of public debt, as opposed to private 
bank debt, may hinder the workout process. Finally, Chatterjee, Dhillon, and Ramirez (1995) 
show that the choice of out-of-court restructuring depends on the firm‘s debt level, its short term 
liquidity and probability of occurrence of coordination problems among creditors. 
 
It is now clear that the choice between either an opening up of negotiations for an informal 
restructuring and a formal bankruptcy procedure depends on a number of factors and that, in fact, 
there are reasons why stakeholders may opt for the more costly formal procedure. The next 
section develops a number of theoretical hypotheses that can be found in the literature in order to 
explain that decision. 
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3.3. Hypotheses  
 
This section reviews the main theoretical arguments and proposes a number of hypotheses on the 
factors which may have an impact on the resolution of financial distress.  
 
3.3.1. Hypothesis 1: Coordination vs. Bargaining Power 
 
One common view in the bankruptcy literature is that the formal bankruptcy can minimize the 
coordination problems arising during debt restructuring. To quote Jackson (1986),  
 
―The basic problem that bankruptcy law is designed to handle, both as a normative matter and 
as a positive matter, is that the system of individual creditor remedies may be bad for the 
creditors as a group when there are not enough assets to go around. Because creditors have 
conflicting rights, there is a tendency in their debt-collection efforts to make a bad situation 
worse. Bankruptcy law responds to this problem.‖ 
  
By freezing the rights of all creditors, formal bankruptcy offers a collective procedure to avoid 
the common property problem and allows for a fair valuation of the firm‘s assets and the 
creditors‘ individual rights in order to maximize the value of the firm.106 
As mentioned in the previous section, a number of authors have shown that informal workouts 
are more likely when there are fewer classes of creditors and when a large portion of long term 
debt is held by banks. Hence, debt restructuring through a private workout is more difficult to 
reach as the number of creditors increases simply because of coordination problems. The lack of 
coordination is amplified when creditors have different rankings in the absolute priority ordering 
(APO). We can now state our first hypothesis. 
 
H1.A (Coordination): The probability of renegotiation decreases with the number of 
creditors. 
 
Yet, a recent study has argued the opposite, suggesting a positive relationship between the 
number of creditors and the probability of an informal workout. Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle 
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creditors and France (except for the ―sauvegarde‖ procedure) relying on the discretionary decision of a judge. 
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(2009) consider a firm in default with a single creditor (bank). In such a setting, the coordination 
problem disappears since the bank does not have to compete with other potential creditors in 
bankruptcy so that informal negotiation and formal bankruptcy offer similar advantages. As 
argued by the author, ―the bank may be less supportive (…) if the chances that substantial value 
may be lost in the future are high. In practice, reorganization is unfeasible with bank support‖. 
Now, let‘s transpose this argument in a framework where the choice between renegotiation and 
bankruptcy is in the hands of a bankruptcy judge such as the system prevailing in France. In 
addition, let‘s suppose that the bank has a liquidation bias. Given that the debtor has no chance to 
survive without the bank‘s support, the bank should not fear the bankruptcy procedure as it can 
expect the court to have little choice but to liquidate the firm since there are no possibilities for 
the debtor to find alternative sources of financing in order to continue its operations. This 
argument is reinforced by the fact that if a firm has a single creditor with a strong bargaining 
power, the later may be too greedy during negotiations and thus force the firm to opt for formal 
bankruptcy. This outcome is a credible one for countries, such as France, which are strongly 
debtor friendly.  
  
The alternative hypothesis to H1.A is thus: 
 
H1.B (Bargaining): The probability of renegotiation increases with the number of creditors. 
 
One can expect these two effects to be at play in the resolution of financial distress. Although we 
believe that the bargaining argument dominates the coordination argument in the context of the 
debtor friendly bankruptcy system such as in France, this is a matter of empirical verification. 
 
3.3.2. Hypothesis 2: Information 
 
Most theoretical works in economics and finance are based on the assumption that the banks are 
under-informed relative to managers, thus generating adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. Adverse selection stems from the bank‘s inability to observe the quality of the project 
to be financed. Moral hazard is associated to the debtor‘s opportunistic behavior. Namely, once 
94 
 
the funds have been granted to the firm, the debtor may not provide the optimal level of effort or 
invest in riskier projects. 
 
There are different means by which these two problems can be mitigated. First, information 
asymmetry is less severe when the firm and the bank have been involved in a long term credit 
relationship. Ceteris paribus, being more informed should increase the likelihood of an informal 
renegotiation since there is less need to trigger bankruptcy and pay the associated costs in order 
to discover information. In addition, reputation and trust are build over time in the context of a 
long and stable financial relationship. Triggering bankruptcy may break that trust and reputation 
and destroy such accumulated value. 
 
H2.A: The probability of renegotiation increases with the length of the banking 
relationship. 
 
Second, collateral can be used as a signaling device by ―high quality‖ borrowers in order to 
separate themselves from ―low quality‖ borrowers. Indeed, the use of collateral is assumed to be 
more costly for ―low quality‖ borrowers having a higher risk of default and hence more likely to 
lose their collateral [Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987)]. In addition, collateral can be 
used to reduce moral hazard problems and align the borrower‘s and the bank‘s interests, since a 
higher value of collateral imposes a greater loss on the borrower in the case of default. This 
incentive effect is stronger in the case of outside collaterals that extend limited liability to some 
external assets [Boot, Thakor and Udell (1991), Hainz (2003)].  
 
H2.B: The probability of an informal workout increases with the level of collateral. 
 
One should note that this argument is being challenged. According to Berger and Udell (1990) 
and Jimenez and Saurina (2004), banks have sufficient information (financial reports, movements 
on the bank account, random audits…) to sort adequately their borrowers. For instance, banks use 
credit scoring to assess a firm‘s default probability and screen between good and bad firms. This 
argument is known as the ―risk-observed‖ hypothesis. In addition, as we will see next, the use of 
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collateral can have additional opposite incentives effect on the banks to participate in a 
negotiation leading to an informal workout.  
3.3.3. Hypothesis 3: Firm’s characteristics 
The likelihood of opting for a renegotiation also depends on a number of firm specific factors 
such as i) the firm‘s profitability and ii) the reliability of the managers (competency) to run a 
successful restructuring. An increase in profitability is synonym for higher cash flows if the firm 
is restructured and a lower probability of default in the future. More competent managers are also 
more likely to be in a position to successfully restructure the firm in the context of an informal 
workout. Therefore, we can make the following hypotheses:  
 
H3.A: The probability of an informal workout increases with the firm’s profitability. 
 
H3.B: The probability of an informal workout increases with the manager’s competency. 
 
3.3.4. Hypothesis 4: Loan characteristics  
 
In addition to the above factors, we believe that the likelihood of private renegotiation depends 
on the loan characteristics, in particular on the amount of the loan (or maximum value of loan 
authorized) and the level of collateral granted by the firm. These two variables are related to the 
―expected loss‖ (EL) as defined by the Basel 2 agreement.107 
 
First, let‘s examine the impact of the loan value. One can expect the bank‘s behavior to be a 
function of the size of the loan. Indeed, a bank has more incentives to try to reach an informal 
agreement when its stakes in the firms are large.
108
 From that perspective, a formal bankruptcy 
procedure provides a standardized way of resolving distress irrespective of the firm‘s size 
whereas informal negotiations are more adequate for large and complex companies.  
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 According the 1st pillar of the Basel 2 agreement, the expected loss is the combined product of three elements: probability of default, exposure 
at default, and loss given default. 
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 Banks also have more incentives to invest time and money to gather information about the debtors when the size of the loan increases.  
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H4.A: The probability of an informal workout increases with the size of the loan  
 
In addition, one can expect that the likelihood of renegotiation be related to bank‘s financial 
involvement in the firm‘s long term financing.  
 
H4.B: The probability of an informal workout increases the proportion of long term debt in 
total debt 
 
Second, the use of collateral can have opposite effects on the likelihood of an informal workout. 
On the one hand, as we have seen above, collateral can be used to mitigate information 
asymmetries between the bank and the firm.
109
 On the other hand, it provides protection for the 
bank in the event of bankruptcy.  Indeed, financial distress generally implies that all the creditors 
cannot be repaid in full. Among them, the secured creditors are those who are likely to have the 
highest bias in favor of liquidation, especially if their loans are fully secured. Several theoretical 
and empirical works pointed out this bias. For instance, Blazy and Chopard (2010) identify the 
circumstances under which the secured creditors prefer reorganization over liquidation: such 
circumstances depend on (1) the level of collateralization, (2) the absolute priority rule, (3) the 
capital structure, and (4) the beliefs about the firm‘s reorganization value. Other recent empirical 
works confirm that the likelihood of reorganizing the debtor is negatively correlated with the 
level of creditors‘ seniority [Ayotte and Morrison (2009), Bergström, Eisenberg, and Sundgren 
(2002), Fisher & Martel (2009)]. As a consequence, secured creditors may reduce the collective 
effort to maintain distressed firms' in operation [Frouté (2007)].  
 
However, this effect depends on the bank‘s position in the absolute priority rule prevailing in 
each country. Indeed, a strict application of the APR in which secured (bank) claims are well 
protected may reduce the bank‘s incentives to try to arrive at a negotiated agreement. Inversely, 
bankruptcy codes which allow for deviations from the APR may reduce the attractiveness of 
bankruptcy procedures and force the parties to enter into informal negotiations in order to reach 
an out-of-court settlement.  As pointed out by Davydenko and Franks (2008), the French 
bankruptcy law offers a weak protection for secured claims at the expense of a greater protection 
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for social claims. Thus, French secured creditors have more incentives to favor an informal 
restructuring over a formal bankruptcy procedure. Thus, depending on the relative strength of 
these factors, we can make two alternative hypotheses:  
 
H4.C: The probability of an informal workout increases with the level of collateral if the 
bank has no liquidation bias and there are deviations from the APR. 
 
H4.D: The probability of an informal workout decreases with the level of collateral if the 
bank has a liquidation bias and there are no deviations from the APR. 
 
 
As we can see, the impact of the collateral is difficult to predict since it may capture different 
effects.   
 
3.4. Data Analysis 
 
The data comes from five major French commercial banks and were hand-collected from their 
recovery units. Our sample contains 735 credit lines allocated to 386 French distressed firms 
(excluding agricultural and financial companies). After dropping observations with missing or 
incoherent data, the final sample includes 282 distressed companies.
110
All firms in the sample 
have liabilities in excess of 100 thousand €. We thus focus on SMEs and exclude micro 
borrowers. The sample covers firms in default between 1993 and 2003 for loans granted between 
1984 and 2001.
111
 The event of ―default‖ follows the Basel 2 criteria: a firm is considered in 
―default‖ as soon as the delays on its financial commitments exceed 90 days.  
 
The variables collected cover i) the company‘s profile, ii) the origin of the default, and 
iii) information on the loan and the debtor‘s banking relationship. Tables 1 and 2 provide some 
stylized facts on firms in our sample. The first table offers a comparison of the characteristics of 
firms in bankruptcy and informal renegotiation. The second table focuses on firms in 
renegotiation and offers a comparative analysis between firms which failed and those which 
succeeded in their negotiation attempt.  
                                                 
110
 The econometric analysis is based on a final sample of 233 firms. 
111
 The sample comes from a larger database we built between 2004 and 2005 under the supervision of Standard & Poor’s Risk Solution. 
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3.4.1. Bankruptcy vs. Renegotiation 
 
Out of 282 firms in the sample, a majority of firms opted for bankruptcy (65%) over negotiations 
(35%). When looking at Table 3.1, the first striking feature is that although firms opting for 
renegotiation appear to be different than those in bankruptcy on the basis of the mean value of the 
different listed variables, there are very few aspects on which there is a statistically significant 
difference. For instance, let‘s consider measures of firm size. The mean value for total assets, 
total debt, turnover and number of employees for firms in renegotiation is two to three times 
larger than for firms in bankruptcy while the median values are quite similar. A test of difference 
in means concludes that there is no statistical significant difference between the two samples 
based on these variables. One of the reasons is that there is a large variance in each of the two 
samples.  
 
Long term debt represents over 25% to 30% of total debt, while short term debt, measured by the 
sum of short term bank debt and trade debt, represents over 50% of total debt financing. Both 
types of firms exhibit negative cash flows (cash minus short term bank debt) at the time of 
default, although this problem seems to be a bit less severe for firms in renegotiation. 
Interestingly, there is no statistical difference in the capacity of both types of firms to generate 
sales from their assets, as measured by the turnover to assets ratio.  
 
Over 40% to 45% of firms in the sample belong to a group and the vast majority has limited 
liability, this number being slightly higher for firms in bankruptcy. This may reflect the fact that 
because of limited liability, shareholders for this type of structure have incentives to take more 
risks than others, so that the chances to renegotiate are ultimately lower. The proportion of firms 
operating in the ―Services‖ industry is significantly higher (41% vs. 26%) for the renegotiation 
sub-sample. Interestingly, the industry distribution in our sample differs from the one prevailing 
for French firms in bankruptcy where Commerce, Industry and Services represent respectively 
22%, 48% and 30% of the industrial sectors.
112
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          Table 3.1: Characteristics of Firms in Bankruptcy and Negotiation 
 
 Formal Bankruptcy Renegotiation 
 #obs. Mean Median # obs. Mean Median 
Total assets (K €) 93 7 307 2 317 60 17 328 2 255 
Total debt (K €) 91 5 681 2 118 60 11 691 2 060 
Total assets / total debt 91 1.24 1.15 60 1.29 1.16 
Long term debt (K €) 90 843 377 60 5 085 492 
Short term bank debt (K €) 89 1 508 288 60 1 136 234 
Trade debt (K €) 91 2 447 642 60 2 942 547 
Long term debt / total debt (%) 90 26.5 19.0 60 30.1 25.0 
Short term debt / total debt (%) 90 53.6 60.0 60 49.5 48.0 
Cash (K €) 91 254 29 60 1 098 25 
Cash flow (K €) 91 -1 235 -176 60 -38 -125 
Turnover (K €) 92 9 181 3 128 60 18 204 2 007 
Turnover / total assets (K €) 91 1.69 1.32 60 1.3 1.05 
Nb. Employees 136 60 22 48 202 16.5 
Age (years) 183 15.0 9.8 99 17 8.1 
Firm belong to a group (%) 183 45.4 -- 99 39.4 -- 
Limited liability (%)
** 
183 92.4 -- 99 81.8 -- 
Commerce (%) 183 36.1 -- 99 34.3 -- 
Industry (%) 183 21.1 -- 99 19.2 -- 
Services (%)
** 
183 26.2 -- 99 41.4 -- 
Bank is the main creditor (%) 165 57.0 -- 99 52.7 -- 
Length of bank‘s relationship (years) 183 6.7 4.3 99 7.4 4.6 
Length of default resolution (years)
**
 183 1.03 0.83 99 1.5 1.0 
Maximum loan authorized (K €)** 169 436 275 91 1 075 450 
Collateralization rate
** 
169 1.87 1.04 91 1.1 1.0 
Bad rating at time of default (%) 183 40.0 -- 99 44.0 -- 
Faulty management (%) 183 19.0 -- 99 19.0 -- 
 
               
 
The data also contains information on the behavior of management and in particular whether or 
not the management was ―faulty‖.113 This information can be found in the internal reports of the 
banks‘ recovery units which contain a literal description of the origin(s) of default from which we 
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 Dummy variable if one of more causes of default are related to faulty management: conscious acceptance of non-profitable markets, over-
investment, under-investment, excessive speculations, private benefits and fraud. 
Source: Authors‘ calculations 
 Note: * and ** indicate a statistically significant difference in mean values at 10% and 5% level. 
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identified 50 possible origins of default which were then classified in six broad categories: ―asset 
substitution‖, ―voluntary excessive risk taking‖, ―private abuse of the company‘s assets‖, ―tricky 
behavior and swindle‖, ―accounts falsification‖, and ―financial fraud‖. According to Table 1, 
―faulty management‖ can be found in about 20% of all procedures. Consistent with expectations, 
over 40% of firms report bad ratings, as measured by a negative Z-value, at the time of default.  
 
According to data, the majority of firms have a single bank as its main creditor, the proportion 
being slightly lower for firms in renegotiation.
114
 This finding is consistent with the fact that 
SMEs have limited access to financial markets and rely heavily on a single bank to finance its 
operations. This is even more so in a bank-oriented country like France with a highly 
concentrated banking sector. The average length of the credit relationship between the debtor and 
its main bank is around 7 years with little differences across procedures. One should notice that 
this is about half the firm‘s life which means that the firm‘s main bank has been supporting the 
debtor‘s activity for half of its lifetime. This also suggests that these banks are lending to 
companies that are not pure start-ups since they are, on average, 7 years old at the beginning of 
the relationship. This could be explained by two factors. First, we know that there is a positive 
correlation between age and loan size and our sample includes only firms with liabilities in 
excess of 100 thousand €, therefore excluding younger firms with smaller loans. Second, in 
France, start-up businesses of less than 2 to 5 years of age are mainly financed by specialized 
financing rather than traditional loans. In fact, a significant percentage of the French start-ups are 
financed by a public financial institution named OSEO.
115
 
  
Firms which opted for an informal renegotiation have access to more banks financing than those 
filing directly for bankruptcy. Indeed, the average maximum loan authorization for firms in 
renegotiation (1.1 million €) is statistically and significantly higher than for those in bankruptcy 
(436 000 €). This data is consistent with hypothesis H4.A on the loan size effect. On the other 
hand, loans of firms going directly in bankruptcy are significantly more collateralized than that 
those of firms in private restructurings. This is consistent with the hypothesis H4.D which states 
that banks may turn more easily to bankruptcy when their loans are more secured.  Based on data 
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 The criterion used to determine whether or not the bank is the ―main creditor‖ is not clearly defined. This is a qualitative statement that can be 
found in the individual internal reports provided by the recovery units. 
115
 The OSEO‘s website is: http://www.oseo.fr/  
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for France, the U.K. and Germany, Dadydenko and Franks‘ (2008) suggest that the French banks 
require more collateral when they grant a loan. In addition, they may rely on special collateral 
forms which minimize the risk of dilution during the court-administered bankruptcy procedure. 
Our data is consistent with this view.  
 
Finally, as expected, the length of default resolution is greater for firms which enter in a private 
workout than those which file directly for bankruptcy. 
 
3.4.2. Successful vs. Failed Renegotiation 
 
As mentioned above, 99 out of the 282 firms in our sample opted for a negotiation with its 
creditors. About 55% of these firms succeeded in reaching a workout agreement while 45% 
failed.  Table 3.2 reports the same information as Table 3.1 but focuses on firms which opted for 
an informal renegotiation and compares the characteristics of those that failed from those that 
succeeded. The first important feature reported in Table 3.2 is that size matters in renegotiation. 
Indeed, firms that succeed in reaching an informal workout are statistically and significantly 
larger, as measured by total assets, total debt and turnover, than those that fail. In addition, on 
average, successful firms seem to be in better financial health than those that fail with a higher 
asset to debt ratio and positive cash flows. Although firms which succeed in renegotiation have 
significantly more short term debt than those that fail, there is no statistical difference in the 
proportion of short term debt in total debt. 
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Table 3.2: Characteristics of Firms in Negotiation by Outcome 
 
 Failed Negotiation Successful Negotiation 
 #obs. Mean Median # obs. Mean Median 
Total assets (K €)** 23  2 930 1 856 37 26 273 2 248 
Total debt (K €)* 23 2 892 1 758 37 17 161 2 211 
Total assets / total debt
** 
23 1.03 1.05 37 1.45 1.30 
Long term debt (K €) 23 581 311 37 7 763 617 
Short term bank debt (K €)** 23 504 200 37 1 528 268 
Trade debt (K €)* 23 1 163 447 37 4 048 637 
Long term debt / total debt (%) 23 27.0 25.0 37 31.9 21.6 
Short term debt / total debt (%) 23 52.3 56.0 37 47.9 46.8 
Cash (K €) 23 130 10 37 1 699 37 
Cash flow (K €) 23 -374 -147 37 170 -90 
Turnover (K €)** 23 5 944 1 517 37 25 825 2 302 
Turnover / total assets (K €) 23 1.48 1.18 37 1.18 0.99 
Nb. Employees 32 30.7 11 16 543 27.5 
Age (years) 45 16.6 7.3 54 17.3 8.3 
Firm belong to a group (%) 45 40.0 -- 54 39.0 -- 
Limited liability (%)
 
45 87.0 -- 54 78.0 -- 
Commerce (%)
* 
45 44.0 -- 54 26.0 -- 
Industry (%) 45 20.0 -- 54 18.5 -- 
Services (%)
** 
45 28.0 -- 54 52.0 -- 
Bank is the main creditor (%) 44 59.0 -- 49 47.0 -- 
Length of bank‘s relationship (years) 45 7.5 4.4 54 7.3 5.0 
Length of default resolution (years)
**
 45 2.04 1.34 54 1.03 0.83 
Maximum loan authorized (K €) 40 827 305 51 1 270 594 
Collateralization rate  40 1.13 1.0 51 1.05 1.0 
Bad rating at time of default (%) 45 43.0 -- 54 46.3 -- 
Faulty management (%) 45 25.0 -- 54 13.0 -- 
 
               
 
 
 
 
Note: * and ** indicate a statistically significant difference in mean values at 10% and 5% level. 
Source: Authors‘ calculations 
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About 40% of firms in the sample belong to a group and the vast majority has limited liability, 
this number being slightly higher for firms which failed. The proportion of firms operating in the 
―Commerce‖ industry is significantly higher for failing firms while successful firms are more 
represented in the ―Services‖ industry. ―Faulty management‖ seems to be more prevalent in 
failing cases but there is no statistical difference between the two samples. The proportion of 
failing firms which have a single bank as its main creditor is a bit higher than for successful 
firms.  
  
It is well known that informal restructuring and/or bankruptcy are time-consuming procedures. 
As pointed out by Wruck (1900), Franks & Torous (1989) and Thornburn (2000), the time in 
bankruptcy can be used as a proxy for indirect bankruptcy costs. Data shows that the time to 
complete a successful informal workout takes, on average, half the time (1.03 years) as the one it 
takes for failed workouts (2.04 years).
116
 This suggests that failed restructuring attempts are much 
more costly than successful restructurings and that, banks have incentives to correctly identify the 
likelihood of reaching an agreement with the debtor prior to opening up the negotiations. If the 
expectations are too low, the bank should favor the use of the formal bankruptcy procedure, 
which is much faster, in order to minimize the costs. Hence, informal negotiations to find a 
solution to financial distress should only be opened when the bank estimates that the probability 
of success is high enough.   
 
Lastly, firms which successfully reorganized in a private workout have, on average, a maximum 
loan authorization in excess of 50% of those that failed. There is no statistical difference in the 
collateralization rate between the two sub-samples. 
 
3.5. Econometric Implementation and Results 
 
Two recent studies have examined the determinants of financial distress resolution. Franks and 
Sussman (2005) focused on the United Kingdom while Jostarndt and Sautner (2010) looked at 
the German system. These two studies cover two of the most important legal systems prevailing 
in Europe: the Common Law and the German Civil Law. Unfortunately, no studies have yet been 
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 The length of the default resolution covers the period from the date of entry into the recovery unit to the date of the final resolution (private 
workout or liquidation / sale / reorganization under bankruptcy). It does not include the extra time needed to definitively close the file (i.e. when 
all the proceeds are recovered). 
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done to examine the resolution of financial distress under the French Civil Law which has 
inspired other important legal systems in continental Europe (Belgium, Luxembourg…). Thus, 
we have an incomplete view of the process driving the default resolution in Europe. 
 
Franks and Sussman (2008) study a sample of 542 distressed SMEs and covers the complete 
default resolution process from its beginning to its end. More specifically, once the default firm 
enters the bank‘s ―Business Support Unit‖, there are three possible outcomes: 1) the firm is 
successfully rescued (so that the firm returns to branch), 2) the firm is transferred to the ―Debt 
Recovery Unit‖ (where formal bankruptcy procedure starts) and 3) the firm repays the loan and 
enters into a new banking relationship with another lender. The authors analyze the links between 
the debtor‘s financial structure and the way financial distress is resolved. Using PROBIT 
regression to model the probability of triggering bankruptcy (outcome (1)) vs. the probability of 
escaping bankruptcy (outcomes (2) and (3)), they show that the liquidation rights are largely 
concentrated in the hands of the main banks, which give them a dominant position in liquidating 
or restructuring their debtors. One of the likely effects is banks may become lazy as they rely too 
much on the value of their collateral. Overall, their study does not find any evidence of 
coordination failures and/or creditors‘ runs.  
 
Jostarndt and Sautner‘s (2010) adopt a similar approach and focus on a sample of 116 listed 
German companies having earnings before interests and taxes (EBIT) inferior to the interest 
charges for more than two consecutive years. Also using a PROBIT regression, they model the 
probability of reaching a successful workout. According to the authors, the approach is robust 
and is not subject to potential endogeneity bias
117
. The authors find that about half of the firms in 
their sample succeed in restructuring their debt contract while the other half file for 
bankruptcy.
118
 Overall, their results suggest that the probability of reaching a private agreement is 
greater for (1) highly leveraged companies and for (2) companies exhibiting higher going concern 
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 As pointed out by the authors: ―The exogeneity assumption can be justified by the actual process of a debt-restructuring: firms choose a 
certain debt structure first and then, upon a default, renegotiate the pre-determined terms. However, borrowing arrangements could also be 
determined endogenously ex ante by claimants' expectations about a firm's restructuring prospects in case of a future default. In this case, the 
coefficients in the above regressions would provide us with correlations but do not allow for a causal interpretation of the link between the 
borrowing characteristics and the workout probability of a firm‖ (quoted from Jostarndt and Sautner (2010)). 
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 In this study, we may suspect a sample bias as it focuses on the German distressed companies for which the assets‘ value is high enough to 
cover the expected bankruptcy costs, so that a formal bankruptcy procedure can be triggered (the sample on bankruptcy is restricted to ―opened 
files‖ only). 
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value. Formal bankruptcy is more likely to happen for the cases showing lack of lenders‘ 
coordination and/or high fraction of collateralized debts. 
 
Despite their valuable contribution to the literature, one may raise some concerns about the 
econometric implementation of both approaches which model the resolution of financial distress 
as a one step rather than as a sequential game. By doing this, the authors implicitly assume that 
such outcomes stem from a static rather than a dynamic process. In reality, most attempts to 
resolve financial distress follow a sequential structure. First, the creditors and/or the debtor 
decide between straight bankruptcy and a renegotiation in order to reach a private agreement. 
Second, conditional on opting for renegotiation, the parties may fail or succeed in reaching an 
agreement. The two approaches are illustrated in Figure 1 which considers three possible 
outcomes: (1) direct bankruptcy, (2) failed renegotiation leading to bankruptcy, and (3) private 
agreement. Figure 1a illustrates the simple multinomial LOGIT approach where the choice 
between the three rival outcomes is modeled as a one-step process. Figure 1b illustrates the 
sequential LOGIT approach which consists of two transitional steps in which a separate LOGIT 
regression is run for each decision. These decisions are called ―transitions‖. As quoted by Buis 
(2007) (2008), this approach is known under several names: ―continuation ratio LOGIT‖ (Agresti 
(2002)), ―model for nested dichotomies‖ (Fox (1997)), ―sequential response model‖ (Maddala 
(1983)), or ―sequential LOGIT model‖ (Tutz (1991)). In such models, the first transition consists 
of an alternative between ―direct bankruptcy‖ and ―renegotiation attempt‖ while the second 
transition consists of an outcome between ―failed renegotiation‖ (i.e. bankruptcy) and ―successful 
renegotiation‖ (i.e. private agreement) for those cases that have selected the alternative 
―renegotiation attempt‖ during the first transition. 
Figure 3.1: Resolution of financial distress 
 
 
Figure 3.1a: Static model (simple LOGIT) Figure 3.1b: Dynamic model (sequential LOGIT) 
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Although we believe that the sequential approach is a more appropriate and natural approach to 
this problem, we estimate both models in order to highlight the differences between the two 
approaches. In addition, French data clearly distinguish between direct bankruptcies, failed 
renegotiations leading to bankruptcy and successful agreements. This allows us to account for the 
accumulation of information over time.  
 
Our explanatory variables are separated into two categories: i) the test variables and ii) the 
control variables. The test variables aim at testing the validity of assumptions H1 to H4. The first 
variable, ―Bank is the Company‘s main creditor‖ (dummy), aims at determining which of the 
coordination (H1.A) or the bargaining (H1.B) hypothesis dominates. When equal to one, this 
variable indicates that the debtor‘s main (and/or exclusive) sources of financing rely in the hands 
of one single bank which is also the one in charge of the recovery process. One should note that 
the company may be financed by other banks (and/or other trade creditors) but these other 
financing opportunities are marginal as compared to the main one. 
 
Hypothesis H2 captures the importance of informational problems in the context of a banking 
relationship. The variable ―length of the banking relationship‖ is used to test hypothesis H2.A 
which predicts that the probability of renegotiation is positively correlated to the length of the 
relationship between the debtor and its bank.
 
According to H2.B, the likelihood of renegotiation 
increases with the level of collateral.  For the purpose of the analysis, we separate this variable in 
two: inside and outside collaterals. Inside collaterals cover the securities whose value relies on 
the debtor‘s own assets such as mortgage, long-term assets other than mortgage, short-term assets 
and other inside collaterals. Outside collaterals extend the bank‘s priority to other patrimonies 
such as guarantees from individuals and guarantees from companies. Both types of collaterals are 
included in the list of explanatory variables.
119
  
 
Hypothesis H3 deals with the impact of the firm‘s characteristics on the firm‘s decision between 
bankruptcy and renegotiation. This effect is captured by two variables: i) firm‘s profitability 
(H3.A) measured by the dummy variable ―bad rating at default‖ and ii) manager‘s competency 
(H3.B) captured by the dummy variable ―faulty management‖. We also include a variable which 
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captures the interaction between faulty management and bad rating. One would predict that a 
badly rated firm run by faulty management would have a lower chance of opting for renegotiation 
and/or reaching a private agreement. 
 
Hypothesis H4 relates to the loan characteristics. According to H4.A the firm‘s decision in 
financial distress depends on the size of the loan.  This effect is captured by the variable 
―maximum loan authorized‖. Hypothesis H4.B which looks at the debt structure is captured by 
the ―proportion of long term debt‖. H4.C and H4.D predict that the firm‘s decision also depends 
on the level of collateral (as for H2.B) but its effect depends on whether or not the bank has a 
liquidation bias and to what extent the absolute priority ordering (APO) is respected. Hence, the 
variables for collateral may capture different effects.  
 
Finally, we control for other effects that may impact on the debtor‘s decision between bankruptcy 
and renegotiation. We include a dummy variable for the legal form of the debtor (―limited 
liability‖), the sector of activity (commerce, industry, relatively to the services), the economic 
organization (―company belongs to a group‖), and the macroeconomic context (GDP growth in 
the year of default).
 120
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 In France, the bankruptcy procedure can be extended to other companies if, first, they belong to the same group of the debtor, and second, the 
respective patrimonies are mingled together. 
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Table 3 reports the results of two regression models presented in Figure 3. Model I is simple 
multinomial LOGIT model: the dependent variable is the probability that renegotiation either 
fails (column 1) or succeeds (column 2) against the reference alternative represented by direct 
bankruptcy. Model II is the sequential LOGIT model. The first step captures the firm‘s decision 
between renegotiation and bankruptcy. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the firm chooses 
renegotiation over bankruptcy. The second step models the outcome of the game conditional on 
the choice of renegotiation by the firm. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if the renegotiation is 
successful. Estimates of both steps are reported in columns 3 and 4 respectively. 
 
3.5.1. Static Model 
 
The first striking feature about the results in Table 3.3 is that the simple LOGIT approach 
generates very few significant independent variables. In fact, a Wald test rejects the global 
significance of the model (the p-value is just above 10%). The Score test is significant (below 
3%) but it is less strict than the Wald test. The first column, which reports the estimates of the 
probability of failed renegotiation, does not show any significant independent variables. The 
second column reveals that the probability of successful renegotiation (informal workout) 
increases with i) the value of loan authorization and ii) the proportion of long term debt in the 
firm‘s total debt financing. These results are consistent with hypothesis H4.A and H4.B. In 
addition, the likelihood of reaching an agreement is lower for firms with limited liability, which 
belong to a group and which operate in the Commerce and Industry sectors. Firms with the bank 
acting as the main creditor are also less likely to reach an informal agreement. This is consistent 
with hypothesis H1.B and suggests that the bargaining effect dominates the coordination effect. It 
also confirms the findings of Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2009). 
 
Other test variables such as bad rating, faulty management, length of the banking relationship and 
the level of collateral have no impact on the likelihood of failing or succeeding in renegotiation 
relative to opting for direct bankruptcy.   
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Table 3.3: The determinants of firms’ decision in financial distress  
Independent variables Model I: Simple LOGIT Model I: Sequential LOGIT 
 Failed negotiation vs. 
bankruptcy 
Successful 
negotiation vs. 
bankruptcy 
Step 1  
negotiation vs. 
bankruptcy  
Step 2  
successful vs. failed 
negotiation  
Test variables Estimate         Prob > χ
2 Estimate      Prob > χ2 Estimate      Prob > |z| Estimate      Prob > |z| 
Bank is the main creditor -0.0387                0.854 -0.5180
**
           0.014 -0.5417
*
            0.094 -1.5516
**
           0.013 
ln (length banking relationship) 0.1595                 0.550 0.2338               0.383 0.2097               0.317 0.4005               0.306 
ln (internal collaterals, K€) 0.0270                 0.708 -0.0479              0.495 -0.0089              0.872 -0.0802              0.394 
ln (external collaterals, K€) 0.0068                 0.922 0.0167               0.807 0.0085               0.875 -0.0246              0.796 
Bad  rating at default -0.1251                0.582 0.1397               0.516 0.0325               0.925 0.4307               0.471 
Faulty management -0.0795                0.800 0.1363               0.639 0.0531               0.910 0.7472               0.361 
Bad rating  × faulty management 0.6671                 0.164 -0.5536              0.396 0.4569               0.571 -2.8897
*
            0.072 
ln (max. loan authorized, K€) 0.2806                 0.170 0.4946**            0.016 0.3751**            0.022 0.0603               0.793 
% long term debt (due amounts) 0.5140                 0.255 0.9828
**
            0.029 0.7477
**
            0.034 0.0119               0.986 
Control variables     
Limited liability -0.1157                0.704 -0.4492
*
            0.088 -0.5956              0.186 -1.1625              0.125 
Company belongs to a group -0.2553                0.209 -0.4358
**
           0.035 -0.7001
**
           0.029 -0.5656              0.315 
Commerce  -0.0658                0.779 -0.4248
*
            0.169 -0.5134              0.169 -1.3376
*
            0.056 
Industry -0.3008                0.246 -0.6243
**
           0.016 -0.9381
**
           0.019 -0.8632              0.236 
GDP growth -1.2791                0.928 22.932               0.133 10.2872             0.368 23.8933             0.232 
Constant -3.2410
**
             0.016 -5.9475
***
       <.0001 -2.2137
**
           0.049 1.4809               0.422 
Test statistics               Stat                         Prob > Chi
2
  
            -210.16                             -- 
               44.11
**
                        0.027 
               37.87                           0.101 
      
              Stat                         Prob > Chi
2
  
            -185.39                           -- 
 
 
               49.54
***
                     0.0073 
Likelihood ratio 
Score 
Wald 
Chi
2
 
                   
Source: Authors‘ calculations 
 Note: *, **, *** indicates statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
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3.5.2. Dynamic Model 
 
Let us now assume that the resolution of financial distress follows a dynamic process. The 
sequential LOGIT estimates for step 1 (renegotiation vs. direct bankruptcy) are reported in 
columns 3 while column 4 reports the estimates for step 2 (successful workout agreement 
vs. failed renegotiation attempt leading to bankruptcy). Compared to the simple static 
model, we can now identify many explanatory variables which allow us to predict the 
likelihood of renegotiation over i) direct bankruptcy and ii) reaching a private agreement 
conditional on renegotiating with its bank.  
 
Let us first consider step 1. According to our regression results, the probability of opting 
for renegotiation, irrespective of the future outcome, increases with the value of loan 
authorization and the proportion of long term debt. This result differs from the simple 
LOGIT which suggests that these two variables have a positive impact on the likelihood of 
successful renegotiation when the alternative is bankruptcy. The sequential LOGIT 
suggests that when the amounts at stake are large and/or when the firm has more long term 
debt, the chance of undertaking renegotiation is higher but this has no influence on the 
future outcome of such renegotiation. Thus, one can expect small borrowers to be more 
attracted by bankruptcy than renegotiation. This is consistent with hypothesis H4.A and 
H4.B. 
 
In addition, firms which belong to a group operate in the Industry sector and for which the 
bank is the main creditor are also less likely to opt for renegotiation. Again, this confirms 
the dominance of the bargaining effect (H1.B) over the coordination effect (H1.A).  
 
Turning now to step 2 of the regression model, we find that the likelihood of succeeding in 
renegotiation is lower for badly rated firms where the management has been identified as 
faulty. Interestingly, these two variables on the firm‘s profitability and management‘s 
competency have no significant effect on the firm‘s decision between renegotiation and 
bankruptcy (hypothesis H3.A. and H3.B). In addition, they have no direct effect on the 
outcome of the renegotiation process. Yet, their combined effect is negative and 
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significant. This suggests that when the bank knows that the firm is badly rated and that 
managers are faulty, the likelihood of reaching a private workout agreement is lower. One 
can view this result as a natural outcome of the sequential information gathering process. 
At the early stage of financial distress, the bank may have information on the firm‘s low 
profitability through its rating but yet, this piece of information may not be sufficient to 
have a direct impact on the decision between bankruptcy and renegotiation. In fact, the 
profitability issue can be overcome if the managers are perceived as competent, reactive, 
and honest. Discovering the managers‘ capacity to restructure the firm requires additional 
time. Although profitability and competency are two essential conditions to avoid 
bankruptcy, the bank needs time to acquire that information. This explains why the first 
step of the decision process (renegotiation attempt vs. direct bankruptcy) does not depend 
on these variables but infact it is conditional on entering the renegotiation process, the 
combined effects of these two variables have a significant negative impact on the 
likelihood of reaching an agreement. 
 
The fact that a firm has a bank as its main creditor not only reduces the likelihood of 
entering the renegotiation process but it also lowers its likelihood of reaching an informal 
agreement. This reinforces the argument that the bargaining effect dominates the 
coordination effect in financial distress. This is consistent with the argument that a major 
bank may not wish to renegotiate because (1) the competition with the other minor 
creditors is expected to be weak under bankruptcy, and/or because (2) the debtor cannot 
survive without the main bank‘s financial support. Thus, bankruptcy may be the most 
desired outcome by the bank.  
 
Interestingly, even a court-administered procedure such as the one prevailing in France 
may not have dissuasive effects provided the bank‘s bargaining power is strong enough. 
On the contrary, such procedure may attract the bank (or, symmetrically discourage the 
firm) whenever nothing can be renegotiated or reorganized without his (her) support. This 
is all the more likely to happen in a country where substitutes to credit financing are scarce 
(in France the SMEs have limited access to the capital markets and rely more on 
intermediated financing). This first result appears relatively strong as it is confirmed 
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whatever the way of modeling the arbitration (simple and sequential LOGIT models). In 
the opposite situation (i.e. when the bank is not the firm‘s main creditor), a balanced pool 
of creditors may have strong incentives to overcome the coordination issue, and 
consequently, to agree together, as they may lose the decision power under a bankruptcy 
procedure where the final decision is transferred to the court. 
 
Now, let‘s consider the impact of collateral. As mentioned in Section 2, collateral may 
have opposite effects on the likelihood of opting for bankruptcy. According to 
hypothesis H2.B, an increase in collateral should decrease the likelihood of bankruptcy by 
lowering the information asymmetry between the debtor and the bank. However, 
hypothesis H4.D predicts that the probability of bankruptcy increases with the level of 
collateral provided that three conditions prevail: (1) the bank prefers liquidation and the 
law facilitates such liquidation, (2) the renegotiation process cannot fully replicate the 
APO prevailing under bankruptcy, (3) there are no deviations from the APO under 
bankruptcy. We find no evidence of any impact of collateral on the resolution process of 
financial distress. This result can be interpreted in two ways. First, collateral plays no role 
in the resolution of financial distress. Second, these separate effects compensate each 
other. We believe that in the context of the French legislation which presents conflicting 
characteristics that compensate each others, the later view may be more convincing. On 
the one hand, the French law favors clearly continuation over liquidation,
121
 and grants the 
social claims a higher rank in the APO than the secured ones. On the other hand, over 90% 
of the French procedures end up in liquidation and provide a complete and rather 
sophisticated framework to sell as a going concern (which is, finally, in fine, an integrated 
way to liquidate the debtor‘s assets). 122 In such a context, the French banks have to 
consider the pros and the cons of the French legal framework that mix liquidation and 
continuation biases and that provides only a limited protection of their secured claims. 
Overall, in France, there is no guarantee that secured claims generate more money inside 
than outside of bankruptcy. 
 
                                                 
121
 See the 1st article of the 1994 French bankruptcy code, whose inclination to continuation was extended in 2005. 
122
 See Blazy, Delannay, Petey, and Weill (2008). 
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3.6. Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates the determinants of financial distress resolution for a sample of 
French firms in default. Recent studies have looked at this issue in the context of other 
legal regimes but until now, no studies have been conducted on the French legal 
framework. In addition, these previous studies have modeled the resolution of financial 
distress as a static game. We propose an alternative approach where the path following 
default follows a sequential or dynamic process in which firms first decide between 
bankruptcy and negotiation with its main bank and second, conditional on negotiation, the 
process can either be a success (workout agreement) or a failure (bankruptcy).  
 
A striking feature when analyzing the data is that firms opting for bankruptcy do not 
appear to be quite different than those opting for negotiation with their bank at least in 
terms of firm size and capital structure. More significant differences appear when 
comparing firms which succeed to those that fail in reaching a workout agreement. Data 
show that firm size matters in negotiation, with larger firms being more likely to succeed 
in their negotiations. We then test a number of hypotheses relative to the effect of i) 
coordination problems and bargaining power, ii) information asymmetry, iii) firm‘s 
characteristics and iv) loan characteristics on the likelihood of opting for negotiation and 
the likelihood of successfully reaching a workout arrangement. We find that the 
probability of negotiation decreases if the firm has a bank as its main creditor which 
suggests that the bargaining power argument dominates the coordination argument. In 
addition, we find that the likelihood of negotiation is positively related to the size of the 
loan and the proportion of loan term debt.  
  
We also find that the firm‘s profitability and the managers‘ reliability and competency are 
two essential conditions to escape bankruptcy, but this information requires time to be 
discovered by the bank. This explains why the first step of the sequential game (i.e. 
negotiation attempt vs. direct bankruptcy) does not depend on these two factors but that, 
conditional on opting for negotiation, the combination of both variables have a positive 
and significant impact on the probability of reaching a workout agreement. Finally, we 
find that collateral has no significant impact on the choice between bankruptcy and 
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negotiation and on the outcome of negotiation. We believe that this result simply reflects 
the opposite effects that collateral is expected to have on these outcomes.  
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Appendixes 
 
 
A1. Variables  
 
The following table provides the list of our explanatory variables, with the complete 
description. 
 
Name of the variable Description
Origin of default: faulty management
Equals 1 if one (or more) cause(s) of the default is related to faulty 
management (conscious acceptance of non-profitable markets, 
overinvestment, underinvestment, excessive speculation, private 
benefits, fraud)
Faulty management  x  Bad rating at default time
Equals 1 if the one (or more) cause(s) of the default is related to faulty 
management and the debtor's last known rating was bad (negative Z 
value).
ln (length of the banking relationship, in years )
log of the duration of the banking relationship, from the first lending 
date up to the date of default (in years).
Bank is the company's main creditor
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the bank is the company's main creditor 
(based on the list of all the creditors).
Bad rating at default time
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the debtor's last known rating was bad 
(negative Z value).
ln ( authorized amount, K€ )
log of the maximum amount of authorized credits (as defined in the 
debt contract).
% of long term credit lines (due amounts, K€)
Percentage of long term lending (more than 1 year) out of the total 
lending.
ln (internal collaterals, K€)
log of the amount of internal collaterals (mortgage, long-term assets 
other than mortgage, short-term assets, other inside collaterals).
ln (external collaterals, K€)
log of the amount of external collaterals (guarantees from individuals, 
guarantees from companies).
Limited liability
Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the debtor benefits from limited liability 
(LTD).
The company belongs to a group Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the debtor belongs to a group.
Commerce Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the sector is 'commerce'.
Industry Dummy variable, equal to 1 if the sector is industry'.
GDP growth Increase annual rate of the GDP of the year of default.
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A2. Density Functions of the Bank Recovery Rates 
Distribution of the bank recovery rate: Direct bankruptcy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution of the bank recovery rate: Failed renegotiation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution of the bank recovery rate: Sucessful renegotiation 
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A3. Correlation Matrix 
 
Origin of 
default: 
faulty 
manage-
ment
Faulty 
manage-
ment x Bad 
rating at 
default time
ln (length of 
the banking 
relationship, 
in years )
Bank is the 
company's 
main 
creditor
Bad rating 
at default 
time
ln (due 
amount,K€)
Part of long 
term credit 
lines (%)
ln (internal 
collaterals)
ln (external 
collaterals)
Limited 
liability
The 
company 
belongs to a 
group
Commerce Industry GDP growth
1
0.52044 1
<.0001
-0.03696 0.12824 1
0.5365 0.0313
-0.00316 0.03659 0.04115 1
0.9597 0.5585 0.5105
-0.09885 0.30078 0.21976 -0.08399 1
0.0976 <.0001 0.0002 0.1787
-0.02858 -0.06182 0.13888 -0.10422 -0.07124 1
0.6328 0.3009 0.0196 0.0948 0.233
-0.00773 -0.00209 -0.07156 0.21034 -0.08632 0.10191 1
0.9022 0.9735 0.2549 0.0012 0.1694 0.1045
-0.04582 -0.0515 0.13159 0.09611 0.06035 0.29941 0.17041 1
0.4434 0.3889 0.0271 0.1236 0.3125 <.0001 0.0064
0.02512 0.13346 0.04384 0.08123 0.10881 0.07491 0.0315 0.08627 1
0.6745 0.025 0.4633 0.1934 0.0681 0.2098 0.6166 0.1485
0.00363 0.09062 0.00285 -0.1955 0.02897 -0.08747 -0.1963 -0.12007 0.02384 1
0.9516 0.129 0.9621 0.0016 0.6281 0.1429 0.0016 0.0439 0.6902
0.0298 0.01941 0.1431 -0.12854 -0.00896 0.16116 0.06884 0.00478 -0.10883 -0.02609 1
0.6182 0.7456 0.0162 0.0391 0.8809 0.0067 0.2735 0.9363 0.068 0.6627
0.05371 0.09255 -0.0816 -0.04871 0.09795 -0.08854 -0.1248 -0.09551 0.0808 0.12497 -0.13858 1
0.3689 0.121 0.1718 0.4359 0.1007 0.138 0.0465 0.1095 0.176 0.0359 0.0199
-0.03155 0.04763 0.15642 -0.11092 0.04003 0.07329 -0.17522 0.02007 -0.08109 0.16691 0.03421 -0.45023 1
0.5978 0.4256 0.0085 0.0753 0.5031 0.2198 0.005 0.7372 0.1745 0.005 0.5673 <.0001
-0.03555 0.07046 0.08756 -0.03331 0.13791 -0.00169 -0.03358 0.05888 0.04418 -0.01038 -0.04264 -0.02012 0.10082 1
0.5522 0.2382 0.1424 0.5943 0.0205 0.9775 0.5935 0.3245 0.4599 0.8622 0.4757 0.7366 0.091
GDP growth
The company belongs to a 
group
Commerce
Industry
Part of long term credit 
lines (%)
ln (internal collaterals)
ln (external collaterals)
Limited liability
Origin of default: faulty 
management
Faulty management x Bad 
rating at default time
ln (length of the banking 
relationship, in years )
Bank is the company's 
main creditor
Bad rating at default time
ln (due amount,K€)
 
Note: The Table shows the Pearson correlation indexes for the variables that are 
considered in our regressions. The small figure that is displayed below each correlation 
index is the p-value for the null hypothesis (a p-value less than 10% means the null 
hypothesis can be rejected so that the correlation index is significantly different from 
zero). 
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CHAPTER 4 
France and United Kingdom:  
A Panorama of the Bankruptcy 
Procedures 
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4.1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a panorama of the bankruptcy procedures 
prevailing in France and in the United Kingdom. Both these countries have been pioneers 
for other countries who have emulated the same legal systems: Civil Law and Common 
Law and especially the structure of their rescue mechanisms
123
.  
 
This chapter is more descriptive in its approach as it intends to explain the detailed 
functioning of formal procedures and at the same time provides national statistics showing 
strong imbalance between liquidations and other reorganization procedures in both the 
countries. 
 
Previously Europe was often identified to have bankruptcy laws favouring creditors more 
than the debtors. It was especially true for the UK, Netherlands and Germany (Wood, 
1995). It was only recently that many countries (UK, Germany, France, Spain, 
Netherlands...) in Europe reformed their bankruptcy laws making them more debtors 
friendly. The main aim behind such reforms was to promote a culture of corporate rescue 
and enable the firms to survive bankruptcies. In this section, we focus our attention on 
France and the United Kingdom as the widespread acceptance of their legal system in 
other jurisdictions makes them unquestionably an ideal object for research. 
 
France is supposed to have a highly debtor oriented system where social claims can often 
outrank the secured ones and continuation and preservation of employment is the primary 
objective. Even though the process of continuation
124
 does not reward the creditors much 
in comparison to the debtors but it preserves the employment by allowing the business to 
continue and hence can create value for the firm as well as for the economy.  
                                                 
123 Countries like South Africa, Italy, Australia, Hong Kong (China), New Zealand have structured their respective rescue system based 
on UK‘s rescue procedures. For details see P Lewis, ―Corporate Rescue Law in the United States‖, in K Gromek Broc and R Parry 
(edition), Corporate Rescue: An Overview of Recent Developments from Selected Countries (2nd edition, Kluwer Law International, 
2006), p333. 
124
 Yet, this trend does not mean the number of continuations is getting higher, compared to liquidations. On the contrary, in UK, 
Germany, and France, bankruptcy procedures end up with liquidation in more than 90% of cases. However, the quite recent change in 
the objectives of national laws means the institutional environment of default is evolving, which may finally affect the strategies, taking 
place in or out bankruptcy. 
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Notably, France is the only country which shares significant characterizes of Chapter 11 of 
the US Bankruptcy Code and its policies are formulated and enforced in a manner so as to 
ensure strong protection for its business entities by incorporating concepts of automatic 
stay on all creditor actions and the granting of super priority status to post petition 
financing 
 
For over twenty years, since the Act of 1985, the focus of reforms has increasingly been 
on the avoidance of corporate failures and promotion of continuations. With respect to 
this, the articles of 1985 and 1994 of the French bankruptcy code explicitly state these 
objectives: [1] ―safeguarding the business‖, [2] ―maintaining the firm‘s operations‖, and 
[3] ―discharging liabilities‖125. In France, the decision making power is solely in the hands 
of the judiciary which can exercise their genuine enforcement power during a collective 
process. Bankruptcy judge is responsible for the adoption of reorganization plan which is 
in total contrast to many other European countries,
126
 and also there is no voting procedure 
for creditors or veto power for other stakeholders. In addition, French legislation offers the 
stakeholders a specific procedure dedicated to sales as a going concern, as an alternative 
way of continuing activity
127
.  
 
UK also provides a good opportunity for studying the bankruptcy laws. And in contrast to 
France, it is often referred to as being a highly creditor friendly country. La Porta et al. 
(1998) studied the creditor rights regarding bankruptcy across various countries and 
obtained a score of 0 for France, 3 for Germany and 4, the best for UK. The Doing 
Business Report (2010) places UK in the 9th percentile in its closing of business report. 
This is a very high ranking as compared to countries like Germany and France which are 
placed in 35th and 42nd quartile respectively. In addition, Davydenko and Franks (2007) 
exhibit undiscounted median recovery rate for banks- 92% in UK, 67% in Germany and 
56% in France. This is the measure for the ex-post efficiency of a bankruptcy regime.  
                                                 
125
 Weber (2005) explores the effects of this French legal priority set on agency problems between bankrupt firms and their debtholders. 
Weber argues that French firms have little incentives to file for bankruptcy, due to the court administered process and the civil and 
criminal sanctions associated with bankruptcy. 
126
 (see the Finish case studied by Bergtröm, Eisenberg, and Sundgren (2002) 
127
 Since 2006, the sale as a going concern is viewed more than a liquidation procedure. However, in our views, sales protect more 
employment than pure liquidations, as a part of the job positions is saved through sales. 
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In addition, UK was among the first countries to incorporate rescue mechanisms 
(administrations and CVA) in its insolvency system. However, over the past few years it 
has become more inclined towards the debtors. With the Enterprise Act of 2002, 
receivership (a mechanism where secured creditors benefitted the most out of their 
exclusive rights and positioning) was abolished. Reforms were made to increase the 
likelihood of continuation and to provide a level playing field to all the creditors including 
the unsecured ones.  
 
Presence of both types of features (creditor friendly and rescue mechanisms) makes UK 
unmistakably an optimum country for research. Often seen as the pioneer in the field of 
efficiency of bankruptcy laws and as a benchmark country for many nations adopting or 
reforming their bankruptcy laws
128
. 
 
So, the legislations of both UK and France have features that are of interest for research. 
We start by studying in detail the bankruptcy procedures of France, provide national 
statistics on the procedures and explain their general functioning and specificities. Then, 
we will apply the same approach to UK. 
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South Africa, Italy, Australia, Hong Kong (China), New Zealand and so on. For more details, see the P Lewis, ―Corporate Rescue 
Law in the United States‖, in K Gromek Broc and R Parry (eds), Corporate Rescue: An Overview of Recent Developments from 
Selected countries (2nd edition, Kluwer Law International, 2006) 
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4.2. Overview of Corporate Bankruptcy in France 
 
The bankruptcy law in France has gradually evolved from a law penalizing the debtor who 
has failed to honor its commitments to a legislation that promotes survival and provides 
opportunities to the debtor to reorganize his debts and start afresh. This change was 
initially settled by a set of two reforms in 1984 (1
st
 March) and 1985 (25
th
 January). 
 
In France the main objective as defined explicitly by laws of 1985 (and afterwards) is to 
maintain the firm and preserve employment. To attain these objectives court can even sell 
the firm to a lower bid if it promises to keep employment contracts intact. The creditors 
have no rights to vote for a reorganization plan and their approval is not required by the 
court to initiate reorganization proceedings. 
 
It is often believed that in a debtor friendly country, where debtor has increasingly higher 
control over bankruptcy proceedings, the creditor recovery may be low
129
 and in countries 
where creditor‘s rights are well protected during the proceedings, creditor recovery may be 
high. France is characterized by a highly debtor oriented bankruptcy law system where 
social claims often outrank the secured ones. 
 
France is unique in the sense that it has an alert procedure (―procédure d’alerte‖) 
introduced by the Act of 1
st
 March 1984 (art. L.611-2). The French legislator defined a set 
of preventive mechanisms aiming at early detection of financial distress. Practically, this 
warning system was created at the initiative of various stakeholders. The main objective of 
this procedure was to draw the attention of the directors towards the difficulties faced by 
the company and to encourage them to take preventive measures to avoid risk of failure. 
This procedure was further strengthened by the reforms of 1994 making it more effective 
by delegating more powers to the chairperson of commerce.  
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 Davydenko and Franks (2007) exhibit undiscounted median recovery rate for banks- 92% in UK, 67% in Germany and 56% in 
France. 
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Article L611-2
130
 (translated in English) states that: ―Where any deed, document or 
proceedings show that a commercial company, an economic interest grouping or a sole 
ownership, running a trading or a craftsman’s business, encounters difficulties that may 
undermine the continuation of its business operations, its managers may be summoned by 
the president of the Tribunal de commerce (commercial court) to determine the 
appropriate steps necessary to remedy the situation‖. 
 
Alert procedures allow a limited set of persons (auditors, shareholders, president of the 
court and the staff representative) to warn the directors about the foreseen difficulties of 
the business so that they have enough time to take appropriate measures to prevent such 
difficulties. These persons do not have the duty to inform, except for the statutory 
auditor
131
. This proceeding can also be launched by the worker‘s representatives,132 if the 
worker‘s representatives note that the continuity of the business is likely to be 
compromised. Please note that, cessation of payments is not the criteria for its initiation.  
 
The French legislator completed the alert procedure by a general framework for workouts 
taking place under the protection of the Court: it is the ―règlement amiable‖; it was 
established by the French legislation on 1
st
 March, 1984.  
 
This procedure was confidential in nature and under the supervision of the commercial 
court, aimed at facilitating a harmonious resolution to the current conflicts between 
debtors and creditors. Any firm facing imminent danger of bankruptcy can apply under 
such procedure and the creditors do not participate in the proceedings. 
 
In 1985, the French legislation completed the 1984 preventive framework with the 
inception of formal bankruptcy mechanism (which replaced the previous 1967 bankruptcy 
                                                 
130
 « Lorsqu'il résulte de tout acte, document ou procédure qu'une société commerciale, un groupement d'intérêt économique, ou une 
entreprise individuelle, commerciale ou artisanale connaît des difficultés de nature à compromettre la continuité de l'exploitation, ses 
dirigeants peuvent être convoqués par le président du tribunal de commerce pour que soient envisagées les mesures propres à redresser 
la situation ». 
131 
The statutory auditor has the duty (art. L.234-1 ff. C.com.) to inform: 1) the chairman of the board; 2) board of directors (if chairman 
does not provide sufficient answer); 3) in the general meeting of shareholders (if the board fails to provide sufficient answer); 4) and 
finally the president of the court (if all the others fail to provide sufficient answers). If the auditor does not receive any reply within 15 
days of his notification from the responsible authority, he shall convene a general meeting and lay down his report at this meeting. Still, 
if he does not receive any substantial result, he will directly communicate it to the president of the commercial court and to the 
representatives. 
132 
article L.432-5 and 422-4 of the Labour code 
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law). The resulting legislation of 25
th
 January, 1985 established a new legal procedure 
whose outcomes are either the debtor‘s continuation (―redressement judiciaire‖) or its 
liquidation (―liquidation judiciaire‖). Implicitly, the French Law thus established a 
hierarchy between the various objectives. 
 
The 1984/85 French bankruptcy code was duly reformed on 10
th
 June, 1994 and 26
th
 July, 
2005 (the law for protection of business named ―sauvegarde‖). The 1994 reform involved 
minor changes within the legislation but maintained the general framework of the 1984 
and 1985 legislations. The 2005 reform (modified in 2008) involved three major changes. 
First, it encompassed the previous procedures, i.e. ―règlement amiable‖ (renamed 
―conciliation‖133), ―redressement judiciaire‖ and ―liquidation judiciaire‖. Second it 
introduced a brand new procedure ―sauvegarde‖, similar to ―redressement judiciaire‖, but 
aimed at companies that are not in default but close to it (yet, contrary to ―règlement 
amiable‖, the procedure is not confidential and involves a stay of claims). Last, the 2005 
reform established another confidential procedure ―mandate ad hoc‖ whose main purpose 
is to prepare an arrangement between the debtor and some creditor. This last procedure is 
confidential and even softer in approach than ―conciliation‖. 
 
Graph 4.1 provides the evolution of the monthly number of corporate bankruptcies for the 
period between 2004 and 2010. The 2008 crisis may explain why the trend has been 
increasing drastically for the last two years. This increase may also be attributed to the 
creation of a new legal form ―autoentrepreneur‖ 134dedicated to individuals who want to 
quit the employee‘s status to create a small business. Also, notice that the annual number 
of French bankruptcies is varying around 50 000
135
.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
133
 Yet, a major difference with ―règlement amiable‖ is that ―conciliation‖ is not restricted to solvent companies, but is also opened to 
distressed companies. 
134
 It is a single person starting a business. The chances of default are high as being single he has the whole liability of the firm and he 
is the sole person to carry the entire management of the firm and at times it can be difficult or impossible to manage.  
135
 The figure shows monthly evaluation to get annual number of bankruptcies it needs to be multiplied by 12. 
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Graph 4.1: Monthly evolution of the number of bankruptcies in France 
 
   Source: INSEE Conjoncture, BODACC. 
 
4.2.1. The Bankruptcy Procedures Prevailing in France 
 
Since the end of the 20
th
 century, two bankruptcy legislations have prevailed in France: the 
1984/85 legislation (slightly reformed in 1994) and the 2005 legislation (slightly reformed 
in 2008). We make an attempt to present both the reforms as they reflect a historical 
change from a debtor-friendly system (since 1985) towards the introduction of few 
creditor-friendly rules (since 2005). The resulting system should lead to a continuation 
bias, but still keep in mind the creditors‘ interests.  
 
Section 4.2.1.1 presents the main procedures prevailing under the 1984/85 legislation 
before 2005. Section 4.2.2.2 describes the main changes that were implemented in 2005 
and section 4.2.3 analyses the specificities of French bankruptcy framework. 
 
4.2.1.1. The French Bankruptcy System before 2005 Reforms 
 
Two types of procedure are prevalent in France ever since 1984. First, the preventive 
procedure (―règlement amiable‖) that aims at assisting the companies at the early stage of 
their difficulties. Second, the bankruptcy procedure that either consummates to 
reorganization (―redressement judiciaire‖) or the liquidation of financially distressed firms 
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(that are said to be in ―cessation des paiements‖, i.e. when the liquid assets are not 
sufficient to meet the short term liabilities). 
 
A. Règlement amiable (1
st
 March, 1984) 
 
In 1984, the French legislation pioneered a preventive framework dedicated to solvent 
companies that may encounter difficulties during the course of their business operations. 
Règlement amiable was unique in the sense that it had hybrid features. By facilitating an 
agreement between the debtor and the principal creditors it aimed at amicably resolving 
distress. But on one hand, to prevent any arising conflicts of interests among the parties 
concerned, it appointed a conciliator (court appointed official), whose duty was to enable a 
coordination mechanism.  Thus, it had features of both private solution and court solution. 
Indeed, presence of both these features facilitates in a harmonious solution to situations 
where it is impossible to reach an agreement without court intervention.  
A solvent firm facing imminent danger of insolvency can seek protection under such a 
regime. The process can be initiated exclusively by the debtor and insolvency is not the 
criteria for initiation of the procedure. The process is carried out in high secrecy and all the 
parties involved are sworn to confidentiality. There is no provision of automatic stay 
during such proceedings and debtors in general remain in operation of their business. The 
principal creditors participate actively in the process of restructuring of debts. 
 
The appointed conciliator enables negotiation process by reducing asymmetries of 
information between the concerned parties and managing the arising conflicts of interests. 
The conciliator does not have power to impose upon any decision however; the 
agreements reached during the negotiation process are binding upon the creditors and 
debtors.  
 
Even though this procedure provides a chance for survival, it is hardly used in practice. 
The participating creditors write down their claims to enter the terms of negotiation, but if 
the firms still fail to survive, then these creditors, who have earlier participated in the 
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negotiation process, have to enter with reduced amounts in the judicial process. This can 
be contributed as the major reason for the low usage of this procedure. 
 
B.  Redressement judiciaire and liquidation judiciaire (25
th
 January, 1985) 
 
The bankruptcy law reforms of 25
th
 January 1985 and of 10
th
 June, 1994
136
 enabled the 
French Collective System to involve two complementary court administered procedures 
(see Figure 4.1). The first procedure known as redressement judiciaire, aims at the 
continuation of business, either through a reorganization plan or sale as a going concern. 
The second procedure is known as liquidation judiciaire
137
 and is a liquidation procedure 
of a firm‘s assets. 
Figure 4.1: The French bankruptcy code before the 2005 reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Blazy, Chopard, Fimayer, Guigou (2008). 
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The 1994 reform is very similar to the previous 1985 law. The main innovations in 1994 are: (1) a change in the absolute priority 
rule in case of liquidation (secured creditors are now paid before those creditors who offer credit after firms file for bankruptcy), (2) the 
judge may pursue agents who buy bankrupt firms in order to sell them piecemeal once bankruptcy process is closed; and (3) the judge 
can immediately liquidate financially distressed firms if he considers it impossible for them to continue their operations under the 
protection of the law (this procedure was in practice before 1994 but was not written in the law). These changes in the law did not 
crucially modify the practice of commercial courts. 
137
 Remind that in the shadow of this process, there is also the out-of-court settlement (―règlement amiable‖): the manager, with the 
help of an appointed officer, negotiates with some of the claimants the payment of outstanding debts. 
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The petition for initiating these procedures can be filed either by a debtor, or the creditor 
or the court if the inability of the firm to pay its dues comes to the notice of the court. In 
such a case, the firm must not delay and should initiate the process within 15-45 days after 
the cessation of payments.  
 
During the first stage of the process, which is known as observation period (―période 
d’observation‖), a series of steps are undertaken by the court, which begins with the 
appointment of an administrator who verifies the viability of the company. A creditors‘ 
representative is appointed to check the value of the due claims. There is an automatic stay 
on creditors‘ enforcement proceedings. Consequently, the creditors cannot enforce upon 
their collaterals.  
 
Primarily, the debtor continues to run the business but could be assisted or replaced by an 
administrator. As this period implies an extension of the firm‘s activity, it should be 
financed by new creditors (―new money‖). To encourage them to lend money to the 
debtor, the post petition financing (new money) gets priority over the other claims. At the 
end of the observation period, the court decides whether the firm should be allowed to 
reorganize (continuation or sale as a going concern) or liquidated. This period may last up 
to 20 months.  
 
We present below the main characteristics of liquidation judiciaire (section A) and of 
―redressement judiciaire‖ through continuation or sale as a going concern (section B).  
 
A. Liquidation 
The liquidation process (―liquidation judiciaire‖) occurs after the observation period (but, 
if the company has no assets or the chances of recovery are too low, the company can be 
directly placed under liquidation proceedings without any observation period). If the court 
finally orders liquidation, the creditors‘ representative becomes the liquidator who is 
mandated to piecemeal liquidate all the firm‘s assets to clear debt in an orderly manner. 
The proceeds are distributed in the following order: the most recent (2 months) salaries are 
paid first (superprivilege), followed by bankruptcy costs, other salaries and claims of tax 
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authorities (privileged claims). Then the liquidator disburses secured debts, which are 
ranked above the new money
138
 (protected by ―article 40‖ of French bankruptcy law). 
Then, any residual amount goes to junior claimants. 
 
B. Continuation and Sale as a Going Concern 
Continuation (―redressement judiciaire‖) prevails when the commercial court estimates 
that a firm might be able to reorganize or to be sold as a going concern. The court specifies 
whether the company should be reorganized according to the continuation plan elaborated 
by the administrator (solution 1), or whether assets should be sold to a third party 
(solution 2). Under solution 1 (continuation plan), the administration is responsible for 
drawing up the reorganization plan. Whatever be the proposed plan, he must ensure that 
the purposes of law are met: to safeguard business, ensure continuation of operations and 
preserve employment and to satisfy creditor claims. Debts are restructured and redefined 
in the best interest of the business survival and protection of employees. Most of the time, 
the plan extends the delays of repayment up to 10 years. However, under solution 2 (sale), 
rival buyers can compete together and propose buyout offers which are then assessed by 
the court and finally one of them is selected. Thus, under sale as a going concern, the 
company does not disappear as most of the contracts are preserved. The administrator has 
to check the content of each proposal and forward such information to the court. The 
winning offer defines a sale price and the expected effects of the sale (employment 
preservation, contracts, economic restructuring…). The sale price is the basis for the 
repayment of the creditors. Here, we would like to emphasize that since 2005, the sale as a 
going concern is not considered as a way of continuation. On the contrary, it is considered 
as a liquidation outcome.  
*    * 
* 
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 The reform of bankruptcy law in 1994 changed this absolute priority order; before 1994, creditors protected by article 40 were paid 
before the secured creditors in all bankruptcy cases. The French legislators aimed, with the reform of 1994, to improve secured 
creditor‘s rights. 
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4.2.1.2. The 2005/2008 Legislation 
 
The Business Safeguard Act of 26
th
 July 2005, n°2005-845 (Loi de sauvegarde des 
enterprises, LSE) and the Distressed Business Reform Act of 18
th
 December 2008, 
n°2008-1345 (Ordonnance portant reforme du droit des entreprises en difficultés) ensures 
the reinforcement of prevention mechanism, thus making France the most debtor friendly 
country of Europe.  
Since the 2005/2008 reform, France offers its firms a menu of procedures to choose from 
(see figure 4.2). Some of these procedures are judicial: safeguard (―sauvegarde‖), 
reorganization (―redressement judiciaire‖), and liquidation (―liquidation judiciaire‖). 
While others are non-judicial: alert (―procedure d’alerte‖), ad hoc commission (―mandat 
ad hoc‖), composition procedures (―conciliation‖, which is the reformed form of the 
previous ―règlement amiable‖)). 
Figure 4.2: Main features of French Bankruptcy procedures 
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In the subsequent text we describe the procedures mentioned in figure 4.2 above. We start 
by exploring the mechanism of preventive procedures and later describe the collective 
procedures provided in the new legal framework.  
 
A. Ad hoc Commission (mandat ad hoc) 
 
The ad-hoc procedure used to exist before the 2005-2008 reform, but it was not inscribed 
in the law. Its aim was to provide a convenient and light way of resolving financial 
distress, without warning all the parties. The concerned firms were those that were solvent 
but may face the threat of future difficulties. Thus, it was a pre-insolvency procedure. At 
the request of the debtor, the president of the commercial court appoints a special 
commissioner. This is exemplified by the Article L.611-3
139
 (translated in English) of the 
commercial code which states that: ―The president of the court may, at the request of the 
debtor, appoint a special commissioner (―mandataire ad hoc‖) whose duties he shall set 
out. The debtor may suggest the name of a special commissioner‖. The appointed 
commissioner is responsible for bringing out an amicable solution between the debtor and 
its principle creditors (usually the contracting partners of the debtors) in order to promote 
continuation of the business and the firm. In this respect he can make proposals for 
safeguarding the business and also for preserving the employment contracts. It is a non 
judicial process and financial distress is not the requirement for its initiation. The 
commissioner‘s mission ends if the parties reach an agreement or else if the agreement 
between the parties is not feasible. The length should not be too long. 
 
B. Composition Procedure (conciliation) 
 
The composition procedure (―conciliation‖) derives from the previous ―règlement 
amiable‖140. This procedure is applicable to all the firms facing short term cash flow 
insolvency and also to firms that face imminent danger of insolvency. The main purpose 
                                                 
139
 « Le président du tribunal peut, à la demande d'un débiteur, désigner un mandataire ad hoc dont il détermine la mission. Le 
débiteur peut proposer le nom d'un mandataire ad hoc ». 
140
 Article L611-4 (translated in English) of the commercial code states that: ―A composition procedure is instituted before the Tribunal 
de Commerce (Commercial court) for the persons who carry out a commercial or craftsman‘s activity, who encounter an actual, or a 
foreseeable legal, economic or financial difficulty, and who have not been in a state of cessation of payments for more than forty-five 
days‖ 
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of this procedure is to allow restructuring of debts by reaching an agreement with its main 
creditors. As the procedure is confidential, there is no provision for moratorium or cram 
downs as such there is danger of creditor enforcement. The duration of the procedure 
cannot exceed more than 4-5 months: the idea being that a solution should be found 
rapidly. 
 
Interestingly enough, the composition procedure differs from the previous règlement 
amiable in the sense that it can be triggered both by the solvent and insolvent firms. The 
current financial distress and/or foreseeable legal, economic or financial difficulties are 
enough for triggering this process.  This procedure can be kept confidential or can be made 
public depending on certain criteria. In practice, the debtor could decide to confidentially 
renegotiate with the crucial creditors leaving other creditors‘ money at stake. In fact, this 
reflects the legislator‘s willingness to provide a mixed and court-supervised way of 
resolving past, present and/or future difficulties. 
 
The debtor is responsible for the initiation of the process. He files a petition to the 
president of the commercial court (art. L.611-6 of the commercial code). The president of 
the court then appoints a conciliator. Conciliator is responsible to assess the condition of 
the company. Article L611-7
141
 (as translated in English) states the duties of the appointed 
conciliator: ―The conciliator’s duty is to promote the conclusion of an amicable agreement 
between the debtor and its main creditors as well as, as the case may be, its usual 
contracting partners, which is intended to put an end to the business’s difficulties. He may 
also make any proposals for the safeguarding of the business, the continuation of the 
economic activity and the maintenance of the employment‖. During the performance of his 
duties he can gather any information from the debtor which can serve the purposes of the 
act. The negotiation process can result in the reduction or cancellation of the debt due 
towards financial authorities, social security bodies, unemployment insurance system etc.  
 
                                                 
141
 Le conciliateur a pour mission de favoriser la conclusion entre le débiteur et ses principaux créanciers ainsi que, le cas échéant, ses 
cocontractants habituels, d'un accord amiable destiné à mettre fin aux difficultés de l'entreprise. Il peut également présenter toute 
proposition se rapportant à la sauvegarde de l'entreprise, à la poursuite de l'activité économique et au maintien de l'emploi. 
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If the agreement is approved by the parties it can be either certified by the court or not. In 
case, the agreement is not certified by the court, it means that it has contractual value and 
remains confidential among the concerned parties. This means parties who have not signed 
the agreement cannot be enforced upon. Moreover, the agreement is considered to be 
concluded on the declaration of the debtor stating that he is not any more in state of 
―cessation of payments‖. In case the agreement is certified by the court, it no longer 
remains confidential. The court checks
142
 that the terms of the agreement ensure the 
continuity of the business‘ activity and that the agreement does not harm the interests of 
non-signatory creditors. The court must ensure that the debtor is no more in a state of 
cessation of payments. The creditors who have agreed to the terms of agreement and 
provide new financing are paid in priority before the rest of the claims. 
 
The proceedings of the composition procedure end under the following circumstances: 1) 
the agreement is certified by the court 2) the agreement fails 3) the agreement is not 
executed 4) if the debtor wants the agreement to terminate 5) a procedure of safeguard, 
reorganization or winding up is commenced. 
 
C. Safeguard Proceedings (sauvegarde) 
 
The provisions of safeguard procedures are governed by Article L.620-1
143
 of the 
commercial code. One of the objectives of its introduction in the French code was mainly 
to mimic the US Chapter 11: i.e. to provide solvent companies that may have future 
difficulties with a collective way of favouring reorganization validated by the pool of 
creditors through vote. It states that: ―A safeguard procedure is instituted to be commenced 
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 Article L611-8142 states the duties of the president: ―I-Upon the join petition of the parties, the president of the court shall record 
their agreement and make it enforceable. He shall rule upon the case based on the debtor‘s certified statement attesting that he was not 
in a state of cessation of payments at the time the agreement was entered into or that the agreement has put an end to the state of 
cessation of payments. The decision recording the agreement shall not be subject to publication formalities and shall not be appealed 
against. The agreement shall terminate the composition proceedings. 
II- However, at the debtor‘s request, the court shall approve the agreement obtained if the following conditions are met: 
1. The debtor is not in a state of cessation of payments of the agreement puts an end to it; 
2. The terms of the agreement should normally ensure the continuity of the business‘s activity; 
3. The agreement does not harm the interests of non-signatory creditors.‖ 
143
 « Il est institué une procédure de sauvegarde ouverte sur demande d'un débiteur mentionné à l'article L. 620-2 qui, sans être en 
cessation des paiements, justifie de difficultés qu'il n'est pas en mesure de surmonter. Cette procédure est destinée à faciliter la 
réorganisation de l'entreprise afin de permettre la poursuite de l'activité économique, le maintien de l'emploi et l'apurement du passif. La 
procédure de sauvegarde donne lieu à un plan arrêté par jugement à l'issue d'une période d'observation et, le cas échéant, à la 
constitution de deux comités de créanciers, conformément aux dispositions des articles L. 626-29 et L. 626-30 ». 
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on the petition of the debtor mentioned in Article L620-2 who, without being in cessation 
of payments, shows difficulties that he or she is unable to overcome on his or her own. The 
purpose of this procedure is to facilitate the reorganization of the business in order to 
allow the continuation of the economic activity, the maintenance of the employment and 
the settlement of liabilities. The safeguard proceedings shall give rise to a plan to be 
confirmed by a court order at the end of an observation period and, where appropriate, to 
the formation of two committees of creditors, in compliance with the provisions of Articles 
L626-29 and L626-30‖. 
 
Thus, the main goals of safeguard proceedings are the promotion of continuation of the 
economic activity, preservation of employment and settlement of liabilities. In this sense, 
it is quite close to ―redressement judiciaire‖ and follows similar mechanisms 
(―observation period‖, ―stay of claims‖, new money). The procedure can only be initiated 
by the debtor.
144
 The debtor continues to carry on the business under the supervision of 
insolvency practitioner. As the procedure is not confidential, there is automatic freezing of 
assets upon the commencement of the proceedings (art. L. 622-21, I). 
 
Before commencing the proceedings, the judge gathers all the critical information related 
to the company‘s financial, economic and employment situation. He may be assisted by an 
expert of his choice (commercial code, art. L.621-1). If the judge thinks that the company 
may survive then it can commence the proceedings. He appoints an administrator who 
supervises the debtors business and might help him with management of his operations. 
Upon commencement, there is an observation period which can last from 6-12 months 
(art. L.621-3) and during this period, the court can anytime on the motion of the debtor, 
order for partial cessation of business‘s operations. Similarly, the court145 on the motion of 
the debtor, administrator, court nominee, the public prosecutor or on its own motion 
converts the safeguard proceedings into reorganization proceedings
146
 or liquidation 
                                                 
144
 Article L620-2, §1er states that: ―The safeguard procedure shall apply to any person who carries out a commercial or craftsman’s 
activity, to any farmer, to any other individual running an independent professional activity, including an independent professional 
person with a statutory or regulated status or whose designation is protected, as well as private law entities‖. 
145 Commercial code, article L. 622-10. 
146
 If the conditions stated in Article L631-1 are satisfied or will be satisfied.  
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proceedings
147
. The debtor draws up a reorganization plan with the assistance of the 
appointed administrator. This plan is either ordered or approved by the court. 
 
In case the plan is ordered by the court, (1) the creditors‘ tradeoff between debt 
restructuring terms (postponing the date of maturity and reduction of debts, reduction in 
interest rates and so on) (2) the Court may order prolongation up to the period of 10 years 
for dissenting creditors and even the secured ones
148
. In case the plan is approved by the 
court, three creditors‘ committees are created (one for financial creditors, one for main 
suppliers and one for bondholders) in order to vote on the plan. If the plan is voted and 
approved, it is binding on all the committees‘ members and there is no time limit for their 
payment dues. Let us note that the Court agrees to approve the plan if it is voted upon by 
the committee members and if the plan protects the interests of all the creditors. 
 
The safeguard procedure comes to an end once the plan is approved or ordered by the 
court. The procedure may also end if the company becomes insolvent during the 
―observation period‖: the safeguard procedure is then converted into judicial 
reorganization (―redressement judiciaire‖) or winding up (―liquidation judiciaire‖) (L622-
10, §3). 
 
D. Judicial Procedures (reorganization and liquidation) 
 
Besides the above mentioned preventive procedures (pure or mixed
149
), the French 
legislation reinvigorated the former formal procedures of bankruptcy. The reorganization 
procedure is known by the same name that existed previously as ―redressement judiciaire‖ 
and same is the case for liquidation procedure previously known as ―liquidation 
judiciaire‖. However, there is now one noticeable difference: sales are no longer part of 
reorganization procedure but fall into the liquidation procedure.   
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If the conditions stated in Article L640-1 are satisfied. 
148
 Minimum payment of 5% each year. 
149
 Pure means complete private solution whereas mixed means having features of both private and court solution. 
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A. Reorganization Plan (redressement judiciaire) 
 
The reorganization procedure is the reformed representation of the 1994 previous 
―redressement judiciaire‖. In addition, it is quite similar to the safeguard procedure, 
except the facts that (1) it is compulsory as it takes place when the debtor is insolvent (i.e. 
―cessation des paiements‖), and (2) within this procedure, the directors/managers can be 
replaced by the administrator. 
 
The reorganization procedure is initiated by the court at the debtor‘s request. Article L622-
10, al. 3
150
 states that: ―At the debtor’s request, [the court] shall also decide the 
conversion [of the safeguard procedure] in a reorganization procedure if the drawing up 
of a safeguard plan is obviously impossible and if the closing of the procedure would, 
quite certainly and within a short time, lead to cessation of payments‖. It can be triggered 
if the debtor in unable to pay its mature debts with his current assets. This means that 
cessation of payments is the criteria for the initiation of this process. Article L631-1
151
 
provides clauses for the conditions under which this procedure can be triggered and its 
objectives. It states that: ―A reorganization procedure is instituted to apply to any debtor 
referred to under Articles L631-2 or L631-3 which, being unable to pay his or her accrued 
liabilities with his or her current assets, is in a state of cessation of payments. The debtor 
shows that the credits still available or the moratorium granted by the creditors allow him 
or her to meet his or her accrued liabilities with his or her current assets, is not in a state 
of cessation of payments. The purpose of reorganization procedure is to allow the 
continuation of the businesses operations, the maintenance of employment and the 
settlement of liabilities. It shall give rise to a plan to be confirmed by a court ruling at the 
end of an observation period and, as the case may be, to the formation of two committees 
of creditors according to the provisions of Articles L626-29 and L626-30‖. 
 
                                                 
150
 A la demande du débiteur, il décide également la conversion en redressement judiciaire si l'adoption d'un plan de sauvegarde est 
manifestement impossible et si la clôture de la procédure conduirait, de manière certaine et à bref délai, à la cessation des paiements. 
151 Il est institué une procédure de redressement judiciaire ouverte à tout débiteur mentionné aux articles L. 631-2 ou L. 631-3 qui, dans 
l'impossibilité de faire face au passif exigible avec son actif disponible, est en cessation des paiements. 
La procédure de redressement judiciaire est destinée à permettre la poursuite de l'activité de l'entreprise, le maintien de l'emploi et 
l'apurement du passif. Elle donne lieu à un plan arrêté par jugement à l'issue d'une période d'observation et, le cas échéant, à la 
constitution de deux comités de créanciers, conformément aux dispositions des articles L. 626-29 et L. 626-30. 
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Overall, this procedure follows similar mechanisms like the safeguard procedure. There is 
an observation period that generates new money claims. The company is audited by the 
administrator, the claims are verified and a reorganization plan is formulated taking into 
consideration the interests of the creditors. Contrary to the safeguard procedure, the 
creditors are not allowed to vote on such reorganization plan. The court has the sole 
authority to decide the fate of the plan. The plan cannot impose debt forgiveness but may 
extend the delays of repayment (until 10 years). It is to recall that, contrary to the previous 
legislation, sale as a going concern is not part of reorganization, but considered as an 
alternative way of liquidation. 
 
B. Liquidation and Sale (liquidation judiciaire) 
 
Although, the post 2005/2008 liquidation procedure is close to the previous ―liquidation 
judiciaire‖, it also encompasses sales as going concern. Article L-640-1152 of the 
commercial code states that: ―A liquidation procedure is instituted to apply to any debtor 
mentioned in Article L640-2 who is in a state of cessation of payments and whose 
reorganization is manifestly impossible. The purpose of the liquidation procedure is to end 
the business activity or to sell the debtor’s assets through a general or separate sale of its 
interests and property‖. It is clear from the article that (1) ―cessation des paiements‖ and 
(2) the impossibility of reorganization are the criteria for the initiation of the process. 
It is a compulsory process (except when composition is asked) and a collective procedure. 
Upon commencement of the procedure, directors partially lose their control over the firm 
and business comes to an end immediately. Liquidators take control of all the assets of the 
firm and are responsible for selling the assets and distributing the proceeds according to 
the ranking, if any, and pari passu to unsecured creditors. 
*       * 
* 
 
                                                 
152 
―Il est institué une procédure de liquidation judiciaire ouverte à tout débiteur mentionné à l'article L. 640-2 en cessation des 
paiements et dont le redressement est manifestement impossible. La procédure de liquidation judiciaire est destinée à mettre fin à 
l'activité de l'entreprise ou à réaliser le patrimoine du débiteur par une cession globale ou séparée de ses droits et de ses biens.‖ 
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4.2.2. Analyzing the Specificities of the French Legal Framework 
 
The French bankruptcy law specificities may have both ex-ante and ex-post effects. 
The first specificity is designated to the decision making process which is fully transferred 
to a Court. Indeed in France, it is the court which decides (1) whether the company should 
be liquidated or not, (2) whether the reorganization plan should be approved or not, 
(3) whether any buyout proposal should be selected or not. Thus, creditors do not enjoy 
the right to disapprove the plan. Neither their confirmation to the plan nor the sale of their 
collateral requires secured creditor‘s approval. In addition, new financing can be raised by                        
the court appointed administrator without the approval of the creditors. On one hand such 
forceful court administered process may be useful to overcome the coordination issues 
(common pool problem) while on the other hand it may create bad incentives prior to 
bankruptcy (ex-ante inefficiency) because the various stakeholders anticipate that they will 
lose the power to decide under bankruptcy and may become hesitant to lend or ask for 
more collaterals to mitigate the risk of dilution in bankruptcy (Davydenko and Franks, 
2007). This may lead to inefficient credit renewals, overinvestment, and/or delays to 
trigger the procedure. 
 
Second, the Act of 1985 establishes a hierarchy between the various objectives and 
safeguarding the business as a support for economic activity outweighs the objectives of 
the creditors. This continuation bias may reduce the ex-post efficiency of the law, as firms 
may be reorganized even if their continuation value is less than their liquidation value. 
This bias in favor of continuation explains why half of the opened procedures are 
redressements judiciaires (see table 4.1 below).  
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Table 4.1: Number of applications for bankruptcy procedures (France, 2010) 
Jan. Feb. March April May June July Aug. Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec. Year 2010
Opening of "Sauvergarde" 81 100 119 81 63 81 125 44 85 90 111 45 1025
Opening of "Redressement 
judiciaire"
1377 1436 1780 1322 1338 1505 1348 449 1519 1518 1450 780 15822
Opening of "Liquidation 
judiciaire"
3004 2958 3317 2500 2488 2973 2503 1204 3321 2776 2760 1549 31353
Total of openings 4462 4494 5216 3903 3889 4559 3976 1697 4925 4384 4321 2374 48200
 
Source: Conseil National des Greffiers des Tribunaux de Commerce. 
 
It is worth mentioning that the procedure that gave its name to the reform (sauvegarde) is 
still insignificant and very rarely opted for (and probably dedicated to the biggest 
companies) and redressements judiciaires remains the dominant continuation procedure. 
Nevertheless, choosing redressements judiciaires does not mean that firm is successfully 
continued. The firm has to pass the observation stage. After which its fate is decided.  
 
Graph 4.2 provides an insight into the results obtained after observation stage. First, we 
have to mention that most of the companies do not have enough assets to justify the 
opening of an observation period. Under this situation, immediate liquidation is the most 
common outcome. Second, for the remaining cases, for which an observation period could 
be implemented, most of the final outcomes are liquidations. This is reflected by the graph 
4.2: redressements judiciaires that involve an observation period lead respectively to 
(1) liquidation in 65% of the cases, (2) sale in 11% of the cases, and (3) reorganization in 
23% of the cases. However, it is worth mentioning that these results are restricted to Paris 
and suburbs only.  
Graph 4.2: Outcomes of the “redressements judiciaires” 
after an observation period (Paris and suburb) 
 
 Source: Observatoire Consulaire des Entreprises en Difficultés : Paris, Nanterre, Bobigny, 
Créteil. 
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At a country level, continuation via reorganization plans and sales as a going concern 
accounts for nearly 5% (Blazy et al. (2008)) of the total population. Thus, despite offering 
such a strong reorganization procedure (either through continuation plans or sales) 
evidence suggests that only very few firms survive bankruptcy in France. Most of the 
French firms are liquidated piecemeal (in 90 percent of the cases
153
) and most of these 
bankruptcies are for small and medium sized enterprises as the listed firms are provided 
protection by the State (Pochet, 2002).  
 
Kaiser (1996) exhibits that only 15% of the firms survive after filing for reorganization. 
He provides a reason for such a low survival rate in reorganization that formal 
reorganization proceedings are restricted by the fact that new owner is required to assume 
all employment contracts. These pre-conditions often make the sale impossible. 
Yet, we have to moderate such analysis of the French statistics. Despite the strong 
imbalance between liquidations and continuations, it is still not as pronounced as in other 
European countries. France still exhibits a much better survival rate for distressed firms 
(5%) as compared to other European countries
154
 (where liquidation is supposed to be 
close to 99%). Thus, continuation plays a minor but not marginal role in France.  
 
Besides as previously mentioned, the French Law offers a set of preventive
155
 procedures 
that aim at solving financial distress in a confidential way. These are ―règlement 
amiable‖ / ―conciliation‖, and the ―mandat ad hoc‖. The graph 4.3 shows the evolution 
(Paris and suburb) of these procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
153
 See Blazy, Delannay, Petey, and Weill (2008). 
154
 See Brouwer (2006) 
155
 To be precise, the ―sauvegarde‖ procedure is also a preventive procedure, but it is not confidential. Regarding ―conciliation‖, this 
procedure is not a pure preventive procedure as it is also opened to bankrupt firms. 
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Graph 4.3: Preventive procedures in France (Paris and suburb) 
 
 
 
Since the 2005 reform, we observe an upward trend for conciliation, whereas ―mandats ad 
hoc‖ show a reverse trend. Today, both procedures have the same importance (in number), 
but we can expect the number of ―conciliations‖ to rise over the ―mandat ad hoc‖.  
 
The importance of prevention is a key feature of the French bankruptcy framework. 
Veritably, for many years, the courts (especially the Parision ones) have engaged an active 
policy promoting early warning tools (for instance, some departments are fully dedicated 
to prevention (―cellules de prevention-détection‖)), their role is to detect the first signs of 
difficulties and to interview the managers prior to bankruptcy. Graph 4.4 shows the 
evolution of such interviews for the period in between 1997-2009. More managers were 
being interviewed, while during the same period, the number of collective procedures 
showed a decline (yet, these co-movements may be due to other external factors).  
 
Graph 4.4: Number of interviewed managers and trigger of collective procedures (Paris and suburb) 
 
Source: Observatoire Consulaire des Entreprises en Difficultés : Paris, Nanterre, Bobigny, 
Créteil. 
Source: Observatoire Consulaire des Entreprises en Difficultés : Paris, Nanterre, 
Bobigny, Créteil. 
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Having explored the French bankruptcy procedures in detail, in the next section of the 
thesis we attempt to explore the Insolvency procedures of UK.  
 
*     * 
* 
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4.3. A Panorama of UK Insolvency procedures 
 
4.3.1. Overview of Corporate Insolvency in U.K. 
 
Among the various European countries, England has enjoyed a prolonged history of 
insolvency law tradition. England‘s first official insolvency procedure was enacted by the 
statute of Henry VIII in 1542. In addition, the first rescue-oriented regime was introduced 
by the Victorian Legislation 1870 called as ―Schemes of Arrangement‖. This regime by 
Victorian Legislation facilitated the debtors and the creditors to find an amicable solution 
to their problems through a renegotiation process. With this the first seeds of rescue 
mechanism were already planted within the English corporate insolvency system.  
 
In 1977, government organized the Cork Committee under the appointment of Secretary of 
State for trade. Based on the recommendations of the Cork Committee in 1982, two new 
bankruptcy procedures were introduced by the Insolvency Act of 1986. Prior to these 
procedures, United Kingdom was supposed to have a very high creditor oriented 
bankruptcy system. The introduction of ―Company Voluntary Arrangement‖ (CVA) and 
Administration marked the beginning of a new era of corporate rescue culture in English 
corporate insolvency legal framework. The primary objective was to provide an 
opportunity to all the concerned parties to get involved in the rescue operation, to get a 
chance to formulate reorganization plans and vote to confirm them. This in turn 
encouraged them to prolong their support to the distressed debtor. 
 
Prior to this act, there existed three bankruptcy procedures namely: Liquidation, 
Receivership and Voluntary Reconstruction or Schemes of Arrangement. Administration 
was subsequently streamlined by the Enterprise Act of 2002 to make it faster, easier and 
better whereas receivership procedure was abolished. 
 
These procedures are further classified into two categories: 
1) Formal and Collective procedures: 
- Administration 
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- Liquidation (Members Voluntary liquidation, Creditor Voluntary liquidation and 
Compulsory liquidation) 
2) Formal but not collective procedures: 
- Schemes of Arrangement 
- Company Voluntary Arrangement 
- Administrative Receivership Informal  
- Contractual Arrangements (London Approach, Pre-packs) 
 
Overall, the total number of insolvencies remains quite stable between the years 1998 till 
2001 (graph 4.5). However it shows a slight peak in the year 2002 and then a sudden drop 
in trough during the period 2003 - 2004. It again shows a peak in 2006 followed by a sharp 
fall in 2007 and sharp rise in 2008. This can be due to the current financial crisis, whose 
effects were felt in UK as well. Thus, we notice that the total number of companies 
entering insolvency procedures has increased over the period of time. The years 2002, 
2006 and 2008 show high peaks in number of corporate insolvencies.  
 
Graph 4.5: Evolution of Insolvencies in UK 
 
      Source: Insolvency Service, UK 
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4.3.2. The Insolvency Procedures Prevailing in UK 
 
We first consider the general evolution of the various UK procedures. Over the period of 
time, the number of corporate insolvency procedures has increased. Table 4.2 and 
Graph 4.6 show the total number of UK companies entering insolvency procedures in 
England and Wales over the period of 10 years (1998-2008). Liquidation is the most 
extensively used procedure accounting for more than 85% of all bankruptcy filings; 
administration accounts to nearly 5% of all cases and receivership amounted to 10% of all 
cases. Among liquidations, creditor voluntary liquidation is the most extensively used 
procedure followed by compulsory liquidations. Creditor voluntary liquidation accounted 
for almost more than 50% of all corporate insolvency procedures till the year 2004 after 
which it showed a slight decrease over subsequent years falling slightly below 50%. 
Compulsory liquidation on the other hand accounted for near about 30% of all corporate 
insolvency procedures. 
Table 4.2: Insolvency Procedures in UK 
YEAR CL CVL RECEIVERSHIP ADMINISTRATION TOTAL
1998 5216 (34.2)% 7987   (52.4)% 1713 (11.2)% 338   (2.2)% 15254
1999 5209 (31.9)% 9071   (55.5)% 1618 (9.9)% 440   (2.7)% 16338
2000 4925 (30.1)% 9392   (57.4)% 1595 (9.8)% 438   (2.7)% 16350
2001 4675 (26.6)% 10297 (58.6)% 1914 (10.9)% 698   (4.0)% 17584
2002 6231 (33.7)% 10075 (54.5)% 1541 (8.3)% 643   (3.5)% 18490
2003 5234 (32.4)% 8950   (55.4)% 1261 (7.8)% 700   (4.3)% 16145
2004 4584 (31.3)% 7608   (51.9)% 864   (5.9)% 1601 (10.9)% 14657
2005 5233 (33.2)% 7660   (48.7)% 590   (3.7)% 2257 (14.3)% 15740
2006 5418 (31.3)% 7719   (44.7)% 588   (3.4)% 3560 (20.6)% 17285
2007 5165 (33.6)% 7342   (47.8)% 337   (2.2)% 2509 (16.3)% 15353
2008 5494 (25.9)% 10041 (47.3)% 867  (4.1)% 4820 (22.7)% 21222
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Insolvency Service, UK 
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Graph 4.6: Insolvency Procedures in UK 
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                Source: Insolvency Service 
 
During the period 1998-2001, receiverships show an increase and then start declining 
gradually. Indeed, receivership is no more pervasive and was abandoned by Enterprise Act 
of 2002, which came into force on 15
th
 September, 2003. It was viewed as a biased 
procedure, imparting too many rights to secured creditors and often leading to immature 
liquidations
156
 as the appointed receiver was only concerned with seeking repayment for 
his appointees (Benveniste, 1986; Aghion et al, 1992). It was also suspected as the longest 
and the most expensive procedure which in return undermined the ex-post efficiency of 
the outcome and also as the procedure that was biased in favour of secured creditors‘ 
interests and did not consider the interests of unsecured creditors (Armour, Hsu, Walters, 
2008, Insolvency Service, 2001). European Insolvency Regulation that came into effect 
from 31
st
 May, 2002 provides for collective proceedings to being in all EU member states. 
Receivership failed to meet this international criteria as it was not a collective procedure 
(Insolvency Service, 2001). Thus, it was considered appropriate to abandon it. Several 
other criticisms have been reported against the functioning of receivership.
157
 
 
Administration on the other hand shows a gradual increase since the time of its inception. 
Indeed, the Enterprise Act of 2002 streamlined the old administration procedure and 
abolished the receivership procedure. The primary objective of the new streamlined 
procedure was to enable more companies to survive insolvency and provide level playing 
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 Aghion, Hart, and Moore, 1992, Armour and Mokal, 2005, Insolvency Service, 2001 
157
 Benveniste, 1986; Aghion, Hart and Moore, 1992; Milman and Mond, 1999; Finch, 2002; Mokal, 2004 
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field to all creditors With regard to this Crown‘s preferential status was abolished158 and 
ring fence fund
159
 was established to allow more assets to be available to the unsecured 
creditors. This enhanced their positioning since the previous law. The purpose of 
administration, as defined by paragraph 3(1) of Schedule B1 of the Act, is to achieve one 
of the following objectives for the company: rescuing the company as a going concern, 
achieving a better result for company‘s creditors as a whole than would be likely if the 
company were wound up (without first being in administration), realizing property in 
order to make a distribution to one or more secured or preferential creditors. Thus, the 
main objective is to rescue the company and to achieve better results for its creditors. 
However, there is hierarchy in the objectives. If the first cannot be achieved only then can 
the second objective be pursued and so on so forth. The administrator is required to work 
within a particular time frame not exceeding more than a year and provide efficient and 
quick solutions. New administration procedure was suspected to be faster, flexible, more 
transparent in terms of accountability (Frisby, 2004; Armour and Mokal, 2005; Finch 
2005). Administrator had fiduciary duties towards all the creditors and was also 
responsible for minimizing the length of bankruptcy proceedings. In order to study the 
impact of Enterprise Act of 2002, Insolvency Service funded several empirical studies 
(Frisby, 2006; Katz and Mumford, 2006). While Frisby (2006) found no significant impact 
on the recoveries for creditors between receivership and the new procedure, Katz and 
Mumford (2006) found that administrations not only substituted receiverships but also 
resulted in liquidations. There was a significant decline in both receiverships and 
liquidations after September, 2003. One of the reasons for substitution of liquidations by 
administrations was supposed to be the decision of House of Lords‘ in Re Leyland DAF 
Ltd, Buchler v Talbot. In this case it was held that general expenses of liquidation
160
 are 
not to be paid by the floating charge assets but have to be paid only out of company‘s free 
assets. Unlike the liquidator, administrator had an incentive, as he was certain that his 
expenses and remuneration will be recovered from floating charge assets. Thus, it led them 
to favour administration over liquidation. 
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 EA 2002, s 251 (1) states that the Crown preference shall cease to exist. 
159 
The EA 2002, s 252 introduces a new s 176A into the IA 1986 which fully stipulates the new creation of ring fence fund. 
160
 as distinct from the costs incurred in the realization of floating charge assets 
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The new changes were introduced in the law to make bankruptcy procedures more 
efficient and to provide greater accountability to unsecured creditors and to increase the 
overall efficiency. Even after all such alterations it was found that the net recoveries 
remain unchanged
161
 (Armour, Hsu, Walters, 2008). Though, the gross realizations seem 
to have increased but it has been compensated by the increasing bankruptcy costs. Frisby 
(2006) found no significant differences in post and prior Enterprise Act cases in terms of 
recoveries.  
 
The above figures have shown the incidence of corporate insolvencies and the most 
extensively used insolvency procedures. Now it is imperative to consider the functioning 
of these procedures. Figure 4.3 presents their general structure. Let us stress that the UK 
legislation interestingly provides its creditors with a menu of procedures to choose from. 
One likely effect of such ―menu‖ is that the various stakeholders (debtor and creditors) can 
use such procedures strategically, in the sense that they are expected to select the 
procedure that fits in their best interest. 
 
In the following sections, we present in more detail the content of each procedure: How 
are they triggered? What are their effects? What is the order of priority?  
 
We first start with liquidation (section 4.3.2.1), which is split between voluntary 
liquidation (section A) and involuntary liquidation (section B). Then, we present 
receivership (section 4.3.2.2) and administration (section 4.3.2.3). Last, we describe the 
CVA (section 4.3.2.4), which is closer to workout than formal bankruptcy (even if CVA is 
a part of the insolvency law act, 1986) and some other prevalent but rarely used 
procedures (section 4.3.2.5) and finally conclude the chapter with section 4.4. 
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 Most of these researchers were able to study administrations and receiverships, which constitutes roughly to 15% of all the 
bankruptcies filed in UK. In our thesis we not only take into consideration the administration cases and receivership cases, but also 
includes liquidation cases which constitute 85% of all bankruptcy filings. We find the bankruptcy costs, duration of the procedure, 
amount due to all creditor classes, amount recovered by all creditors classes and find the overall efficiency of each procedure my 
calculated the global recovery rate (total recovery rate) for all creditors. We also notice that outcomes for unsecured creditors remain 
very futile even after all the favorable reforms. Based on these parameters it will be interesting to have a detailed insight into the UK 
insolvency law. 
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4.3.2.1 Liquidation 
 
Liquidations are the most widely used insolvency procedures, accounting for 75-85% of 
all corporate insolvency procedures in United Kingdom. Liquidation of a company is a 
legal process where the assets of the company are sold in whole or piecemeal and the 
proceeds so realized are distributed among the creditors in the order of priority. A 
liquidator is appointed to manage the winding up of the company. The liquidator is not 
only responsible for making distributions to creditors but also ensures that company‘s 
affairs have been carried out in a just manner. He is also responsible for verifying whether 
all company contracts (including employee contracts) are completed, closing all the 
businesses of the company, settling any legal disputes, selling the assets of the company, 
collecting receivables due to the company and making payments to creditors in the order 
of priority and any residual payments to shareholders.  At the end of the process the 
company ceases to exit.  
 
Liquidation is often called as winding up or dissolution, though the latter indicates the last 
stage of winding up. Liquidation can be voluntary or driven by the court.  
 
INVOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION (DRIVEN BY COURT): 
- Compulsory Liquidation (or equivalently, winding up by court
162
) 
 
VOLUNTARY LIQUIDATION: 
- Members Voluntary Liquidation 
- Creditors Voluntary Liquidation 
 
A.  Involuntary Liquidation: Compulsory Liquidation (or winding up) 
 
Compulsory Liquidation is the second most used insolvency procedure accounting for 
30% of all insolvency procedures. The compulsory liquidation cases showed a general 
decline between the period 1998 to 2001 falling from 34.2% to 26.6% with respect to total 
                                                 
162
 Modes of winding up are provided in Part IV, Chapter 1 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
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number of insolvency filings (graph 4.7). Then in 2002, we observe a steep rise in the 
number of compulsory liquidation filings and again surging down till 2004 and then 
showing quite a stable trend of rise. On the whole it shows quite a stable trend. As it is 
extensively used by companies, it is imperative to understand what compulsory liquidation 
is, who triggers it, and how the process is followed and so on.  
 
Graph 4.7: Evolution of Compulsory Liquidation cases 
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  Source: Insolvency Service 
 
A1. The Triggering 
 
Compulsory liquidation is mostly dedicated to insolvent companies. This is the case when 
a company is unable to pay its debts as they become due and no other alternative 
insolvency procedure can be enforced. Then in such case the company can be wound up 
under the supervision of the court. Interestingly enough, the insolvency criteria in UK is 
broader than that in France, as it considers both short term illiquidity situations and long 
term prospective financial difficulties. The procedure can be triggered under both 
situations. Regarding illiquidity, section 123 (1a) of Insolvency Act of 1986 states that a 
company is unable to pay its debts ―if a creditor (by assignment or otherwise) to whom the 
company is indebted on a sum exceeding £ 750 then due has served on the company, by 
leaving it at the company‘s registered office, a written demand (in the prescribed form) 
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requiring the company to pay sum so due and the company has for 3 weeks thereafter 
neglected to pay the sum or to secure or compound for it to the reasonable satisfaction of 
the creditor‖. Regarding long term prospective financial difficulties, section 123 (2) states 
that: ―A company is also deemed unable to pay its debts if it is proved to the satisfaction of 
the court that the value of the company‘s assets is less than the amount of its liabilities, 
taking into account its contingent and prospective liabilities‖. Here we would like to 
emphasize that there can be more criteria‘s leading a company to compulsory liquidation, 
but these are of minor importance as compared to the debtor‘s inability to pay its debts163. 
The petition
164
 is usually presented by the creditors or by the company itself or the 
directors or the shareholders
165
. In special circumstances the petition can also be filed by 
the Secretary of State or an official receiver
166
. 
 
A2. The Winding Up Process 
 
As soon as the winding up order has been issued, a copy of it should be forwarded to the 
company and the registrar of the companies who will duly file them in records
167
. If an 
official liquidator has been appointed, then a statement of affairs should be submitted
168
 to 
him in the prescribed format by the management authorities of the company such as 
directors or managers. Such statement of affairs should contain details
169
 about the 
company‘s assets, debts and liabilities, names and addresses of creditors, the securities 
held by them and the dates when the securities were issued. Besides, he should also be 
                                                 
163
 Section 122 of the Insolvency Act 1986 outlines the circumstances under which the company may be wound up by the court: 
a) the company has by special resolution resolved that the company be wound up by the court, 
b) despite being a public company by virtue of incorporation, it has not been issued a certificate under section 117 of the Companies Act 
(public company share capital requirements) and more than a year has expired since it was so registered,  
c) it is an old public company within the context of the Consequential Provisions Act 
d) the company does not commence its business within a year from its incorporation or suspends its business for a whole year, 
e) the number of members is reduced below 2, 
f) the company is unable to pay its debts, 
g) the court is of the opinion that winding up of the company is a just and equitable measure. 
h) However, in practice, the majority of the compulsory liquidations are made on the last two grounds. 
164
 The petition for winding up should be made in the High Court or the District Registry of the High Court that covers the jurisdiction 
of company‘s trading address or where the registered office is situated (see IA 1986 Sec 117). If the company‘s share capital, paid up or 
credited as paid up, is not more than £120,000 , the petition can be presented in a county court that deals with insolvency matters and 
has jurisdiction authority over the area  where the company's trading address or registered office is situated. 
165
 See section 124 of Insolvency acts 1986 provides provisions for an application of winding up. 
166
 An official receiver is a court appointed official who carries on the winding up of the company. For details see IA 1986 Sec 399 and 
Sec 400.  
167
 IA, 1986 Sec 130(1) 
168 
IA, 1986 Sec 131(1) 
169
 IA, 1986 Sec 131(2) and Sec 131(3) 
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provided with the information on the officers and employees of the company who have 
joined within one year of his appointment. All this information should be provided, in a 
prescribed manner, within 21 days of notification given to them by the liquidator. The 
official receiver should also submit a report to the court
170
, specifying the reasons for the 
company‘s failure and general information like formation, trading, partners, suppliers and 
affairs of the company.  
 
The liquidator
171
 is mainly responsible for making an account of the company‘s assets, 
realizing them
172
 and distributing the proceeds to the company creditors adhering to the 
absolute priority rule and making residual payments to the shareholders. As such winding 
up process takes time, it involves several managerial and financial specificities that change 
the way the company is managed. First, the liquidator takes control of entire property and 
assets of the company. He is solely responsible for managing the affairs of the company 
and acts as an agent of the company. Within the liquidation process, he terminates (1) the 
business of the company to the extent he believes is feasible for the beneficial disposal of 
the business or the company assets, and (2) the existing contracts of employees upon 
receiving notice of liquidation. Second, in counterpart, the directors‘ existing powers cease 
upon the notice of liquidation. During the winding up process, they are required (1) to 
provide all financial information to the liquidator or official receiver, (2) to deliver all 
property including financial books and records to the liquidator or official receiver, (3) to 
assist the liquidator if needed, and (4) to attend any meetings or proceedings if required. 
 
As the compulsory liquidation process is a collective procedure, most creditors have an 
automatic stay of claims. However, secured creditors may be exempt from this. Once the 
liquidation process has ended
173
, a priority order of repayment applies. Bankruptcy costs 
benefit from a higher rank
174
. The proceeds from secured assets are used to pay the 
                                                 
170
 IA 1986 Sec 132 
171
 See IA 1986 Sec (163-170) for the details of liquidators, their appointment and their powers and duties. 
172
 See IA 1986 Sec 143 for the general functions of the liquidator with respect to the winding up of the company.  
173
 The Liquidator should duly summon a final meeting of creditors to inform them about the outcome of liquidation and his release 
date from his duties, as a liquidator. The report is also sent to the registrar of the companies and upon receiving the final documents 
from the liquidator and on the expiration of 3 months the company is deemed to be dissolved (IA 1986 Sec 201). The company can also 
request their name to be struck off the registrar by sending an application to the registrar of the companies. 
174
 Fixed costs include petition deposit of £1,000 towards the costs of administration of the liquidation process and a court fee of £190. 
Variable costs include costs involved in advertising the petition in the London Gazette and the solicitor‘s fees. As defined by the law 
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secured creditors and residual amount, if any, goes towards paying liquidator fees 
followed by preferential creditors
175
 and unsecured creditors. The proceeds from 
unsecured assets are first utilized in paying the liquidators fees, followed by preferential 
creditors and unsecured creditors. 
 
B. Voluntary Liquidation: CVL and MVL
176
 
 
B1. Creditor Voluntary Liquidation 
 
Creditor Voluntary Liquidation (CVL) accounted for almost more than 50% of all 
corporate insolvency procedures until the period 2004, after which it showed a slight 
decrease falling slightly below 50% during subsequent years. The decrease can be 
attributed to the increased usage of administration
177
.  
CVL
178
 shows a constant rise between the periods 1998 - 2001 and then a sudden dip in 
the trough from 2002 onwards till 2004 after which a quite stable trend is observed before 
a sudden peak in 2008 (graph 4.8). Hence the following questions arise: What constitutes 
CVL as the most extensively used procedure? How is it initiated? What are the criteria for 
initiation and how does the whole process work? The answers to these questions should 
provide for a better understanding of the process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
(IA 1986 rules 4.127), liquidator‘s remuneration shall be fixed as either a percentage of the value of assets realized and distributed or in 
reference to the time spent by the liquidator and his staff on the proceedings. 
175
 Preferential debts are debts due to Inland Revenue, customs and excise, value added tax, social security contributions, contributions 
to occupational pension schemes, remuneration of employees. For further details see IA 1986, Sch 6.  
176 
Both members‘ voluntary liquidation and creditor voluntary liquidation are voluntary proceedings. The difference between the two 
is that in case of members‘ voluntary liquidation, the directors are required to make a statutory declaration under IA 1986 sec 89 while 
in the case of creditors voluntary liquidation they do not require doing that. For details see IA 1989 sec 90.  
177 
See, a report on administration cases prepared by Alan Katz and Michael Mumford, submitted to Insolvency service 2006. 
178
 The source of all above tables is Insolvency Service, United Kingdom. 
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Graph 4.8: Evolution of Creditor Voluntary Liquidation cases 
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B1a. The Triggering 
 
Creditor Voluntary Liquidation is also known as creditor voluntary winding up which 
takes place when the shareholders, usually at the directors‘ request, decide to put the 
company into liquidation realizing the fact that the company is unable to pay its debts as 
they become due or company‘s assets are less than the amount of its liabilities179. It is 
interesting to note that despite its misleading name, creditor voluntary liquidation can 
never be initiated by the creditors. It is only the directors which can initiate this process. 
The circumstances under which the company may be wound up voluntarily are provided 
by section 84 (1) of Insolvency Act of 1986 which states that: ―a company may be wound 
up voluntarily (a) when the period (if any) fixed for the duration of the company by the 
articles expires, or the event (if any) occurs, on the occurrence of which the articles 
provide that the company is to be dissolved, and the company in general meeting has 
passed a resolution requiring it to be wound up voluntarily; (b) if the company resolves by 
special resolution that it be wound up voluntarily; (c) if the company resolves by 
extraordinary resolution to the effect that it cannot by reason of its liabilities continue its 
business, and that it is advisable to wind up.‖ Thus, we notice that the directors voluntarily 
                                                 
179
 Here also we notice that the insolvency criteria is broader than in France, as it considers both short term illiquidity situations and 
long term prospective financial difficulties. The procedure can be triggered under both situations. 
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initiate the process realizing the fact that there is no other means (other insolvency 
procedure like administration) left to rescue the company than to opt for liquidation.  
 
B1b. The Winding Up Process 
 
A meeting of creditors is summoned within 14 days of passing of such resolution by the 
shareholders. The notice of such meeting should be duly sent to all creditors at least 7 days 
before the meeting takes place. Within such a notice, the creditors are informed about the 
time, date and venue where the meeting is to be held. They are also informed about the 
name and the address of the person who acts as the insolvency practitioner of the 
company. The insolvency practitioner provides the creditors with the information about 
company‘s affairs and a list of company‘s creditors before the meeting itself. The notice of 
the meeting is also published in newspapers and in London Gazette
180
. During this 
meeting, the directors should present to the creditors
181
, the statement of affairs of the 
company in its prescribed format which contains details of company‘s assets, debts and 
liabilities, names and addresses of the company‘s creditors, securities held by them 
respectively and any other information considered important from the point of view of 
disclosure. The insolvency practitioner who is nominated as the liquidator by the 
shareholders assists the directors in carrying on the meeting. The creditors are given the 
right to choose the liquidator and their choice can override the choice of shareholders. A 
report of the meeting is duly sent to all known creditors within 28 days.  
 
The winding up process has several implications. First, the liquidator takes control of the 
entire property and assets of the company. He is solely responsible for managing the 
affairs of the company and acts as an agent of the company. Within the liquidation 
process, he terminates (1) the business of the company to the extent he believes is feasible 
for the beneficial disposal of the business or the company assets, and (2) the existing 
contracts of employees upon receiving notice of liquidation.
182
 Second, in counterpart, the 
                                                 
180
 Section 98 (1)(2) of Insolvency Act 1986.  
181 
Section 99 (1)(2) of Insolvency Act 1986.  
182 Most of these decisions require agreement of liquidation committee if constituted. Section 101 of Insolvency Act 1986 lays down the 
process of appointment of the members of the liquidation committee.  Such committee is formed at a creditors meeting and comprises of 
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directors‘ existing powers cease upon the notice of liquidation. During the winding up 
process, they are required (1) to provide all financial information to the liquidator or 
official receiver, (2) to deliver all property including financial books and records to the 
liquidator or official receiver, (3) to assist the liquidator if needed, and (4) to attend any 
meetings or proceedings if required.  
 
As the creditor voluntary liquidation process is a collective procedure, most creditors have 
an automatic stay of claims. Once the liquidation process has ended
183
, a priority order of 
repayment applies. Bankruptcy costs benefit from a higher rank
184
. The proceeds from 
secured assets are used to pay the secured creditors and residual amount, if any, goes 
towards paying liquidator fees, followed by preferential creditors
185
 and unsecured 
creditors. The proceeds from unsecured assets are first utilized in paying the liquidators 
fees, followed by preferential creditors and unsecured creditors. 
 
B2. Member Voluntary Liquidation 
 
B2a. The Triggering 
 
In Members Voluntary Liquidation the shareholders of the company convene a general 
meeting and voluntarily decide to appoint the liquidator and put the company into 
liquidation. The difference between other liquidation processes and MVL is that it is 
triggered only for solvent companies. Thus, this specific procedure is out of the scope of 
our studies as the considered population is not in financial distress. Anyway, as MVL 
involves the liquidation of the debtor, the creditors are paid on a collective basis. This 
means that the company possesses enough assets for paying off all its debts and liabilities. 
                                                                                                                                                   
at least three creditors of the company. Such committee receives report from the liquidator and may meet periodically. It approves the 
remuneration of the liquidator and restrains him from exercising certain powers.  
183 
The Liquidator should duly summon a final meeting of creditors to inform them about the outcome of liquidation and his release 
date from his duties, as a liquidator. The report is also sent to the registrar of the companies and upon receiving the final documents 
from the liquidator and on the expiration of 3 months the company is deemed to be dissolved (IA 1986 Sec 201). The company can also 
request their name to be struck off the registrar by sending an application to the registrar of the companies. 
184
 It is the creditors who decide upon the liquidators fees, failing which it is determined in accordance with a statutory scale fixed by 
the court (IA 1986 rules 4.127: fixing of remuneration). It can also be fixed as a percentage of assets realized or distributed. It usually 
depends on the time spent by the liquidator, complexity of the case, the value and nature of company‘s asset and with how much 
effectiveness the process is carried out.  
185 
Preferential debts are debts due to inland revenue, customs and excise, value added tax, social security contributions, contributions 
to occupational pension schemes, remuneration of employees. For further details see IA 1986, Sch 6.  
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The directors then issue a statutory declaration under sec. 89 of Insolvency Act of 1986 
that the company is solvent
186
. After this it is mandatory for the company to pay off all its 
debts within a period of 12 months.  
 
B2b. The Winding Up Process 
 
The liquidator is responsible for managing the winding up affairs of the company and 
distribution of the assets
187
. As soon as he is appointed, the powers of directors cease to 
exist. The liquidator appointed will be responsible for making an account of the 
company‘s property and how it has been realized. He should hold a general meeting of the 
creditors and submit before them his report. Such a meeting should be advertised in the 
official Gazette, one month prior to the meeting date. After the meeting, the liquidator 
should send a report to the registrar of the company within a week, informing him of the 
meeting‘s outcome. A final meeting of creditors takes place to inform them of the outcome 
of liquidation and to decide upon the date of release of the liquidator from his duties. The 
report is also sent to the registrar of the companies and the company is subsequently 
dissolved
188
. The company can also submit an application to the registrar of the companies 
requesting to be struck off from the registrar.  
 
4.3.2.2. Receivership 
 
Receivership
189
 accounted for 11.2% of all insolvencies in 1998 while it dropped to 4.1% 
in 2008. Since the year 2001, we witness a gradual decrease in the number of receiverships 
(graph 4.9). This is obvious as receivership was abolished by Enterprise Act of 2002, 
which came into force in September 2003. However, 2007 onwards we observe a sudden 
rise in receiverships as receivers could still be appointed by Law of Property Act 1925. 
                                                 
186 If the liquidator is of the opinion that the company is unable to pay its debts in full as declared by the director under section 89 then 
in that case, the liquidator shall summon a meeting of creditors within 28 days of such opinion formed and send notices to all creditors 
at least 7 days prior to the date of meeting. He would also be required to submit statement of affairs in the prescribed format. Such 
statement of affairs should contain details about company‘s assets, debts and liabilities, names and addresses of creditors, the securities 
held by them and the dates when the securities were given. 
187
 For the details of liquidator‘s powers and duties see IA 1986 sec 165.  
188
 IA 1986 Sec 201. 
189
 The source of all above tables is Insolvency Service, United Kingdom. 
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This seems to be the only reason for the abnormal rise in receiverships in recent years even 
after abolishment as it no more constitutes a part of Insolvencies Act in UK.  
 
Graph 4.9: Evolution of Receivership cases 
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A. Receivership: A procedure unique to English Insolvency  
 
Receivership was quite often addressed as a ‗private liquidation‘190 procedure or 
‗contractualist‘ bankruptcy system191 because a secured creditor holding fixed192 or 
floating charges
193
 against the company was permitted to enforce upon its collateral in 
entirety, in out of court proceedings. The security agreements gave them the power to 
appoint the receiver who then takes control and monetizes the assets for the benefit of the 
secured creditors (Armour and Frisby, 2001). He owes fiduciary duties only towards the 
appointee. These bestowed rights gave floating charge creditors undue advantage over 
other creditors and also provided them with strong bargaining power
194
.  This more often 
than not resulted in premature liquidation of the firms which could have been continued or 
                                                 
190 
See Armour, Hsu, Walters, ‗The cost and benefit of secured creditor control in bankruptcy: evidence from UK, Empirical legal 
studies paper, University of Cambridge for business research working paper no 332, p2. 
191 
Franks and Sussman, ‗Financial distress and bank restructuring of small to medium size UK companies, (2003) CEPR  discussion 
paper no 3915, p1.  
192
 A fixed charge is a security on the specific assets of the company like immovable assets (land and building). 
193
 A floating charge is a security that may be extended to encompass the whole pool of company‘s assets including intangibles and 
receivables (cash, receivables, inventory and future cash flows).  
194 
It should be taken into consideration that with the Enterprise Act 2002, the economic interests with respect to an insolvent company 
have been transferred from floating charge creditors to the creditors as a whole. See J Armour and R Mokal, ‗Reforming the 
Governance of Corporate Rescue: Enterprise Act 2002‘, (2005) LMCLQ 28, 2830; V Finch, ‗Reinvigorating Corporate Rescue‘ (2003) 
J.B.L. 527, 531533.  
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saved (Benveniste, 1986; Aghion et al., 1982). It was severely criticized on this ground 
(Benveniste, 1986; Aghion, Hart and Moore, 1992; Milman and Mond, 1999; Mokal, 
2004) and was abolished by the Enterprise Act of 2002.
195
It was also commented that 
receivership procedure hindered the rescue mechanism by involving sale of assets critical 
to the working of business operations (Insolvency Service, 2001; Mokal, 2004). Further, it 
received criticism for the lack of accountability to the concerned parties (Insolvency 
Service, 2001) and also on the inflated bankruptcy costs involved in the process (Mokal, 
2004). Despite these criticisms, this system had some proponents who believed that this 
type of concentrated ownership can benefit the governance of the firm and also encourage 
private renegotiation between the concerned parties. This could also result in the 
avoidance of legal costs involved in formal bankruptcy process. It can shrink the 
monitoring costs of the investors
196
 and provide them with the control of management.
197
 
Having observed both the criticisms and supporting views, it will be interesting to review 
this procedure in detail as it was peculiar to English insolvency law only.  
 
B. The Triggering 
 
A receiver is generally an insolvency practitioner, appointed by a creditor holding fixed
198
 
or floating charges on the assets of the company. These securities gave creditors the right 
to appoint a receiver out of court
199
. The receiver so appointed held fiduciary duties only 
towards the appointee. He was generally responsible for selling of the assets and repaying 
the appointee. The provisions related to receivership are governed by Insolvency Act of 
1986. The term administrative receiver means
200
: ―a receiver or manager of the whole (or 
substantially the whole) of a company’s property appointed by or on the behalf of the 
                                                 
195 
See V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (CUP, Cambridge, 2002), P294; S Leinster, ―Policy Aims of 
the Enterprise Act‖ (2003) Recovery (Autumn) 27, 28. 
196
 Scott, 1986; Franks and Sussman, 2005; Baird and Russman, 2006; Armour, 2006 
197
 Triantis, 1995; Baird and Russman, 2002 
198 
The advantages of having fixed charge over the floating charge are that its ranking is not affected by the preferential creditors 
(Ss.175, 45, Schedule B1 paragraph 65(2) Insolvency Act 1986). or by the prescribed part (S.176A Insolvency Act 1986.). Neither can 
the bankruptcy or administering costs be paid out of its proceeds. The assets cannot be freely disposed of by the receiver without 
seeking permission from the court. Thus, creditors have incentives to have fixed charge assets as security to increase their positioning.  
199
 IA, 1986 Sec 33(1). 
200 
IA, 1986 Sec 29 (2). 
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holders of any debentures of the company secured by a charge which, as created, was a 
floating charge, or by such a charge and one or more securities‖ 
 
C. The Receivership Process 
 
Upon appointment, the receiver acts as an agent of the company. He will decide whether 
the company should be maintained as going concern or the assets should be sold off
201
. His 
appointment cannot be challenged in principle except on technical grounds. If the firm is 
continued, he acts as a manager of the company carrying out the daily operations of the 
company. He has the power to enter into contracts
202
 and employ experts to carry out the 
functions of his duties
203
. Upon appointment he should send a notice to the company in a 
prescribed manner of his appointment. And within 28 days of his appointment such a 
notice should be sent to all creditors to the extent he knows their addresses
204
. Within three 
months of his appointment as the receiver of the company, the receiver should send a 
report to the following: 1) the registrar, 2) the company‘s creditors, 3) the floating charge 
holders and 4) any trustees for secured creditors of the company. Administrative receiver‘s 
report
205
 contains the following information: 
- statutory information about the company like name of the company, registration 
number, registered address of the company, name of directors, name of shareholders, 
year of incorporation and name of company secretary; 
- history of events leading to the appointment of administrative receiver; 
- actions taken after appointment; 
- details of all creditors (secured creditors, preferential creditors, unsecured creditors); 
- statement of affairs of the company which is generally provided by the directors to the 
receiver
206
. 
                                                 
201
 IA 1986 Sec 43. 
202 
Sec. 37 of Insolvency act 1986 outlines the provisions for the liability of receiver‘s in relation to any contracts made by him during 
the performance of his functions. He is personally liable for any post-appointment liabilities. Any contracts entered by him while 
performing his duties or any employment contracts made during the process, will be paid out in priority, out of the proceeds of the 
assets.  
203
 IA 1986 Sec 44.  
204
 IA 1986 Sec 46.  
205
 IA 1986 Sec 48. 
206
 IA 1986 Sec 47. 
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Besides this, receiver should also send to the registrar an abstract of receipts and payments 
of the company while in receivership process. This report should be sent to the registrar on 
every 6 months basis
207
. At the end of the process
208
, the receiver should make 
distributions according to the order or priority
209: (1) receiver‘s fees210 and all post-
appointment liabilities, (2) preferential debts, (3) floating charge holders debts, (4) residual 
if any goes to unsecured creditors (usually they get nothing). 
 
4.3.2.3. Administration 
 
Administration was introduced by the Insolvency Act of 1986. In the year 1998, it 
accounted for 2.2% with respect to total number of insolvencies filed and in the year 2008 
it accounted for 22.7% of all corporate insolvencies filed (see table 4.2 above).  The 
sudden increase starting from the year 2003 onwards is obvious, as receivership was 
abolished and secured creditors lost their right to appoint a receiver (graph 4.10). In 
absence of receivership, appointing administrators was the only formal rescue option left 
with secured creditors. We will be studying both the old and new administrative 
procedures in detail to understand the reasons behind the changes made by law and 
comprehend the whole process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
207 
IA 1986 Sec 38.  
208
 The process ends when the distribution has been made to the secured creditors and notice for the release as receiver of the company 
is send to the registrar. A new process can be triggered if the receiver has some balance left and in such a situation, a liquidator can be 
appointed to carry out further proceedings (IA 1986 Sec 48(4)).  
209
 IA 1986 Sec 40.  
210
 The receiver is remunerated either with a fixed commission as a proportion of the value of the assets or with a time-based fee. In 
some circumstances (where an application is submitted to the court by the liquidator) the court can decide the remuneration of the 
receiver210. He is generally paid out of the sale of the secured assets of the company.  
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Graph 4.10: Evolution of Administration cases 
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A. Administration (Old law before 15
th
 September, 2003) 
 
The provisions of administration are provided in part II of the Insolvency Act of 1986. In 
1977 a commission was appointed with a view to provide a new era of rescue culture to 
the existing insolvency regime framework. The commission‘s work is documented in a 
report titled: "Cork Report". Thus, on the recommendations of Cork committee
211
, 
administration came into existence. It is a court administered procedure that was 
constituted with the main intention of serving the interests of all the creditors.  The 
objective of this procedure was to make bankruptcy code more debtors friendly and to 
provide an opportunity to the businesses to survive default. It was considered to be the 
reorganization procedure of United Kingdom. The main feature of the administration 
procedure was the effect of statutory moratorium which provided the debtor with breathing 
space and allowed an automatic stay on the assets of the company (which means creditors 
could not enforce their collaterals during this period).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
211
 The full reference of this committee‘s work can be found in ‗Insolvency law and practice, report of the review committee (Cmnd 
8558) 1982 
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B. The Triggering 
 
The application for an administration order can be filed in the court by either of the 
following
212
: a) the company, b) the directors and c) the creditors (both secured and 
unsecured). An administration order
213
 is an order issued by the court
214
, which appoints
215
 
a person for managing the business affairs and property of the company as long as the 
order is in effect. This person is referred to as the ―Administrator‖ and is generally an 
insolvency practitioner. The main purpose of administration order is to achieve one of the 
purposes as laid down by the provisions
216
 of Insolvency Act of 1986. These are:  
1) The survival of the company and the whole or any part of its undertaking as a going 
concern 
2) The approval of a voluntary arrangement under Part 1 
3) The sanctioning under section 425 of the Companies Act of a compromise or 
arrangement between the company and any such persons as are mentioned in that section; 
4) A more advantageous realisation of company‘s assets that would be effected in a 
winding up. The order thus issued should specify which purposes it wants to achieve. 
When an administration order is issued, the following effects can be observed
217
: 
- any petition for the winding of the company will be dismissed 
- any administrative receiver of the company shall vacate the office 
- there will be an automatic stay on all the assets of the company and no security can be 
enforced to repossess goods 
- no legal proceedings can be executed 
- no administrative receiver can be appointed 
 
                                                 
212
 IA 1986 Sec 9 
213
 IA, 1986 Sec 8(2) 
214
 Sec 8(1) of Insolvency act 1986 empowers the court with the ability to issue an administration order. If the court believes that a 
company can fulfill one or more purposes of administration and is insolvent as defined by Sec 123 of the act, it can be put into 
administration.  
215
 Section 13 lays down the provisions of appointing an administrator. An administrator can be appointed in the following ways: a) by 
the administration order issued by the court; 
by any continuing administrator of the company; c) by creditors‘ committee established under section 26 in the absence of any 
continuing administrator d) and in the absence of such a committee, it is carried out by the company or the directors or by any creditors 
of the company. 
216 
IA 1986 Sec 8(3) 
217 
IA 1986 Sec 10 
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C. The Administration Process 
 
Once the administrator has been appointed, he should send the notice of his appointment 
to the company and its creditors in the manner prescribed by the law
218
. He should also 
publish his appointment in a circulating local newspaper or in the London Gazette and 
duly send a copy of the appointment order to the registrar within 14 days of his 
appointment. The failure to perform such actions in time can make him liable for fine. 
Upon appointment as the administrator, he is solely responsible for managing the affairs of 
the company
219
 and takes control of all the assets, business and property of the 
company
220
. He is responsible for drawing up a reorganization plan for the company. Soon 
after his appointment, the director‘s of the company should duly provide to the 
administrator a statement verified by an affidavit containing the following particulars
221
: 
1) particulars of the company‘s assets, debts and liabilities; 2) the names and addresses of 
its creditors; 3) the securities held by them respectively; 4) the dates when the securities 
were respectively given and any other information as considered necessary to disclose. 
Based on this, within 3 months
222
 of his appointment (or longer if allowed by the court) as 
the administrator,  he sends a statement of his proposals for achieving the objectives 
specified in the administration order to the registrar of companies and to those creditors 
whose addresses are known to him or provided by the directors. A creditors meeting is 
summoned and the administrator‘s proposal is laid before them. At the creditors‘ meeting 
it is decided whether the administrator‘s proposal should be approved or not. 
Administrator‘s proposal contains the following information223: 
                                                 
218 IA 1986 Sec 21 
219
 The administrator of the company shall have following powers as conferred by Section 14 and Schedule 1 of the Insolvency Act 
1986. Some of these are mentioned below: 
- he acts as an agent of the company 
- he can perform any acts which are necessary for managing the affairs of the business and property of the company 
- he can remove the directors of the company and appoint a new one 
- to summon meeting of members and creditors of the company 
- the administrator can dispose off any property of a company which is subject to security or any goods in the possession of the 
company under a hire purchase agreement if it would promote one or more of the purposes specified in administration order. It  
includes floating charge security as well 
220
 See,  IA 1986 Sec 17 for general duties of the administrator 
221
 Pursuant to section 22 of the Insolvency act 1986. 
222
 IA 1986 Sec 23 
223
 Besides, in accordance to the rule 2.19 of the Insolvency Act, the following documents are also enclosed and presented to creditors: 
- A copy of rule 2.22 of Insolvency act 1986 
- A form of proxy 
- A proof of debt form 
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- Statutory information about the company 
- Background of events leading to the granting of administration order 
- Events subsequent to administration order 
- Financial information about the company as provided by the directors (statement of 
affairs) 
- The proposals of the administrator 
 
The creditors enjoy certain power during the administration process
224
. If they do not agree 
to all the terms of proposals they can suggest modifications. The administrator then reports 
the results of the meeting to the registrar of companies and to such other persons as may 
be prescribed. Every 6 months, he is also required to send a progress report of the 
proceedings containing abstracts of receipt and payments to the creditors and the registrar 
of companies. At the end of the administration process
225
, the administrator is required to 
distribute the proceedings in the order of priority. Secured creditors are paid first, followed 
by the employee‘s unpaid wages, the legal fees of administration and the preferential 
debts. Any residual amount goes to the unsecured creditors.   
 
D. Flaws of Old Administration Regime 
 
The creation of administration procedure was aimed at providing a level playing ground to 
all the stakeholders and to promote a collective rescue oriented approach to deal with 
distress. It was supposed to be the Chapter 11 of UK. It provided statutory moratorium, it 
                                                                                                                                                   
A creditor‘s guide to administrator‘s fees (Administrator‘s remuneration is decided in accordance to the Insolvency rules 2.106; it is 
subject to the approval of creditors committee or in the absence of it, by creditors‘ resolution. He is remunerated either with a fixed 
commission as a proportion of the value of the assets or with a time-based fee. His remuneration and any expenses incurred by him after 
his appointment or any debts and liabilities incurred in relation to employment contracts shall be paid in priority to any security out of 
the assets in his custody). 
224 Some of the powers of creditors during the administration procedure are: 
- Creditors can apply to the court for the issuance of administration order  
- Creditors can decide upon the name of the administrator 
- Creditors committee can be formulated pursuant to Sec 26 of the act 
- Creditors are required to approve the administrator‘s proposal 
- Creditors consent is necessary for deciding upon the fees of the administrator 
- Administrator is required to furnish all information relating to carrying out of his functions before such committee if formulated 
- If at any time during the proceedings the creditors think that the administration is carried out in an unfair manner then they can file 
an appeal in court, which can give some relief to them; 
- The creditors can vote either in person or proxy 
- A creditor can give proxy to any person 
225
 The administrator can apply to the court for the discharge of administration order if it appears to him that the purpose of the 
administration has been achieved or is unlikely to be achieved. He is required to send a notice of discharge, in the prescribed format, to 
the registrar of companies and to any other parties as prescribed by the act. 
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appointed an administrator who represented the interests of all the creditors, creditors were 
given the right to vote on the reorganization plan, at the same time it aimed for the rescue 
of firm as going concern (yet, it is well-known that the creditors – especially the secured 
ones – might have pro-liquidation bias, that might reduce the probability that a 
continuation plan is accepted (Blazy and Chopard 2011). Despite all this, it was not free 
from flaws. Its shortcomings became apparent during the implementation stage. Even 
though the directors, shareholders and the creditors had the right to appoint the 
administrator, it was more often than not easily impeded by the veto of floating charge 
creditors by appointing an administrative receiver. In addition, the bankruptcy costs
226
 
related to legal fees and expert fees were more of a burden to the debtor‘s company. The 
company was obliged to seek professional consultation with regards to fulfilling entry 
criteria‘s and was under obligation to prove that the company is likely to achieve one of 
the four mentioned statutory objectives.
227
 All this made administration a very lengthy and 
expensive procedure.
228
Also some creditors could avoid the legal effect of statutory 
moratorium
229
. Further, there was a confusion related to exit routes
230
 out of the 
administrative procedure. It could lead to liquidation, CVA‘s or dissolution of the firm. 
Amidst the presence of all such flaws, it was considered imperative to introduce a 
procedure that reformed the existing administration procedure for making it more 
attractive and convenient for the company and its debtors and hence facilitating more of its 
usage.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
226 See, Fletcher, ―UK Corporate Rescue: Recent Developments—Changes to Administrative Receiverships, Administration, and 
Company Voluntary Arrangements - The Insolvency Act 2000, The White Paper 2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002‖ (2004) 5 EBOR 
119, 125. 
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 IA, 1986 Sec 8(3). 
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secure the services of necessary IPs.‖ See Finch, p283; D Milman and C Durrant, Corporate Insolvency: Law and Practice (3rd edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1999), p51. 
229 See, Fletcher, ―UK Corporate Rescue: Recent Developments—Changes to Administrative Receiverships, Administration, and 
Company Voluntary Arrangements - The Insolvency Act 2000, The White Paper 2001, and the Enterprise Act 2002‖ (2004) 5 EBOR 
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E. New Streamlined Administration (after 15
th
 September, 2003) 
 
Enterprise Act of 2002 streamlined the old administration procedure and brought some 
major changes in its provisions. Schedule B1 was inserted in the Insolvency Act of 1986 
with effect from 15
th
 September, 2003. The primary aim of the new streamlined procedure 
was to enable more and more companies to survive and provide level playing field to all 
creditors especially the unsecured creditors who were devoid of it in previous proceedings. 
With regards to this, Crown‘s preferential status was abolished231 and ring fence fund232 
was established to allow more assets to be available to the unsecured creditors. This 
enhanced their positioning from the previous law. Administrative receivership was 
abolished and since floating charge holders lost their right to appoint a receiver; they were 
obliged to appoint an administrator to apply for rescue operations. The new procedure also 
facilitated easy entry and easy exit routes by providing the procedure to take place in out 
of court proceedings. Besides, new time deadlines were added in order to make the process 
fast and less expensive
233
. All these reforms were injected into the system by the 
Government to provide an opportunity to the firms to survive default and preserve 
employment. It also aimed at encouraging innovation and risk taking activities
234
 by 
providing a favorable atmosphere.  In the following text we discuss some of the major 
changes brought about by the Enterprise Act of 2002.  
 
F. Major changes brought down by the Enterprise Act of 2002 
 
The purpose of administration, as defined by paragraph 3(1) of Schedule B1 of the 
Enterprise Act, is to achieve one of the following objectives for the company:  
a) rescuing the company as a going concern; 
b) achieving a better result for company‘s creditors on the whole than would be likely if    
the company were wound up (without first being in administration); 
                                                 
231
 EA 2002,  s 251 (1) states that the Crown preference shall cease to exist. 
232 
The EA 2002,  s 252 introduces a new s 176A into the IA 1986 which fully stipulates the new creation of ring fence fund. 
233
 S Davies QC (ed),  Insolvency and the Enterprise Act 2002 (Jordans, Bristol,  2003),  p171. 
234 
V Finch, ‗Re-invigorating Corporate Rescue‘, (2003) J.B.L. 527, 529 
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c) realising property in order to make a distribution  to one or more secured or 
preferential creditors 
 
Thus, the new bankruptcy regime established a hierarchy in objectives. The main objective 
is to rescue the company and to achieve better results for its creditors. Failing to achieve 
the first objective, the company can aim for next objective and so on so forth. 
 
The accessibility of the procedure was increased by allowing out of court appointment of 
the administrator. In addition to the appointment of administrators by the court, they can 
also be appointed out of court by the holders of floating charges or the company and its 
directors. Interestingly, the holders of floating charges can appoint the administrator out of 
court without having to demonstrate that the company is unable to pay its debts. While, the 
directors of the company need to demonstrate that the company is unable to pay its 
debts
235
 to make out of court appointment. This allowed for the stakeholders to have an 
easy and more flexible access to the procedure. Previously, administrators could only be 
appointed on the order of court.  
 
Old administration procedure was criticized on the basis that it was too lengthy and 
cumbersome. With the new reforms, the length of administration was restricted to one year 
except under few conditions when it could be extended by the consent of creditors or by 
the order of court for a period of six months
236
. This automatic termination of 
administration procedure was introduced by the new regime with the purpose of making 
the process speedy and effective.  
 
One of the major changes brought about by Enterprise Act of 2002 was the abolition of 
receivership. Section 72A of Schedule B1 restricts the right of the floating charge holders 
of the company to appoint an administrative receiver. However, this restriction is 
applicable only to the charges created after 15
th
 September, 2003. The main purpose was 
to provide a level playing field to all creditors. In case of receiverships, it was observed 
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 Paragraph 27(2) Schedule B1 Insolvency Act. 
236
 IA 1986, Sch B1, 76-78 
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that secured creditors could have an advantage over other creditors and can often result in 
immature liquidation of viable firms (Benveniste, 1986; Aghion et al., 1982). Abolishing 
of receivership meant an alarming increase in the number of administrations. We can see 
the substitution of receiverships by administration cases
237
. This is verified by the graph 
4.11 below: 
Graph 4:11: Substitution of Receiverships by Administrations after EA 2002 
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Section 251 of Enterprise Act of 2002, abolished the preferential status of debts due to 
Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise and Social Security Contributions from the 
categories of preferential debts in schedule 6 of Insolvency Act of 1986. The main idea 
behind such abolition was to provide benefits to unsecured creditors. In addition, a new 
section 176A was inserted in the Insolvency Act of 1986. It was also inserted with the 
intent of benefiting the unsecured creditors. In case of companies having no floating 
charge holders, the benefit would directly go to unsecured creditors. However, in case 
there is a floating charge holder and the charges have been created after 15
th
 September, 
2003, the act requires that prescribed part of funds available to floating charge holders 
should be set aside for the benefit of unsecured creditors. The calculations of prescribed 
part have been provided in article 3 of the Insolvency Act of 1986 (prescribed part) order 
2003 (SI 2003/2097). These are as follows: 
                                                 
237 
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Adrian Walters of Nottingham Trent University and John Armour of Cambridge University 
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a) where the company‘s net property does not exceed £10,000 in value which is 50% of 
that  property 
b) subject to paragraph (2), where the company‘s net property exceeds £10,000 in value 
the sum of: 
- 50% of the first £10,000 in value; and 
- 20% of that part of the company’s net property which exceeds £10,000 in value. 
 
The value of prescribed part of the company‘s net property to be made available for the 
satisfaction of unsecured creditors of the company pursuant to section 176A shall not 
exceed £600,000. 
 
Under the new administration regime, administration procedure automatically terminates 
at the end of one year period since its inception, with the exception of few conditions.
238
 
Besides, it can also be terminated by the application of an administrator submitted in 
court.
239
 The new regime tried to overcome the shortcoming of previous regime by 
providing more flexible, faster and less expensive exit routes. The previous regime was 
criticized due to its failure of providing links between administration and voluntary 
liquidations or dissolution which lead to unnecessary waste of time and money
240
. It 
overcame this problem by providing good linking between the procedures and faster exit 
routes. Administration can end in the following procedures: company can enter into CVA, 
it can opt for voluntary liquidations and it can be dissolved. A company can enter 
voluntary winding up if the administrator thinks: ―(a) that the total amount which each 
secured creditor of the company is likely to receive has been paid to him or set aside for 
him, and (b) that a distribution will be made to unsecured creditors of the company (if 
there are any).‖241 On the other hand if the administrator believes that the entire 
distribution has been made and company does not have any more assets left for 
distribution, it can put the company into dissolution. The notice of dissolution is sent to the 
registrar following which the company is dissolved within 3 months.
242
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4.3.2.4. Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) 
 
Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) is a rescue procedure provided in Part I of the 
Insolvency Act of 1986 (sec 1-7). Its primary objective was to provide a confidential, 
inexpensive and amicable private solution to the concerned parties. This procedure allows 
a distressed company to renegotiate its debts payments and reach a binding agreement 
with its creditors through out of court proceedings
243
. It is not collective in nature. It does 
not bind secured creditors (unless they agree). There is no requirement for the company to 
be insolvent. The directors remain in control of the proceedings subject to supervision of 
the insolvency practitioner. In this view, the mechanism of CVA is close to the working of 
Chapter 11 of US Bankruptcy Code
244
 and to the French règlement amiable (or 
conciliation since 2005). It is interesting to notice the prevalence of intermediate 
resolutions of default in both countries (UK and France) even though they belong to 
distinct legal families. These procedures can be regarded as mixed solutions (private and 
legal) to financial distress. Even though CVA is an out of court proceeding, yet the court 
plays a supervisory role to ensure justice in a timely manner
245
. It is the same case for 
French règlement amiable. 
 
Graph 4.12 shows constant increase in the number of CVA filings, yet it constitutes only 
2-3% of all corporate insolvencies in UK. The lack of its usage can be attributed to the fact 
that it was unable to provide the intended rescue mechanism to the financially distressed 
firms, which is evident by its statistics. It was reported to have a series of flaws.
246
 And the 
biggest weakness noticed in this procedure was the lack of statutory moratorium. The 
secured creditors were free to enforce upon their collateral
247
. This makes it extra difficult 
for the debtor to reach an agreement with its creditors in the absence of critical assets. 
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Graph 4.12: Evolution of Company Voluntary Arrangement  
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A. The CVA process 
 
CVA can be initiated
248
 by either of the following: 1) the administrator, where the 
company is in administration; 2) the liquidator, where the company is in liquidation; 3) the 
directors, in all the other circumstances. CVA cannot be initiated by the creditors or 
shareholders
249
 of the company. 
 
Once the proposal is made by the directors, a nominee is appointed who should be a 
qualified insolvency practitioner. The director should provide the nominee with a 
document stating the terms of arrangement and statement of company‘s affairs containing 
list of creditors, payments due and other liabilities and assets
250
. These proposals are sent 
to the creditors and the shareholders serving them a 14 days notice for the creditors 
meeting. The nominee then reports to the court within 28 days whether a meeting of 
creditors and shareholders was held to consider the proposal
251
. During this meeting, it is 
decided whether the proposal is accepted or not
252
. If 75% in value of the creditors present 
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in person or by proxy, to whom the notice of meeting was sent, vote in favour of the 
proposal, then it is deemed to be accepted. The proposal is binding on all creditors who 
were entitled to vote at the meeting. The nominee becomes the supervisor of the company 
during the period of arrangement
253
. The creditors who agree are bound by the terms of 
arrangement and the company continues to trade during the period. 
 
D. Reforms incorporated in CVA by Insolvency Act of 2000 
 
A new schedule A1 was infused into the Insolvency Act of 1986, by the Schedule 1 of 
Insolvency Act of 2000. The biggest task was to resolve the problem of moratorium. This 
was achieved by proposing a statutory moratorium for small firms
254
. The moratorium 
provided the company with 28 days of relief from the creditors‘ actions. The main aim of 
the new CVA reforms was to make it a cost efficient procedure for the small financially 
troubled firms and provide them with a rescue mechanism out of court thereby avoiding 
heavy bankruptcy costs.   
 
With the recent reforms of 2005, French bankruptcy law added a series of preventive 
procedures to the resolution of default. In the subsequent paragraphs we will notice that 
UK also provides preventive out of court debt restructuring mechanisms, even if scarcely 
practiced. Thus, both the countries can be seen to provide a menu of rescue mechanisms to 
a distressed debtor. Because of which it appears that the arbitration (choice between 
private and formal solution) described in chapter 3 of the thesis becomes more complex as 
there exists hybrid solutions for default resolution.  
 
4.3.2.5. Some other prevalent procedures 
 
‗Schemes of Arrangement‘ is the oldest form of restructuring mechanism present in UK, 
whereas ‗London Approach‘ was conceived in mid 1970‘s by an initiative of Bank of 
England. It is a private solution that is implemented only with the help of major bank or 
major lender.  
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A.  Schemes of Arrangement  
‗Schemes of arrangement‘ or voluntary reconstruction is a formal rescue procedure in 
place since the 19
th
 century.
255
 The provisions are provided in Part 26 of the Companies 
Act of 2006. It is a confidential arrangement between the company and its creditors. The 
directors and their advisors are responsible for drawing up the scheme. It is not collective 
in nature and insolvency is not the criteria for initiating this process. It can be initiated as a 
rescue mechanism for early corporate rescue or within insolvency as an alternative to 
liquidation or following on from administration. It binds all creditors and even the 
dissenting creditors if approved and sanctioned by the court.
 256
 It has been successful in 
the rehabilitation of some notably large companies
257
 of the UK. However, Cork 
committee remarked it to be inexpedient and impracticable for small companies as it 
involved processes which were tedious, lengthy and too expensive for them. The lack of 
moratorium is the biggest flaw of this proceeding. 
 
The directors and their advisors prepare a scheme of arrangement and send this 
information to the court along with information of the schedules of the meetings to be 
held. The notice of meeting is also sent to all creditors and shareholders of the company. 
During the meeting it is decided whether the scheme is approved or not. If 75% in value
258
 
of the creditors present in person or by proxy, to whom the notice of meeting was sent, 
vote in favour of the scheme then the scheme is approved and an application is sent to the 
court requesting the approval of the scheme. If the court approves the scheme, then it is 
binding on all the creditors (even the dissenting ones). This is one of the main differences 
between CVA and the schemes of arrangement, whose effects are restricted to the 
creditors who have voted in favour of the plan. Once approved, the directors retain the 
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control and carry out the affairs as mentioned in the scheme. It can be used as a process for 
early corporate rescue. 
 
Indeed, it was the failure of schemes of arrangement that led the Government to introduce 
new insolvency procedures into the legal framework of English insolvency regime.  
 
B.  London Approach: A Private Way to Resolve Distress 
London Approach is an informal arrangement between the creditors, to allow a distressed 
firm to continue if it demonstrates the potential of being viable. Bank of England 
advocated
259
 the use of London approach to achieve co-ordination and co-operation among 
the creditors to arrive at healthy rehabilitation for the already distressed firm
260
. It has no 
status in law and is carried out in a very private manner with no publicity at all. It is a 
voluntary mechanism initiated by the debtors who approach the banks for seeking 
assistance and fair treatment.  
 
London approach came into existence in mid 1970‘s. This was the time when UK was 
facing industrial recession, high inflation and rising unemployment. In the absence of 
adequate rescue mechanisms at that time, a need was generated to save the firms from 
getting into financial troubles (Slatter, 1984:254). Bank of England initiated a series of 
discussions with the other banks to promote this approach. The main aim of the bank was 
to ensure that a potentially viable firm should not get terminated just because of conflicts 
between creditors. ―Our aim is to break log-jams and to seek a solution which represents 
an acceptable promise for those concerned. In other words, we act as an ‗honest 
broker‘.261It has been defined by British Banker Association (1996:1) as, ―[a] non statutory 
and informal framework introduced with the support of the Bank of England for dealing 
with temporary support operations mounted by banks and other lenders to a company or 
group in financial difficulties, pending a possible restructuring”. 
 
                                                 
259
 See Kent, 1993, 1994 and 1997. 
260
 C. Bird, ‗The London Approach‘, (1996) 12 Insolvency Law & Practice 87.  
261 
Mr. Pen Kent, Executive director of the Bank of England, In a speech in Euroforum conference, ‗The London approach: distressed 
debt trading‘  
182 
 
B1. The Motives behind London Approach 
 
The bank‘s motives in initiating and advocating its usage have been described as threefold 
by Kent:
262
 First, London approach might minimise the losses to banks and other 
interested parties from unavoidable company failures by employing patient and 
coordinated workouts. Second, it avoids companies from being subjected unnecessarily to 
receivership or liquidation and preserves viable jobs and productive capacity wherever 
possible. The underlying objective was to create a means to support companies whose 
problems were generally thought to be curable through a period of financial rehabilitation. 
Third, London approach might prevent failure of attempts in providing financial support 
for companies because their bankers could not agree to the terms on which it would be 
provided. As the central bank, the Bank of England was concerned with the reputation of 
the financial community which suffered from time to time from accusations that it was not 
supporting the real economy. 
 
These were the reasons behind Bank of England‘s vast support to this mission of corporate 
rescue. Since its inception it is believed to have successfully resolved over 150 cases. It is 
supposedly considered successful for large firms owing a large debt and having numerous 
banks as creditors where the number of banks varied from 6 to 106.
263
  
 
There were many reasons which motivated the companies to opt for London Approach as 
compared to other insolvency processes. The first and foremost important reason for 
applying assistance under this approach was that the company trusted its banks and felt 
free to seek consultancy from its own bank rather than seeking help from a stranger. The 
second reason could be attributed to the fact that this procedure was kept very secret and 
confidential and apart from the creditors, the general public did not come to know about it. 
This in return preserved a company‘s goodwill and did not result in the loss of clients or in 
creation of bad reputation (Cutlers and Summers, 1988). Third reason can be the costs 
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involved in the process. The firms are supposed to be already distressed and hardly have 
any money to spare for the huge consultancy fees of the insolvency practitioners or other 
consultants. In London approach no fees was ever requisitioned or even expected as the 
Bank was glad to offer assistance to such firms. Moreover, problems related to 
information asymmetry and hold outs
264
 are also dealt with. All creditors share the pain on 
equitable basis. The secured creditors do not enforce upon their collaterals and participate 
in the ‗standstill‘265 process to avoid the collapse of the viable company. Also this 
mechanism makes extra financing available which meets the company‘s demands for 
capital influx. 
 
B2. The Mechanisms behind London Approach 
 
The whole process involves two major stages. During the first stage the distressed debtor 
approaches his main bank and expresses his willingness to initiate a workout. This 
approach can be regarded as the know-how stage in which the knowledge about a firm is 
circulated among the main creditors and they are not allowed to enforce upon their 
collaterals against the debtor company. There is a provision of ‗standstill‘ where all the 
banks participate. The inflow of finances is maintained during the period and they enjoy 
priority over the existing loans. At this stage proper scrutiny of debtor‘s company takes 
place. Accountants and auditors are appointed to investigate the financial viability of the 
firm. Critical information is shared among the creditors which help them in arriving at 
important decisions. Based on this investigation it is decided whether the firm is viable for 
workout or not. The losses that have accrued during this phase are shared on pro rata basis 
among the creditors.  
 
Second stage is the stage of negotiation during which, the main banker
266
 attempts to 
restructure the debts of the company in a manner which is in the interest of the majority of 
bankers. These negotiations may involve debt-equity swap or reduction of certain claims 
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on pro rata basis or prolongation of maturity terms. All the incurring costs and negotiation 
expenses are shared on equitable basis among the creditors.  
It has been noted that the ‗London Approach‘ has been instrumental for large firms having 
multiple banks as lenders internationally or domestically. This approach has been imitated 
by many countries despite legal and cultural differences.
267
 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter is descriptive in its contents. It intends to provide a macro view of the 
bankruptcy procedures existent in both the countries and also provide the readers with 
national statistics and figures.  
 
Within this chapter the detailed mechanism of corporate bankruptcy procedures (UK and 
France) is laid out. This will be the basis for the forthcoming chapters of the thesis. The 
chapter discusses the various kinds of bankruptcy procedures (both formal and informal) 
that existed in both the countries. In addition, we mention the recent reforms and the 
reasons behind such reforms and how these reforms were able to mitigate the 
shortcomings of previous procedures. Based on this, in the forthcoming chapters we will 
be able to test how does legal environment affects bankruptcy code.  
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CHAPTER 5 
France and United Kingdom:  
A Microeconomic View based on 
Real Bankruptcy Cases 
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 5.  FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM: AN EMPIRICAL PANORAMA 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
In Chapter 5, the focus returns to the level of micro economic analysis. We explore two of 
our unique hand coded databases, compiled through different reliable sources. These 
databases contain data of 264 small and medium sized enterprises representing France and 
564 small and medium sized enterprises representing UK. These countries represent two 
major legal systems prevailing in Europe: Common Law and Civil Law. And both 
legislations have features that are interesting from the point of view of research. Based on 
our datasets we provide summary statistics on both the countries. Our descriptive statistics 
explains the average profile of our sample company provides us with the reasons that lead 
the company into bankruptcy and analyses the detailed asset and liability structures of the 
firms along with estimation of recovery rates and the structure of claims. In addition, we 
also calculate the duration of the procedure and related costs. We also perform 
multivariate analysis to test the choice between continuations against liquidation for 
France and to test the factors that increase or decrease the chances of receivership and 
administration against liquidations in UK.  
 
5.2. Microeconomic Features using Original Dataset on France 
 
As shown previously, France is characterized by a debtor oriented bankruptcy law system 
where social objectives honored prior to secured ones. This facilitates in an engaging study 
of its details like (1) the content of such legal system, (2) the criteria explaining the final 
choice between liquidation and continuation. Additionally, in this section, we compute 
recovery rate for all classes of creditors (which shall be explored in further detail in the 
last chapter). 
In France the main objective, as defined explicitly by laws of 1985, is to maintain the firm 
and preserve employment
268
. To attain these objectives court can even sell the firm to a 
lower bid if it promises to keep employment contracts intact (Blazy et al. (2009)). In 
                                                 
268
 See, Kaiser (1996) for more detailed analysis of French bankruptcy law.  
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addition, the creditors have no rights to vote on a reorganization plan and neither is their 
approval required by the court to initiate reorganization proceedings. As a consequence, 
one can expect sub-optimal continuations to be decided at the cost of stakeholders. Thus, 
delegating the decision making power to the court may be the most effective way of 
implementing the legal orientation, as defined by the legislator. Interestingly, France and 
UK often demonstrate an inclination towards avoiding piecemeal liquidations. In recent 
time, we have witnessed an increasing affinity of both countries towards the rescue 
culture. However, we assume that allowing the vote of creditors for the approval of 
reorganization plan (as in the UK) may render this objective rather difficult to attain. This 
may explain the reason why in France, the final decision to save the debtor (or not) lies 
with the court and not with the creditor.  
 
A lot of studies have been conducted in US and UK. (Table 5.1 provides an overview of 
some empirical studies performed on the costs and recovery rates in different countries). 
Very few studies have been conducted on France and hence only an incomplete view of 
the French bankruptcy panorama is available research purposes. 
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Table 5.1: Previous literature on Bankruptcy costs and Recovery rates 
Authors Country Procedure Period Observations
Size 
(millions) Direct Costs Time Firms RR Secured RR Unsecured RR
Baird et al (2005) US Reorganization 1995-2001 139 $ 20 - - - 92% 52%
Betkar (1997) US Reorganization 1986-1993 75 $ 889 3.90% - - - -
Betkar (1995) US Reorganization 1986-1993 44 $ 476 2.90% 2.5 - - -
Bris et al. (2005) US Reorganization 1995-2001 225 $ 20 16.90% 28 69% 90% 52%
Bris et al. (2005) US Liquidation 1995-2001 61 $ 1 8.10% 24 27% 51% 1%
Ferris and Lawless (2000) US Reorganization 1986-1993 118 $ 4.2 17.60% 15 - - -
Franks and Torous (1994) US Reorganization 1985-1990 37 - - 27 51% 80% 29%
Lopucki and Doherty 
(2004) US Reorganization 1998-2002 48 $ 882 1.40% - - - -
Lubben (2000) US Reorganization 1994 22 $ 139 2.50% - - - -
Tashijan et al. (1996) US Reorganization 1986-1993 49 $ 570 1.90% 3.3 73% 99% 64%
Weiss (1990) US Reorganization 1980-1986 31 $ 228 2.80% 30 - - -
Armour et al. (2006) UK Administration 2003-2004 195 £2.20 49% 12 21% 61% 0%
Armour et al. (2006) UK Receivership 2003-2004 153 £3.30 28% 21 21% 55% 0%
Citron et al. (2003) UK Receivership 1992-1999 42 - - 28 - 62% -
Davydenko and Franks 
(2005) UK Receivership 1984-2003 1418 - - - - 76% -
Franks and Sussman (2005) UK Receivership 1997-1998 542 - - 7.5 - 74-77% 0%
Franks and et al. (1996) UK Receivership 1987-1995 61 - - - 34% 53% 3%
Davydenko and Franks 
(2005) France Combined 1984-2003 586 - - - - 54% -
Davydenko and Franks 
(2005) Germany Combined 1984-2003 276 - - - - 64% -
Raviv and Sundgren (1998) Finland Combined 1982-1992 72 $ 1.3 7.0/8.9% - 34% - -
Sundgren (1998) Finland Reorganization 1993-1994 63 FIM 11 5.30% - 43% - -
Thorburn (2000) Sweden Liquidation 1988-1991 210 $ 2.4 6.90% - 35% 69% 2%
 
 
This table has been taken from the works of Couwenberg (2007) but has been duly edited 
by the author for UK cases. It provides us with the information related to empirical studies 
conducted in different countries. It also provides insights into the recovery rates for 
different creditors in different countries. The table consists of the name of the authors, the 
country on which the study was conducted, the name of the bankruptcy procedure which 
was studied, the time period, number of observations recorded, the average size of the 
firms, average direct costs involved in the process and average time it took to resolve 
bankruptcy proceedings. 
 
To add substantial inputs to the existing limited empirical literature, our work explores a 
comprehensive sample of 264 small and medium sized French enterprises from 1993-
Source: Couwenberg (2007) 
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2005. The data was hand collected from the French commercial court (Paris). Using this, 
we gathered crucial information related to characteristics of the firms, industry 
specifications, length of resolution process, debt claims and amount of recovery made. We 
find evidence that recovery rates are significantly higher when the firms were allowed to 
continue business. Our study contributes an in depth knowledge about the different French 
bankruptcy procedures and also points out similarities and differences between various 
rival procedures. 
 
5.2.1. Data Sample and Methodology 
 
Our sample covers those companies which went bankrupt after the 1993 reform but before 
the 2005 new bankruptcy code. We employed a unique database of 264 bankruptcy 
appeals filed in French commercial court (259 of which are used for analysis purposes as 
some files had missing crucial data). Graph 5.1 provides the time structure of our sample. 
 
Graph 5.1: Structure of sample over the period of 12 years 
YEAR FRANCE
1993 6
1994 3
1995 11
1996 20
1997 31
1998 48
1999 19
2000 38
2001 36
2002 38
2003 6
2004 2
2005 1
TOTAL 259
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FRANCE
 
    Source: Parisian courts (greffe du tribunal de commerce de Paris). 
 
As a primary step towards the construction of the database, we manually extracted the 
required information from these following documents: the bankruptcy declaration form, 
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documents related to Court's decision and motivations, the list of claims and the financial-
economic administrator's report on the bankrupt firm
269
. Thereafter, this information was 
entered in an excel template for further analysis. You may view the general structure of the 
template in appendix B1. In this case, our focus of study revolved around banks in Paris 
and its suburbs because their data was of high quality and was readily available. In 
addition, these courts possessed a greater capacity for facilitating out-of-court 
settlements
270
. Further, to maintain a neutral perspective and avoid a bias towards 
selection, we ensured that, in many ways, there is no variation between characteristics of 
our sample and that of national figures (appendix B3). First, the percentage of outcomes in 
bankruptcy is quite similar to the national averages (liquidations are about 90%). Second, 
the sectors to which these firms belong to are also similar to the national figures. The only 
difference is relative to the legal form of the firms
271
. Paris is identified to have higher 
incidences of limited liability firms.  
 
An important consideration towards the facilitation of an accurate design required the 
exclusion of data on agricultural and financial firms.
272
 Further, in our analysis, we 
included only those firms which were not in an active state of bankruptcy proceedings or 
whose bankruptcy procedures had been completed and outcome published. For each 
bankruptcy filing, we collected data on the firm's economic and financial difficulties, 
origin of default,
273
 the outcome of the financial distress,
274
 and the amounts recovered by 
each class of claimants according to the legal priority order: employee‘s ‗superprivilège‘, 
new money, preferential claims,
275
 secured claims,
276
 and unsecured claims.  
 
                                                 
269 
Namely, these documents are: ―déclaration de cessation des paiements, extrait Kbis, jugement d'ouverture de la procédure de 
redressement judiciaire, extraits des jugements modificatifs et jugement définitif sur le sort de l'entreprise, bilan économique et social 
(rédigé par l'administrateur judiciaire), requêtes auprès du juge commissaire ainsi que les réponses de celui-ci (ordonnances), états 
des créances, rapports L13‖. 
270 The court in Paris have set up several prevention units (―cellules de prévention-détection‖ and ―cellules de prévention-traitement‖) 
which aim to audit the firm‘s managers when the court receives clear signals of economic and/or financial difficulties. 
271 
Paris is identified to have higher incidences of limited liability firms.  
272
 Which depend on a specific bankruptcy code 
273
 51 codes; see appendix B2 
274
 Whether they are liquidated or reorganized 
275
 State and social claims 
276
 mostly put forward by banks 
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5.2.2. Descriptive Statistics on France 
 
5.2.2.1. What is the Average Profile of French Bankrupt Firms? 
 
To answer this question, let us look at the individual subcomponents that collectively 
conglomerate to construct an average profile of a French Bankrupt firm. We have listed 
these from A – D:  
 
A. Limited Liability- Table 5.2 highlights the main characteristics of our sample firms. If 
you notice, the bulk of the companies (around 90% and even more) belong to the limited 
liability legal form. It is observed that the firms have more incentives for risk undertaking 
under this legal form. Is this an issue? We presume that it is not. Limited liability of the 
firms encourages the creation of businesses thereby contributing to the economy. Even 
Governments increasingly promote such undertaking of risks.  ―Europe must re-examine 
its attitude to risk, reward and failure. Thus, enterprise policy must encourage policy 
initiatives that reward those who take risks. Europe is often reluctant to give another 
chance to entrepreneurs who failed. Enterprise policy will examine the conditions under 
which failure could acquire a less negative connotation and it could be acceptable to try 
again. It will encourage Member States to review bankruptcy legislation to encourage 
risk-taking‖277. Thus, being in bankruptcy due to risk undertaking is not abnormal for 
limited liability firms. However, reckless risk taking or inviting moral hazard through asset 
substitution must not be encouraged and hence French law issues sanctions against the 
directors/managers of the firm found guilty of such activities. Unsurprisingly, even for our 
UK data sample, the majority of firms belong to this legal form. This exemplifies the 
popularity of this legal form in both the countries.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
277 
Commission of the European Communities (2000) Challenges for enterprise policy in the knowledge-driven economy. Proposal for 
a Council decision on a Multiannual Programme for Enterprise and Entrepreneurship (2001-2005). 
 
195 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics on France (main characteristics of firms) 
Frequencies & averages 
Liquidation 
judiciaire 
Redressement 
judiciaire 
ANOVA 
Prob. > F Stat 
Nb. of observations 100 164  
Limited liability*** 97% 87% 0.0071 
Age (years)*** 9.9 17.2 0.0007 
Trade 19% 21% 0.7345 
Manufacturing 26% 26% 0.9442 
Services 55% 54% 0.8327 
Reason for default: strategy 15% 15% 0.9355 
Reason for default: production 19% 27% 0.1216 
Reason for default: finance 24% 25% 0.8555 
Reason for default: management 12% 13% 0.7404 
Reason for default: accident 20% 28% 0.1177 
Reason for default: outlets 59% 51% 0.2199 
Reason for default: macro. environment*** 21% 43% 0.0002 
 
 
 
B) Age: The average age of the companies in our sample is between 10 and 17 years. This 
clearly indicates that these companies are not young or startup companies. The interesting 
question that arises here is: Why most of the sample companies are mature companies and 
not the young ones? The answer can be derived from these pointers: Certain privileges like 
tax shields and subsidies are conferred over young and freshly incorporated firms by the 
Government. Moreover it takes some time for young companies to accumulate debts and 
hence their chances of falling into bankruptcy are substantially low
278
. Also, classical 
banking system is often apprehensive in lending to newly incorporated firms and to 
                                                 
278
 Bordes et Mélitz (1992), Combier (1994) 
Source: The Authors calculations (Tribunal de commerce de Paris). 
 The number of stars (from * to ***) refers to the significance of the ANOVA test (respectively 10%, 5%, 1% 
levels). 
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remedy this, a specialized organization exists (OSEO) which is dedicated to the financing 
of young companies in France and acts as a substitute to classical bank lending.  
 
Moreover, the average age of a firm is significantly higher in ‗redressement judiciare‘ 
(17.2 years) than in Liquidation (9.9 years). This validates that the older firms have more 
chances of survival through reorganisation. This may be also attributed to the fact that 
financial relations and goodwill are developed over the period of time and such 
accumulated value can enhance their chances of avoiding liquidation.  
 
C. Sectors: The test of difference in means (Fisher stat (ANOVA)) concludes that there is 
no significant difference between LJ and RJ with respect to ‗sectors‘. Yet, a quick 
observation confirms that for both outcomes, majority of the companies belong to the 
service sector. This could be attributed to a geographical bias as our data was collected in 
Paris which has a higher proportion of service based companies.  
 
D. Cause of Default: The information related to the causes of default is not readily 
available and was hand collected from the administrators report filed in the commercial 
courts. To facilitate analysis, we formulate 7 major categories of default (for details see 
appendix B2) and whenever we encounter a cause of default, we assign it to our sample 
firms. Based on this we derive the most dominant reasons for default. We came to 
conclude that ‗Outlets‘ are the most dominant reason for default for both the procedures in 
France. This signifies the fact that revival of a company which loses its customer base is 
hard to accomplish as it is a prerequisite for continuation of any business. Blazy and 
Combier (1997
279
) suggested that one reason may not be sufficient to generate the risk of 
default and often involves a combination of causes. Although we do not include these 
combinations in our study, we do notice that subsequent dominant causes for default 
strongly differ between RJ and LJ. For LJ, the second most common cause is linked to the 
internal financial policy of the company (finance), whereas for RJ it is external to the 
company. It may signify that external problems are more likely to lead the firm towards 
                                                 
279
 Blazy R., J. Combier (1997). « La défaillance d'entreprise : causes économiques, traitement judiciaire et impact financier », 
Economica, INSEE Méthodes, n°72-73. 
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reorganizations than internal ones. However, validation of this requires further 
econometric analysis.
280
 
 
5.2.2.2. Description of the Structure of Assets 
 
Table 5.3 displays the asset structure of defaulted companies which was estimated at the 
time of default. Based on these computations, we can derive some intriguing results. First, 
total estimated assets are significantly higher under RJ than under LJ. This proves that the 
continuation perspective strongly depends on the size of assets that are available to the 
company for the continuation of its business operations. In the absence of critical assets, 
liquidation is the most observed choice. Second, interestingly, the assets (fixed or current) 
that are attached to the economic activity (that is excluding cash and financial assets) are 
also significantly higher under RJ than for LJ. Again, the explanation is identical: these 
economic assets are the ones needed to support continuation of the firm. Third, regarding 
cash, even if the average is higher for RJ, the Fisher Stat (ANOVA test) is not significant. 
We need to use econometrics to deduce any definitive answer.
281
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
280
 We will see such effect is confirmed on macro causes that increase the probability of being continued against liquidation 
281
 In our results, we will observe that the value of cash increases the chances for continuation. Thus, under LJ, cash will provide 
recoveries whereas under continuation, the current cash may be destroyed due to the continuation of the business activity 
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Table 5.3 : Descriptive on France (assets) 
 
Frequencies & averages 
Liquidation 
judiciaire 
Redressement 
judiciaire 
ANOVA 
Prob. > F Stat 
Nb. of observations 100 164  
Total assets: estimated market value (K€)*** 227.0 1040.1 0.0003 
Intangible assets: estimated market value (K€)*** 28.8 115.5 0.012 
Tangible assets: estimated market value (K€)*** 42.5 225.1 0.001 
Financial assets: estimated market value (K€) 24.5 32.9 0.625 
Inventory: estimated market value (K€)*** 22.8 255.9 0.016 
Receivables: estimated market value (K€)*** 76.2 264.5 0.005 
Mark. securities: estimated market value (K€) 0.6 5.0 0.168 
Cash: estimated market value (K€) 4.8 40.5 0.136 
Other assets: estimated market value (K€)*** 26.7 100.7 0.012 
 
 
 
 
5.2.2.3. The Structure of Claims 
 
Table 5.4 provides information on the structure of claims for French companies. We notice 
that there is a significant difference between LJ and RJ across many important variables. 
The amount due for secured creditors is significantly higher for RJ than for LJ. A possible 
explanation for this difference may stem from the fact that the banks have lent a huge 
amount to the companies that opted for reorgansation and hence the banks are motivated to 
support the continuation of business operations of such firms. It is not disconcerting that 
the value of a new money creditor is almost insignificant in case of liquidation. New 
money creditors provide additional financing to the firm after it defaults and this financing 
is the foundation stone for implementing the reorganisation plan. In case of liquidation, it 
is minimal as the need for post petition financing arises only if the company is continued. 
One may also notice that there are huge amounts due for unsecured creditors for both the 
procedures however it is significantly high for RJ‘s. In the event of bankruptcy it is 
Source: The Authors calculations (Tribunal de 
commerce de Paris) 
The number of stars (from * to ***) refers to the significance of the ANOVA test (respectively 10%, 5%, 
1% levels) 
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observed that these creditors suffer huge from huge monetary losses. In order to avoid 
such losses, these creditors should be naturally inclined towards gaining information on 
the distressed firm (Fama (1990), Milwa and Ramseyer (2005)). However, it is a notable 
observation that these creditors fail to monitor the financial health of the company and 
continue to supply credit even if the company is no longer meet its financial commitments. 
This further highlights the severity of the problem of information asymmetry, which is 
further aggravated between small firms and small creditors as the number of small 
creditors is large and difficult to monitor. Thus, an appropriate mechanism should be 
deployed with the objective of reducing information asymmetry between concerned 
parties.  
 
Table 5.4: Structure of claims 
Frequencies & averages 
Liquidation 
judiciaire 
Redressement 
judiciaire 
ANOVA 
Prob. > F Stat 
Nb. of observations 100 164  
Due total claims (K€)** 760.2 1743.3 0.0259 
Due claims (K€): secured*** 26.3 184.7 0.0086 
Due claims (K€): preferential 
(State + employees, including "superprivilège" 
on recent unpaid wages) 
518.1 421.3 0.6419 
Due claims (K€): New Money* 5.6 28.5 0.0653 
Due claims (K€): unsecured*** 205.2 1098.6 0.0037 
 
 
 
 
5.2.2.4. The Creditors’ Recoveries in France  
 
In this section, we first analyze the overall recovery rate, defined as the ratio between the 
total recovered amounts out of the total due claims. Second, we distinguish between three 
types of creditors: secured creditors, new money, and unsecured creditors. 
 
Source: The Authors calculations (Tribunal de commerce de Paris) 
The number of stars (from * to ***) refers to the significance of the ANOVA test 
(respectively 10%, 5%, 1% levels) 
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The overall recovery rate is found to be quite high in France (between 20% and 46%) as 
compared to UK.
 282
 This undermines the previous studies claiming that the French system 
leads to inefficiencies, especially ex-post efficiencies. In fact, the French bankruptcy 
system does not destroy value (or reversely preserves value). What are the reasons for 
this? First, it may be derived from higher coverage rate.
283
 Indeed, such coverage rate is 
found to be quite high in France (between 46% and 66%) as compared to UK
284
 (between 
15% and 35%). This indicates that most of the time in France, bankruptcy is triggered 
when there are still sufficient assets remaining in the debtor‘s patrimony. This can be 
attributed to the proactive prevention policy of France. On the other hand, it may be an 
artifact, as it could be that the companies in France are propelled towards legal outcomes 
in absence of private workouts (cf. our previous chapter 3). However, the case may be 
different in other countries like UK, where private solutions may be more frequent and 
employed as a measure to resolve default.
285
 
 
The higher recovery rate may reflect that there are more senior claims
286
 in France.
287
 
Indeed, in France, the percentage of senior claims is mainly due to the weight of 
preferential claims (much more than secured claims). In other words, the weight of 
employees and the State is much higher than the banks.
288
 
 
Let us now analyze the recovery rates for different classes of creditors (table 5.5). It 
appears that there is a significant difference between the recovery rates for preferential, 
new money and unsecured creditors under LJ and RJ. While, the condition of unsecured 
creditors remains futile under liquidation. They hardly receive anything under liquidation 
process (this is true for UK as well). New money creditors show an overall recovery rate 
of 27% for LJ and 62% for RJ. As expected, this is quite low and means that they are not 
                                                 
282
 In the UK section, you will be able to find results of the overall recovery rate for UK. 
283
 Coverage rate is the ratio of assets at the time of default against the liabilities at the time of default. The value is converted to 
percents.  
284 
For more details see UK section.  
285 
Besides it is impossible to figuratively prove such idea and hence this is only a hypothetical explanation 
286
 secured and preferential 
287
 it is noteworthy that senior claims may be more informed than the junior ones, and/or exert more control on the debtor 
288
 in contrast, the situation is reversed in UK where the banks have more weight in the claims of dues 
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rewarded well in France.
289
 This mainly reflects that in France, banks are paid before new 
money creditors
290
 in case of liquidation as banks were granted priority over article 40 
claims (1994 reforms). In addition, it is observed that irrespective of the outcome, new 
money creditors have low priority as compared to the employees (superprivilège). The 
recovery rate for preferential creditors is found to be 30.8% in case of LJ and 56.8% in 
case of RJ (this is more than the recovery rate for preferential creditors in UK).
291
 On the 
basis of this we can deduce that preferential creditors which comprise of state and 
employees are more protected in France than in UK. Indeed, French Bankruptcy Law 
explicitly provides clauses for the protection of employment. Further, the court may even 
show willingness to sell the firm to a lower bid if the employment contracts are kept intact. 
We also observe that the recovery rate of secured creditors for LJ is quite high as 
compared to UK.
292
 This means that banks recover more through the French liquidation 
procedure than UK liquidation procedures. Secured creditors under RJ also exhibit a 
substantial recovery (51.9%). Even receivership procedure which was made for the benefit 
of secured creditors shows less recovery rate for secured creditors (44.7%) in comparison 
to French RJ. The reason for higher recovery rate for French banks could be that they ask 
for more collateral
293
 because they fear the risk of dilution in case of bankruptcy. Lastly, 
the overall recovery rate for the firms in liquidation is found to be 19.6% while it is found 
to be 45.7% under RJ. This clearly shows that continuation yields a better result than 
liquidation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
289
 On the contrary, in UK, newmoney creditors show nearly 100% recovery rate for administration and receiverships procedures 
290
 Also called as Article 40 Claims 
291
 See section 5.3 on UK 
292
 The recovery rate for secured creditors for CVL is 27.7% and or CL is 16.2%.  
293
 Davydenko and Franks, 2008 
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                        Table 5.5: Descriptive on France (recovery rates) 
Frequencies & averages 
Liquidation 
judiciaire 
Redressement 
judiciaire 
ANOVA 
Prob. > F Stat 
Nb. of observations 100 164  
Overall recovery rate (%)*** 19.6% 45.7% <.0001 
Recovery rate (%): secured 40.2% 51.9% 0.1090 
Recovery rate (%): preferential 
(State + employees, including "superprivilège"*** 
on recent unpaid wages) 
30.8% 56.8% <.0001 
Recovery rate (%): New Money*** 27.3% 62.5% 0.0177 
Recovery rate (%): unsecured*** 3.1% 38.1% <.0001 
Coverage rate (%) (assets/debts)*** 46.4% 66.7% 0.017 
 
 
 
 
. 
5.2.2.5. The Costs of the French Procedures 
 
Table 5.6 provides us with the direct bankruptcy costs and length of the procedures of 
sample firms. Regarding the direct bankruptcy costs, the legal fees are rather moderate 
(less than 10 thousand Euros, which is very low relatively to the total due claims: between 
760 and 1740 thousands of Euros on average). Thus one can observe that the cost of the 
legal solution is quite low in France and is coherent with the orientation of the French code 
that promotes an early triggering (which is not the case in UK, as shown later). 
 
The indirect bankruptcy costs are computed by analyzing the duration of the procedure (as 
a proxy). Usually for France, a procedure lasts for less than a year (which is strikingly low 
as compared to UK, as discussed in section 5.3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the author (Tribunal de commerce de Paris) 
 The number of stars (from * to ***) refers to the significancy of the ANOVA test (respectively 10%, 5%, 
1% levels) 
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Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics on France (bankruptcy costs) 
Frequencies & averages 
Liquidation 
judiciaire 
Redressement 
judiciaire 
ANOVA 
Prob. > F Stat 
Nb. of observations 100 164  
Length of the procedure (months)*** 
(duration excludes the liquidation process) 
3.1 11.5 <.0001 
Direct bankruptcy costs (K€)*** 5.2 10.3 <.0001 
 
 
 
 
 
In the above text we have provided summary statistics of various relevant variables. Yet, 
adopting univariate analysis is insufficient to draw definitive conclusions, as this approach 
does not allow for controlling additional variables that may impact the outcome may 
interact with the test variables. From the perspective of comprehending the way RJ and LJ 
differ, we thus have to employ multivariate approach and econometrics. Precisely, we now 
aim at understanding (and testing) the determinants of the final choice between both 
outcomes (RJ versus LJ). Based on this, we develop our hypothesis and perform 
multivariate analysis and derive our main conclusions from it. 
 
5.2.3. Multivariate Analysis: What are the Determinants of Choice between 
Continuation and Liquidation? 
 
Our multivariate analysis aims at testing the determinants of the choice between 
continuation and liquidation. Indeed, such choice may stem from several factors. First, the 
choice may be derived from the orientation of the Law and the duty for the court to adhere 
to such orientation within a Civil law context. Second, it may reflect the initial situation of 
the debtor at the time of triggering of default (coverage rate, structure of claims…). Third, 
it may reflect the external macroeconomic environment in which the firm carries out its 
business activities. 
 
The number of stars (from * to ***) refers to the significancy of the ANOVA test (respectively 10%, 5%, 
1% levels). 
 
Source: the author (Tribunal de commerce de Paris) 
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We have the data of a total of 259 bankrupt firms and Table 5.7 provides the results of our 
multivariate analysis. Based on our expectations, we try to find the factors that increase the 
chances of continuation over liquidation. 
 
We created dummy variables which are assigned the value of one whenever we indentify a 
cause of default zero otherwise. We also include certain variables that determine certain 
characteristics of the firm like age and limited liability. In addition, we include other 
explanatory variables are related to the assets and liabilities structure.  
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Table 5.7: Multivariate analysis of the determinants of choice between RJ and LJ 
  Endogenous variable: bankruptcy's output (259 
bankrupt firms)   
Variable explained 
Output = redressement judiciaire (ref. liquidation 
judiciaire) 
  Estimation Prob. > c² 
Intercept 2.0165*** 0.009 
Coverage rate (Assets/liabilities) 0.621** 0.033 
Weight of amount due to preferential creditors -2.8181*** 0.0002 
Weight of amount due to secured creditors -0.264 0.789 
Weight of amount due to newmoney creditors 7.9196* 0.097 
Weight of inventory in estimated assets 2.9466*** 0.007 
Weight of receivables in estimated assets 0.1433 0.812 
Weight of cash in estimated assets 3.1089* 0.02 
Age of the firm 0.001 0.199 
GDP growth 41.0676*** 0.002 
Sector: trade -1.5171*** 0.002 
Sector: manufacturing -0.669 0.117 
Limited liability -0.8832** 0.019 
Reason for default: strategy 0.3131 0.18 
Reason for default: production 0.2101 0.299 
Reason for default: finance 0.0507 0.8004 
Reason for default: management 0.1661 0.487 
Reason for default: accident 0.4063* 0.054 
Reason for default: outlets -0.0706 0.69 
Reason for default: macro  0.6483*** 0.0009 
The model is: 
LOGIT regression 
 Test                   Khi 2   
 Likelihood Ratio   99.26 
 Score              81.49 
 Wald               56.97 
 Condition Index (Belsley et al. 
(1980)):              
18.5 
Source: the author (Tribunal de commerce de Paris) 
The number of stars (from * to ***) refers to the significancy of the ANOVA test (respectively 10%, 5%, 1% 
levels). 
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The result of our multivariate analysis highlights the following points. First, having 
controlled for other variables, we confirm that the coverage rate variable has a positive 
impact on the continuation probability. The higher the coverage rate, the more are the 
chances of rescue. Certainly, a low coverage rate signifies that assets are so 
disproportionate compared to the due claims that continuation would be possible only at 
the expense of creditors. As the creditors are not willing to lose more in continuation, they 
prefer to opt for a quick liquidation procedure if the coverage rate is very low. Moreover, 
results of our summary statistics on coverage rate proved that French firms are more liquid 
than UK firms at the time of onset of default. Indeed this higher coverage rate in France 
could be attributed to the proactive prevention policy in France. 
 
Second, the probability of continuation (through RJ) is not totally independent of the 
structure of the debts. We observe following significant results. First, weight of 
preferential claims has a negative impact on the chances of continuation. This implies that 
higher the proportion of these claims, less are the chances of rescue. This can be explained 
by the fact that in France, preferential creditors are mainly the employees (benefitting from 
superprivilege rights that now include recent unpaid claims for last two months). A 
company which fails to pay them is considered a virtually dead company with no possible 
chances for continuation. Second, on the contrary, new money claims increase the 
probability of continuation. Thus, new money can be viewed in France as a tool that 
effectively helps in preparing continuation plan and is a necessary prerequisite for 
implementation of continuation plans. Third, the outcome seems to be independent of the 
secured claims. As shown by (Blazy and Chopard, 2011), the pro-liquidation bias of 
secured claims is reduced in France as the final choice depends on the Court and not on 
secured creditors (who do not vote in France). Therefore we summarize that the presence 
of secured claims is not sufficient to significantly decrease the probability of continuation 
in France. 
 
Third, the assets‘ structure indicates that liquid assets (inventory and cash) positively 
impact the chances of continuation. This is true as inventory generates future turnover and 
cash is considered a requisite in supporting the early stages of continuation and it takes 
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time for the company to convince the creditors to inject additional money in the temporary 
absence of such financing cash serves the purpose. Availability of cash at this critical 
juncture increases the chances for rescue. In the absence of cash and inventories, the court 
is left with no other choice than to put the company into liquidation or allow going 
concern sales.  
 
Fourth and finally, we consider the other determinants that are control variables. First, 
limited liability of the company negatively affects the continuation probabilities.  As 
previously mentioned, managers enjoy protection under this legal form. This encourages 
them to indulge in excessive risk taking activities that can be harmful to the interest of the 
creditors.  
 
Second, recalling the results of our summary statistics (see previous section) that 
suggested that subsequent dominant cause for default strongly differ between RJ and LJ. 
We found that for LJ, the second most common cause was linked to the internal financial 
policy of the company (finance), whereas for RJ it was external to the company. Thus, our 
descriptive statistics suggested that external problems were more likely to lead the firm 
towards reorganizations than internal ones. Indeed, we find that the chances of 
continuation increase if the cause of default is external to the company (macro) and/or 
structural on the long run (accident). The other reasons do not show any significance on 
the choice of the procedure.  
 
The next section provides our empirical results on UK bankrupt firms.  
 
*     * 
* 
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5.3. Microeconomic Features Using Original Dataset on the UK 
 
 
During the nineteenth century, the English insolvency law also witnessed a series of 
reforms
294
  which made it a creditor friendly system. It was not until 1977 that the 
government realized a need for a more debtor friendly rescue oriented mechanism. 
Consequently a commission was appointed keeping this objective in mind. Its work is 
documented in the ‗Cork Report‘295.  Administration procedure was promulgated as a 
result of this report, which eventually effectuated by the Insolvency Act of 1986. Before 
the enactment of the Insolvency Act of 1986, UK insolvency regime already had two 
procedures called Receivership and Liquidation. Receivership was the peculiarity of the 
English law. It conferred exclusive rights of appointing the receiver to a creditor holding 
fixed and floating charges (Armour and Frisby 2001). Whereas liquidation comprised of 
voluntary and involuntary liquidation procedures: Voluntary liquidation procedure called 
as ‗Creditor Voluntary Liquidation‘ and involuntary liquidation procedure known as 
‗Compulsory Liquidation‘.  
 
In UK, liquidation is the most extensively used procedure amounting to more than 85% of 
all bankruptcy filings whereas administration amounts to nearly 5% of all cases and 
receivership accounted for 10% of all cases. However, receivership is no more pervasive 
and was abandoned by Enterprise Act of 2002
296
, which came into force on 15
th
 
September, 2003. It was viewed as a biased procedure, conferring too many rights to 
secured creditors and often leading to immature liquidations
297
 as the appointed receiver 
was only concerned with seeking repayment for his appointees.
298
  
 
Enterprise Act of 2002 was introduced in the law to make bankruptcy procedures more 
efficient and to provide greater accountability to unsecured creditors. The main aim of the 
new streamlined procedure was to enable more companies to survive insolvency while 
                                                 
294
 Rose Lewis, ‗Australian Bankruptcy law 11th edition (1999), 8-16.  
295
 For full reference of Committee‘s work see, ‗Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee‘, (Cmnd 8558, 1982) 
(hereinafter referred to as ―Cork Report‖).  
296
 See V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (CUP, Cambridge, 2002), P294; S Leinster, ―Policy Aims of 
the Enterprise Act‖ (2003) Recovery (Autumn) 27, 28. 
297
 See., Aghion, Hart, and Moore, 1992, Armour and Mokal, 2005, Insolvency Service, 2001. 
298
 See., Benveniste, 1986; Aghion et al, 1992. 
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providing level playing field to all creditors. With regard to this Crown‘s preferential 
status was abolished
299
 and ring fence fund
300
 was established to allow more assets to be 
made available to the unsecured creditors. The appointed administrator had fiduciary 
duties towards all the creditors of the firm and was required to work within a particular 
time frame not exceeding more than a year.  
 
Most of the previous studies conducted on Bankruptcy procedures of UK generally 
concentrated on administrations and receiverships, which constitutes roughly about 15% 
of all the bankruptcies filed in UK. In our sample we not only take into consideration the 
administration cases and receivership cases, but also includes liquidation cases which 
constitute 85% of all bankruptcy filings in UK.  
 
In this chapter we look at in detail, the four major formal bankruptcy procedures of UK 
(Administration, Receivership, Creditor Voluntary Liquidation and Compulsory 
Liquidation). We have built an original dataset comprising of 574 bankrupt companies of 
UK. Out of which 200 companies filed for administration, 199 companies filed for 
receiverships, 100 companies filed for compulsory liquidation and 75 companies filed for 
creditor voluntary liquidation. We have detailed information about these companies 
through various trusted sources. Based on this, we developed a unique hand coded 
database that computes information for the recoveries for all classes of creditors 
(employees, state, banks, trade creditors, newmoney creditors and the practitioner fees). 
Consequently, we present first the recovery rates for each type of creditors for each 
procedure, and second global recovery rates for the entire firm. We also identify the 
factors that lead a company to distress. In addition, we have information related to the 
initiators of the process, costs of the process, length of the process, asset and debt structure 
of the firms, measures taken before and after bankruptcy, general information about the 
company (sector, age, geographical location, number of directors and so on) and the final 
outcome of bankruptcy. We also employ multivariate analysis to determine the choice 
                                                 
299
 EA 2002, s 251 (1) states that the Crown preference shall cease to exist. 
300 
The EA 2002, s 252 introduces a new s 176A into the IA 1986 which fully stipulates the new creation of ring fence fund. 
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between administration and receivership against liquidation. This facilitates in explaining 
if the content of law impacts such choice or not.  
 
Here‘s a brief summary of our principal findings: we found that most of the companies 
that filed for bankruptcies had their registered office situated in regions of Greater London 
or North West regions of United Kingdom. Majority of administration and creditor 
voluntary liquidation cases were triggered by debtors while receiverships by secured 
creditors and compulsory liquidation by unsecured creditors. Further, our analysis 
confirms ―Outlets‖ as the dominant reason for default. Receivership was found to be the 
lengthiest and the most expensive procedure while yielding the highest recovery rate.  
 
The rest of the chapter is organized into four sections. Section 5.3.1 describes the process 
of Data Collection and Methodology, section 5.3.2 is devoted to Descriptive Statistics 
based on our original hand collected data, section 5.3.3 presents the results of our 
multivariate analysis and Section 5.3.4 finally presents the conclusion.  
 
5.3.1. Data Collection and Methodology 
 
 
In this chapter, we study 574 small and medium sized enterprises that filed for different 
bankruptcy procedures in the UK (table 5.8).  
 
Table 5.8: Number of files per bankruptcy procedure 
BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURES 
Number 
of files 
UK Administration (UKADM) 200 
UK Receivership (UKREC) 199 
UK Creditor Voluntary 
liquidation (UKCVL) 75 
UK Compulsory liquidation 
(UK_CL) 100 
TOTAL 574 
 
        Source: Authors database 
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The empirical study reported in this chapter includes both qualitative and quantitative 
variables. The template
301
 built for the survey contains information on 299 variables 
ranging from general characteristics of the firm, amount recovered by the respective 
creditors, information on asset and debt structure of the firm and many other variables 
considered important for the study.  
 
We only concentrated on those firms which were not currently placed under any 
procedure. This means that the procedure has been terminated and the company has been 
dissolved. This was an important prerequisite for choosing any firm. To find such 
information, we referred to the London Gazette online services.
302
 This website provided 
us with the information on appointment notifications of administrators, receivers and 
liquidators. We then randomly made a huge list of companies and recorded their names 
and registration numbers. In order to be certain that this was a closed case and contained 
information on most of our template variables, we officially registered with the Companies 
online house database.
303
The company name and the registration number enabled us to 
browse for important information like notices of dissolution (to make sure it is a closed 
file) and reports of administrators and receivers to access the statement of affairs and other 
statutory details of the dissolved company. Once all the important criteria were met and 
we were satisfied with the quality of information available, we then downloaded all the 
information related to such firms. After all this sampling and selection process, we 
downloaded information for 200 administration cases, 199 receivership cases and 50 
creditor voluntary liquidation cases. Companies‘ online database successfully provided us 
information on administrations and receivership cases. However, we realized that the data 
on creditor liquidation cases was missing information on important variables that we were 
looking for. These cases were in bulk and often go unrecorded. For our studies we realized 
the importance of such cases as they constitute more than 40-50% of the total bankruptcies 
in UK. To achieve our goal, we again resorted to the London gazette and found the 
registration number of the firms and from companies house we eventually found details of 
                                                 
301 
This template is provided in the appendix for a more in depth view. 
302
 London Gazette is highly specialized publication that contains information for public, private, libraries and researchers. For more 
details check the official website http://www.london-gazette.co.uk 
303
 Companies‘ house is an official website for England and Wales. It contains information on all the companies registered and 
dissolved. For more information check http://www.companieshouse.gov.uk/ 
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the Insolvency practitioners. Based on this we made a list of 100 such practitioners and 
sent them a confidential letter inviting them to participate in our studies by providing 
relevant data ensuring them due acknowledgement if they participate. Unfortunately, as 
these cases are in themselves very confidential, we did not receive many responses except 
from the one insolvency firm.
304
 This firm provided us with the data for creditor voluntary 
liquidation cases. This completed one data set for creditor voluntary liquidations. No 
sooner was this goal achieved, another obstacle surfaced. We came to know that 
information on compulsory liquidations is very rare and not available through insolvency 
practitioners. For these cases, courts often appoint an official receiver. Although the only 
available source seemed like the courts we soon realized that Insolvency service
305
 can 
also have access to such files as most of the cases are officially reported there. We then 
conducted a series of conferences and meetings with officials working with the Insolvency 
service and finally managed to obtain information on 100 compulsory voluntary 
liquidation cases.  
 
Thus, as you can see, the data collection process was not so easy and every step was laced 
with obstacles. However, once we had our data, we jumpstarted the process of recording it 
in the excel templates and went on to build the most unique and comprehensive database 
on bankruptcy procedures in the UK till date.  
 
The data collected from the Companies house online services contained information on 
various aspects of the firm
306
 like:  
- Name of the Company and Registration Number, 
- Name of the Appointer, 
- Name of the Insolvency Practitioner, 
- Statement of Administrators/Receivers proposals and expected outcome, 
- Administrators/Receivers six months progress report and abstract of receipts/payments   
                                                 
304
 Begbies Traynor is UK‘s largest and fastest growing independent practice of corporate rescue and recovery specialists. For details 
see, http://www.begbies-traynorgroup.com 
305
 Insolvency Service works under the statutory framework for IA 1986 and 2000, Companies Directors Disqualifications Act 1986 
and the Employment Rights Act 1986. For more details on services provided by them see, 
http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/aboutus/aboutusmenu.htm. 
306
 For various forms see appendix. 
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- Accounting Data of the Company, 
- Director‘s Statement of Affairs, 
- Notice of Dissolution. 
 
With the help of these documents we were able to identify outcomes to many variables of 
the template. The administrators/receivers report provided statutory information about the 
company and crucial information on the events leading to default, the final outcome, the 
details on recovery made by the creditors and also information on costs of the bankruptcy 
process including the administrator‘s fees and expenses. With the statement of affairs we 
were able to find the real market value of the assets at the time of default and from the 
balance sheet data we were able to find the financial situation of the company one or two 
years prior to default.  
 
5.3.1.1. Data Sample 
 
The graph 5.2 shows the distribution of our sample data over a period of eight years 
ranging from 1998-2005. The year column represents the year in which a particular 
company defaulted and triggered its bankruptcy proceedings. We can see a clear bias in 
our distribution sample. The recent years have more incidences, which can be explained 
by the fact that it was not so easy to trace files of firms which defaulted years back 
because information related to them was very rarely available. Data of recently defaulted 
firms was readily available which increased their incidence in our study. Even though, it 
was simply too complex and time consuming, we tried our best to make the data sample as 
homogenous as possible. 
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Graph 5.2: Distribution of UK firms over the period of 8 years  
 
YEARS UK
1998 32
1999 34
2000 34
2001 43
2002 41
2003 115
2004 172
2005 103
TOTAL 574
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5.3.1.2. Geographical Distribution of the Sample Data 
 
The registered address of each company was identified and recorded from the statutory 
information about the company obtained from Companies‘ house. Based on this, each 
company in the database was further divided into 10 major locations of UK. These are: 
 
1. North 
2. Yorkshire 
3. Humberside 
4. East Midlands 
5. East Anglia 
6. Greater London 
7. Rest of South East 
8. South West 
9. West Midlands 
10. North West 
We study the geographical distribution of whole data sample and in the subsequent graphs 
Source: Insolvency Service, UK 
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we focus on the geographical distribution of the firms according to the procedure they 
enter into. This will help us in noticing any existing regional biases. Graph 5.3 shows the 
distribution of whole sample. As is evident, more than half (51%) of the sample firms 
belong to Greater London and North West regions of UK. 
 
                     Graph 5.3: Geographical distribution of our sample firms 
 
                                  Source: Authors database 
 
Let us shift our focus to the geographical distribution according to the individual 
bankruptcy procedures. Graph 5.4 shows that companies that went into compulsory 
liquidation process were mainly situated in Greater London and Rest of South East 
regions. 39% of the companies were situated in Greater London and 17% of the 
companies located in Rest of South East regions of UK.  
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                         Graph 5.4: Geographical distribution of the Compulsory liquidation cases 
 
                                          Source: Authors database 
 
Graph 5.5 shows that the companies filing for creditor voluntary liquidation were largely 
concentrated in Greater London and North West regions of UK. North West region 
accounted for 47% of the companies and Greater London consisted of 31% of the sample 
companies. 
 
                        Graph 5.5: Geographical distribution of the Creditor Voluntary liquidation cases 
 
                          Source: Authors database 
 
Administration procedure showed highest incidence in North West regions. (Graph 5.6). 
33 percent of the companies were concentrated in North West region while 21 percent of 
the companies situated in Greater London area.  
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                         Graph 5.6: Geographical distribution of the Administration cases 
 
                        Source: Authors database 
 
Receivership shows highest incidence for Greater London area (Graph 5.7). It accounted 
for 39% of the sample companies. We presume that the Greater London bias (areas in 
London and Greater London) and North West Region (Manchester and neighboring 
areas) bias can be attributed to the fact that larger numbers of small and medium sized 
firms are concentrated in those regions of UK. Frisby (2008) reports London as the main 
location for both administrations and receiverships in a sample of 2063 sample firms.   
 
                               Graph 5.7: Geographical distribution of the Receivership cases 
 
 
                        Source: Authors database 
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5.3.2. Descriptive Statistics on UK 
 
5.3.2.1. What is the Average Profile of UK’s Bankrupt Firm? 
 
To comprehend this, we need to take a look at the individual components that 
collectively conglomerate to construct an average profile of UK‘s bankrupt firms. These 
components are listed through A – D: 
 
A. Limited Liability- Table 5.8 provides us with the main characteristics of firms in 
the UK. Most of the firms in the given sample enjoy limited liability. This is not 
unexpected as limited liability has become one of the most preferred legal forms all over 
the world. (Armour, 2009). It benefits the shareholders whose liability is limited to the 
amount of capital invested. In the event of default, unpaid creditors cannot seek 
contributions from the company‘s shareholders in excess of their contributions307, even 
if the shareholders made huge fortunes when the company was flourishing. This legal 
form also encourages the managers/directors to get involved in risk taking as they enjoy 
the benefits of their limited liability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
307
 S Davies QC (ed), Insolvency and the Enterprise Act 2002 (Jordans, Bristol, 2003), p176 
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Table 5.8: Descriptive statistics on UK (main characteristics of firms) 
Frequencies & averages 
Compulsory 
liquidation 
Creditors 
Voluntary 
Liquidation 
Administration Receivership 
ANOVA 
Prob. > F 
Stat 
Nb. of observations 100 75 200 199  
Limited liability 100.0% 
 
100.0% 
     (3) 
 
97.9% 
    (2) 
 
      97.4% 
       (1) 
0.2487 
Age (years)*** 8.3 12.3 13.3 15.2 0.0016 
Trade 12.0% 13.9% 15.6% 13.1% 0.8342 
Manufacturing 48.0% 51.3% 49.2% 58.6% 0.2015 
Services* 39.0% 31.9% 31.2% 23.7% 0.0501 
Reason for default: strategy*** 15% 
11% 
     (50) 
30% 26% 0.0016 
Reason for default: production*** 11% 
11% 
     (50) 
30% 25% <.0001 
Reason for default: finance** 10% 
6% 
     (50) 
19% 16% 0.0289 
Reason for default: management** 18% 
8% 
    (50) 
9% 8% 0.0422 
Reason for default: accident*** 57% 
9% 
   (50) 
32% 23% <.0001 
Reason for default: outlets*** 45% 
27% 
   (50) 
64% 83% <.0001 
Reason for default: macro*** 19% 
21% 
   (50) 
42% 45% <.0001 
 
Source: The Authors calculations (Companies house direct and reports from Insolvency service and 
Insolvency practitioners).The number of stars (from * to ***) refers to the significance of the ANOVA test 
(respectively 10%, 5%, 1% levels). 
 
 
B. Age- The mean age of the sample firms listed under the four different bankruptcy 
procedures varies between 8-15 years.  This highlights the fact that these firms were not 
young firms or startups which is similar to the summary statistics obtained for French 
firms where average age was between 9 - 17 years. This amplifies the fact that young 
firms in both the countries need time to accumulate losses over a period of time. In 
France, the Government actively supports the creation of firms and helps them with 
obtaining financing through a specialized organization called (OSEO) and they are also 
provided subsidies and tax shields during the initial stages of their life cycle. In UK, even 
though small and medium sized enterprises provide 60% of the UK‘s jobs and account 
for half of the country‘s economic output, still no such specialized organization exists 
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that ensures that these firms have easy access to sufficient credit.  In UK, the need for 
encouraging creation of firms arose after the current crisis and thousands of job losses. 
The Government now recognizes the need for supporting the creation of new firms and to 
ensure that they get sufficient support from the Government
308
. Our summary statistics of 
age shows that oldest firms that default were under receivership process and the youngest 
were under compulsory liquidations. Receivership was the procedure designed for the 
benefit of banks and old age of the firms reflects that they had long relationships with 
their main banks. It also signifies that banks might have attempted to revive the firms 
from difficulties for some years failing which; bankruptcy was opted as the last resort 
measure.  
 
C. Sectors- Majority of the firms in the given sample, irrespective of the procedures, 
belongs to the manufacturing industry. Service industry turns out to be the second most 
dominant sector. The firm‘s choice of industry is considered important for two main 
reasons. First, it has been found that there is high correlation between the industry 
structure and a firm‘s performance (e.g. Scherer, 1980; Ravenscraft, 1983; Schmalensee, 
1985) which manifests into the firm‘s survival likelihood (Drucker, 1970). Second, in 
order to minimize the chances of failure, reducing industry effects by diversification of 
firms is often cited as a reason by acclaimed authors (e.g. Weston & Mansinghka 1971; 
Pfeffer& Salancik, 1978; Amihud & Lev, 1981). It is seen as a measure that dilutes the 
risk of failures in any given particular environment the firm operates in (Thompson, 
1967; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Kotter, 1979) and hence positively impacts the chances 
of survival (Amihud &Lev, 1981) because such firms do not rely on one particular 
domain or sector and thus insulate themselves from unforeseen market and industry 
downturns. In the next point, we get to see that external environment (macro) is one of 
the major causes for default.  Thus, it is very important to consider such factors if we 
want to increase the life span of a firm. 
 
                                                 
308 
David Cameron has appointed former Cabinet minister Lord Young as his enterprise tsar with a remit to cut red tape for small 
business. His review of enterprise policy will aim to: 1) Minimise the "bureaucratic burdens" which increase costs and hassle; 2) 
Identify ways that government departments can help ensure firms have access to sufficient finance; 3) Encourage people to start 
businesses rather than seek jobs as employees; 4) Improve the way government listens to the views of small and medium-sized 
enterprises when designing policy. For more details see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-11663262. Article published on BBC on 
1st November, 2010. 
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D. Cause of default- It is worth mentioning that one can always find compelling 
reasons for a company‘s failure. In our sample, these reasons were identified from the 
reports of insolvency practitioners or official receivers dealing with a particular firm. 
These causes were hand coded using a list of 52 codes which were later classified into 7 
major categories: Strategy, Production, Finance, Management, Accident, Outlets and 
Macro. We built 7 dummy variables which take a value of 1 whenever we identify one 
cause in a given category and zero else wise. For some files, this information was hard to 
find and we treat them as missing data. Table 5.8 presents the distribution of these causes 
of default for the four different bankruptcy procedures of UK within our sample firms. 
Our Fisher tests exhibit significant differences among all categories of default causes for 
all types of procedures. It is however interesting to note that irrespective of the 
procedure, outlets remain the most dominant reason for default, particularly showing 
very high percentages for receiverships (83%) and administrations (64%). Outlets signify 
the fact that a company has lost its customer base. Reviving such firms proves to be an 
unprofitable activity as the primary source for generation of income (no customers) has 
come to an end. Second, most dominant reason for default for administrations, 
receiverships and creditor voluntary liquidation is external environment (macro). This 
shows that industry downturn, rise in competition and market factors play a significant 
role in the survival of UK firms.  While in the case of compulsory liquidations, the 
second most dominant reason for default is accident. This illustrates that the intensity of 
these accidents is very severe and often causes irreversible damage to the firm with no 
likelihood of rescue. Blazy and Combier (1997)
309
 suggested that one reason may not be 
sufficient to generate default and involves a combination of causes. Even though we do 
not include these combinations in our study but we do acknowledge that subsequent 
dominant causes for default strongly differ from one procedure to the other and are 
significant as shown by Fisher tests.  
 
 
 
                                                 
309
 Blazy R., J. Combier (1997). « La défaillance d'entreprise : causes économiques, traitement judiciaire et impact financier », 
Economica, INSEE Méthodes, n°72-73. 
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5.3.2.2. Description of the Assets Structure 
 
For different bankruptcy procedures in UK, we were able to extract accounting 
information from the abbreviated balance sheets provided by the director at the time of 
bankruptcy. In this, the directors provide their best estimates of the current value of the 
assets of the company at the onset of the procedure and most of the times they also 
provide the balance sheet a year before default. So this gave us two kinds of estimates. 
Balance Sheet Value a year before default and Balance Sheet Estimates at the time of 
commencement of the proceedings assumed to be the last accounting figures. This helped 
us in analysing the asset structure before and at the time of default. Looking at the values 
of assets, we observe a significant difference in the asset structure (total assets, tangibles, 
inventory, receivables and cash) for firms entering different procedures. The value of 
total assets is increasingly high for the firms entering administration and receivership 
than compared to CVL and CL. Larger value signifies that these firms have more assets. 
Thus, more time and effort is needed to assess their market value and find a solution for 
such firms (Lawless and Ferris, 2000; LoPucki and Doherty, 2004; Bris et al, 2006). We 
notice that firms entering administration have substantial tangibles, inventory, 
receivables and cash. Firms entering receivership are identified to have high proportions 
of long term financial assets. Majority of liquidations are identified to have high 
proportion of receivables, inventory and cash in their asset structure. Here we notice that 
a high proportion of fixed assets in the asset structure often lead the firm into 
administration or receivership rather than liquidations.  On the other hand, we notice that 
the firms entering liquidations are identified to have more current assets (receivables + 
stock + cash) than fixed assets (intangibles + tangibles + long term financial assets).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
223 
 
 
Table 5.9: Book value of assets: Balance sheet figures 
A year before default      
Frequencies & averages 
Compulsory 
liquidation 
Creditors 
Voluntary 
Liquidation 
Administration Receivership 
ANOVA 
Prob. > F 
Stat 
Nb. of observations 87 58 176 176   
Total assets:  (K€)*** 368.8 473.6 1629.8 2862.8 <.0001 
Intangible assets:  (K€) 20.8 19.1 29.8 38.3 0.265 
Tangible assets: (K€)*** 128.0 172.7 528.4 870.2 <.0001 
Financial assets: (K€) 9.7 1.4 52.5 315.52 0.10 
Inventory:  (K€)* 42.7 70.9 232.2 520.5 0.08 
Receivables: (K€)*** 152.6 172.5 642.1 986.1 <.0001 
Mark. securities: (K€) 3.2 17.8 6.1 23.1 0.537 
Cash:  (K€)*** 11.9 19.1 38.8 109.2 0.004 
Other assets:  (K€) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.194 
Last accounting figure      
Nb. of observations 36 45 155 126  
Total assets:  (K€)*** 195.8 354.8 1819.3 2313.7 <.0001 
Intangible assets:  (K€) 12.2 2.9 126.4 50.2 0.429 
Tangible assets: (K€)*** 43.0 126.3 686.0 743.2 0.015 
Financial assets: (K€) 0.0 0.0 74.7 170.40 0.36 
Inventory:  (K€)*** 39.6 40.7 213.3 383.9 0004 
Receivables: (K€)*** 95.1 151.6 649.1 872.9 <.0001 
Mark. securities: (K€) 0.2 7.2 7.37 24.7 0.794 
Cash:  (K€) 5. 26.2 63.8 68.4 0.445 
Other assets:  (K€) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.710 
 
Source: The Authors calculations (Companies house direct and reports from Insolvency service and 
Insolvency practitioners).The number of stars (from * to ***) refers to the significance of the ANOVA test 
(respectively 10%, 5%, 1% levels). 
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In table 5.9 we analysed the book value of assets extracted from the balance sheet of the 
companies. In table 5.10, we analyse the value extracted from the statement of affairs of 
the company prepared by the directors
310
 and handed out to the insolvency practitioner at 
the time of trigger of default. In this they document the estimated market value of the 
firm‘s assets. Additionally we also provide the realized market value of the assets. This 
information was gathered from the abstracts of receipts and payments filed by the 
administrator/receiver/liquidator at the Registrar of Companies, at six monthly intervals.  
Comparing the estimated value of total assets with the realized value of total assets, we 
notice a huge difference for all sample firms. This reflects two facts: First, director‘s 
estimations of their patrimony were subject to optimum bias (Armour, 2009). Second, 
insolvency practitioner is responsible for collecting receivables, sell the tangibles to the 
highest amount and realize all the assets in a manner so as to achieve the best results for 
the firm. This demonstrates the effectiveness of the insolvency practitioner in realizing 
the assets and maximizing the value of the firm. However, here we would like to reinstate 
that this case of UK is different from France. As in France we only have estimated value 
of assets which in fact is equivalent to realized value of assets and is calculated by the 
court appointed official at the time of trigger of default.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
310
 The directors are obliged by law to provide such document to the court appointed official. 
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Table 5.10: Estimated and realized value of assets 
Frequencies & averages 
Compulsory 
liquidation 
Creditors 
Voluntary 
Liquidation 
Administratio
n 
Receivership 
ANOVA 
Prob. > F 
Stat 
Nb. of observations 100 75 200 199  
Total assets:estimated market value (K€)*** 35.8 108.8 524.2 925.3      <.0001 
Intangible assets:estimated market value (K€)** 0.0 0.0 15.9 27.3 0.0184 
Tangible assets:estimated market value (K€)*** 1.5 59.0 285.0 485.8 0.0001 
Financial assets:estimated market value (K€) 0.0 0.1 1.0 2.6 0.4158 
Inventory:estimated market value (K€)** 3.0 2.7 381 77.6 0.0288 
Receivables:estimated market value (K€)*** 22.7 37.9 171.2 312.3        <.0001 
Mark. securities:estimated market value (K€) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 n.s 
Cash:estimated market value (K€) 7.6 8.1 6.6 15.3 0.3142 
Other assets:estimated market value (K€) 1.1 1.0 6.4 4.3 0.2674 
Total assets: real market value (K€)*** 19.3 88.5 380.7 605.7       <.0001 
Intangible assets: real market value (K€)** 0.0 0.1 9.8 2.2      0.0191 
Tangible assets: real market value (K€)*** 1.4 56.1 150.8 241.4      0.0040 
Financial assets: real market value (K€) 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5      0.5267 
Inventory: real market value (K€)* 0.6 1.7 11.4       28.8     0.0877 
Receivables: real market value (K€)*** 10.8 16.2 117.9     184.2     <.0001 
Mark. securities: real market value (K€) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5    0.4997 
Cash: real market value (K€) 6.4 7.6 11.6       10.1    0.7382 
Other assets: real market value (K€)*** 0.0 6.8 68.0       96.7    0.0015 
Source: The Authors calculations (Companies house direct and reports from Insolvency service and 
Insolvency practitioners).The number of stars (from * to ***) refers to the significance of the ANOVA test 
(respectively 10%, 5%, 1% levels). 
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  5.3.2.3. Description of the Debt Structure 
 
The values of the table 5.11 were extracted from the balance sheet provided by the 
directors. The table shows a detailed debt structure of the companies a year before default 
and at the time of default. This can help us in analyzing as to what kinds of liabilities are 
associated with firms entering different bankruptcy procedures. In both the tables, we 
observe significant differences for long term financial debts, short term financial debts 
and total debts. We notice that the firms opting for liquidations are characterized to have 
more short term debts over long term debts. This means that these firms had more 
amounts due to trade creditors (unsecured) rather than the banks (secured). Similarly, the 
firms that are put under administration also showed huge proportion of amount due to 
trade creditors but at the same time they also show reasonable amount due to banks. For 
receiverships, we notice huge proportions of amount due to banks. This could be the 
major reason as to why these firms are put under receivership and not under 
administration. Banks as secured lenders had the right to appoint
311
 the receiver in out of 
court proceedings, who was solely responsible to his appointee.  In addition, it gave them 
the power to control the management of the firm through the appointed receivers. More 
often than not it was believed that it caused harm to the junior claimants who hardly 
received anything. Consequently, with the Enterprise Act of 2002, it was abandoned and 
new streamlined administration procedure was deployed aimed at shifting power from 
secured creditors to unsecured creditors. However, whether this reform really increased 
recovery of unsecured creditors is a matter of more research and study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
311
 No one has the right to veto their appointment.  
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Table 5.11: Debt structure of the firms 
Debt structure a year before default      
Frequencies & averages 
Compulsory 
liquidation 
Creditors Voluntary 
Liquidation 
Administration Receivership 
ANOVA 
Prob. > F 
Stat 
Nb. of observations 87 58 176 176   
Equity (K€)*** 22.7 -250.0 295.4 402.8 0.009 
Long term financial debts (K€)*** 90.3 342.1 269.8 914.4 0.008 
Short term operating debts (K€)*** 255.2 379.9 1044.0 1480.0 <.0001 
Short term financial debts (K€) 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.2 0.295 
Other debts (K€)* 0.6 2.2 20.0 65.1 0.084 
Total debts (K€)*** 368.9 473.7 1630.0 2862.5 <.0001 
          
Last accounting figures         
Nb. of observations 36 45 55 126  
Equity (K€) -22.5 -246.4 201.8 -59.2 0.554 
Long term financial debts (K€)* 43.9 300.2 385.3 872.3 0.090 
Short term operating debts (K€)*** 174.3 296.8 1205.2 1452.3 <.0001 
Short term financial debts (K€) 0.0 3.1 4.1 3.4 0.994 
Other debts (K€) 1.1 1.14 22.9 33.6 0.329 
Total debts (K€)*** 195.8 354.9 1819.3 2302.4 <.0001 
 
 
Source: The Authors calculations (Companies house direct and reports from Insolvency service and 
Insolvency practitioners).The number of stars (from * to ***) refers to the significance of the ANOVA test 
(respectively 10%, 5%, 1% levels). 
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  5.3.2.4. The Structure of Claims 
 
Table 5.12 provides the amount due to various categories of creditors. For UK 
bankruptcy procedures, we identified five major classes of creditors: Secured, 
Preferential
312
, Employees, Newmoney and Unsecured Creditors. Secured creditors are 
pre-dominantly the banks or financing companies that lend the money to companies on 
fixed and floating charges. Preferential creditors
313
 usually comprise of amounts due to 
Inland revenue, customs and excise, social security contributions and contributions to 
pension and occupational schemes. Remuneration of employees is also preferential but in 
our study we create a separate employee class in order to calculate the entire amount due 
to employees. Newmoney creditors are the creditors whose dues arise after default (for 
example salaries of personals appointed after default). Unsecured creditors comprises of 
trade creditors and suppliers of goods and raw materials. The details about the amounts 
due to these creditors were obtained from insolvency practitioner‘s reports, abstract of 
receipts and payments and statement of affairs. We noticed a significant difference 
among the sample firms entering different procedures. The firms entering administration 
and receivership have huge amounts at stake while this is not the case with firms entering 
liquidations. In case of receivership we observe heavy amounts due to secured lenders 
which again reflect that secured creditors exercised their exclusive right and put the 
company into receivership. Surprisingly, for all the procedures, we noticed high value of 
amounts due to unsecured creditors. This reflects two points: First, trade credit is crucial 
(see the value of their amounts due for all procedures) for running of the firm as it 
provides timely supply of raw materials and other goods and services necessary for the 
functioning of the company and as such should be treated with more respect in case of 
default by providing them level playing field as compared to other creditor claims. 
Second, we noticed (table 5.13) that trade creditors are numerous in numbers. This 
signifies co-ordination failures as they are dispersed. As such they fail to keep 
themselves informed about the financial position of the company, failing which they keep 
                                                 
312
 For more details on preferential creditors see Schedule 6 of Insolvency Act 1986. 
313
 This is to bring to your notice that after Enterprise Act 2002, state lost its preferential status and now falls in unsecured category for 
administrations. 
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up their supplies and in the end are left with no recoveries. Indeed, these creditors should 
have high incentives to monitor the firms as they are the worst affected categories. But in 
reality this is not the case and it is secured lenders who efficiently monitor the firms 
despite the fact that they will recover out of the collaterals. Thus we observed that 
unsecured creditors should have more incentives to monitor the firm than the banks and 
Governments should introduce such mechanisms that help them serve this purpose.  
 
Table 5.12: Structure of due claims 
Frequencies & averages 
Compulsory 
liquidation 
Creditors Voluntary 
Liquidation 
Administration Receivership 
ANOVA 
Prob. > F Stat 
Nb. of observations 100 75 200 199   
Due total (K€)*** 282.6 657.8 1788.1 3390.3 <.0001 
Due claims (K€): secured*** 16.9 82.1 692.0 1573.3 <.0001 
Due claims (K€): preferential 
(State before 2002; not including 
employees)*** 
6.0 32.5 12.1 121.3 <.0001 
Due claims (K€): employees 5.4 5.0 24.8 26.7 0.3049 
Due claims (K€): New Money* 0.0 11.6 99.7 333.9 0.076 
Due claims (K€): unsecured*** 254.2 507.8 883.8 1236.5 <.0001 
Source: The Authors calculations (Companies house direct and reports from Insolvency service and 
Insolvency practitioners).The number of stars (from * to ***) refers to the significance of the ANOVA test 
(respectively 10%, 5%, 1% levels). 
 
Table 5.13: Number of Creditors 
 
Number of claims 
 
 
Compulsory liquidation 
Creditors 
Voluntary 
Liquidation 
Administration Receivership 
    Secured 0.22  0.59  1.67  1.6  
   Preferential  0.12  1.08  0.18  1.18  
   Employees 0.14  0.01  0.85  0.39  
   Newmoney  0 7.7  9.76  13.8  
   Unsecured 4.75  37.8  77.5  49.6  
   Total  5.68  48.0  89  65.3  
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors‘ Calculations 
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  5.3.2.5. The Creditors’ Recoveries in UK 
 
Bankruptcy procedures should aim at maximizing the value of the bankrupt firm by 
taking into account interests of all the stakeholders. Creditor recovery rate is often used 
as a proxy to judge the ex post efficiency of the procedure (Davydenko and Franks, 2008, 
Grunert and Weber, 2009). Higher recovery rates are associated with increased efficiency 
of a particular procedure. We managed to obtain information related to recoveries from 
the abstracts of receipts and payments and from the insolvency practitioners report. 
Based on which, we calculated the recovery rate for each class of creditors and also 
overall firms‘ recovery rate. We noticed a significant difference in the overall recovery 
rate for the firms entering into different insolvency procedures (Table 5.14). The 
receivership process shows high bank recovery rate when compared with other 
procedures. This is not unexpected as this procedure aimed at the benefit of secured 
lenders. Preferential creditors show highest recoveries under administration procedures. 
Newmoney creditors show 100 percent recovery for all the procedures whereas 
recoveries for unsecured creditors remain futile. They hardly receive anything out of any 
procedure. For administration, secured creditors show a recovery rate of 39.2 percent 
while for receiverships it is slightly higher at 44.7 percent. This is in coherence with the 
expectations. Secured creditors benefit more in receivership because of their exclusive 
rights; however it is worth noting that the difference in recovery rate between 
administration and receiverships is not so vast.  Armour et al. (2008) found contrasting 
results, where secured creditors recovery was more in administrations (61 percent) than 
in receiverships (55 percent). However, they found that the overall firm‘s recovery rate is 
similar in both the procedures (21 percent). In our sample, we find the highest overall 
recovery rate for receiverships. Interestingly, this procedure was abolished by the 
Enterprise Act of 2002 which opens up the debate whether contractualist approach was a 
feasible way to resolve default in UK or not. Enterprise Act of 2002 was introduced with 
the objective of providing a level playing field to all the creditors and especially 
improving the position of unsecured creditors. The main aim of the new streamlined 
procedure is to enable more and more companies to survive and provide level playing 
field to all creditors especially the unsecured creditors who were devoid of it in previous 
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proceedings. With regards to this, Crown‘s preferential status was abolished314 and ring 
fence fund
315
 was established to allow more assets to be available to the unsecured 
creditors. The incentives of Crown were supposed to potentially benefit the unsecured 
creditors. Even after all these reforms
316
 we do not notice any increase in their recoveries 
(3.5% in administration). It still remains futile.  
 
Thus, on an average, UK procedures do not show a very high global recovery rate than 
France. This is in contrast to studies conducted by Doing Business Report, World Bank 
which put UK (9th percentile) a lot higher than France (42nd percentile). However, this 
study does not take into consideration all the creditors. It focuses more on secured 
creditor‘s recovery. Another reason for higher recovery in France could be attributed to 
the fact that French firms show higher coverage rates than UK firms. This signifies that 
French firms are more liquid at the commencement of bankruptcy and as such result in 
higher recoveries. This is surely due to proactive prevention policy of France.   
 
Although, liquidations do not yield good results for both the countries but the case is 
worse for UK. Liquidations are the most dominant procedures in both the countries 
(almost 90 percent of the firms liquidate every year). Thus, with such a low recovery rate 
it is a cause of concern. Here we would like to emphasize the fact that to the best of our 
knowledge no studies have been conducted on UK liquidation cases and their recovery 
rates. We are the sole team to have access to such type of information.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
314 
EA 2002,  s 251 (1) states that the Crown preference shall cease to exist. 
315
 The EA 2002,  s 252 introduces a new s 176A into the IA 1986 which fully stipulates the new creation of ring fence fund 
316
 We can comment on firms as 68 percent of the data sample comes between the years 2003-2005. If they position would have 
changed it would have reflected on our results as well. 
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Table 5.14: Recovery rate for creditors 
Frequencies & averages 
Compulsory 
liquidation 
Creditors 
Voluntary 
Liquidation 
Administration Receivership 
ANOVA 
Prob. > F 
Stat 
Nb. of observations 100 75 200 199   
Overall recovery rate (%)*** 8.6% 12.5% 20.1% 29.4% <.0001 
Recovery rate (%): secured*** 16.2% 27.7% 39.2% 44.7% 0.0052 
Recovery rate (%): preferential* 
(State before 2002; not including 
employees) 
17.1% 19.2% 42.2% 33.1% 0.0907 
Recovery rate (%): employees 40.0% 22.3% 52.3% 36.8% 0.1847 
Recovery rate (%): New Money n.s. 100.0% 99.5% 100.0% n.s 
Recovery rate (%): unsecured** 7.7% 4.7% 3.5% 1.5%       0.0114 
Coverage rate(%) 
(assets/debts)*** 
15.4% 20.8% 31.8% 35.7% <.0001 
 
Source: The Authors calculations (Companies house direct and reports from Insolvency service and 
Insolvency practitioners).The number of stars (from * to ***) refers to the significance of the ANOVA test 
(respectively 10%, 5%, 1% levels). 
 
  5.3.2.6. The Costs of the UK Bankruptcy Procedures 
 
Table 5.15 provides us with the direct bankruptcy costs and length of the procedures. 
Length of the procedure is often considered as the important criteria for calculating the 
bankruptcy costs. Thorburn (2000), Franks and Sussman (2005) and Bris et al (2006) find 
the length of the procedure to be directly proportional to the bankruptcy costs. As these 
generated costs consume lot of the bankruptcy estate and reduce creditor recovery in the 
process, it should be kept the minimum. We are able to compute the duration of each 
bankruptcy procedure in UK through the reports of Insolvency practitioners filed at the 
Companies House Direct, UK. Within our sample, we notice that receivership process 
(mean of 38 months) takes twice as long as the time taken for administration process 
(mean of 19 months). This is not surprising because Enterprise Act of 2002, restricted the 
administrations to one year statutory limit that can be extended either by the permission 
of the court or by the majority of creditors
317
, taking into consideration that bulk of our 
sample firms (68%) triggered bankruptcy after 2003. Receiverships on the other hand are 
often thought to result in speedy outcomes as they often take place in out of court 
                                                 
317
 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 76. 
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settings. However, we do not find them to be a speedy procedure. Citron et al (2004) find 
evidence that in a sample of 65 receiverships, 37% of them, took more than 3 years and 
only 3.1% were completed within one year. Armour et al. (2008) also find that 
receiverships consume twice as many days as compared to administration. Thus, these 
studies are coherent with the results obtained by us. Liquidations are often considered to 
be fast processes as nothing much needs to be done. Surprisingly, we noticed long 
durations for both kinds of liquidation procedures. This led us to believe that a lot of time 
is consumed in the legalities of the procedure. What else could explain such long 
durations? Interestingly, France seems to provide much more speedy results (3.1 months 
for liquidations and 11.2 for continuations).  
 
It is worthwhile to note that in France, the length of liquidation process excludes the time 
the court takes to liquidate the firm finally. Meaning it only includes the time when the 
firm enters bankruptcy and time at which the judge decides to liquidate it. It does not 
include the time when actual selling of assets takes place. As selling assets might also 
take additional period. But still difference is enormous between France and UK for 
liquidations.  
 
Formal procedures of bankruptcy involve direct (accruing out of the legal process for 
instance fees to lawyers, accountants, auditors and other professional fees) and indirect 
costs (arising out of foregone investment opportunities, lost sales, loss of 
competitiveness, all the costs arising out of suboptimal use of resources, asymmetric 
information, conflicts of interests and loss of management time) which eventually have to 
be borne by the already distressed company and thus can shrink the overall incentives of 
claimants. While direct costs are easy to be estimated by the records of Insolvency 
practitioners which contain abstracts of receipts and payments, it is often considered 
complex to estimate the indirect costs of a process. Many researchers have been able to 
successfully document the direct costs of the US insolvency procedure (Lawless and 
Ferris, 1997, Lawless and Ferris, 2000, Bris and et al 2006) for Sweden (Thorburn, 2000) 
and for UK (Franks and Sussman, 2000, Citron et al, 2004). As efficiency of the 
procedure is closely related to the costs involved in the procedure, we presume that a 
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good procedure should be cost effective. Armour et al (2008) found that administrations 
are more costly than receiverships. However, we found contrasting results. This can be 
due to the fact that our sample firms for receiverships offer more complexities. 
Bankruptcy costs are often calculated on the amount of time spent on the case or on the 
percentage of realized amount. Thus, we notice costs may often vary with size of the firm 
and complexity of the case. In our sample, receiverships are characterized by huge due 
amounts and complex liability structure which means it requires more time and more 
efforts by bankruptcy experts and thus leads to high overall costs in receiverships. 
Liquidations, no doubt, remain the cheapest process as they are mostly carried out by 
official receivers who are court appointed officials and have fixed fees. Here also we see 
a huge difference between France and UK‘s bankruptcy costs. The legal fees are rather 
moderate in France (less than 10 thousand Euros, which is very low relatively to the total 
due claims: between 760 and 1740 thousands of Euros on average). Thus the cost of the 
legal solution is quite low, which is coherent with the orientation of the French code that 
promotes an early triggering. However, in English system we do not see such preventive 
or early detection mechanisms.  
 
Table 5.15: Costs of the bankruptcy procedure 
Frequencies & averages 
Compulsory 
liquidation 
Creditors Voluntary 
Liquidation 
Administration Receivership 
ANOVA 
Prob. > 
F Stat 
Nb. of observations 100 75 200 199   
Length of the procedure (months)*** 
 
26.4 35.4 19.4 38.9 <.0001 
Direct bankruptcy costs (KE)*** 0.1 18.8 75.7 98.7 <.0001 
 
Source: The Authors calculations (Companies house direct and reports from Insolvency service and 
Insolvency practitioners).The number of stars (from * to ***) refers to the significance of the ANOVA test 
(respectively 10%, 5%, 1% levels). 
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  5.3.3. Multivariate Analysis 
 
In this section we analyse the determinants of choice for Receivership and 
Administration procedures against Liquidation (Table 5.16).  
 
Based on our expectations we try to relate the choices with a series of explanatory 
variables related to the amount due under various categories of claimants, coverage rate 
and estimated value of certain assets. In addition we add variables that explain 
characteristics of the firm (age, limited liability, and sector) and the variables related to 
causes of default. To control for economic conditions we add GDP growth as the control 
variable. While, most of the variables are quantitative in nature, those related to trade, 
manufacturing, limited liability and causes of default are binary variables (0 or 1). In 
total we have 475 bankrupt firms for multivariate analysis.  
 
The first choice explains the factors that increase or decrease a firm‘s chances of falling 
into receivership against liquidation. Firstly, we study the impact of the structure of 
claims on the choice between receivership and liquidation. Here we notice that the 
amount due for secured creditors positively impacts the chances of receiverships and is 
highly significant (1%).  This is not an unexpected result. Receivership is a unique 
procedure specific to UK only and was mainly aimed at the benefit of secured lenders 
(banks). The secured lender has the right to appoint receivers for out of court proceedings 
and does not need to consult the directors or any other creditors. Thus, a high amount due 
to secured creditors means that they have the right to appoint receivers whenever they 
wish to and no one can veto his/her appointment. We do not observe any impact of 
amount due to preferential creditors and employees. This reflects that in UK choice for 
bankruptcy procedure is not impacted by the employee and State dues but more by 
secured claims.   
 
Secondly, we study the impact of asset structure on the choice. On one hand we observe 
that estimated value of cash and receivables shows a significant negative impact on the 
chances of receivership, while on the other hand we notice that estimated value of total 
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assets have a significant positive impact on the chances of receivership. This could be 
explained by the results of our summary statistics, which demonstrated that certain types 
of assets were associated with certain types of procedures. Liquation was identified to 
have more current assets as compared to tangibles and intangibles where as receiverships 
was identified to huge proportion of tangibles and financial assets. We assume that 
current assets are the dominant source of recovery for unsecured creditors under 
Liquidation proceedings. Whereas for receiverships secured assets often form the basis 
for recover for secured creditors.  Thus, asset structure shows an impact on the choice 
between receivership and liquidation.  
 
The second choice explains the factors that increase or decrease the chances of 
administration against liquidation. Firstly, we study the impact of the structure of claims 
on the choice between liquidation and administration. We noticed that the amount due for 
preferential creditors has a negative impact on chances of administration. This means that 
the more is the amount due to preferential creditors, the lesser are the chances of 
administration. Here we would like to recall that administration is believed to be the 
reorganization procedure of UK, and its major objective is to save the company as going 
concern. If the company is not able to meet the needs of its employees and at the same 
time defaults on various state claims, it means that the company is in serious financial 
situation. Spending time on reorganizing such companies would prove detrimental to the 
economy and the feasible solution for such companies is to liquidate them as soon as 
possible. Next, we notice that the amount due for secured creditors increases the 
likelihood of administration.  This might seem a little contrasting to expectations as 
secured creditors are often interested in the amount due to them and for attaining it they 
quickly want to liquidate the firm and satisfy their dues. They are not bothered about 
saving the firm or the recovery of other claimants. The question to address here is: what 
motivates these creditors to apply for reorganization procedure that aims to provide a 
level playing field to all creditors? This could be explained by two facts: First, a secured 
lender in UK has limited powers to initiate certain insolvency procedures. Creditor 
voluntary liquidation can only be initiated by the directors and in case of compulsory 
liquidations there is hardly any secured creditor. Receivership is an abandoned procedure 
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while company voluntary arrangement can only be initiated by the directors. Thus, a 
secured lender is only left with administration as an option. Second, with the Enterprise 
Act of 2002, the accessibility of the administration procedure was increased by allowing 
out of court appointment of the administrator either by the court or the holders of floating 
charges (secured creditors) or the company and its directors. Interestingly, the holders of 
floating charge can appoint the administrator out of court without having to demonstrate 
that the company is unable to pay its debts. On the other hand, directors of the company 
need to demonstrate that the company is unable to pay its debts
318
 to materialize out of 
court appointment. This facilitated the initiation process. Previously, administrators could 
only be appointed on the order of court.  
 
Second we study the impact of asset structure on the choice between administration and 
liquidation procedures. We obtain similar results to the first choice of procedure. We 
observe that estimated value of cash and receivables shows a significant negative impact 
on the chances of administration, while on the other hand we notice that estimated value 
of total assets have a significant positive impact on the chances of administration. The 
reason could be similar to the one provided for receivership. Also it signifies more is the 
value of estimated total assets more are the chances for opting for receivership or 
administration. However, to recall, receivership is no more prevalent. As such, in absence 
of such a procedures secured creditors have only one formal procedure to resort to and 
that is Administration.  
 
Analyzing the control variables we observe that chances of administrations are negatively 
impacted if the cause of default is related to the internal management. The credibility of 
the management is an essential ingredient for proposing any survival plans for the 
debtors. If the debtors/directors/managers are found to be fraudulent or found guilty of 
tricky behavior then court/secured creditors have no intentions to save them as once the 
trust is broken chances of developing any further relations with such fraudulent debtors is 
permanently put out of question.   
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Table 5.16: Multivariate analysis for choice between bankruptcy procedures 
  Endogenous variable: bankruptcy's output (475 
bankrupt firms)   
Variable explained 
Output = Receivership 
(ref. liquidation) 
Output = 
Administration 
(ref. liquidation) 
  Estimation 
Prob. > 
c² 
Estimation 
Prob. > 
c² 
Intercept 
7.29 0.981 11.57 0.97 
Coverage rate (Assets/liabilities) 
-0.3841 0.5711 0.0154 0.9784 
Weight of amount due to preferential 
creditors 
0.0134 0.9982 -23.09*** <.0001 
Weight of amount due to secured creditors 
8.443*** <.0001 5.989*** <.0001 
Weight of amount due to employees 
-1.6246 0.683 -1.8398 0.58 
Weight of inventory in estimated assets 
1.044 0.3759 1.4488 0.1914 
Weight of receivables in estimated assets 
-1.2969** 0.03 -1.3292** 0.02 
Weight of cash in estimated assets 
-2.302** 0.049 -1.389* 0.092 
Weight of total estimated assets 
0.0006*** <.0001 -0.0060*** <.0001 
Age of the firm 
-0.0011 0.3705 -0.0012 0.3307 
GDP growth 
-97.19** 0.015 -191.7*** <.0001 
Sector: trade 
-0.0821 0.8976 -0.5745 0.3347 
Sector: manufacturing 
0.2618 0.5799 -0.2327 0.6015 
Limited liability 
-6.996 0.9819 -6.9158 0.982 
Reason for default: strategy 
0.0792 0.7522 0.1641 0.5045 
Reason for default: production 
-0.0644 0.7914 0.2193 0.3507 
Reason for default: finance 
0.1457 0.6035 0.4366 0.0935 
Reason for default: management 
-0.457 0.141 -0.572** 0.049 
Reason for default: accident 
-0.4574*** 0.059 -0.2786 0.2275 
Reason for default: outlets 
 
Reason for default: Macro 
0.144 
 
0.2275 
0.56 
 
0.301 
-1.214 
 
0.2447 
0.5896 
 
0.563 
The model is: 
Multinomial LOGIT regression 
 Test                   Khi 2    Pr > Khi 2   
 Likelihood Ratio   433.03 <.0001   
 Score              319.87 <.0001   
 Wald               169.68 <.0001   
 Condition Index (Belsley et al. 
(1980)) 34 
  
 
 
 
Source: The Authors calculations  
The number of stars (from * to ***) refers to the significance of the ANOVA test (respectively 10%, 5%, 
1% levels). 
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  5.3.4. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, using the data collected from Parisian courts, we built a comprehensive 
sample of 264 small and medium sized enterprises. The resulting dataset provided 
summary statistics on several important variables (characteristics of firms, asset 
structure, due amount structure and recovery rates for different classes of creditors, 
length and costs of the procedure).  Based on this, we conducted multivariate analysis to 
test the determinants for the choice between liquidation and continuation. This test holds 
significance as France is identified by a bankruptcy law system which favours 
continuations over liquidations. Using the similar approach, we also built a 
comprehensive sample of 574 small and medium sized firms of UK. We perform 
univariate analysis on important variables (characteristics of firms, asset structure, due 
amount structure and recovery rates for different classes of creditors, length and costs of 
the procedure) and also conduct multivariate analysis to test the choice for different 
bankruptcy procedures (administrations and receiverships against liquidation). 
 
Our results conclude that legal orientation does play an important part in determining the 
choice for different bankruptcy procedures. The effect of this legal context on the 
recovery rate will be further explored in detail in the last chapter of the thesis, where we 
test the effect of legal orientation on the ex-post efficiency of the system (recovery rates).  
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Appendixes 
 
B1. The French and the UK templates (data collection from Tribunal de commerce de Paris and 
Companies House) 
 
Template identificator [AUTOMATIC: do not fill!]
When saving the template, name it with this ident.
UK001
Filling person (student) UK002
Filling date UK003
Filling location UK004
Comments / file's history: UK005
Name of the firm UK006
Immatriculation number UK007
Sector UK008
Legal form UK009
Geographical location UK010
Creation date UK011
Nb. of firms belonging to the same group
 (put 0 if not : i.e. when there is no holding)
UK012
Immatriculation name (Holding) UK013
Immatriculation number (Holding) UK014
Sector (Holding) UK015
Legal form (Holding) UK016
Geographical localisation (Holding) UK017
Manager's age (YY)
Manager has been in place for... (YY) UK018
Board of directors: Nb of administrators 
(minimum: 0)
UK019
2. Firm Identification
1. Template Information
__
 
3a. Qualitative information
Cause of financial distress n°1 UK020
Cause of financial distress n°2 UK021
Cause of financial distress n°3 UK022
Cause of financial distress n°4 UK023
Cause of financial distress n°5 UK024
Cause of financial distress n°6 UK025
Measures:
Measure the firm engaged before distress  n°1 UK026
Measure the firm engaged before distress  n°2 UK027
Measure the firm engaged before distress  n°3 UK028
Measure the firm engaged before distress  n°4 UK029
Measure the firm engaged before distress  n°5 UK030
Measure the firm engaged before distress  n°6 UK031
Has the default been delayed? (y/n/unfilled)
(based upon legal sanctions, for instance)
UK032
Codification
Codification Literal description
Literal description
3. Process of the Financial Distress
Yes No  
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Assets (account. book values)
Accounts Date UK033 UK043 UK053
Intangible fixed assets UK034 UK044 UK054
Tangible fixed assets UK035 UK045 UK055
Long term financial assets UK036 UK046 UK056
Operating assets: stocks UK037 UK047 UK057
Operating assets: clients UK038 UK048 UK058
Short term financial assets UK039 UK049 UK059
Cash UK040 UK050 UK060
Other assets UK041 UK051 UK061
Total [AUTOMATIC] UK042 UK052 UK062
Financial debt structure (book values)
Equity (shares + net Income + retained earnings) UK063 UK069 UK075
Long term financial debts UK064 UK070 UK076
Short term operating debts (accounts payable) UK065 UK071 UK077
Short term financial debts (banks: due cash) UK066 UK072 UK078
Other debts (ibcl. fiscal & soc.) UK067 UK073 UK079
Total [AUTOMATIC] UK068 UK074 UK080
Employement & Income (account. values)
Number of employees UK081 UK089 UK097
Turnover UK082 UK090 UK098
Operating income UK083 UK091 UK099
Financial income UK084 UK092 UK100
Exceptional income UK085 UK093 UK101
Other charges  (Taxes on benefits…)
UK086 UK094 UK102
Other products
UK087 UK095 UK103
Net income (please, fill it MANUALLY) UK088 UK096 UK104
Last info. -2 Before default
value 1000x£
3b. Financial & Quantitative Information
Last info. -1 Before default
value 1000x£
Last info. Before default
value 1000x£
Last info. -1 Before default
value 1000x£
Last info. -2 Before default
value 1000x£
Last info. -2 Before default
value 1000x£
Last info. -1 Before default
value 1000x£
Last info. Before default
value 1000x£
Last info. Before default
value 1000x£
 
 
4a. Insolvency procedure(s)
This procedure: type UK105 UK110
Date of triggering UK106 UK111
Origin of this procedure: type UK107 UK112
Origin of this proc: put "template ident." [IF ANY]
Here, do not fill if this is a first procedure
UK108
Who trigerred the procedure? UK109
4b. Financial and quantitative information
I) Assets (at default time):
REAL market values
Intangible fixed assets UK113
Tangible fixed assets UK114
Long term financial assets UK115
Operating assets: inventory UK116
Operating assets: accounts receivable UK117 UK123 UK124
Short term financial assets (except cash: securities) UK118
Cash UK119
Other assets UK120
Total [AUTOMATIC] UK121
Realizable total (i.e. total assets that can be sold
in the very short term)
UK122
4. Insolvency Procedure
Please, in case the procedure leads to another procedure, open a new template
Total
value (1000x£)
This procedure
Nb. Of
items
Mean
value (1000x£)
The new proc: put "template identificator" [IF ANY]
Here, do not fill if there is no new procedure
#DIV/0!
The outcome OR new procedure: type
Date of the decision OR new proc.triggering
Final outcome of the procedure
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II) Financial structure by LEGAL PRIORITY
 (measure of deviations from APO)
Remark:  group claims of same rank together
Creditor's
type
Collateral's
type
Number of claims
Due
value (1000x£)
Future due
value (1000x£)
Total value 
(1000x£) [AUTO]
Recovered val. 
(1000x£)
Future recov.
value (1000x£)
Total value 
(1000x£) [AUTO]
Group of similar creditors n°1
Group of similar creditors n°2
Group of similar creditors n°3
Group of similar creditors n°4
Group of similar creditors n°5
Group of similar creditors n°6
Group of similar creditors n°7
Group of similar creditors n°8
Group of similar creditors n°9
Group of similar creditors n°10
Total [AUTOMATIC]
Recovered amounts  (cf. issue below)Due and future due amountsGeneral information
UK156
UK157
UK158
UK159
UK160
UK161
UK169
UK170
UK171
UK172
UK178
UK179
UK180
UK181
UK182
UK183
UK189
UK190
UK191
UK192
UK193
UK194
UK201
UK202
UK203
UK204
UK205
UK211
UK212
UK213
UK214
UK215
UK216
UK155 UK166 UK177 UK188 UK199 UK210 UK221
UK167
UK168
UK145
UK146
UK147
UK148
UK129 UK149
UK150
UK151
UK152
UK153
UK154
UK140
UK141
UK142
UK143
UK144UK134
UK133
UK132
UK131
UK130
UK128
UK127
UK126
UK125 UK135
UK136
UK137
UK138
UK139
UK162
UK163
UK164
UK165
UK173
UK174
UK175
UK176
UK184
UK185
UK186
UK187
UK195
UK196
UK197
UK198 UK209
UK208
UK207
UK206 UK217
UK218
UK219
UK220
UK200
 
 
4c. What happens during the bankruptcy process?
Measures:
Measure undertaken during the procedure n°1 UK222
Measure undertaken during the procedure n°2 UK223
Measure undertaken during the procedure n°3 UK224
Measure undertaken during the procedure n°4 UK225
Measure undertaken during the procedure n°5 UK226
Measure undertaken during the procedure n°6 UK227
Legal representative n°1 UK228
Legal representative n°2 UK229
Legal representative n°3 UK230
4d. Bankruptcy costs
Direct bankruptcy costs (total legal fees, 1000x£) UK240
Lengh of the bankruptcy process (MM) UK250
Codification Literal description
 
4e. Alternative possible issues : ("liquidation" and "sale as a going concern" can be mixed together)
FINAL DECISION / OUTCOME
[AUTOMATIC]: must be equal to 'Final Outcome of the 
Procedure' (see above, point 4a)
UK251
I) Liquidation
IMPORTANT : estimated values MUST always be 
filled (realized value are filled if and only if 
liquidation is finally decided)
Intangible fixed assets UK252 UK261
Tangible fixed assets UK253 UK262
Long term financial assets UK254 UK263
Operating assets: inventory UK255 UK264
Operating assets: accounts receivable UK256 UK265
Short term financial assets (except cash: securities) UK257 UK266
Cash UK258 UK267
Other assets UK259 UK268
Total [AUTOMATIC] UK260 UK269
Estimated
value (1000x£)
[AUTOMATIC]
Realized value (1000x£): at least, 
'Total' must be filled (when detailled 
values are not here)
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II) If sale of the firm "as a going concern"
This section should only be filled if there are 
offer(s)
 - Proposed value (1000x£) UK270
 - Motivation of the buyout: code n°1 UK271
 - Motivation of the buyout: code n°2 UK272
 - Motivation of the buyout: code n°3 UK273
 - Does the buyout preserves employment? (y/n) UK274
 - Is the buyout price relatively high? (y/n) UK275
 - Is the buyer financially strong? (y/n) UK276
 - Does the buyer have a long experience? (y/n) UK277
 - Does the buyer have a good reputation? (y/n) UK278
 - Are the synergies attached to the buyout? (y/n) UK279
III) Continuation-reorganization of the firm
IMPORTANT: foreseen values sould always be 
filled 
Nb. of years of the reorganization plan (YY) UK280
Nb. of years before the firm recovers profitability (YY) UK281
Forecasts (should be filled, even if continuation
is not finally decided):
Year (19XX / 20XX) UK282 UK286 UK290
Turnover (foreseen value, 1000x£) UK283 UK287 UK291
Operating income (foreseen value, 1000x£) UK284 UK288 UK292
Net income (foreseen value, 1000x£) UK285 UK289 UK293
The buyer
(if any)
Middle time
(of the forecast period)
Ending time
(of the forecast period)
Beginning time
(of the forecast period)
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
Yes No
 
4f. The decision process (non applicable to bankrupt firms in France)
Is there a vote? (y/n) UK294
4g. Legal sanctions to managers
(ALL countries)
Amount of pecuniary legal sanctions (1000x£)
(if available)
UK295
Non pecuniary legal sanctions ? (y/n) UK296
Type of faulty behaviour:
Management fault n°1 UK297
Management fault n°2 UK298
Management fault n°3 UK299
Literal descriptionCodification
Yes No
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B2. The codifications of the causes of default (France and UK) 
 
Outlets
[1] Brutal disappearance of the customers; [2] Customer(s) in default; [3] Product(s) too 
expensive (selling price is too high); [4] Bad evaluation of the market; [5] Product(s) too 
cheap (selling price is too low); [6] Unsuitable products; [7] Obsolete products; [8] Loss of 
market shares (regular fall of the firm's demand).
Strategy
[1] Youth of the company (inexperience); [2] Voluntary dissolution of the activity;[3] Failure 
of important projects (partnerships, investments, reorganizations);[4] Voluntary 
acceptance of less profitable markets (dumping...).
Production
[1] Production capacity was too strong, overinvestment; [2] Depreciation of assets(active 
persons); [3] Operating costs were too high (other than wages: external expenses, raw 
materials...); [4] Wages expenses were too high; [5] Brutal disapearance of suppliers; [6] 
Unsuitable process of production (obsolete); [7] Under-investment.
Finance
[1] Longer delays on accounts receivable; [2] Dominos effect / reported losses from 
subsidiaries; [3] Shorter delays on accounts payable; [4] Speculation of the company, 
problems due to exchange rates fluctuation; [5] Stop of the financial support from the 
head office / holding; [6] Lack of equity (compared to leverage/liabilities); [7] Loan refusal 
to the company; [8] Stop/reduction of previous State financial subventions to the firm; [9] 
Contractual interest rates are too high.
Management
[1] Weak accounts reporting / informational system is deficient; [2] Problems of 
competence; [3] Disagreements among the directors / managers; [4] Excessive risk 
takings from the managers; [5] Insufficient provisions; [6] Lack of knowledge on the real 
level of costs of returns (causing too weak selling); [7] Bad evaluation of inventory; [8] 
Problems of transmission of the company / difficulties in restructuring.
Accident
[1] Swindle / embezzlements affecting the company (whatever its origin); [2] Another 
insolvency procedure (for other companies) is extended to the firm (same patrimonies); [3] 
Disputes with public partners (fiscal inquiry); [4] Disputes with private partners; [5] Death / 
disease / disappearance of the manager; [6] Disaster; [7] Social problems within the 
company.
External
environment
[1] Unfavorable fluctuation of the exchange rates; [2] Increase of the competition; [3] 
Decreasing demand to the sector; [4] “Force majeure” (war, natural catastrophe, industrial 
crisis, politics, bad price evolution); [5] Public policy less favorable to the sector; [6] Period 
of credit crunch; [7] The general level of interest rates is too high; [8] Macroeconomic 
increase of operating costs (raw materials, GMW…).
Origin of the default
(codifications)
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B3. Structure comparison between Paris (sample) and France (population) 
 
1994 2005 1994 2005
Limited responsibility 78.2 84.4 60.8 68.0
Other legal forms 21.8 15.7 39.3 32.0
Commerce 27.3 25.6 28.9 27.0
Industry
(1) 31.9 34.0 33.7 35.2
Services
(1) 40.9 40.4 37.4 37.8
Continuations (reorganizations and sales) 7.1 5.6 7.0
(2) 11.0
Liquidations (immediate or not) 92.9 94.5 93.0
(2) 89.0
Paris France
Corporate bankruptcies
 
Sources: France: INSEE; Paris: Paris Commercial Court. 
(1) Agriculture, and financial services excluded. 
(2) For year 1995: see J. Domens, "Les défaillances d'entreprises entre 1993et 2004", coll°. 
« PME/TPE en bref »  n°23 (May 2007), Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Emploi. 
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CHAPTER 6: BUILDING LEGAL INDEXES TO EXPLAIN RECOVERY RATES: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE FRENCH   AND UK BANKRUPTCY CODES 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Since the end of the 90‘s, a widespread literature in law and finance has been investigating how 
the legal context might impact the behaviors of stakeholders and their decisions and finally on 
their outcomes. In their seminal work, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) have notably suggested that 
the origin of the legal systems (Common Law vs. Civil Law), and the resulting differences in 
protection of the stakeholders‘ rights, are likely to influence the development of financial 
markets and the economic growth. So far, the laws that have been investigated by this literature 
are numerous: mainly credit law, corporate law, commercial law, banking law, financial markets 
law, and corporate bankruptcy law. The latter is of prime importance as bankruptcy codes help in 
solving the governance conflicts emerging between the companies‘ shareholders and their 
creditors after the occurrence of default. Indeed, governance conflicts arise from default as the 
previous financial commitments have not been fulfilled and creditors cannot receive their 
contractual payments. In that context, bankruptcy procedures should be able to preserve as much 
value as possible in order to increase the creditors‘ expected recoveries. This issue deals with ex-
post efficiency and was pointed out by Bebchuck (1988), White (1989), Longhofer (1998), and 
more recently, by Blazy and Chopard (2004), Fisher and Martel (2009). 
 
Bankruptcy procedures are ex-post efficient if they promote the reallocation of the debtor‘s 
assets towards the most efficient alternative projects (that is those maximizing the market value 
of the firm). A narrower perspective restricts this reallocation issue to a simpler alternative: 
should the bankrupt firm be liquidated or continued? As concluded by White (1989), bankruptcy 
procedures are considered to be ex-post efficient, if they favour the outcome (liquidation or 
continuation) that maximizes the value of the firm which is defined as the sum of all 
stakeholders‘ claims. Precisely, a firm should be liquidated as soon as the discounted value of its 
present and future expected outcomes exceeds under liquidation, when compared to 
continuation. Empirically, the measure of such trade-off is obviously difficult to compute, as it 
requires comparison between the rival values which can hardly be ascertained for same debtor. 
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Consequently, most researchers have suggested recovery rates as a proxy for a measure of each 
observed outcome. (Armour, Hsu, and Walters (2006), Davydenko and Franks (2007)). 
 
These studies focusing on the recoveries under bankruptcy are useful in drawing a ranking 
between countries based on their abilities to design ex post efficient bankruptcy procedures 
thereby creating value for the creditors. Two recent works have followed this path. Using 
banking data, Davydenko and Franks (2008) find that recovery rates for banks are significantly 
lower in France than those observed in Germany and in the UK. As a consequence, an observed 
outcome is that French banks ask for more collateral when they provide credit. In addition, they 
may rely on special collateral forms which minimize the risk of dilution during the court-
administered bankruptcy process. More recently, Blazy, Petey and Weill (2010) find that this 
ranking is reversed when encompassing all the classes of claimants: Germany and France both 
outrank the UK which shows the lowest average overall recovery rate (13.8%) as against 20.7% 
for France and 21.5% for Germany. According to the authors, three elements can explain the 
differences in recoveries amongst the countries: the quality of assets at the early stage of 
bankruptcy, the structure of claims by seniority levels, and the intrinsic qualities of national 
bankruptcy codes. 
 
Despite their valuable contribution, these works do not offer a satisfactory explanation of the 
legal mechanisms that play a role in explaining the differences in creditors‘ recoveries. The fact 
to be taken into consideration is that, without the use of legal indexes accounting for such 
characteristics, the researchers could only observe differences between various legal 
environments of bankruptcy but they fail to comprehend the legal characteristics that may impact 
creditor recoveries. In other words, these studies could answer the following question: ―are 
recoveries higher/lower due to the design of its bankruptcy law or to external factors?‖. But they 
fail to address the following ones: ―what are the characteristics of bankruptcy procedures that 
create more recoveries?‖, ―are these characteristics linked to the production of information 
taking place under bankruptcy or to the protection conferred to assets after the triggering  or to 
the coordination mechanisms that are implemented to make a collective choice?‖, etc.. The 
objective of our paper is to directly answer these questions by taking into consideration two 
countries that are good representatives of the two main legal systems prevailing in Europe: 
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France (civil law country) and United Kingdom (common law country). We first propose a set of 
original legal indexes highlighting ten major dimensions of corporate bankruptcy law. In a 
second step, we use these indexes to explain the recovery rates coming from a database gathering 
833 bankruptcy files in France and in UK. 
 
This article is organized as follows. Section 6.2 describes the methodology we use to build legal 
indexes on corporate bankruptcy law. Section 6.3 presents the French and UK bankruptcy codes. 
Section 6.4 uses our legal indexes to compare both legislations. Section 6.5 presents our dataset 
on recoveries in France and in UK. Section 6.6 discusses the results of regression models using 
legal indexes to explain the total recovery rate in both countries. The last section concludes. 
 
6.2. Building Legal Indexes on Corporate Bankruptcy Law 
 
We begin by addressing a set of questions. How can the differences between various bankruptcy 
laws be ascertained? How can the most important legal features be identified, when focusing on 
a particular legislation? Both questions are related to the way bankruptcy law should be designed 
for managing financial distress. Answering them requires the use of several complementary 
approaches. Monographs in comparative law (Ringe, Gullifer, and Théry (2009)) are helpful to 
provide a detailed view of the content of the national bankruptcy procedures (Franks and Torous 
(1996), White (1996)). Yet, the qualitative nature of such works makes quite difficult, a 
systematic and direct comparison of the bankruptcy procedures across countries. To draw a 
parallel comparison of different legal systems, one has to consider the use of legal indexes, and 
thus to follow the avenue opened by La porta et al. (1997, 1998). Following their work, 
numerous institutions have been engaged in the production of legal indexes (World Bank, World 
Economic Forum, INSEE, French ministère de l’économie, rating agencies…). These indexes are 
useful from a Law and Economics perspective as they systematize the comparison of 
heterogeneous legal environments, making them comparable. 
 
However, some authors (du Marais et al. (2006), Menard and du Marais (2008), Haravon (2009)) 
have tackled the reliability of such indexes, especially those published in the annual Doing 
Business reports (World Bank (2009)). According to their views, the reliance on legal indexes 
suffers from two major drawbacks. 
252 
 
 
The first issue is related to the fallacious ease of use of rankings: as pointed out by Kerhuel and 
Fauvarque-Cosson (2009) ―The complexity of the traditional comparative method contrasts 
starkly with the almost disconcerting simplicity of the mathematical criteria driving an economic 
analysis. (…) Under these conditions, there could be a strong temptation to substitute the 
economic analysis of law for the more traditional comparative approach.‖. Following Kerhuel 
and Fauvarque-Cosson (2009), we consider that both approaches should be considered as 
complements rather than substitutes. Indeed, the approach based on legal indexes cannot ignore 
the traditional comparative methods: building quantitative tools, such as indexes, requires relying 
first on some qualitative perspective that only comparative works can provide. The latter 
approach is by nature, more informative, complete, and balanced than the use of pure 
quantitative tools. Yet, such qualitative comparative works are insufficient to draw a complete 
view of numerous legal systems. 
 
The second issue is related to the methodology that is used to build legal indexes on corporate 
bankruptcy systems. To illustrate this, let us consider the indicators of LLSV (1998) on corporate 
bankruptcy. The authors build four indexes: (1) ―restrictions for going into reorganization‖319, 
(2) ―no automatic stay on secured assets‖320, (3) ―secured creditors first‖321, (4) ―management 
does not stay‖322. The aggregation of these indexes leads to a composite index (ranked between 0 
and 4) named ―creditor rights‖. These indicators help in comparing a huge rank of countries as 
they provide a common basis for comparison. Yet, they suffer from several weaknesses. First, 
usage of four indicators is clearly insufficient to draw a complete map of corporate bankruptcy 
law. Staying at a too general level of analysis may lead to spurious interpretations. In France for 
instance, the rank of secured creditors in the absolute priority order varies with the outcome 
(liquidation or reorganization). Second, it would be misleading to stay at the country level when 
we know that several bankruptcy procedures can prevail within the same country. In UK for 
instance, four insolvency procedures prevail (administration, receivership, compulsory 
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 Equals 1 if the reorganization procedures impose restrictions (for instance, creditors consent). 
320
 Equals 1 if the reorganization procedure does not impose an automatic stay of claims on the debtor‘s assets. 
321
 Equals 1 if the secured creditors are ranked first in the absolute priority order (in case of piecemeal liquidation). 
322
 Equals 1 if an official is appointed to manage the bankrupt company during reorganization. 
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liquidation, and creditor voluntary liquidation
323
), each of them being characterized by different 
features. Third, the aggregation of different binary indexes, even if mathematically feasible, is 
logically unacceptable as it sums heterogeneous indicators. 
 
In this chapter, we try to augment previous studies which were conducted in the fields of Law 
and Economics on the topic of the design of corporate bankruptcy law. It is important to stress 
that our objective is to account for the content of the law and not on the manner in which it is 
enforced. Most of the previous studies computing legal indexes implicitly relied on the same 
assumption as they adopted the similar approach. Yet, as we are comparing two developed 
countries belonging to the same area (Europe), we can consider that some similarities might 
prevail regarding their economic, financial, and legal practices, even if the behaviours might vary 
across civil law and common law systems. 
 
We propose here original indexes accounting for corporate bankruptcy law. These results come 
from legal templates that were sent to 13 national experts of corporate bankruptcy law, being 
either academics or practitioners in their respective country (three academics and four 
bankruptcy practitioners in France, two academics and four bankruptcy practitioners in UK). 
They were involved (1) in the production of the legal indexes (by filling/checking the templates), 
and/or (2) in the analysis of the bankruptcy files. Additional students were involved in the data 
collection process. The experts who were in charge of the filling of our legal templates were 
required to answer a set of ―yes-no‖ questions regarding the content of corporate bankruptcy law, 
for each procedure. The double checking process was made anonymously. The whole process 
took place between March 2006 and November 2010. It was financed and supervised by Fonds 
National de la Recherche (Luxembourg) and OSEO (France). 
 
Our approach aims at ameliorating some of the methodological issues mentioned previously. 
Namely, these improvements deal with (1) the country-level analysis, (2) the number of indexes, 
and (3) the aggregation of heterogeneous binary indexes. 
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 The receivership does not prevail anymore: the UK Enterprise Act 2002 put an end to the secured creditor‘s right to appoint a receiver. 
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Firstly, we build one set of indexes per bankruptcy procedure. We thus account for the fact that 
several procedures might prevail in the same country. In UK, we consider four procedures: 
(1) administration, (2) receivership, (3) compulsory liquidation, and (4) creditor voluntary 
liquidation. In France, we split our sample between (1) liquidation procedure (―liquidation 
judiciaire‖), and (2) reorganization procedure (―redressement judiciaire‖). We thus obtain a set 
of indexes, each of them being built on six procedures. This shift from a country-level analysis 
towards a procedure-level analysis has two advantages. First, we account for the specificities of 
procedures whose purposes (and resulting design) might differ. Second, we acknowledge that a 
ranking of countries is less informative than a comparative analysis of procedures that various 
stakeholders can use in their country. Indeed, in UK, the choice between receivership and 
administration is strategic and depends on the owned collateral. 
 
Secondly, we make our analysis sharper by drastically increasing the number of indexes. We 
consider a set of 158 binary questions, each of them being equal to one or zero. Adding precision 
has obvious advantages. First, it helps in considering several classes of claimants (and not only 
the secured ones). Indeed, depending on their respective rights, the various creditors are not 
equally protected under bankruptcy. We isolate here five classes of creditors: (1) the employees, 
(2) the State, (3) the fixed secured creditors
324
, (4) the floating secured creditors
325
, and (5) the 
unsecured creditors. Second, using more indexes helps in capturing the complexity of the 
bankruptcy procedures that are, by nature, multidimensional. One can consider bankruptcy law 
as a set of state-dependant tools aiming at the resolution of governance conflicts after default. 
Describing such tools requires the use of numerous indicators. However, adding more indexes 
mechanically increase their heterogeneity and challenges the question of aggregation. This is the 
third methodological issue we address in this chapter. 
 
Thirdly, our approach aims at reducing the heterogeneity of the legal indexes that are aggregated 
for the computation of composite indexes. In our view, considering bankruptcy law as a 
homogenous corpus of legal rules is unsatisfactory, and aggregating these rules altogether to 
obtain an average rank is even more misleading. Here, one needs a thorough analysis of 
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 i.e. the creditors having collateral(s) on a specific asset of the debtor (fixed charge). 
325
 i.e. the creditors having collateral(s) on the total assets of the debtor (floating charge). 
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bankruptcy procedures to identify several major functional features of the bankruptcy codes. 
Precisely, we propose to define a finite set of dimensions attached to corporate bankruptcy law so 
that each one can be considered as a linear combination of binary and individual indexes. Thus, 
their aggregation is acceptable provided it is performed within each identified dimension. Now 
the question is: how can these dimensions, be identified? The economic literature on corporate 
bankruptcy provides several arguments that help in answering this question. We now present 
these arguments that will help us in defining 10 major dimensions of bankruptcy laws, namely: 
(1) accessibility of the procedure, (2) exclusivity of the procedure, (3) cost of the procedure, 
(4) production of public information, (5) protection of the debtors‘ assets, (6) protection of the 
creditors (employees, State, secured creditors
326
, and unsecured creditors), (7) coordination of 
the claims, (8) collective decision tools, (9) sanction of faulty managers, (10) orientation 
favouring liquidation (10a) against reorganization (10b). These dimensions are related to the 
process of resolving default. Indeed, the debtor and its creditors can resolve default by choosing 
between two alternatives: either by exploring informal solutions (private agreement), or by 
delegating this work to a judge (formal bankruptcy). Several arguments and counterarguments 
have been proposed to describe the advantages and the disadvantages of both ways of resolving 
default. On one hand, informal agreements are relatively fast, cheap and preserve confidentiality 
while, on the other hand, formal bankruptcy procedures can solve coordination issues, disclose 
public information, and preserve the debtor‘s value. 
 
In the following sections, we detail the 10 dimensions mentioned above. Each of them is related 
to the role of the Law as an alternative way of resolving financial distress, when compared to 
private workouts. 
 
6.2.1. Accessibility and Exclusivity of the Procedure (dimensions 1 and 2) 
Default stems from the debtor‘s inability to respect the current charges deriving from previous 
commitments. Yet, default does not lead always to bankruptcy. To be initiated, a procedure 
needs the conjunction of two distinct conditions: first, the stakeholders having the power to 
trigger the procedure must wish to do it. Second, the debtor must be in financial (and/or 
                                                 
326
 Owning either fixed or floating collaterals. 
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economic) situation that justifies the opening of a legal procedure. In other terms, a bankruptcy 
procedure is ―accessible‖ to the various stakeholders, provided (1) the legal solution is opened to 
them (and desired by them), and (2) the required criteria to trigger bankruptcy are met. 
 
The optimal
327
 situation is in between two polar cases. On the one side, the procedure should not 
be triggered too easily and/or too early so that the stakeholders cannot use the bankruptcy 
environment in their sole interests. From that perspective, such strategic use of bankruptcy is all 
the more likely to happen when the procedure is too much accessible (Delanney (1999)). On the 
other side, the triggering criteria should not be too restrictive, so that a wide set of stakeholders 
can turn to bankruptcy as a credible alternative to private attempts of renegotiation. In addition, 
inaccessibility of the procedures reduces the chances of bankruptcy being triggered at a time 
when opportunities of recovery are still present. Thus, an efficient bankruptcy procedure should 
be accessible up to a certain level, so that it can be triggered by those stakeholders having good 
incentives to turn to the legal solution (Taube (1984)), and at a time when the maximization of 
the value of assets is still feasible (White, (1989)). 
 
To account for the ―accessibility‖ of the procedure, we use 20 binary indexes (yes/no questions) 
related to (1) the triggering criteria related to the value of assets, (2) the types of difficulties that 
justify the opening of a procedure, (3) the stakeholders who are allowed to trigger the procedure, 
and (4) the creditors‘ opposition rights to the triggering. Appendix C1 lists all these indexes for 
the six encompassed procedures (administration, receivership, compulsory liquidation, creditor 
voluntary liquidation, French ―liquidation judiciaire‖, and French ―redressement judiciaire‖). 
Each binary index equals 1 (respectively 0) whenever the answer to the question is ―yes‖ 
(respectively ―no‖). Precisely, the ―yes/no‖ questions are labelled so that the binary indexes take 
a strict positive value provided the answer reflects an increase in accessibility. For instance, 
when answering ―yes‖ to the sentence ―unsecured creditor(s) can trigger the procedure‖ means 
that the considered procedure is more accessible regarding this criterion. As these 20 questions 
account for the same dimension (i.e. accessibility), we consider them to be homogenous and 
aggregate
328
 them to obtain an overall composite index reflecting such dimension. This 
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 i.e. maximizing the expected value of the debtors‘ assets. 
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 The aggregation is not weighted. Thus all the questions are considered to be equivalently important. 
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composite index, named ―ACCESSIBILITY‖, is initially bounded between 0 and 20, and 
rescaled into a percentage. 
 
Most of the papers on corporate default consider two main ways of resolving financial distress: 
private renegotiation and formal bankruptcy (Gilson, John, and Lang (1990), Jensen (1989) 
(1991)). Yet, once bankruptcy is triggered (i.e. when renegotiation has failed), the most common 
assumption is that the involved stakeholders cannot abort the procedure and resort to other ways 
of resolving bankruptcy. For instance, Franks and Nyborg (1996) model the UK bankruptcy 
procedure as a game with no solution of exit and/or change of procedure. Such approach 
contrasts with the observed legal practices, as several countries propose a menu of bankruptcy 
procedures (four in UK
329
, two in France
330
) with – sometimes – the ability for the stakeholders 
to abort them, either by turning back to renegotiation or by switching to another procedure. 
Under the UK receivership, for instance, the appointing floating charge holder is given the ability 
to abort the procedure. We thus consider a procedure to be exclusive if it cannot be aborted easily 
so that it remains the sole way of resolving bankruptcy. To account for ―exclusivity‖ of our six 
procedures, we consider three binary variables (see Appendix C1) that equal one if the 
stakeholders cannot abort the ongoing procedure to switch to another (private or legal) 
alternative. The sum of these three indexes leads to the composite index ―EXCLUSIVITY‖ (in 
percentage). 
 
6.2.2. Bankruptcy Costs and Information Disclosure (dimensions 3 and 4) 
The arbitration between private agreement and formal bankruptcy is related to the Coasian 
approach of litigation. Haugen and Senbet (1978) (1988) studied the various ways to resolve 
default efficiently in a market solution so that the litigation costs accruing from the legal solution 
can be avoided. Consequently, the creditors should always turn the solution which increases their 
recoveries at the lowest cost (Gilson (1997), Wruck (1990)). Yet, such approach relies on the 
assumption that the legal solution is always more costly than the private one. Indeed, formal 
procedures involve direct (accruing out of the legal process for instance legal fees) and indirect 
                                                 
329
 Administration, receivership, creditors voluntary liquidation, and compulsory liquidation. 
330
 Two bankruptcy procedures prevail under the 1994 French legislation ―redressement judiciaire‖ and ―liquidation judiciaire‖). Since 2005, 
two additional procedures have been introduced: ―conciliation‖ and ―sauvegarde‖. 
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costs (arising out of foregone investment opportunities, loss of sales) which eventually have to 
be borne by the already distressed company and thus can shrink the overall recoveries. Some 
recent works (Lubben (2010)) questioned such assumptions, mainly for three reasons: first, the 
empirical measure of the costs incurred to resolve default is a challenging task
331
, as private 
agreements are not always cheaper than formal bankruptcies. Second, it is wrong to consider the 
payment of bankruptcy costs to be a pure loss of money. On the contrary, the legal fees charged 
under bankruptcy are often related to audit procedures and verification of claims that produce 
information for the various stakeholders
332. As observed by Webb (1987), ―bankruptcy costs are 
essentially verification costs‖ (p.286). Third, one can consider that the costs which are attached 
to a particular bankruptcy procedure mainly reflect the complexity and the sophistication of the 
solution that is offered by the law to reach an efficient solution. 
 
The question of how big the bankruptcy costs are is fundamental as it questions the very 
existence of collective procedures in bankruptcy. Even if we provide later in the chapter some 
estimates of these costs in France and in UK, we do not primarily aim to measure them within 
the scope of building legal indexes. Again, the purpose of such indexes is to account for the 
content of the law. From that perspective, several elements in the law are related to these costs, 
and it is possible to identify the rules that are likely to increase the costs paid under bankruptcy. 
For instance, these costs should be higher ceteris paribus, if a numerus clausus limits the number 
of bankruptcy practitioners who are allowed to operate in the market. Such a limitation prevails 
in France so that liquidators and administrators do not work under perfect competition. The 
resulting effect should be an overpricing of bankruptcy files. This effect is captured by the 
question ―Do some barriers limit free entrance of the practitioners?‖. Overall, we build six 
binary indexes, which aggregation result in the composite index ―COSTLY_PROC‖ (in 
percentage). 
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 For instance, the measure of the direct costs of private workouts is a difficult task as this process is carried out with confidentiality. 
Nevertheless, some researchers have b een able to document these costs. Namely, Gilson, John and Lang (1990) examine the exchange cost for 
18 offers which averaged at 0.6 % of the book value of assets. 
332
 As quoted by Lubben (2010) : ―The wealth transfer argument depends on the odd belief that professionals would otherwise be sitting at home 
on the couch, but for chapter 11. But most who work on large chapter 11 cases are very talented, and quite employable, and could otherwise be 
working on mergers or bond offerings or loan agreements. These alternative tasks have real economic value, and professionals are routinely 
compensated for their work on such tasks, without much press or academic disparagement.‖ (p.4). 
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Bankruptcy procedures are costly. In counterpart, they are non confidential procedures and 
disclose information to the creditors. Practically, information disclosure is facilitated through the 
implementation of audit procedures under the supervision of the Court. In France, for instance, 
the administrator in charge of the bankrupt company has 20 months to write and forward a report 
(―bilan économique et social‖) to the Court. This report contains detailed information on (1) the 
causes of default, (2) the market value of the assets, (3) the number of creditors and the value of 
their value of the claims, (3) the buyout proposal(s) (if any), (4) an assessment of the chances of 
recovery (etc.). Such costly state verification process is similar to the one described by 
Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) regarding the theoretical justification of standard 
debt contracts
333
. 
 
The breach of confidentiality is justified as the debtor‘s financial commitments have not been 
fulfilled and the creditors might not receive their contractual payments. In that context, 
bankruptcy procedures should preserve as much value as possible in order to increase their 
expected recoveries (Blazy, Petey and Weill, 2010). One measure of increasing ex-post 
recoveries is to disclose public information to warn the creditors about the debtor‘s actual 
situation. From an economic point of view, information disclosure has opposite effects. On one 
hand, it increases the awareness of the creditors on the debtor‘s actual situation and might 
moderate type I and type II errors
334
 when choosing between liquidation and reorganization. On 
the other hand, public procedures might have discrediting effects leading to the disengagement of 
key partners and/or to losses of investment opportunities (Sutton and Callahan (1987)). The fear 
of bankruptcy is more likely to take roots when financial markets are imperfect and suffer from 
lack of information. In that context, the disclosure of any new signals might be misinterpreted by 
the stakeholders (Campbell (1979)). 
 
To account for the production of public information under our six bankruptcy procedures, we 
consider 11 binary indexes (yes/no questions, listed in Appendix C1) related to 
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 These contracts are efficient as they limit the occurrence of situations when the creditors have to check the actual value of the debtor‘s assets 
(here, the costly state verification process takes place only when the debtor cannot repay its debt anymore, which is the most common triggering 
criterion of formal bankruptcy). 
334
 Creditors might commit type I errors if they liquidate the debtor‘s assets, whereas they are worth more under reorganization. On the contrary, 
creditors might commit type II errors if they reorganize bankrupt firms whose liquidation is desirable (see Fisher and Martel (2004) for empirical 
tests). 
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(1) confidentiality, (2) information and warning rights of the various creditors, (3) audit 
procedures, and (4) forecast accounting. The resulting composite index is rescaled in percentage 
and named ―INFORMATION‖. 
 
6.2.3. Protection of the Debtors’ Assets and of the Creditors’ Claims (dimensions 5 and 6) 
When compared to private workout, bankruptcy provides a specific protective environment for 
both the debtor and the creditors. An efficient procedure should be able to preserve as much 
debtor‘s value as possible before a collective decision is made. As the bankruptcy process takes 
time, the debtor‘s assets might loose substantial value due to reputation effects, lost investment 
opportunities, and/or management failures. Ceteris paribus, the more the debtor‘s assets are 
protected under bankruptcy, the higher the recovery rates should be, irrespective of the final 
outcome. There are several ways to protect the debtor‘s assets. First, some of the assets that were 
sold prior to default might be recovered by the bankruptcy practitioner if the purpose of such sale 
was to impoverish the creditors (cf. ―période suspecte‖ in France). Second, specific managerial 
rules may apply during the procedure to protect the assets (forced extension of previous 
contracts, supervision of the managers…). Third, various preventive rules taking place before 
default might preserve the value of assets before any bankruptcy (cf. ―alert rights‖, account 
certification, interview of the managers…). According to Blazy, Petey and Weill (2010), the 
differences in prevention policies explain the observed differences in coverage rates
335
 at the 
early stage of bankruptcy. To account for the legal rules that increase and/or facilitate the 
protection of the debtor‘s assets under bankruptcy, we build 10 binary indexes (see Appendix 
C1). Their aggregation leads to the composite index named ―PROTECT_ASSETS‖ (in 
percentage). 
 
The protection of the debtor‘s assets is related to efficiency (i.e. the maximization of the ―size of 
the cake‖). Another complementary question is related to repartition: i.e. how to ―share the cake‖ 
between the claimants having various rakings in the absolute priority order? In other terms, why 
do bankruptcy codes define several classes of claimants wherein some enjoy more protection as 
compared to others? The literature provides two elements of answers (Baird and Jackson 
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 The ―coverage rate‖ is defined as the ratio of the value of assets at triggering divided by the due claims. 
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(2007)): by granting priority, bankruptcy law acknowledges that (1) some creditors should be 
protected because they were cautious enough to take guaranties prior to default (White (1989), 
Davydenko and Franks (2008)), and (2) some other creditors should be protected because they 
hardly can renegotiate outside of bankruptcy (for instance, the employees: see Korobkin (1996)). 
Both types of creditors might benefit from seniority. Yet, depending on the procedure, seniority 
may be more or less protected under bankruptcy
336
. For each class of creditors, we consider 6 
binary indexes (see Appendix C1) accounting for the creditors‘ ability to obtain additional 
payments outside of bankruptcy and to escape debt reduction and/or extended delays. We 
additionally take into account the time at which the claim originated, either before or after the 
procedure. The resulting composite indicators (in percentage) are named ―PROTECT_EMPL‖ 
(employees), ―PROTECT_STATE‖ (the State), ―PROTECT_FIXEDSEC‖ (fixed secured 
creditors), ―PROTECT_FLOATSEC‖ (floating secured creditors), and ―PROTECT_UNSEC‖ 
(unsecured creditors). These indicators take higher value when the considered class of claimant 
is more protected by the Law. 
 
6.2.4. Creditors’ Coordination and Collective Decision Tools (dimensions 7 and 8) 
 
Bankruptcy procedures can be viewed as a tool to coordinate between the creditors‘ competing 
interests and to help them in finding a collective solution that maximizes the debtor‘s overall 
value. Under the bankruptcy process, the need of coordination and of decision-making arises at 
two successive stages. 
 
At the time of default, the distressed firm is likely to be dismantled through an anarchic 
creditors‘ run, which eventually reduces the value of the debtor‘s assets. This common pool 
problem has been widely addressed by Bulow and Shoven (1978), Gertner and Scharfstein 
(1990), and more recently by Longhofer and Peters (2004). By implementing various legal 
mechanisms (stay of claims and of individual proceedings, creditors‘ representation, creditors‘ 
consultation…), bankruptcy procedures help in freezing the creditors‘ individual right to sue the 
debtor and, more generally, in solving the arising coordination problems among them. 
                                                 
336
 In addition, by granting priority, bankruptcy law acknowledges that some creditors play a key role in the final decision. Such decision-making 
process needs time. From that perspective, ―new money‖ claims (i.e. the ones that are born during the bankruptcy procedure) should be protected 
as they provide the required financing resources to prepare the decision. In most countries, new money benefits from a higher priority than other 
claims. 
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At the end of bankruptcy, the various procedures differ in the way of collectively making the 
final decision (voting rules, Court enforced solution, appeal rights…). Indeed, finding an 
agreement that leads to reorganization is more complex to attain when creditor with conflicting 
interests are numerous. Without coordination, the creditors might not reach an agreement and 
consequently select an outcome that does not maximize the overall recoveries. An important 
question can arise here as to how can this problem, be overcome. The first solution is to give the 
creditors the right to vote on the final outcome and to approve reorganization (for instance, 
France since 2005, and UK). Here, the creditors‘ decision power is maximized, but the final 
decision might depend on the capital structure. Indeed, as mentioned by Bergström, Eisenberg, 
and Sundgren (2002) and Morrison (2007), the more secured the creditors are, the lower is the 
likelihood of reorganization under bankruptcy systems that require secured (and unsecured) 
creditors to approve the reorganization plan. The second solution is to transfer the decision to a 
Court (France before 2005). Here, the creditors‘ decision power is minimized as it relies in the 
hands of one sole decision maker: on one hand, the final outcome should not depend on 
conflicting interests anymore, while on the other hand, types I and type II errors may arise if the 
primary objectives of the judge do align with the maximization of the debtor‘s assets. 
 
To account for coordination and decision-making issues, we consider several aggregated 
indicators (in percentage). They are computed for each class of creditors: ―COORD_EMPL‖, 
―DECISION_EMPL‖, (employees), ―COORD_STATE‖, ―DECISION_STATE‖, (the State), 
―COORD_FIXEDSEC‖, ―DECISION_FIXEDSEC‖ (fixed secured), ―COORD_FLOATSEC‖, 
―DECISION_FLOATSEC‖, (floating secured), ―COORD_UNSEC‖, ―DECISION_UNSEC‖ 
(unsecured). Each indicator is composed of 5 binary indexes on each class of creditors (see the 
listed questions in Appendix C1). Each index equals one (and zero otherwise) whenever the 
answer to the corresponding question is ―yes‖, which represents an improvement in either the 
coordination of creditors or in their decision making power under bankruptcy. 
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6.2.5. Sanction of Faulty Managers (dimension 9) 
 
The distinction between faulty managers and honest ones is an important and quite recent feature 
of the modern corporate bankruptcy codes. In the 16
th
 century, in the city of Florence, Italy, a 
merchant who could not repay the creditors had his bench (banca) physically broken (rotta) so 
that (s)he could not sell his (her) wares anymore. Such practice (la ―banca rotta‖, which gave its 
name to ―bankruptcy‖) had a double justification: first, it informed the creditors about the default 
of their debtor and, second, it was a punishment tool to prevent him from future business. 
Similarly in France, until the recent reforms, the effects of bankruptcy affected both the firm‘s 
and the manager‘s patrimonies: managers had to be punished whatever the origins of default, 
even if it was related to bad luck or to times of crisis. Here, the systematic punishment of 
managers was justified by their inability to fulfill the firm‘s financial commitments. However, 
this approach has been evolving over time. Nowadays, most of the contemporary legislations 
admit that default might derive from unfavorable environment. From that perspective, legal 
sanctions should apply to faulty managers only; whose bad behaviour has worsened the 
consequences of financial distress. Sanctions should be either criminal and/or pecuniary (the 
latter makes the manager pay for the firm‘s debt using his own patrimony). In a nutshell, moral 
hazard should be punished whereas bad luck should be forgiven: namely, honest and competent 
managers (and their patrimony) should be preserved from the consequences of bankruptcy. On 
the contrary, faulty managers should be punished individually. 
 
One can wonder if applying legal sanctions onto the faulty managers is the solitary way of 
reducing the managers‘ incentives to moral hazard. Indeed, an adequate design of the debt 
contracts might be another solution with equivalent effects. For instance, following Bester 
(1985), one could argue that implementing personal guarantees on the manager‘s private wealth 
is an efficient way to reduce bad incentives: here, collateralization can help in discriminating 
between good and bad managers. Yet, the systematic use of such personal guarantees might lead 
to underinvestment. From that perspective, by punishing faulty managers only, legal sanctions 
reduce advantageously the incentives to moral hazard but without frightening the honest – but 
unlucky – managers (Sen (2007)). Naturally, implementing legal sanctions on faulty managers 
implies a costly state verification process. We consider such process as a counterpart of the 
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bankruptcy costs associated to the verification and audit procedures that take place under 
bankruptcy. For instance, in France, the Court can sanction managers if the administrator‘s report 
reveals faulty management. Here, the ―fault‖ covers asset substitution, tricky behavior, and, more 
generally, any action that have worsened the debtor‘s financial situation337. 
 
To capture the importance of the sanctions of faulty management, we consider 5 binary variables 
accounting for the ways to supplant – or at least to control – the faulty and incompetent 
managers (see Appendix C1). We also consider the various sanctions that might be pronounced 
against them (obligation to personally repay the creditors, deprivation of the right to start a new 
business, fines, jail). The resulting composite indicator (in percentage) is named ―SANCTION‖. 
 
6.2.6. Orientation Favouring Liquidation Against Continuation (dimension 10) 
 
As pointed out by Di Martino (2008), the protection of the debtor against the various creditors 
should be distinguished from the inclination towards liquidation or continuation. Let us consider 
first the protection of the debtor vs. the creditors: the bankruptcy procedures are more or less 
debtor / creditor-friendly depending on (1) the way they protect the various claims, (2) the 
decision power they grant to the different stakeholders, (3) the way they discharge the debtor, 
(4) the absolute priority order that prevails under bankruptcy, etc. Such features were captured by 
the previous dimensions that we discussed previously. Let us turn now the liquidation / 
continuation bias of corporate bankruptcy law. We need to consider another dimension related to 
the way the procedure drives the choice between liquidation and continuation. Indeed, even if the 
various creditors might have different opinions on such a choice, the ultimate decision mainly 
depends on the legal framework that prioritises one solution over the other. Precisely, some 
bankruptcy procedures (liquidation procedures in the UK, or immediate ―liquidation judiciaire‖ 
in France) are fully dedicated to liquidation and do not offer any scope for reorganization. Some 
other procedures are fully dedicated to the elaboration of a continuation plan (cf. French 
―redressement judiciaire‖). Last, some other procedures are flexible enough to preserve both 
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 French code n°85-98, 25th of January 1985, Title V, Art. 180 to 182. 
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solutions (under the UK administration for instance, the administrator is given a mission to either 
liquidate or reorganize the firm). 
 
Depending on the considered legislation, bankruptcy procedures are more or less inclined to 
liquidation or reorganization. As mentioned by Berglöf et al. (2007), such inclination mainly 
depends on the countries. In the emerging market economies, liquidation biases are more 
common as reorganization procedures are more complex to implement than liquidation ones. 
Now turning to the developed economies, some profiles have been identified in the literature 
(Berglöf, Rosenthal and Von Thadden (2001)) wherein the US bankruptcy code if often viewed 
as a pro reorganisation system (as established by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and then, by the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978). Likewise, France is also considered to favour reorganization 
over liquidation. Precisely, the 1
st
 article of the 1985 French bankruptcy law explicitly ranks the 
various objectives, in declining order: safeguarding the business first, then maintaining the firm‘s 
operations, and last discharging liabilities. Contrastingly, the regimes prevailing in UK and in 
Germany are considered to be more in favour of liquidation, either because they concentrate the 
power to decide within the hands of some secured creditors (UK receivership
338
), or because 
reorganization is an exceptional outcome (Germany). 
 
Nevertheless, the recent legal reforms in the European western economies suggest a shifting 
trend favouring more reorganizations. Namely, UK and Germany engaged several reforms 
following that direction. In UK, Part 10 of the 2002 Enterprise Act specifies a new objective, ―to 
facilitate company rescue‖ in addition to ―produce better returns for creditors as a whole‖. 
Additionally, the former UK Receivership was abolished in 2003 as it was suspected to generate 
too many liquidations. In Germany, we observe a similar shift since the new bankruptcy code 
Insolvenzordnung (1994)
339
. While the German legislation keeps prioritising the repayment of 
creditors, the new German code sets an additional derogatory procedure (Insolvenzplan), 
allowing for continuation (provided the value of the debtor‘s assets exceeds the expected 
bankruptcy costs). This trend reflects to some extent the legislators‘ willingness to use 
                                                 
338
 The UK receivership allows a creditor (generally a bank) in possession of a floating charge, to appoint a receiver to protect its own interests. 
339
 It was put into practice since the 1st of January 1999. 
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bankruptcy as a tool to promote reorganization in order to protect businesses and employment 
(Blazy et al. (2009)). 
 
Our two last composite indexes (in percentage) account for the inclination towards liquidation 
(EASY_LIQ) and towards continuation (EASY_REORG). The former and the latter indexes are 
respectively composed of 13 and of 10 binary indexes (see Appendix C1). The indexes reflect 
(1) the main objectives of the procedure as they are stated by the Law, (2) the ability to force an 
outcome (liquidation, reorganization), and (3) the measures that are allowed by the procedure in 
order to achieve one specific outcome. 
 
6.3. The French and UK Bankruptcy Laws 
 
In this section, we present the six main corporate bankruptcy procedures prevailing in France 
(―Loi sur le redressement judiciaire des entreprises en difficultés‖, 1994) and in United Kingdom 
(Insolvency Act, 1986, and Enterprise Act, 2002). Both countries offer a menu of procedures to 
the stakeholders, depending on the debtor‘s situation, the types of claims, and the perspectives of 
recovery. Their analysis shows strong differences that should be reflected in our indexes and that 
are likely to impact on the creditors‘ recoveries. 
 
6.3.1. French Bankruptcy Code 
Three successive reforms were implemented in France. Initially, on the 25
th
 January 1985, the 
French bankruptcy code settled two procedures dedicated to reorganization (―redressement 
judiciaire‖) or to liquidation (―liquidation judiciaire‖)340. The 1985 legislation explicitly 
prioritized reorganization over liquidation. Precisely, the 1
st
 article of the 1985 French code 
ranks first the continuation of business, second the protection of employment, and third the 
repayment of creditors
341
. On 10
th
 June 1994, the 1985 legislation was slightly reformed. First, 
the secured creditors now benefited from a higher rank in the absolute priority order in case of 
                                                 
340
 Before 2005, sales as a going concern were a part of ―redressement judiciaire‖. Since then, they are viewed as a particular case of 
―liquidation judiciaire‖. 
341
 The 1st article of the French bankruptcy law 10th of June 1994 explicitly promotes continuation over liquidation. In French, it states that ―la 
procédure est destinée à permettre la sauvegarde de l'entreprise, le maintien de l'activité et de l'emploi et l'apurement du passif. Le redressement 
judiciaire est assuré selon un plan arrêté par décision de justice à l'issue d'une période d'observation. Ce plan prévoit, soit la continuation de 
l'entreprise, soit sa cession. Lorsque aucune de ces solutions n'apparaît possible, il est procédé à la liquidation judiciaire. ‖. This is the main 
justification for the opening of an observation period (―période d’observation‖). 
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liquidation. Second, prevention was strengthened after 1994. More recently, in 2005, bankruptcy 
law was reformed (―loi de sauvegarde‖, 26th July 2005): the 1985 original structure (and its 
hierarchy of objectives) has not changed but a new procedure (―sauvegarde‖) is added to the 
previously existing ones. This new procedures is close to ―redressement judiciaire‖ but is 
dedicated to solvent firms which face difficulties. This reform is too recent to have reliable 
information on its macroeconomic impact. We thus restrict our research to the 1994 legal 
framework.
 342
 
 
The triggering of ―redressement judiciaire‖ or ―liquidation judiciaire‖ relies on the same 
criterion: when the value of liquid assets is less than due debts, the firm has to enter into the 
procedure rapidly (within 15 days
343
). Once the debtor enters the procedure, an observation 
period (―période d’observation‖) begins and lasts up to 20 months in order to assess the chances 
of recovery. Owing to this specificity, the French procedure provides additional time to elaborate 
a reorganization plan (if possible). Contrastingly, liquidation is the default solution, most of them 
being decided immediately
344
 by the Court when the chances of recovery are obviously minimal. 
 
During this observation period, there is a stay of claims. The manager of the bankrupt firm might 
stay in place with the help of an administrator (in the worst cases, (s)he replaces the manager). 
Meanwhile, a creditors‘ representative (―représentant des créanciers‖) is appointed to check the 
claims and the remaining assets. In case of liquidation, (s)he becomes the liquidator 
(―mandataire liquidateur‖) of the firm. During the observation period, the bankrupt firm has to 
keep on running the business: first, the maintenance of the previous contracts might be enforced, 
and, second, the new creditors (i.e. new money claims) are granted a higher position in the 
absolute priority order in case of liquidation. 
 
The final decision lies in the hands of the commercial Court that decides either to liquidate (i.e. 
the procedure becomes ―liquidation judiciaire‖) or to reorganize the firm (i.e. the procedure 
                                                 
342
 In addition to this set of procedures, several ways of strengthening prevention were introduced. Most of them are private renegotiations under 
the supervision of the Court. This is the purpose of ―règlements amiables‖ (1984) and of ―conciliations‖ and ―mandats ad-hoc‖ (2005). These 
procedures do not deal with bankruptcy stricto sensu, as (1) the targeted firms are still solvent and (2) the default resolution is confidential and 
quite informal. 
343
 This delay is extended to 45 days since 2005. 
344
 I.e. without any observation period. 
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becomes ―redressement judiciaire‖)345. Hence, creditors do not vote or play a significant role in 
the decision-making process. Such court-administered decision process might alleviate 
coordination problems between the creditors, but it might also generate inefficiencies if the 
Court‘s objectives systematically prioritize continuation over liquidation. 
 
The absolute priority order is quite specific in France: especially, the last (2 months) unpaid 
wages benefit from a ―superprivilège‖: whatever the outcome, these should be repaid prior to the 
other claims
346
. Regarding the other due claims, they are repaid successively following a specific 
priority order depending on the final outcome. In case of liquidation (and/or sale), the liquidation 
proceeds (and/or the sale price) is the basis for the creditors‘ repayment. The priority order is 
(from the highest to lowest rank): ―superprivilège‖ claims, bankruptcy costs, new money claims, 
preferential and secured claims
347
, and last, unsecured claims. In case of reorganization, all the 
creditors must be repaid equally
348
. The continuation plan states the extended delays (limited to 
10 years) and the debt reductions (if any). 
 
6.3.2. UK Insolvency Code 
Until 2002, the UK corporate insolvency was ruled by the Insolvency Act of 1986. In 2002, it 
was reformed by the Enterprise Act that came into force in September, 2003. Among other 
important changes, this recent reform incorporated an additional objective: ―to facilitate 
company rescue‖ (in addition to ―produce better returns for creditors‖) 349. 
 
The UK legislation offers the stakeholders a menu of procedures: liquidation (85% of cases 
according to London Gazette), administration (5%), and receivership (10%). The latter procedure 
does not prevail anymore since 2003
350
. Indeed, receivership had been increasingly considered as 
an inefficient procedure favouring too much liquidation (Armour and Mokal, 2005, and 
formerly, Aghion, Hart, and Moore, 1992,). In addition, a fourth procedure (CVA, for Company 
                                                 
345
 According to the Observatoire Consulaire des Entreprises en Difficultés (OCED), bankrupt firms are piecemeal liquidated in 95% of the 
cases, sold in 2.5% of the cases, and reorganized in 2.5% of the cases. 
346
 The employees benefit from an public insurance system (AGS) if the firm‘s assets are insufficient to repay them. 
347
 Since the 1994 reform, some secured creditors are repaid before new money claims, in case of liquidation. 
348
 With two exceptions: ―superprivilège‖ and small claims should be repaid first. 
349
 This reform reflects a slight change towards the debtor‘s interests. However, the creditors are still well protected by the UK insolvency law, 
which is still considered as ―creditor friendly‖. 
350
 Since 2003, one had attended some substitution from receivership to administration procedures, which are more frequent now. 
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Voluntary Arrangement) exists which aims to ease informal renegotiation under the court‘s 
supervision. Yet, this latter procedure is not a bankruptcy procedure: it is closer to a workout and 
does not require default as a prerequisite for initiation. 
 
Let us begin our discussion in detail, with the first procedure: Liquidation. As in UK, this is the 
most common outcome (even more frequent). There are 3 types of liquidation procedures: 
Compulsory Liquidation, Creditor Voluntary Liquidation and Member Voluntary Liquidation. 
Firstly, Compulsory Liquidation is the one which can prevail under a rather large set of 
circumstances
351
: illiquidity, future financial difficulties, no business for more than 1 year, and/or 
less than 2 associates in the business. Petition for Compulsory Liquidation can be presented 
either by the creditors or by the debtor. As can be interpreted literally, second and third types of 
liquidations are be triggered voluntarily. Depending on the debtor‘s individual situation, such 
procedure is either Creditor Voluntary Liquidation, or Member Voluntary Liquidation. Creditor 
Voluntary Liquidation takes place when the debtor itself decides to liquidate the firm, as it 
cannot repay the firm‘s debts anymore and has become insolvent352 while on the other hand 
Member Voluntary Liquidation happens when the shareholders convene to liquidate: at this 
point, the firm has sufficient assets to pay off its liabilities
353
 and the creditors do not need to be 
notified. Thus, we exclude Member Voluntary Liquidation from the analysis as such this 
procedure has nothing to do with default companies. For each procedure, a liquidator is 
appointed. Most creditors are subjected to automatic stay of their claims. However, some secured 
creditors might be exempt from it. The liquidation ends with piecemeal liquidation or sale as a 
going concern. Once the liquidation process is terminated, a priority order of repayment applies: 
first, the bankruptcy costs, second and third the secured and preferential creditors, fourth the 
unsecured creditors. 
 
The second procedure is administration, which is a way to reorganize the firm, or to prepare a 
CVA with its creditors, or to plan liquidation
354
. An administrator is appointed by the court: (s)he 
                                                 
351
 See section 122 of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
352
 It is noteworthy that – despite its misleading name - , CVL cannot be initiated by the creditors 
353
 The directors then issue a statutory declaration under section 89 of Insolvency act (1986) that the company is solvent. After this, it is 
mandatory for the company to pay off all its debts within a period of 12 months. 
354
 Section 8(3) of Insolvency Act 1986 lays down the purposes for making an administration order. These are: (1) the survival of the company 
and the whole or any part of its undertaking as a going concern, (2) the approval of a voluntary arrangement, (3) the sanctioning under 
section 425 of the Companies Act of a compromise or arrangement between the company and any such persons as are mentioned in that section, 
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replaces the manager(s) and has the duty to protect all the interests at stake (debtor‘s and 
creditors‘). The individual pursuits are suspended during administration. The procedure can be 
triggered by the debtor or by the creditors. Two conditions are needed to enter administration: 
the company should be illiquid (or insolvent), the administrator‘s mission355 should be reachable. 
Eventually, the administrator prepares either a reorganization plan (8% of cases, according to 
Homan, 1989), or prepare a CVA (11%), or organize liquidation (45% as piecemeal liquidation 
and 36% as sale as a going concern). In case of reorganization, the administration ends with the 
vote of the creditors who endorse either accept or reject the plan. Consequently, the creditors are 
not passive in the decision-making process (even if but they stay under the supervision of the 
court that might impose another solution if the plan is rejected by them). 
 
The third procedure is receivership. It is the most specific one. It had been applicable until 2003 
but was abolished thereafter
356
. It is not a mere collective procedure. Indeed, it gives the secured 
creditors in possession of a floating charge
357
 (the appointer) the right to appoint a receiver
358
, 
whose mission is to prioritize and protect the appointer‘s interests. Consequently, receivership 
leads to liquidation
359
. Under receivership, the absolute priority order of repayment ranks 
decreasingly (1) secured and preferential creditors, (2) floating charges, (3) liquidator‘s fees (if 
receivership leads to liquidation), and (1) junior creditors. Receivership has been suspected to be 
costly and to undermine the recoveries, as the receiver has no incentives to manage the procedure 
in the unsecured creditors‘ interests (Armour, Hsu, Walters, 2008). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(4) a more advantageous realization of company‘s assets that would be effected under liquidation. Enterprise Act 2002 streamlined the old 
administration procedure and brought some major changes in its provisions. Specifically, schedule B1 was inserted in the Insolvency Act 1986 
with effect from 15th September 2003. The new purpose of administration is to achieve one of the following objectives: (1) rescuing the company 
as a going concern, (2) achieving a better result for company‘s creditors on the whole than would be likely if the company were wound up, 
(3) realizing property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or preferential creditors. 
355
 As described in the ―administrative order‖. 
356
 European Insolvency Regulation that came into effect from 31st May 2002 provides for collective proceedings to open in all EU member 
states. Receivership failed to meet this European criterion as it was not a collective procedure. Finally, the Enterprise Act 2002 put an end to the 
secured creditor‘s right to appoint a receiver. 
357 
The floating charges are not attached to one specific asset: the value of the assets they encompass may fluctuate over time. When the 
administrative receivership is triggered, the value of the assets is crystallized. Let‘s note that some charges may be fixed charges as well, 
provided the repayment basis is attached to one specific asset. 
358
 Or an administrative receiver if (s)he manages the firm at the same time. 
359 
Thus, selecting the type of collaterals (i.e. traditional ones vs. floating charges) is a strategic decision for the creditor‘s point of view. On the 
one hand, floating charges enables their owner to escape a collective procedure, but on the other hand, they do not grant a very high rank in the 
absolute priority order. 
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6.4. Using Legal Indexes to Compare the French and UK Bankruptcy Laws 
 
The preceding section has described in a nutshell the French and UK bankruptcy procedures. We 
now use our legal indexes to analyze the six procedures prevailing in France (―redressement 
judiciaire‖, ―liquidation judiciaire‖) and in UK (administration, receivership, compulsory 
liquidation, voluntary liquidation). The use of legal indexes helps in highlighting the procedures‘ 
characteristics (strengths / weaknesses) that are most noteworthy. We first turn to univariate 
statistics showing the values of the indexes for each procedure (Tables 6.1a and 6.1b). 
 
Table 6.1a. Legal indexes on the French and UK bankruptcy procedures (part 1/2) 
French "redressement 
judiciaire" (1994)
55% 100% 33% 82% 100% 100% 62% 70%
French "liquidation 
judiciaire" (1994)
55% 100% 33% 82% 90% 100% 69% 0%
UK Receivership 50% 33% 67% 100% 50% 40% 38% 0%
UK Administration 65% 67% 67% 100% 60% 60% 38% 50%
UK Compulsory liquidation 45% 100% 17% 91% 80% 100% 69% 0%
UK Voluntary liquidation 45% 67% 17% 91% 80% 100% 46% 50%
Ease of 
liquidation / 
sale
Ease of 
reorganization
Accessibility
of the
procedure
Exclusivity
of the
procedure
Costly 
procedure
Production
of public
information
Protection of
the debtor's
assets
Sanction of 
faulty 
management
 
Source: the Authors’ calculations 
 
Table 6.1b. Legal indexes on the French and UK bankruptcy procedures (part 2/2) 
Protec-
tion
Coordi-
nation
Decision 
power
Protec-
tion
Coordi-
nation
Decision 
power
Protec-
tion
Coordi-
nation
Decision 
power
Protec-
tion
Coordi-
nation
Decision 
power
Protec-
tion
Coordi-
nation
Decision 
power
French "redressement 
judiciaire" (1994)
100% 60% 20% 33% 100% 40% 67% 80% 20% 50% 80% 20% 33% 80% 20%
French "liquidation 
judiciaire" (1994)
100% 60% 0% 33% 80% 20% 67% 80% 0% 50% 80% 0% 67% 80% 0%
UK Receivership 67% 60% 20% 50% 60% 20% 100% 20% 60% 83% 60% 80% 50% 60% 20%
UK Administration 50% 80% 40% 33% 80% 40% 83% 80% 40% 33% 80% 40% 17% 80% 40%
UK Compulsory liquidation 17% 60% 20% 17% 60% 20% 100% 20% 40% 67% 0% 40% 17% 80% 20%
UK Voluntary liquidation 17% 60% 20% 17% 60% 20% 100% 20% 40% 67% 0% 20% 17% 80% 40%
Floating Secured Claims Unsecured ClaimsEmployees State Fixed Secured Claims
 
Source: the Authors’ calculations 
 
One may note that, in Table 6.1a, the legal indexes for French procedures take almost similar 
values. This is not unexpected, as the two French procedures share several features in common 
(especially the way they are triggered and managed). French ―liquidation judiciaire‖ and 
―redressement judiciaire‖ mainly differ in their outcome and in the associated repayment order. 
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On the contrary, UK procedures are quite different in their characteristics, as reflected by their 
indexes. 
 
We first consider the legal index ACCESSIBILITY. The UK administration is the most 
accessible procedure, when compared to the others (especially the UK liquidation procedures). 
Ceteris paribus, administration is easier to trigger and is accessible to a wider set of 
stakeholders. As a consequence, the parties can revert to the legal solution if the attempts to 
privately renegotiate fail. Now turning to the EXCLUSIVITY of the procedure, we notice that 
the French procedures are more exclusive than the UK ones (except UK compulsory liquidation). 
As a consequence, the French bankruptcy code can be viewed as more ―irreversible‖ than other 
procedures, in the sense that, once triggered, the legal solution is hard to abort and coming back 
to the private solution is more difficult. 
 
When considering corporate bankruptcy law as a means to generate INFORMATION, we 
observe that the indexes of both countries show rather high values (bigger than 80%). Thus, in 
both countries, entering bankruptcy breaches confidentiality. Yet, the UK procedures show 
higher values than for France. From this perspective, the creditors are more protected in UK as 
they benefit from a more transparent legal environment. On the contrary, the debtor might suffer 
from lack of confidentiality and incur opportunity costs. 
 
The protection of the assets (PROTECT_ASSETS) is a core feature of corporate bankruptcy 
laws. Indeed, by holding the environment constant, if a procedure is efficient in protecting the 
debtor‘s assets, it should generate more recoveries for the pool of creditors. We observe that the 
design of the French procedures is relatively more protective of the debtor‘s assets. On the 
contrary, UK receivership is less protective. Overall, it is interesting to see that the various 
procedures do not equally protect the debtor‘s assets. This should generate significant differences 
in the overall recovery rates and confirm the idea that choosing one procedure against another is 
a strategic choice. 
 
The SANCTION of faulty management is another key dimension of corporate bankruptcy laws. 
If we follow the assumption that such sanctions are anticipated by the managers, one can expect 
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that the legal environment has ex-ante effects onto the managerial behaviours taking place before 
default. From that perspective, French procedures and UK liquidation procedures are the most 
severe ones against faulty managers. At this stage of the analysis, let us remind that we focus on 
the content of the law only, and not on the way the law is enforced (especially, a procedure might 
contain lots of chapters dealing with sanction, but such sanctions might not be effective if the 
Courts are clement towards managers). That being said, it is not surprising to observe that 
liquidation procedures are more severe against faulty managers as liquidation generates 
additional costs relatively to reorganization (social costs, reputation costs, systemic costs, 
dominos effects…). 
 
Another difference between liquidation and reorganization procedures is the way they facilitate 
LIQUIDATON or REORGANIZATION. Here, without any surprise, we observe that all the 
procedures are in coherence with respect to their objectives. Precisely, the procedures that are 
oriented toward liquidation facilitate more liquidation than reorganization. Yet, some of them do 
not show a big imbalance between the two possible outcomes (namely, the French ―redressement 
judiciaire‖, the UK administration and the UK voluntary liquidation). 
 
Table 6.1b shows, for each type of creditor, the values of the legal indexes accounting for 
PROTECTION, COORDINATION and DECISION. We confirm that the French legislation is 
more protective of the employees‘ interests and prioritizes social goals. This finding is coherent 
with the ranking of objectives, as stated by the 1
st
 article of the 1985/1994 French bankruptcy 
law. On the other hand, in UK, the (fixed or floating) secured creditors are relatively more 
protected under receivership, compulsory liquidation, and voluntary liquidation. As most of the 
secured creditors are bankers, one can predict that such orientation of the UK law might generate 
higher recovery for the banks (Davydenko and Franks (2008)). The scenario however changes 
with respect to unsecured claims: the UK bankruptcy procedures (except receivership) show 
quite low protection indexes for them. On the contrary, unsecured creditors seem more protected 
in France, especially against delays or repayment and debt reduction. Most of the unsecured 
creditors are suppliers (i.e. other companies). Again, this is coherent with the orientation of the 
French legislation prioritizing the protection of business. When considering coordination in UK, 
it appears that liquidation procedures do not provide strong coordination tools to the secured 
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creditors. This contrasts with the situation of the other creditors (employees, State and public 
claims, unsecured creditors) who benefit from more coordination, whatever the considered 
procedure. Overall, receivership and administration equally coordinate the various creditors. In 
France, the coordination indexes are strong and quite balanced: all the classes of claimants 
benefit from a comparable level of coordination. Last, we turn to the indexes relative to decision. 
The situation of France contrasts with the UK. Indeed, the lowest values for decision are 
observed for ―redressement judiciaire‖ and ―liquidation judiciaire‖. This is a direct consequence 
of the absence of voting procedures in France: the final decision lies in the hands of the Court, so 
that the decision power of creditors is minimized. 
 
Tables 6.1a and 6.1b do not account for the combined effect of the 10 indexes. We then turn to 
multivariate approach and perform principal component analysis (PCA) to draw a mapping of 
the six procedures. Graph 6.1 provides the result of this analysis which explains 71% of the 
initial inertia
360
. The first axis (41% of inertia) mainly opposes the French and UK procedures 
and the second axis (30%) mainly opposes liquidation against reorganization procedures. Each 
arrow shows a direction indicated by one particular procedure. The variables used to compute the 
PCA are the legal indexes. They are also displayed in the same graph. Thus, the interpretation of 
the PCA mapping is straightforward: an index is higher (respectively lower) for the procedure(s) 
that indicate(s) a location close to them. For instance, the indexes COORD_UNSEC, 
EXCLUSIVITY, PROTECT_ASSETS, EASY_LIQ, and SANCTION altogether take relatively 
higher values for French ―liquidation judiciaire‖ than for other procedures, especially the UK 
ones. 
                                                 
360
 i.e. the original dispersion of the scatter-plot. 
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Graph 6.1: Mapping of the French and UK bankruptcy procedures (component analysis) 
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              Source: the Authors’ calculations 
 
We observe several interesting features on the United Kingdom. Administration – which is a 
quite sophisticated procedure as it follows multiple objectives – shows the highest 
COSTLY_PROC index. Such a costly procedure may be less attractive but, on the other side 
administration appears relatively accessible to all the stakeholders. Administration and 
receivership have frequently been compared together. Indeed, since the abolishment of 
receivership in 2003, the number of administrations has increased, which probably reflects a 
substitution effect between both the procedures. Yet, administration and receivership show 
several differences. On one side, administration preserves the decision power of public claims 
and of employees‘ claims, and strongly coordinates them. On the other side, receivership 
provides more decision power to the secured creditors. This is a direct and natural consequence 
of the bank-friendly inclination of receivership. Yet, interestingly enough, this procedure remains 
transparent to all the stakeholders as it shows a high INFORMATION index that makes it 
comparable to administration. In that view, receivership is actually a collective procedure as it 
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shares information beyond the sole appointer‘s interests. Last, (compulsory and voluntary) 
liquidation procedures are quite close to each other. They show higher SANCTION indexes than 
the other UK procedures. In addition, they provide more protection to the secured claims (fixed 
and floating). This inclination towards the secured-creditors‘ interests has a cost, as it exhibits a 
low level of protection for the employees, the public claims, and the unsecured creditors. This 
might impact on efficiency: some of the creditors cannot get secured either because their 
bargaining power is low outside bankruptcy (employees) or because they can hardly take 
collaterals to protect their claims (trade creditors). 
 
The French legislation also shows interesting characteristics. First, the coordination of secured 
claims, public claims, and unsecured claims is higher in France than is in UK (this is less true for 
the employees, but they take advantage of other types of protection, especially in terms of 
privilege
361
). Yet, these stronger coordination mechanisms are compensated by weaker decision 
mechanisms. Thus, entering the French procedures has two opposite effects (that might impact 
on the incentives to trigger bankruptcy): on the one hand, the creditors benefit from good 
coordination that should reduce the common pool problem, but on the other hand, they are 
excluded from the final choice that finally affects their recoveries. In addition, the French 
procedures are characterized by a stronger protection of the debtor‘s assets. This is a core aspect 
of the French legislation that has been prioritizing prevention and post-default conservatory 
measures that aim to preserve the debtors‘ asset and, consequently, the chances of 
reorganization. 
 
We now wonder if these differences between the procedures are sufficient to explain (or not) the 
differences in the recovery rates that are observed on each procedures. We then need to use an 
additional set of data coming from bankruptcy files in France and in UK. This is the purpose of 
the two subsequent sections. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
361
 Cf. ―super-privilège des salaries‖. 
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6.5. The Dataset on Recoveries in UK and France 
 
Data were manually collected from 833 bankruptcy files for the period 1993-2005 for France, 
and for the period 1998-2005 for the United-Kingdom (the time repartition of our sample is 
shown in appendix C2). The English data are slightly more recent for three reasons: first, they 
were already stored in electronic format
362
 so that the data collection process was quicker to 
undertake. Second, we could not extract too many French files for year 2005 as it was a 
transition year in France (between the old and the new legislation). Third, we had to exclude 
from the sample the very recent files as we needed to work on closed files only (so that the 
computation of recovery rates is reliable and definitive). As the covered period is quite long 
(more than 10 years), we control for macroeconomic shocks by introducing in our regressions 
the annual growth rate of GDP. 
 
The data on France were collected at the Commercial Court of Paris (Tribunal de Commerce de 
Paris). As the French bankruptcy procedure is mainly carried out under the supervision of the 
court, data might not fully reflect the countrywide application of the bankruptcy code. 
Additionally, local conditions might have some influence on reorganization decisions. 
However, we assume that this potential geographic bias is marginal when compared to the 
international differences that our study focuses on.
363
 The bankrupt firms were identified using 
the BODACC
364
 that records each new bankruptcy judgement. English data were collected 
from the Companies House web-database (Insolvency Service). This database collects the main 
documents of the bankrupt firms located in Greater London, Yorkshire, North, North West, 
East Midlands, East Anglia, Rest of South East, South West, West Midlands, Wales and 
Scotland. The bankrupt firms were identified using the bankruptcy filings announcements 
published in the ―London Gazette‖. 
 
Despite some formal differences, the bankruptcy files in both countries contain similar 
information, which allowed us to collect data using a common template (see appendix C4). The 
main available data are: (1) identification of firm (age, legal form, sector, number of employees, 
                                                 
362
 Source: Insolvency Service and Companies House. 
363
 A comparison of our sample with the characteristics of French corporate bankruptcies shows little differences in terms of structural 
dimensions: size, sector, yet our sample entails slightly more LTD firms compared to France. 
364
 Bulletin Officiel des Annonces Civiles et Commerciales. 
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part of a group, duration of the procedure); (2) the cause(s) of default (these causes were coded 
into 51 dummies which were further classified into 7 groups: outlets, strategy, production, 
finance, management, accident, and macroeconomic environment
365
: see appendix C3); (3) the 
coverage rates (i.e. the market value of assets divided by the due debts); (4) the estimated value 
of assets at the time of bankruptcy; (5) the amounts recovered by the creditors; (6) the direct 
bankruptcy costs
366
. 
 
Our dataset has the following breakdown for the six bankruptcy paths: 164 French 
―redressements judiciaires‖, 100 ―liquidations judiciaires‖ (excluding sales367), 199 UK 
administrations, 198 receiverships, 100 compulsory liquidations, and 72 voluntary liquidations 
(to our knowledge, no previous studies on the UK had access to liquidations files). Such 
distribution of the sample does not reflect the actual breakdown between procedures in each 
country. Indeed, in order to have robust estimates in the subsequent analyses, we need to use a 
sufficiently high number of observations for every procedure. However, if we had the same 
structure as the national one, the samples would have exhibited excessive imbalance towards 
liquidation. Yet, to rebuild the original national structure, our estimations weight the 
observations by using each country‘s actual repartition of procedures for the given period368. 
 
Both samples are made of young SMEs. The average firm‘s age lies between 8 and 17 years for 
both the countries (the liquidated firms being younger than the others). The bulk of the sample 
is made of limited liability companies (on an average ranging between 90% – 100%). The 
number of employees was available for the French sample only: the liquidated firms in France 
are on an average smaller (12 employees) than the reorganized ones (26). Additionally, in 
France, most of the firms do not belong to a group (more than 90% of them), while this figure 
is in contrast with the percentages applicable to UK firms where 23% and 28% of the 
companies entering administration (resp. receivership) are a part of group. On the other side, all 
                                                 
365
 We built 7 dummy variables equal to 1 if there is at least 1 cause identified in a given category and 0 elsewhere. A few files miss information 
on the cause(s) of default. As such information is critical, we consider them as missing data and remove them from the econometric models. 
366
 The UK files contain direct information about bankruptcy costs, which mainly correspond to the administrator‘s fees. For France, this 
information is not displayed in the bankruptcy file. However, as bankruptcy costs are precisely defined by a legal formula based on observable 
characteristics (recovered amounts…), costs could be reconstituted using the regulatory formula and validated by a bankruptcy practitioner. 
367
 Sale as a going concern is not part of ―liquidation judiciaire‖ until 2005, but part of ―redressement judiciaire‖. 
368
 Individual weights are 5% for ―redressement judiciaire‖, 95% for ―liquidation judiciaire‖, 5% for administration, 10% for receivership and 
30% for compulsory liquidation, and 55% for voluntary liquidation. 
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the firms being liquidated in UK do not belong to a group. We now consider the market value 
of assets at triggering
369
. The French figures look similar between both the procedures: the 
most important accounts, in percentage of total assets, are receivables (from 23% to 36%), 
tangible assets (around 25%), intangible assets (around 13%), and cash (less than 7%). The UK 
figures are quite different: receivables account for more than 36% (to 44%) of the total assets. 
The liquidated firms show high values of cash (from 27% to 38%) which is in contrast with the 
administration and receivership files (less than 5%). The latter files show higher values of 
tangible assets (around 40%). 
 
The various bankruptcy procedures differ considerably in their scope and in the types of rights 
they confer to the creditors. We thus focus on the main output of such procedures: the creditors‘ 
recovery rate, which can be considered as a proxy of the ex-post efficiency of bankruptcy law; 
ceteris paribus, a higher debtor‘s value should generate more recoveries. These recoveries 
strongly depend on the final outcome: under liquidation (or sale), the recoveries come from the 
liquidation (or sale) price. Under reorganization, the plan contains a provisional schedule of 
payments
370
. As a consequence, the actual recoveries depend on the success of the plan. For the 
French data, the use of external databases over the period
371
 makes it possible to identify the 
companies whose reorganization plan failed or ended successfully: we observe that 89% of plans 
are successful. If the reorganized company defaults again, subsequent failure signifies that future 
recoveries are expected to be null. For the other successful plans, we discount the future 
recoveries using the French Treasury term structure. For UK data, we do not observe 
reorganization plan as the entire files end either in piecemeal liquidation or sale. 
 
Table 6.2 shows the recovery rates for each type of procedure and for each class of creditors. The 
total recovery rate shows noticeable differences between the procedures. The higher value (46%) 
is observed for the French ―redressement judiciaires‖. Then, come receiverships (30%), 
administrations (21%), and liquidation procedures. It is noteworthy that UK liquidations show 
                                                 
369
 This is the estimated value from the administrator‘s or the manager‘s point of view. We additionally have the final verified value of the assets 
that enters in the computation of the recovery rates. 
370
 In France, the plan – as designed by the court – cannot force debt forgiveness but can impose longer delays. 
371
 Sources: INSEE, ―série nationale des défaillances d’entreprises‖, BODACC. 
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poor total recovery rates (9% for compulsory liquidation, 13% for voluntary liquidation): these 
values are in contrast with the higher rate for French liquidations (20%). 
 
Table 6.2: Recovery rates, coverage rate, and structure of claims 
Redressement 
judiciaire
(incl. sales)
Liquidation 
judiciaire
(excl. sales)
Administration Receivership
Compulsory 
liquidation
Voluntary 
liquidation
Sample size 164 100 199 198 100 72
Recovery rate (total) 45.8% 19.6% 20.5% 29.7% 8.6% 12.9%
Recovery rate (junior) 38.2% 3.1% 3.5% 1.6% 7.7% 4.3%
Recovery rate (preferential) 56.9% 30.8% 42.0% 31.2% 17.2% 18.7%
Recovery rate (secured) 51.9% 40.3% 38.7% 43.7% 16.2% 25.3%
Recovery rate (new money) 62.6% 27.3% 98.7% 100.0% n.s. 100.0%
Coverage rate 66.7% 46.4% 31.8% 35.8% 15.4% 20.8%
Due claims (amount in K€) 1743 760 1788 3390 283 658
% of junior due claims 45.9% 32.9% 53.6% 35.6% 91.0% 69.5%
% of preferential due claims 33.9% 55.8% 0.7% 5.7% 3.8% 10.3%
% of secured due claims 15.2% 7.6% 31.6% 45.8% 5.1% 10.6%
% of new money claims 2.3% 0.7% 6.1% 7.6% 0.0% 4.2%
% of bankruptcy costs 2.7% 3.1% 8.0% 5.3% 0.1% 5.4%
Duration of the procedure (in months) 11.6 3.1 19.4 38.9 26.4 35.5
France United Kingdom
Variables
 
Source: the authors’ calculations 
 
The questions we address in this chapter are the following: what can explain such differences 
between the countries? Is the design of bankruptcy Law a significant explanation? If yes, which 
features increase (or not) the total recovery rate? To answer these questions, we must control for 
several factors. 
 
Firstly, the recovery rate mechanically depends on the situation of the firm at triggering, and 
more precisely, on the value of its assets. To capture this effect, we use the coverage rate which 
measures the value of assets (at triggering) divided by the total due amounts. We observe in the 
sample that the coverage rate takes higher values in France (67% for ―redressements judiciaires‖ 
and 46% for ―liquidations judiciaires‖). Thus the French bankrupt firms are in relative better 
shape when they enter the procedure than the UK ones
372
. 
                                                 
372
 Several factors might explain this, especially, the effects of prevention policy that is quite developed in France. All remaining things being 
equal, a higher prevention should preserve more value before bankruptcy is triggered. 
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Secondly, the structure of claims (secured, unsecured, new money…) might impact on the total 
recovery rate. Especially, one can expect the secured creditors to monitor the debtor more as 
compared to the unsecured ones. In addition, the more secured the assets are, the less value they 
should loose, as collateralized assets cannot be sold as easily as uncollateralized ones. Table 6.2 
shows the weight of each class of creditors in percentage of total due claims. We observe that the 
part of junior claims is generally lower in France (between 33% and 46%) as compared to UK. 
Especially, UK liquidations show the highest share of junior creditors (between 70% and 91%). 
On the contrary, the French claims are mainly owned by preferential creditors (between 34% to 
56%). This mainly reflects the protection of social claims (employees) and of public claims 
(State) that benefit from numerous privileges (―superprivilège des salariés‖, ―privilège general 
des salariés et des créances publiques‖). The share of secured creditors (mainly banks) is on an 
average higher in UK (especially for administration (32%) and for receivership (46%)) than in 
France (less than 15%). 
 
Thirdly, the differences in total recovery rates might reflect differences in bankruptcy costs. The 
share of direct bankruptcy costs differs from one procedure to another. To measure this, 
Table 6.2 discloses the percentage of direct bankruptcy fees out of the total claims. The most 
expensive procedures are administrations (8.0%), voluntary liquidations (5.4%) and 
receiverships (5.3%). The less expensive ones are ―liquidations judiciaires‖ (3.1%), 
―redressements judiciaires‖ (2.7%), and compulsory liquidations (0.1%). We additionally 
compute the duration of the procedure. Indeed, as previously suggested by White (1989), 
duration can be viewed as a proxy of cost of the procedure, or the complexity of the case, or the 
attempts to keep the firm alive and in view of this, the delay evidently suggests attempts of 
renegotiation. However, it can also be a proxy of lengthy court and administrative procedures 
demanding a series of formalities to be fulfilled at the time of trigger or at the time the firm is 
finally being dissolved. In our sample, we observe differences in the durations across countries. 
France shows the fastest procedures (less than one year on average)
373
. 
 
                                                 
373
 However, the two countries differ in their practices and there can be a considerable delay before the case is closed from an economic point of 
view and the formal closing by a court. So, we consider the time necessary for creditors (or a court) to make a decision on the outcome of the 
procedure. 
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Fourthly, once the three first effects (coverage rate, structure of claims, bankruptcy costs) have 
been accounted for, we consider that the fourth explanation of the differences between the total 
recovery rates can be attributed to the effects of the Law. In other terms, we first have to control 
for these three first effects (plus some other environmental variables). Then, if significant 
difference between the total recovery rates remains, this should reflect some differences in the 
design of the procedure that might be more or less efficient in generating recoveries. To capture 
such effects, we have to switch from univariate approach to multivariate analysis and 
regressions. In the next section, we shall see how this is accomplished. 
 
6.6. Using Legal Indexes to Explain the Recoveries in France and UK 
 
We use regression analysis to test the variables that explain the differences in total recovery 
rates. We split between control variables and test variables, the latter being related to the 
procedures and to the legal indexes. 
 
We first control for several variables. First, we use the coverage rate to control for the quality of 
the assets at triggering. It compares the initial value of assets to due claims. Second, to control 
for the structure of claims, we compute the percentage of secured claims, which mainly 
represents the weight of bankers‘ claims. Third, we control for bankruptcy costs, and mainly the 
indirect ones
374
 through the duration of the procedure. In fact, the duration itself is a misleading 
indicator as it is strongly related to the procedure. In fact, it is more relevant to use the duration 
in excess: for each procedure, some files are more complex or difficult to deal with, so that they 
last longer than the average duration. Thus, for each file, we compute the difference between the 
duration of such file and the average duration that is observed on all the files belonging to the 
same procedure (in log). Fourth, we encompass the causes of default that have played a role in 
the bankruptcy process. For each category, (strategy, production, finance, management, accident, 
outlets, macro.), we built a dummy variable equal to 1 if a cause related to such category was 
mentioned in the bankruptcy file
375
 (and 0 elsewhere). Fifth, we control for a set of variable 
accounting for the firm‘s characteristics: age (in log), limited liability (dummy variable), group 
belonging (dummy variable), percentage of estimated cash in the total assets, and total assets 
                                                 
374
 Direct bankruptcy costs are already taken into account in the analysis as the total recovery rate is net of such costs. 
375
 Let us stress the fact that all the causes should be mentioned here as they come from the report of the administrator who checked and reported 
all of them. 
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(thousands of euros, in log). Last, we control for the sector (industrial dummy) and for the 
macroeconomic growth (increase rate of national GDP). 
 
Then, we test the impact of corporate bankruptcy law onto the total recovery rate (our explained 
variable). From this perspective, we build successive models. In the first set of models, our 
explanatory variables are the bankruptcy procedures. Each procedure (―redressement judiciaire‖, 
―liquidation judiciaire‖, administration, receivership, compulsory liquidation, and voluntary 
liquidation) is a dummy variable that enters into the regression equation: a positive and 
significant coefficient indicates that the considered procedure significantly increases (relatively 
to the others) the total recovery rate. Table 3 reports the estimations. 
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Table 6.3: Bankruptcy procedures as explanatory variables of the total recovery rate 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant
0.19903***  
0.0007
0.21721***  
0.001
0.21177***  
0.0004
0.22493***  
0.0002
0.22131***  
0.0002
0.19806***  
0.0009
"Redressement judiciaire"
0.19951***  
<.0001
"Liquidation judiciaire"   
-0.00203  
0.9173
      
Administration   
-0.02955  
0.3724
      
Receivership     
0.03023  
0.3102
    
Compulsory liquidation       
-0.05047*  
0.0615
  
Voluntary liquidation         
-0.0828***  
0.0054
Coverage rate
0.13017***  
<.0001
0.13419***  
<.0001
0.1327***  
<.0001
0.13671***  
<.0001
0.13576***  
<.0001
0.13169***  
<.0001
% of secured debts
0.25756***  
<.0001
0.24323***  
<.0001
0.25096***  
<.0001
0.22491***  
<.0001
0.23911***  
<.0001
0.25***
<.0001
Duration of the procedure (relative to average)
0.00753  
0.4075
0.00506  
0.5857
0.00472  
0.6116
0.00592  
0.5252
0.00613  
0.5088
0.00866
0.353
ln (age)
-0.00184  
0.8028
0.0007
0.9267
0.00087
0.9082
0.00054
0.9422
0.001
0.8939
0.00182  
0.8074
Limited liability
-0.16005***  
0.0005
-0.19771***  
<.0001
-0.19646***  
<.0001
-0.20043***  
<.0001
-0.19526***  
<.0001
-0.19265***  
<.0001
Debtor belongs to a group
-0.09305***  
0.0014
-0.09431***  
0.0016
-0.09247***  
0.002
-0.09811***  
0.0011
-0.0943***  
0.0016
-0.10434***  
0.0005
% of estimated cash in the assets
0.04664  
0.1526
0.04906  
0.1621
0.05013  
0.1326
0.04839  
0.1471
0.07373**  
0.0383
0.0515
0.1206
ln (total assets, in K€)
0.01835***  
0.0008
0.02251***  
<.0001
0.02291***  
<.0001
0.02126***  
0.0002
0.01961***  
0.0006
0.02157***  
<.0001
Cause of default: strategy
-0.00427  
0.8266
-0.00633  
0.7528
-0.00521  
0.7942
-0.00633  
0.7509
-0.00648  
0.7448
0.00204  
0.9191
Cause of default: production
-0.06569***  
0.0004
-0.06494***  
0.0006
-0.06426***  
0.0007
-0.06463***  
0.0007
-0.06764***  
0.0004
-0.06111***  
0.0013
Cause of default: finance
-0.02334  
0.2219
-0.02165  
0.2702
-0.0209  
0.2849
-0.02203  
0.2596
-0.02114  
0.2783
-0.01781  
0.3607
Cause of default: management
0.08481***  
0.0001
0.08734***  
0.0001
0.0871***  
0.0001
0.08782***  
<.0001
0.08647***  
0.0001
0.09557***  
<.0001
Cause of default: accident
0.01238
0.49
0.01337  
0.4804
0.01509  
0.4119
0.01318  
0.4723
0.01953  
0.2925
0.0188
0.3051
Cause of default: outlets
0.01521  
0.3625
0.01125  
0.5115
0.01125  
0.5098
0.01022
0.55
0.00907  
0.5953
0.0206
0.2338
Cause of default: macro
0.00135  
0.9362
0.00681
0.702
0.00807
0.641
0.00547  
0.7527
0.00622  
0.7184
0.01711  
0.3299
Sector: industry
0.01756  
0.2833
0.01171  
0.4906
0.01278  
0.4449
0.00981  
0.5604
0.01612
0.338
0.01215  
0.4649
 Annual change in GDP
-0.94378  
0.1599
-0.76997  
0.2801
-0.77274  
0.2601
-0.77761  
0.2571
-0.42876  
0.5433
-0.54845
0.424
Fisher Stat: 18.35
(prob: <.0001)
Fisher Stat: 15.75
(prob: <.0001)
Fisher Stat: 15.81
(prob: <.0001)
Fisher Stat: 15.83
(prob: <.0001)
Fisher Stat: 16.02
(prob: <.0001)
Fisher Stat: 16.35
(prob: <.0001)
Adj. R²:  0.299 Adj. R²:  0.266 Adj. R²:  0.267 Adj. R²:  0.267 Adj. R²:  0.270 Adj. R²:  0.274
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: none
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: none
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: none
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: none
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: none
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: none
Dependant variable: total recovery rate
Variables
OLS regression
Number of observations:   735
 
Source: the Authors’ calculations 
Note – The dependent variable is the total recovery rate. Table reports coefficients with t-statistics below. *, **, *** 
denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
 
Table 6.3 shows the results of OLS regression models. They are computed on the full sample, i.e. 
France and UK (due to missing data, 735 observations out of 833 were used in the regressions). 
The six columns share the same control variables. The difference between them is the considered 
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procedure as test variable. Our models are globally significant at the 1% level (Fisher stat.). The 
adjusted R² is satisfactory with values lying between 27% and 30%. Last, we use the VIF
376
 
check for multicolinearity: all our variables show an acceptable VIF factor inferior to 2. When 
compared to the others, only one bankruptcy procedure is significantly associated to higher total 
recovery rate: the French ―redressement judiciaire‖. On the contrary, the two procedures which 
are significantly associated to lower total recovery rate are the UK compulsory and voluntary 
liquidation procedures. This result is quite important, as UK has long been suspected to generate 
more recoveries than France. But, most of the previous studies on UK ignored liquidation 
procedures and only focused on administration and receivership. Overall, this first result 
confirms that the Law is not neutral: after having controlled for various factors (value of assets, 
structures of claims, origins of default, bankruptcy duration, firm‘s characteristics…), we find 
that the total recovery rate strongly depends on the procedure that is triggered after default. 
 
This first approach is useful in identifying those procedures which are most efficient in 
increasing the total recovery rate. Yet, this approach is not sufficient as it does not highlight 
precisely the legal features that play a role in generating additional recoveries. In the second set 
of models, we use our legal indexes
377
 as explanatory variables of the total recovery rate. We 
propose here a set of 8 hypothesis (H1 to H8), each of them being related to one or more 
index(es). 
 
Hypothesis H1. A more accessible procedure increases the total recovery rate. 
 
We consider the first the index named ―ACCESSIBILITY‖. What is the expected impact on the 
total recovery rate? As discussed before, an accessible procedure should be triggered earlier 
because it relies on a wide and accessible set of triggering criteria and/or can be triggered by a 
wide set of stakeholders. As a consequence, ―accessibility‖ should increase recoveries. Yet, an 
easily accessible procedure might be triggered for pure strategic purpose, and the final impact on 
recoveries be reversed. We second consider EXCLUSIVITY. An ―exclusive‖ procedure cannot 
                                                 
376
 VIF stands for ―Variance Inflation Factor‖. It measures the severity of multicollinearity in an OLS regression. It indicates how much the 
variance of an estimated regression coefficient is increased because of multicollinearity. 
377
 Namely, these dummies are: ACCESSIBILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, COSTLY PROCEDURE, INFORMATION, PROTECT_ASSETS, 
PROTECT_CLAIMS, COORD_CLAIMS, DECISION_CLAIMS, EASE_LIQ and EASE_REORG. 
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be aborted easily: precisely, the parties cannot turn back to the private solution or switch to 
another procedure. We cannot predict any direct impact of ―exclusivity‖ on the recoveries but we 
can expect the effects of an exclusive procedure to be amplified as no other ways of resolving the 
default can be used by the stakeholders. 
 
Hypothesis H2. A costly procedure has opposite effects onto the total recovery rate. 
 
We expect bankruptcy costs (COSTLY_PROC) to have balanced and opposite effects onto the 
recoveries. On one hand, the higher the bankruptcy costs are, the lower is the remaining amount 
to be shared among the creditors. Ceteris paribus, bankruptcy costs compete with the other 
classes of claimants. On the other hand, bankruptcy costs should not be considered as a loss of 
money but rather as a way to (1) explore the various outcomes, (2) to audit the debtor‘s situation, 
(3) to reward the practitioner‘s efforts to recover more. Overall, both effects might compensate, 
so we cannot predict which one will overcompensate the other. 
 
Hypothesis H3. Production of public information under bankruptcy has opposite effects onto the 
total recovery rate. 
 
We consider here the index INFORMATION. A common feature of bankruptcy procedures is 
that they are not (fully) confidential. From that point of view, they might generate fear among the 
debtor‘s partners due to loss of reputation. This effect depends of the relations that have been 
settled between the debtor and its creditors prior to the default. It might also depend on the 
―climat des affaires‖ within the country. From that point of view, the final recoveries might 
suffer from the lack of support from the most important creditors. So, it is important to 
comprehend that confidence has value, even under the event of bankruptcy. However, the 
production of public information has also positive effects onto the recoveries. This is particularly 
true regarding the final choice to be made. Such choice should maximize the value of the 
bankrupt firm, and consequently the recovered amounts. To be efficient, such choice needs to 
rely on complete and reliable information. Considering this view, producing more information 
should reduce type I and type II errors. Overall, both effects might compensate for each other. 
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Hypothesis H4. Protection of the debtor’s assets should increase the total recovery rate. 
 
It seems natural to predict that a procedure being able to protect the debtor‘s assets 
(PROTECT_ASSETS) and to preserve their value should generate more recoveries for all the 
creditors. Such protection can take several aspects. First, some assets might be reinstated within 
the debtor‘s patrimony if they were previously sold under suspicious circumstances (―période 
suspecte‖ in France). Second, other assets might stay in the debtor‘s patrimony as they are 
attached to collaterals. Third, other assets might be protected by the administrators (or the 
liquidators) in order to avoid any additional loss of value. On the contrary, some creditors might 
withdraw those assets from the debtor‘s patrimony whose ownership belongs to them (in France: 
―droit de revendication‖, ―droit de rétention‖). Overall, the rules prevailing under the procedure 
are not neutral regarding the way the assets (and their values) are preserved. The resulting 
recoveries mechanically depend on the effect of such rules. 
 
Hypothesis H5. The protection and coordination of claims should generate higher total recovery 
rate but with differences depending on the type of claims. 
 
A first major role of bankruptcy procedures is to protect the creditors‘ claims 
(PROTECT_CLAIMS) and their expected recoveries. One can expect that the more the law 
protects the creditors‘ interests, the higher should be the associated recoveries. This is true if we 
consider the creditors as a homogenous pool of claimants. Yet, the legislation might not 
identically protect the various types of claimants: such differences might serve the recoveries of 
specific classes of creditors at the expenses of others. A second important feature of bankruptcy 
procedures is to help the creditor to coordinate (COORD_CLAIMS). Resolving this well-known 
common pool problem should help in increasing the total recoveries, especially when compared 
to the private solution. 
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Hypothesis H6. The decision power granted to the creditors has opposite effect onto the total 
recovery rate. 
 
The power to decide has no direct and obvious connection with the recoveries. Nevertheless, we 
can predict two opposite effects associated to variable DECISION_CLAIMS. On one hand, 
having the power to influence the final choice might have positive (direct and indirect) effects on 
recoveries. First, it gives the creditors more incentives to trigger the procedure earlier as they 
know they can influence its outcome. Second, it makes them more involved in the procedure 
seeking for the solution which maximizes their interests. On the other hand, benefiting from the 
decision power might have contrasting effects. First, it might increase the recoveries of the 
classes of creditors who have the highest decision power at the expense of the other classes of 
creditors. Second, it might generate additional coordination issues among the other creditors. 
Overall, all these effects can compensate so that it is hard to predict any definitive impact on the 
total recovery rate. 
 
Hypothesis H7. Excessive inclination to liquidation or to continuation might have a negative 
impact on the total recovery rate. 
 
The various bankruptcy procedures are more or less oriented towards liquidation (EASY_LIQ) 
or towards reorganization (EASY_REORG). Some procedures are solely dedicated to one single 
outcome, but some others are flexible enough to lead to both solutions. In fact, such orientation 
has a priori no direct link with the global recovery rate. In fact, one can suspect that a systematic 
orientation in favour of one solution against the other is likely to fail in minimizing the type I and 
type II errors that might occur while making the final choice. On the contrary, more balanced 
procedures should be able to minimize such costs as they are flexible enough to lead to the most 
efficient outcome (i.e. the one maximizing the debtor‘s value). 
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Hypothesis H8. Provided they are anticipated, the sanctions of faulty management should 
increase the total recovery rate. 
 
Do managers fully anticipate all the states of the world, especially those corresponding to 
bankruptcy? This answer is not straightforward and goes beyond the scope of this research. Yet, 
if we make the assumption that the managers are aware that they might be sanctioned for faulty 
management, then an increase of sanctions (SANCTION) might reduce their incentives to moral 
hazard, which in return, should make them more responsible towards the management of the 
debtors assets, and the resulting recoveries in case of bankruptcy. 
 
Table 6.4 summarizes the results of our OLS regressions. Appendix C5 details the corresponding 
estimations
378
. Table 6.4 discloses the signs and significance of the estimated parameters that are 
associated to our legal indexes. It also provides the list of the control variables that are used in 
the regressions. 
 
                                                 
378
 Due to space constraints, we only give the estimates on all the claims, without showing our results on the classes of creditors (these are 
available on request). 
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Table 6.4: Legal indexes as explanatory variables of the total recovery rate 
 
Accessiblity Positive** Sanction of faulty management Non significant
Exclusivity Non significant Coordination of claims (all claims) Positive***
Costly procedure Positive* Coordination of claims (employees) Non significant
Production of information Negative** Coordination of claims (State, public claims) Positive***
Protection of debtor's assets Positive* Coordination of claims (fixed secured) Positive**
Ease of liquidation Non significant Coordination of claims (floating secured) Positive***
Ease of reorganization Positive* Coordination of claims (unsecured) Non significant
Protection of claims (all claims) Positive*** Decision power (all claims) Non significant
Protection of claims (employees) Positive*** Decision power (employees) Non significant
Protection of claims (State, public claims) Positive*** Decision power (State, public claims) Positive***
Protection of claims (fixed secured) Negative*** Decision power (fixed secured) Non significant
Protection of claims (floating secured) Non significant Decision power (floating secured) Non significant
Protection of claims (unsecured) Non significant Decision power (unsecured) Non significant
Test variables: legal indexes on corporate bankruptcy law (%)
Control variables (list)
OLS models on France and UK   -   sample size: 734 observations
(each test variable is introduced one after the other in the models; control variables are the same in all the models)
Coverage rate  Share of secured claims (in % of dues claims)  Age (log)   GDP growth  Limited liability (dummy)  
Debtor is part of a group (dummy)  Value of total assets at triggering (thousands of €)  Share of cash (in % of total assets 
at triggering)  Cause of default: strategy (dummy)  Cause of default: production (dummy)  Cause of default: finance 
(dummy)  Cause of default: management (dummy)  Cause of default: accident (dummy)  Cause of default: outlets 
(dummy)  Cause of default: macro. (dummy)  Sector: industry (dummy)  duration of the procedure (in log, relatively to the 
average duration in the considered country).  
Source: the Authors’ calculations 
 
Note – The dependent variable is the total recovery rate. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from 
zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
 
Several of our hypotheses are empirically confirmed. We first consider H1. As expected, we 
confirm that an accessible procedure is associated to higher recovery rates, but we do not find 
such effect on exclusivity (not related to the total recovery rate). 
 
Interestingly enough, when considering hypothesis H2, we empirically find that, despite being in 
competition with the creditors‘ recoveries, bankruptcy costs significantly serve the total 
recoveries. This is coherent with the Lubben‘s view (Lubben 2010). Bankruptcy costs are not 
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pure sunk costs but are the counterpart of a service that is provided by the practitioners, whose 
work eventually serves the creditors‘ interests. 
 
According to hypothesis H3, the production of information has two opposite effects on 
recoveries. While, on one hand, it should destroy value due to breach in confidentiality. On the 
other hand, producing public signals to the stakeholders should help them to make the adequate 
choice at the end of the process. From our result it is evident that the former effect over 
compensates the latter and our legal index relative to production is negatively related to total 
recovery rates which signify a more transparent procedure leads to lower recoveries.  
 
We now test hypothesis H4. Without surprise, we confirm that the procedures that provide more 
protection to the debtor‘s assets significantly improve the total recovery rate. 
 
We find a similar result regarding the protection and coordination of claims (hypothesis H5). 
Indeed, we find that both indexes PROTECT_CLAIMS and COORD_CLAIMS strongly 
increase total recoveries. A higher protection of the creditors‘ rights is actually associated to 
improved recoveries for them. Similarly, the more the procedure is efficient in reducing the 
conflicts of interests, by improving coordination, the more recoveries it generates. These findings 
are key results as they confirm the usefulness of legal procedures when compared to simple 
private workouts. However, as suggested in H5, the overall effect is not the same for all the 
classes of claimants. Indeed, we find a reversed result regarding the protection of secured claims 
that does not generate higher global recoveries. This can be explained as the procedures that 
provide more protection to the secured creditors (receivership for instance) are not designed with 
the intent of increasing the overall recoveries but are more focused on the repayment of those 
creditors who are in possession of the collaterals. 
 
Last, we consider hypotheses H6 to H8. Firstly, regarding H6, we do not find a significant effect 
of the creditors‘ decision-power on the global recovery rates. This is not that much surprising as 
the final outcome should mainly depend on the structure of claims and of the creditors‘ interests, 
which varies from a file to another. The power to decide is not sufficient in itself to draw a 
systematic link (either positive of negative) with the recovery rate. We can also interpret this 
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result in a symmetric way: leaving the power to decide in the hands of a judge (as in France) 
should not impact too much on the total recoveries. Above finding negates the common vision 
about the French Bankruptcy code, being suspected to be excessively debtor friendly and in that 
sense could compromise the value maximization goal. Secondly, hypothesis H7 is partially 
confirmed: inclination towards liquidation does not create or destroy recoveries. But, inclination 
towards reorganization significantly increases the total recovery rate. Thirdly and finally, 
hypothesis H8 is not confirmed as it is observable that it does not have any impact on the total 
recoveries. This signifies that a stringent legal environment does not affect the total recoveries. 
 
6.7. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we contribute to the literature by reconciling two complementary approaches of 
corporate bankruptcy. The first approach belongs to the law and finance paradigm and is based 
on the construction of legal indexes. Yet, the works following that avenue are mainly oriented to 
macroeconomic development and growth without drawing a direct link with the creditors‘ 
individual recovery rates. The second approach gathers financial works testing for a ranking of 
countries based on their recovery rates. Nevertheless, such works provide little insights into the 
legal characteristics that can explain such ranking. 
 
We first propose a set of legal indexes highlighting ten dimensions of corporate bankruptcy law. 
We build composite indexes on six bankruptcy procedures prevailing in two countries which are 
good representative of the main European legal systems: France (Civil Law country) and United-
Kingdom (Common Law country). We then propose a mapping of procedures that shows a clear 
specialization between them. The French procedures are more protective of the debtor‘s assets 
and favor more the coordination of secured claims, public claims, and unsecured claims. Yet, 
stronger coordination mechanisms are compensated by weaker decision mechanism in France. In 
United-Kingdom, we find strong opposition between the procedures oriented to liquidation and 
the other procedures (administration and receivership). On one side, UK liquidation procedures 
are more severe against faulty management and provide more protection for secured claims. 
Indeed, this inclination towards the secured-creditors‘ interests has a cost, as it provides less 
protection to the employees, the public and the unsecured claims. On the other side, we observe 
that UK administration preserves more the decision making power of public claims and of 
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employees‘ claims, and coordinates them. UK receivership provides more decision power to the 
secured creditors but still remains transparent to all the stakeholders. 
 
We then use an original database of 833 bankruptcy files to measure the recovery rates that are 
generated by each procedure. We find strong differences between them on an average: French 
―redressement judiciaires‖ (46%), receiverships (30%), administrations (21%), French 
liquidation (20%), UK voluntary liquidation (13%), and compulsory liquidation (9%). 
 
We then turn to OLS regressions and use our legal indexes to isolate the characteristics of 
corporate bankruptcy law that significantly impact on the total recovery rate in France and in 
UK. By controlling for the value of assets, the structure of claims, the origins of default, and the 
firm characteristics, we test for several hypotheses. We first isolate the legal features of 
bankruptcy procedures that are associated to higher total recovery rates: namely, (1) accessibility 
of the procedure, (2) protection of the debtor‘s assets, (3) protection and coordination of claims, 
(4) orientation towards reorganization, and (5) bankruptcy costs. From that perspective, these 
costs are not sunk cost only, but can be viewed as the counterpart of a service provided by the 
practitioners that eventually serve the creditors‘ recoveries. On the contrary, we find that the 
production of information under bankruptcy has a negative impact on total recoveries, probably 
due to the breach in confidentiality. Last, some dimensions of corporate bankruptcy law are not 
significantly related to total recovery rates (inclination towards liquidation, severity towards 
faulty management). 
 
Our approach advocates for further works exploring the relations between the Law and the 
financial output of bankruptcy. The combined use of legal indexes and individual data from the 
bankruptcy files is an interesting and promising way to explore. 
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Appendixes 
 
C1. Legal Indexes (list) 
"Redressement 
judiciaire"
"Liquidation 
judiciaire"
Receivership Administration
Compulsory 
liquidation
Voluntary 
liquidation
ACCESSIBILITY
The triggering criteria does not require the value of the firm's assets to exceed the expected legal costs. 1 1 0 1 0 0
The triggering criteria relies (partially or not) on present financial difficulties (cash shortage, delays…). 1 1 1 1 1 1
The triggering criteria relies (partially or not) on present non financial difficulties (social conflict…). 0 0 0 0 0 0
The triggering criteria relies (partially or not) on future / expected financial difficulties. 0 0 1 1 1 1
The triggering criteria relies (partially or not) on future / expected non-financial difficulties. 0 0 0 0 0 0
The triggering criteria does not require any difficulty, financial or not, present or future. 0 0 0 0 0 0
The debtor (manager or shareholder) can trigger the procedure. 1 1 0 1 1 1
The Court(s) can trigger the procedure. 1 1 0 0 0 0
Debtor's employees can trigger the procedure. 0 0 0 0 0 0
The State & public claims can trigger the procedure. 1 1 0 1 1 0
Secured creditor(s) can trigger the procedure. 1 1 1 1 0 0
Unsecured creditor(s) can trigger the procedure. 1 1 0 1 1 0
Any other stakeholder (account supervisor, customers, etc.) can trigger the procedure. 0 0 0 0 0 0
The debtor cannot oppose to the triggering (when (s)he has not decided to trigger him(her)self) . 0 0 1 0 0 0
The Court (in charge of the corporate bankruptcy affairs) cannot oppose to the triggering. 0 0 1 1 1 1
Debtor's employees cannot oppose to the triggering. 1 1 1 1 1 1
The State & public claims cannot oppose to the triggering. 0 0 1 1 0 1
Secured creditor(s) cannot oppose to the triggering. (whatever the type of collateral) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Unsecured creditor(s) cannot oppose to the triggering. 1 1 1 1 0 1
Any other stakeholder(s) (account supervisors, customers...) cannot oppose to the triggering. 1 1 1 1 1 1
EXCLUSIVITY
The bankruptcy procedure can be aborted if the debtor and the creditor(s) find a private agreement. 0 0 1 1 0 1
The debtor can abort the bankruptcy procedure. 0 0 0 0 0 0
One (at least) creditor(s) can abort the bankruptcy procedure. 0 0 1 0 0 0
COSTLY_PROC
The firm's assets must exceed the expected legal costs. 0 0 0 0 0 0
The practitioners do not operate under perfect competition: i.e. some barriers limit free entrance. 1 1 1 1 1 1
The legal costs are freely invoiced by the practitioners. Put 'N' if the legal fees are determined by the Law. 0 0 1 1 0 0
The amount of the legal costs does not have to be approved by the creditor(s). 1 1 0 0 0 0
The legal costs are not limited by a pre-determined maximum ceiling. Put 'Y' if the costs are freely invoiced. 0 0 1 1 0 0
The legal costs cannot be reduced for small companies or files. Put 'Y' if the costs are freely invoiced. 0 0 1 1 0 0
France United Kingdom
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"Redressement 
judiciaire"
"Liquidation 
judiciaire"
Receivership Administration
Compulsory 
liquidation
Voluntary 
liquidation
INFORMATION
The procedure is not confidential. 1 1 1 1 1 1
The law entitles stakeholders (employee…) to alert the manager on the difficulties, prior to bankuptcy. 1 1 1 1 1 1
Any stakeholder has an access to the information in the bankruptcy files, before the procedure is ended. 1 1 1 1 1 1
Any stakeholder has an access to the information in the bankruptcy files, once the procedure is ended. 0 1 1 1 1 1
Court and/or practitionner(s) may share the information they gather with the creditors (whatever their type). 1 1 1 1 1 1
An audit of the debtor takes place during the procedure (origin(s) of the default, last financial reports…). 1 0 1 1 1 1
Some experts can be hired to audit the firm. 1 1 1 1 1 1
The value of the debtor's assets is checked. (market value) 1 1 1 1 1 1
The value of the claims is checked. (some may be accepted or rejected) 1 1 1 1 1 1
Pre-estimation of the debtor's liquidation value is performed during the bankruptcy process. 0 1 1 1 1 1
Pre-estimation of the debtor's continuation value is performed during the procedure (forecast accounting). 1 0 1 1 0 0
PROTECT_ASSETS
The contracts that took place before bankruptcy can be cancelled if they decreased the value of assets. 1 1 0 1 1 1
Before the procedure, some stakeholder(s) can warn the Court  in case of first difficulties. 1 1 0 0 0 0
Before the procedure, the Court  can interview the manager(s) in case of first difficulties. 1 1 0 0 0 0
During the procedure, the economic value of the debtor's assets is assessed and checked. 1 1 1 1 1 1
During the procedure, an audit of the restructuring opportunities (if they exist!) is performed. 1 0 1 1 1 1
During the procedure, the debtor's assets cannot be freely sold or liquidated. 1 1 0 0 1 1
During the procedure, major decisions (firing, investing…) are subjected to a legal authorization. 1 1 0 1 1 1
During the procedure, the continuation of previous contracts (supplies, electricity…) can be enforced. 1 1 1 0 1 1
During the procedure, legal practitioners (administrators, experts...) can help the manager(s) to run the firm. 1 1 1 1 1 1
During the procedure, faulty and/or incompetent manager(s) can be fired from the direction of the company. 1 1 1 1 1 1
PROTECT_EMPL
Employees (prior): can be paid outside the procedure. 1 1 1 0 0 0
Employees (prior): no debt reduction 1 1 1 0 0 0
Employees (prior): no delays 1 1 0 0 0 0
Employees (post): can be paid outside the procedure. 1 1 1 1 1 1
Employees (post): no debt reduction 1 1 1 1 0 0
Employees (post): no delays 1 1 0 1 0 0
COORD_EMPL
Employees: A legal mandatory represents them 1 1 0 1 0 0
Employees: stay of claim 0 0 1 1 1 1
Employees: stay of individual legal proceedings 0 0 1 1 1 1
Employees: They are consulted for the  important decision 1 1 0 0 0 0
Employees: they are granted an information right 1 1 1 1 1 1
France United Kingdom
 
301 
 
"Redressement 
judiciaire"
"Liquidation 
judiciaire"
Receivership Administration
Compulsory 
liquidation
Voluntary 
liquidation
DECISION_EMPL
Employees: They are consulted on the final decision 1 0 0 1 1 1
Employees: They vote on the final decision 0 0 0 1 0 0
Employees: The Court cannot impose a solution on them 0 0 1 0 0 0
Employees: They have an appeal right 0 0 0 0 0 0
Employees: Eventually, they can take the control 0 0 0 0 0 0
PROTECT_STATE
State & public claims (prior): can be paid outside the procedure. 0 0 0 0 0 0
State & public claims (prior): no debt reduction 1 1 1 0 0 0
State & public claims (prior): no delays 0 0 0 0 0 0
State & public claims (post): can be paid outside the procedure. 0 0 1 1 1 1
State & public claims (post): no debt reduction 1 0 1 1 0 0
State & public claims (post): no delays 0 1 0 0 0 0
COORD_STATE
State & public claims: A legal mandatory represents them 1 1 0 1 0 0
State & public claims: stay of claim 1 1 1 1 1 1
State & public claims: stay of individual legal proceedings 1 1 1 1 1 1
State & public claims: They are consulted for the  important decision 1 0 0 0 0 0
State & public claims: they are granted an information right 1 1 1 1 1 1
DECISION_STATE
State & public claims: They are consulted on the final decision 1 0 0 1 1 1
State & public claims: They vote on the final decision 0 0 0 1 0 0
State & public claims: The Court cannot impose a solution on them 0 0 1 0 0 0
State & public claims: They have an appeal right 1 1 0 0 0 0
State & public claims: Eventually, they can take the control 0 0 0 0 0 0
PROTECT_FIXEDSEC
Fixed Secured (prior): can be paid outside the procedure. 0 0 1 1 1 1
Fixed Secured (prior): no debt reduction 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fixed Secured (prior): no delays 0 0 1 0 1 1
Fixed Secured (post): can be paid outside the procedure. 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fixed Secured (post): no debt reduction 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fixed Secured (post): no delays 1 1 1 1 1 1
COORD_FIXEDSEC
Fixed secured: A legal mandatory represents them 1 1 1 1 1 1
Fixed secured: stay of claim 1 1 0 1 0 0
Fixed secured: stay of individual legal proceedings 1 1 0 1 0 0
Fixed secured: They are consulted for the  important decision 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fixed secured: they are granted an information right 1 1 0 1 0 0
France United Kingdom
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"Redressement 
judiciaire"
"Liquidation 
judiciaire"
Receivership Administration
Compulsory 
liquidation
Voluntary 
liquidation
DECISION_FIXEDSEC
Fixed secured: They are consulted on the final decision 1 0 1 1 0 0
Fixed secured: They vote on the final decision 0 0 0 1 0 0
Fixed secured: The Court cannot impose a solution on them 0 0 1 0 1 1
Fixed secured: They have an appeal right 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fixed secured: Eventually, they can take the control 0 0 1 0 1 1
PROTECT_FLOATSEC
Floating Secured (prior): can be paid outside the procedure. 0 0 1 0 1 1
Floating Secured (prior): no debt reduction 1 1 1 0 0 0
Floating Secured (prior): no delays 0 0 0 0 1 1
Floating Secured (post): can be paid outside the procedure. 0 0 1 1 1 1
Floating Secured (post): no debt reduction 1 1 1 1 0 0
Floating Secured (post): no delays 1 1 1 0 1 1
COORD_FLOATSEC
Floating secured: A legal mandatory represents them 1 1 1 1 0 0
Floating secured: stay of claim 1 1 0 1 0 0
Floating secured: stay of individual legal proceedings 1 1 0 1 0 0
Floating secured: They are consulted for the  important decision 0 0 1 0 0 0
Floating secured: they are granted an information right 1 1 1 1 0 0
DECISION_FLOATSEC
Floating secured: They are consulted on the final decision 1 0 1 1 0 0
Floating secured: They vote on the final decision 0 0 1 1 0 0
Floating secured: The Court cannot impose a solution on them 0 0 1 0 1 1
Floating secured: They have an appeal right 0 0 0 0 0 0
Floating secured: Eventually, they can take the control 0 0 1 0 1 0
PROTECT_UNSEC
Unsecured (prior): can be paid outside the procedure. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unsecured (prior): no debt reduction 1 1 1 0 0 0
Unsecured (prior): no delays 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unsecured (post): can be paid outside the procedure. 0 1 1 1 1 1
Unsecured (post): no debt reduction 1 1 1 0 0 0
Unsecured (post): no delays 0 1 0 0 0 0
COORD_UNSEC
Unsecured: A legal mandatory represents them 1 1 0 1 1 1
Unsecured: stay of claim 1 1 1 1 1 1
Unsecured: stay of individual legal proceedings 1 1 1 1 1 1
Unsecured: They are consulted for the  important decision 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unsecured: they are granted an information right 1 1 1 1 1 1
France United Kingdom
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"Redressement 
judiciaire"
"Liquidation 
judiciaire"
Receivership Administration
Compulsory 
liquidation
Voluntary 
liquidation
DECISION_UNSEC
Unsecured: They are consulted on the final decision 1 0 0 1 1 1
Unsecured: They vote on the final decision 0 0 0 1 0 0
Unsecured: The Court cannot impose a solution on them 0 0 1 0 0 0
Unsecured: They have an appeal right 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unsecured: Eventually, they can take the control 0 0 0 0 0 1
SANCTION
The pre-default managers' decisions can be cancelled if they have decreased the value of the debtor's assets. 1 1 0 1 1 1
During the procedure, faulty and/or incompetent manager(s) can be fired from the direction of the company. 1 1 1 1 1 1
Manager having contributed to impoverish the debtor (voluntarily or not) may be put to jail. 1 1 0 0 1 1
Manager having contributed to impoverish the debtor may have to personally repay for the company's debts. 1 1 0 0 1 1
Manager having contributed to impoverish the debtor may not be allowed to restart a new business. 1 1 1 1 1 1
EASY_LIQ
The objectives of the law a-priori explicitely promote piecemeal liquidation over continuation. 0 0 0 0 1 0
The objectives of the law a-priori explicitely promote sale over continuation. 0 1 1 0 1 1
The company can (or must) be piecemeal liquidated at the end of the procedure. 1 1 1 1 1 1
The Court can force liquidation. 1 1 0 0 0 0
A specific stakeholder can force liquidation. 0 0 1 0 1 0
A liquidator facilitates/monitors the liquidation process. 1 1 0 1 1 1
A fast (or simplified) liquidation procedure may prevail for the smallest companies (or the simplest files). 0 0 0 0 0 0
The company (or a part of it) can (or must) be sold as a going concern at the end of the procedure. 1 1 0 1 1 1
A liquidator facilitates/monitors the sale (if any). 1 1 0 1 1 1
The Court can force the sale. 1 1 0 0 0 0
A specific stakeholder can force the sale. 0 0 1 0 1 0
Rival Buyout offers can be proposed to the Court at the end (or during) the procedure. 1 1 0 0 0 0
Auctions can take place at the end of (or during) the procedure. (either on the firm itself or its assets) 1 1 1 1 1 1
EASY_REORG
The objectives of the law a-priori explicitely promote continuation over piecemeal liquidation. 1 0 0 1 0 0
The objectives of the law a-priori explicitely promote continuation over sale. 1 0 0 0 0 0
A continuation plan can (or must) be decided (or voted) at the end of the procedure. 1 0 0 1 0 1
The Court can force a continuation plan. 1 0 0 0 0 0
A specific stakeholder can force a continuation plan. 0 0 0 0 0 0
A practitionner (administrator, mediator…) prepares/facilitates/monitors the plan. 1 0 0 1 0 1
Delays can be imposed on some claims to facilitate the continuation plan. 1 0 0 1 0 1
Delays (if any) are not time-limited. 1 0 0 0 0 1
Claim reduction can be imposed on some creditors to facilitate the continuation plan. 0 0 0 1 0 1
Public aids (direct or indirect) can be granted to the  reorganizing firms. 0 0 0 0 0 0
France United Kingdom
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C2. Sample Structure and Time Repartition 
 
C2.1. Sample Structure 
 
Redressement 
judiciaire
(incl. sales)
Liquidation 
judiciaire
(excl. sales)
Administration Receivership
Compulsory 
liquidation
Voluntary 
liquidation
Sample size 164 100 199 198 100 72
Age (in years) 17.4 9.9 13.3 15.2 8.3 12.3
% of LTD companies 87.2% 97.0% 98.0% 97.5% 100.0% 100.0%
Number of employees 26.12 11.96 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sector: trade 20.7% 19.0% 15.6% 13.1% 12.0% 13.9%
Sector: industry 25.6% 26.0% 49.2% 58.6% 48.0% 51.4%
Sector: services & others 53.7% 55.0% 35.2% 28.3% 40.0% 34.7%
% of groups 8.5% 5.0% 23.1% 27.8% 0.0% 0.0%
% of intangible assets 13.7% 12.7% 5.8% 5.1% 0.0% 0.0%
% of tangible assets 24.9% 23.9% 39.9% 42.1% 13.5% 24.7%
% of financial assets 6.6% 2.2% 0.1% 0.5% 0.0% 0.9%
% of inventory 14.5% 6.1% 11.1% 8.5% 4.4% 4.4%
% of receivables 23.3% 35.9% 36.0% 39.1% 44.3% 39.0%
% of marketable securities 0.5% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
% of cash 7.0% 5.7% 4.6% 3.1% 37.7% 27.0%
% of other assets 9.5% 13.4% 2.4% 1.7% 0.1% 4.0%
Cause(s) of default: strategy 14.6% 15.0% 29.6% 26.3% 15.0% 11.1%
Cause(s) of default: production 27.4% 19.0% 30.2% 24.7% 11.0% 11.1%
Cause(s) of default: finance 25.0% 24.0% 19.6% 15.7% 10.0% 6.9%
Cause(s) of default: management 13.4% 12.0% 9.0% 8.1% 18.0% 8.3%
Cause(s) of default: accident 28.7% 20.0% 32.7% 22.7% 57.0% 9.7%
Cause(s) of default: outlets 51.2% 59.0% 64.8% 83.3% 45.0% 27.8%
Cause(s) of default: macro 43.3% 21.0% 42.2% 44.9% 19.0% 20.8%
Variables
France United Kingdom
 
Remark: for each procedure, the sum of all causes is more than 100% as there can be more than one cause per 
file that did participate to the bankruptcy process. 
 
 
C2.2. Time Repartition of the Sample 
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C3. Codification of the Causes of Default 
 
Outlets
[1] Brutal disappearance of customers; [2] Customer(s) in default; [3] Product(s) too expensive 
(selling price is too high); [4] Bad evaluation of the market; [5] Product(s) too cheap (selling price 
is too low); [6] Unsuitable products; [7] Obsolete products; [8] Loss of market shares (regular fall 
of the firm's demand).
Strategy
[1] Youth of the company (inexperience); [2] Voluntary dissolution of the activity;[3] Failure of 
important projects (partnerships, investments, reorganizations);[4] Voluntary acceptance of 
little profitable markets (dumping...).
Production
[1] Production capacity was too strong, overinvestment; [2] Depreciation of the assets; [3] 
Operating costs were too high (other than wages: external expenses, raw materials...); [4] Wages 
expenses were too high; [5] Brutal disapearance of suppliers; [6] Unsuitable process of 
production (obsolete); [7] Underinvestment.
Finance
[1] Longer delays on accounts receivable; [2] Contagion / reported losses from subsidiaries; [3] 
Shorter delays on accounts payable; [4] Excessive speculation of the company; [5] end of the 
financial support from the head office / holding; [6] Lack of equity (compared to 
leverage/liabilities); [7] Loan refusal to the company; [8] end/reduction of the subventions to the 
company; [9] Contractual interest rates are too high.
Management
[1] Weak accounts reporting / informational system is deficient; [2] Problems of 
competence; [3] Disagreements among the directors / managers; [4] Excessive takings from 
the managers; [5] Insufficient provisions; [6] Lack of knowledge on the real level of costs 
of returns (causing too weak selling); [7] Bad evaluation of inventory; [8] Problems of 
transmission of the company / difficulties in restructuring.
Accident
[1] Swindle / embezzlements affecting the company; [2] Another insolvency procedure (for 
other companies) is extended to the firm (same patrimonies); [3] Disputes with public partners 
(fiscal inquiry); [4] Disputes with private partners; [5] Death / disease / disappearance of the 
manager; [6] Disaster; [7] Social problems within the company.
External
environment
[1] Unfavorable fluctuation of the exchange rates; [2] Increase of the competition; [3] Decreasing 
demand to the sector; [4] “Force majeure” (war, natural catastrophe, industrial crisis, politics, bad 
price evolution); [5] Public policy less favorable to the sector; [6] Period of credit crunch; [7] The 
general level of interest rates is too high; [8] Macroeconomic increase of operating costs (raw 
materials, GMW…).
Origin of the default
(codifications)
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C4. Structure of the Templates 
 
1. Company's identification 3b. Financial information and bankruptcy costs
  Matriculation number  Declared market values of assets (triggering time).
 Sector (French NAF national codification)  Verified claims by levels of priority (end of the procedure)
 Geographical localization  Number of creditors.
 Number of employees  Bankruptcy costs individual estimation (décret 85-1390 of the 12/27/1985)
 Legal form 3c. Engaged measures / legal measures
 Creation date
 Engaged measures during the bankruptcy procédure (up to 10), each of them is subject 
to the Court approval.
 Manager(s): age, functions, nb. of administrators…  Identification of the legal practitioners
2. Process of default 3d. Procedure outcome
 Origin of default (up to 10 cumulative causes, based on a specific codification (51 codes). 
The identification of causes stems from an audit engaged by the administrator.
 Realized value of assets (if liquidation)
3. The bankruptcy procedure (from triggering to the final issue)
 Characteristics of the buyout plan(s) (if any), in case of a sale as a going concern (price, 
pros and cons of the offer, as analyzed by the legal administrator)
3a Type of procedure  Characteristics of the reorganization plan (length of the plan, repayment schedule…)
 Type of the legal procedure (simplified or not) 3e. Legal sanctions against managers (if any)
 Date of triggering and of ending  Suspect period
 Identity of the bankruptcy's initiator  Pecuniary sanctions
 Legal issue: liquidation, sale, reorganization  Extra pecuniary sanctions
 Remark: all files are closed files (with definitive recovery rates).  Type of fault
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C5. Regression Analysis using Legal Indexes 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
Constant
0.02311  
0.8369
0.20177***  
0.0011
0.19142***  
0.0016
0.42319***  
0.0005
0.06667
0.493
0.17001*  
0.0753
0.22031***  
0.0002
0.24511***  
0.0048
0.05943  
0.4708
0.03708
0.647
0.21194***  
0.0004
Legal index: "Accessibility"
0.33861**  
0.0452
    
Legal index: "Exclusivity"
-0.03826  
0.4168
                  
Legal index: "Costly procedure"
0.11645*  
0.0644
                
Legal index: "Production of information"
-0.28488**  
0.0499
              
Legal index: "Protection of debtor's assets"
0.13677*  
0.0557
            
Legal index (a): "Ease of liquidation"
0.05121  
0.5533
          
Legal index (b): "Ease of reorganization"
0.06821*  
0.0588
        
Legal index: sanction of faulty management
-0.02473
0.625
      
Legal index: protection of claims (all claims)
0.24457***  
0.0071
    
Legal index: coordination of claims (all claims)
0.20553***  
0.0014
  
Legal index: decision power (all claims)
-0.02061  
0.7664
Coverage rate
0.13416***  
<.0001
0.13075***  
<.0001
0.13933***  
<.0001
0.12724***  
<.0001
0.12709***  
<.0001
0.13162***  
<.0001
0.13547***  
<.0001
0.13574***  
<.0001
0.13404***  
<.0001
0.13022***  
<.0001
0.1331***  
<.0001
% of secured debts
0.24713***  
<.0001
0.265***
<.0001
0.21012***  
<.0001
0.28842***  
<.0001
0.28950***  
<.0001
0.25887***  
<.0001
0.23851***  
<.0001
0.23294***  
<.0001
0.24084***  
<.0001
0.27275***  
<.0001
0.25068***  
<.0001
Duration of the procedure (relative to average)
0.00721  
0.4394
0.00478  
0.6072
0.00788  
0.4013
0.00467  
0.6143
0.00411  
0.6578
0.00492  
0.5965
0.00462  
0.6177
0.00562  
0.5478
0.00785  
0.3982
0.00814  
0.3802
0.00506  
0.5862
ln (age)
0.00138  
0.8535
0.00117
0.876
0.00069  
0.9266
0.00177  
0.8132
0.00138  
0.8544
0.00115  
0.8791
-0.00038  
0.9597
0.00063  
0.9328
0.00184  
0.8057
0.00215  
0.7739
0.001
0.8951
Limited liability
-0.19374***  
<.0001
-0.19397***  
<.0001
-0.20069***  
<.0001
-0.18799***  
<.0001
-0.18688***  
<.0001
-0.19557***  
<.0001
-0.19199***  
<.0001
-0.19938***  
<.0001
-0.19506***  
<.0001
-0.18477***  
<.0001
-0.19688***  
<.0001
Debtor belongs to a group
-0.0982***  
0.001
-0.09171***  
0.0023
-0.1039***  
0.0006
-0.0877***  
0.0034
-0.08635***  
0.0041
-0.09271***  
0.002
-0.09173***  
0.0021
-0.09669***  
0.0014
-0.09966***  
0.0008
-0.09644***  
0.0012
-0.09344***  
0.0018
% of estimated cash in the assets
0.0676**  
0.0494
0.05189  
0.1204
0.05728*  
0.0873
0.06567*  
0.0549
0.05972*
0.076
0.05135  
0.1242
0.04887
0.142
0.04933  
0.1397
0.07299**  
0.0332
0.08472**  
0.0152
0.05308  
0.1266
ln (total assets, in K€)
0.02044***  
0.0003
0.02361***  
<.0001
0.01904***  
0.0011
0.02358***  
<.0001
0.02412***  
<.0001
0.02334***  
<.0001
0.02147***  
0.0001
0.02177***  
0.0002
0.01943***  
0.0005
0.01976***  
0.0004
0.02268***  
<.0001
Cause of default: strategy
-0.0039
0.845
-0.00425  
0.8323
-0.00581  
0.7705
-0.00179  
0.9288
-0.00307  
0.8779
-0.00437  
0.8283
-0.01001  
0.617
-0.0065
0.7449
-0.0005
0.9801
0.00008  
0.9967
-0.0054
0.7882
Cause of default: production
-0.06611***  
0.0005
-0.0643***  
0.0007
-0.06557***  
0.0006
-0.06446***  
0.0007
-0.06469***  
0.0007
-0.06416***  
0.0008
-0.06744***  
0.0004
-0.065***  
0.0006
-0.06399***  
0.0007
-0.06613***  
0.0005
-0.06485***  
0.0007
Cause of default: finance
-0.02007  
0.3035
-0.02017  
0.3034
-0.02195  
0.2603
-0.01819  
0.3524
-0.01909  
0.3285
-0.02031  
0.3011
-0.02405  
0.2185
-0.02192  
0.2625
-0.01823  
0.3494
-0.01744  
0.3697
-0.02089  
0.2874
Cause of default: management
0.09034***  
<.0001
0.08827***  
<.0001
0.08991***  
<.0001
0.08826***  
<.0001
0.08722***  
0.0001
0.0883***  
<.0001
0.08392***  
0.0002
0.08776***  
<.0001
0.09108***  
<.0001
0.09203***  
<.0001
0.08774***  
<.0001
Cause of default: accident
0.01867  
0.3117
0.01573  
0.3947
0.0147
0.4219
0.02163
0.248
0.01904  
0.3033
0.0156
0.4009
0.01007  
0.5844
0.01312  
0.4758
0.02404  
0.1973
0.02588  
0.1643
0.01522  
0.4207
Cause of default: outlets
0.01446  
0.3977
0.01376  
0.4265
0.01135  
0.5053
0.01484
0.386
0.01449  
0.3971
0.01318  
0.4469
0.00873  
0.6094
0.01089  
0.5245
0.01334  
0.4327
0.01781
0.297
0.01191  
0.4876
Cause of default: macro
0.01064  
0.5391
0.01062  
0.5503
0.00579  
0.7374
0.0143
0.417
0.01255  
0.4725
0.01013  
0.5728
0.00082  
0.9628
0.0061
0.7267
0.01296  
0.4546
0.01617  
0.3526
0.0085
0.633
Sector: industry
0.01519  
0.3643
0.01424  
0.4004
0.00977  
0.5588
0.01929  
0.2588
0.01859  
0.2749
0.01348  
0.4248
0.01242  
0.4564
0.01068  
0.5282
0.01567  
0.3477
0.02109  
0.2106
0.01305  
0.4446
 Annual change in GDP
-0.41031  
0.5603
-0.70531  
0.3052
-0.58543  
0.3962
-0.51444  
0.4589
-0.62444  
0.3636
-0.71512  
0.2989
-0.8528  
0.2142
-0.75582  
0.2706
-0.35693  
0.609
-0.12779  
0.8568
-0.70129
0.32
Fisher Stat: 16.06
(prob: <.0001)
Fisher Stat: 15.80
(prob: <.0001)
Fisher Stat: 16.02
(prob: <.0001)
Fisher Stat: 16.05
(prob: <.0001)
Fisher Stat: 16.04
(prob: <.0001)
Fisher Stat: 15.78
(prob: <.0001)
Fisher Stat: 16.03
(prob: <.0001)
Fisher Stat: 15.77
(prob: <.0001)
Fisher Stat: 16.32
(prob: <.0001)
Fisher Stat: 16.54
(prob: <.0001)
Fisher Stat: 15.76
(prob: <.0001)
Adj. R²:  0.270 Adj. R²:  0.267 Adj. R²:  0.269 Adj. R²:  0.270 Adj. R²:  0.270 Adj. R²:  0.266 Adj. R²:  0.270 Adj. R²:  0.266 Adj. R²:  0.273 Adj. R²:  0.276 Adj. R²:  0.266
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: none
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: 1
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: none
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: none
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: none
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: 
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: none
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: none
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: none
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: none
Nb. of variables 
with VIF>2: none
OLS regression
Number of observations:   735
Dependant variable: total recovery rate
Variables
 
Note –Table reports coefficients with t-statistics below. *, **, *** denote an estimate significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% or 1% 
level. 
 
 
 
 
 
